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# THE DISARMAMENT ILLUSION



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# THE DISARMAMENT ILLUSION

*The Movement for a Limitation  
of Armaments to 1907*

By  
MERZE TATE  
B.LITT., PH.D.

*New York*  
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## FOREWORD

WHEN the fabric of a durable peace is finally woven, there will be seen running through it from the beginning the design of man's aspiration to be freed from the crushing burden of armament. In this book the faint early outlines of this design are clearly traced. By disarmament, the author explains, she means not the total abolition of armaments implied in "lay down your arms," but the more practical limitation of armament and the gradual reduction of military and naval budgets.

The study falls into two parts, the first covering the period which led up to the calling of the First Hague Conference in 1898, the second, the period from 1899 to the Second Conference in 1907. The historical background is sketched in skillfully to prepare for the surprise and excitement caused by the Tsar's Manifesto in 1898. The chapters dealing with the First Hague Conference are admirable in showing how impossible it is to separate the problem of disarmament from political implications. Evidence is piled up to prove that "disarmament is not a moral, not a mathematical, but a political problem." The philosophers, writers, even the statesmen, who had a vision of a peaceful world could make no headway in the midst of the fears and hatreds growing out of an unorganized and insecure political system.

To publish a treatise on the limitation of armaments in a year in which all the world is arming itself more desperately than ever before, may seem paradoxical. The publication is well timed, however, for the book is filled with incident and commentary which explain, at least in part, how the world has come to its present grievous pass. Furthermore, the book is a hopeful one. Although there is no example of effective limitation of armament to be cited in the long period under review, there are

indications of a vastly improved outlook for permanent peace over the outlook of, say, one hundred years ago. The author points out that with the coming of the radio, the movies, the daily newspaper, and above all, more nearly universal suffrage, the public, after understanding the issues involved in war and peace, may succeed in making itself felt on the positive, constructive side.

The Atlantic Charter expresses the belief that "all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force" (for aggression), but recognizes that this is dependent on the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security. There are many who will argue that this implies making permanent the *status quo* and that such a proposal is doomed to failure. Certainly no *status quo* will ever suit the ambitions of all parties. Given an informed public and a widespread will to peace, is it not possible that the framework of a secure society can be built which will provide within itself ways and means for effecting changes in whatever field of human welfare change may be indicated?

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## PREFACE

IN THIS study, *The Movement for a Limitation of Armaments to 1907*, the writer has dealt with the movement only in its broadest aspects, in the proposals for a general, simultaneous reduction or non-augmentation of armies and navies or of military budgets. "Limitation"—abstention from increase of armaments—and "reduction"—the general and simultaneous decrease or curtailment of armaments—may be differentiated from "disarmament"—the reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety—which implies sufficient arms not only for internal policing but for the protection of territory against invasion. The word disarmament has not been used to signify the complete abolition of armament as implied in the phrase "lay down your arms," but in the wider significance given to it in popular language, as meaning "limitation and reduction of armaments."

The writer has not included proposals for neutralization, non-fortification or demobilization, nor prohibitions and restrictions upon the use of particular kinds of military or naval forces or equipment, nor plans for regulating the manufacture and trade in war materials. Attention has been concentrated upon the movement for the general, simultaneous reduction or limitation of armaments; the underlying reasons or ulterior motives for the proposals made by statesmen, kings and emperors; the influence of economists, international jurists, novelists, pacifists, peace societies, international congresses and associations and the press upon governments; and the official attitude towards and the proceedings and results of the Hague Conferences.

This book is not peace propaganda; neither is it a mere enumeration of the resolutions, proposals and suggestions for

a limitation of armaments. Rather, it is a critical historical treatment of the pre-World War efforts towards a limitation of armaments, for in the last quarter of the nineteenth century the history of the movement for arbitration and disarmament became an integral part of international relations. Since the movement cannot be dissociated from the policies of the states, the writer has not dealt with the limitation of armaments as an isolated subject. Disarmament is not a moral, not a mathematical, but a political problem. Too often this fact has been ignored. The available treatises on the subject were prepared before the German and British official documents were published and also before the appearance of several revealing memoirs, autobiographies and biographies, and are, therefore, often incomplete and incorrect in their approach to the subject. For this reason, it appears that there is a need for such a study as the one submitted, one in which the writer has attempted to present an objective, impartial, complete and authentic account of the movement for a limitation of armaments to 1907.

\* \* \* \* \*

This study was commenced in January, 1933, when the "Conference for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments," for which five years of elaborate preparation had been made by the Preparatory Commission, was already a year old and had just reassembled with the professed object of granting Germany and other disarmed powers "equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations." It was revised in 1939 and completed in July, 1940, when most of central and western Europe lay war-torn and crushed, conquered by the armaments of the country which had been denied equality of arms by the states supreme in 1933. Although this thesis is concerned only with the pre-World War movement for a limitation of armaments, the conclusions drawn from the study are applicable to the seven-year period 1933 to 1940; for no enduring security can be found in compulsory unilateral

disarmament or in competing armaments and alliances. There is no security for any state unless it be a security in which all its neighbors share. No great power seriously considered limiting its armaments; no one nation was exclusively responsible for the competition in armaments, but the failure to check the intense armament rivalry made war inevitable.

\* \* \* \* \*

To the following organizations from which I received financial assistance I wish to express my gratitude: the Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority for its third foreign fellowship; the Phelps-Stokes Fund for grants and loans; the Julius Rosenwald Fund for a generous research fellowship; and the Bureau of International Research of Harvard University and Radcliffe College for financing the publication of the finished study.

To the several persons who have advised me in preparing this book I am deeply grateful. My appreciation is first of all due to Sir Alfred Zimmern, Montague Burton Professor of International Relations in the University of Oxford, who suggested research on the movement for a limitation of armaments to satisfy a partial requirement for the B.Litt. degree and whose kindly interest, advice and assistance served as an inspiration throughout my period of study in England. During Sir Alfred's absence from Oxford in the autumn and winter of 1933-34, James L. Brierly, Chichele Professor of International Law, gave helpful supervision, and he, together with Professor C. A. W. Manning of the London School of Economics and Political Science, criticized the manuscript in the form of the B.Litt. thesis. To Miss Agnes Headlam-Morley of St. Hughes College, Oxford, is due credit for valuable suggestions in limiting the subject and in emphasizing the nature of the Liberal, Radical and Nonconformist opinion in the movement for disarmament. Finally, without the assistance, advice and encouragement of Payson S. Wild, Jr., Professor of Government at Harvard University, this study would never have

reached the form of a doctoral thesis. I also wish to thank Philip Ireland of the Department of Government of Harvard University for his critical reading of the dissertation and his pertinent suggestions; Youra T. Qualls of Radcliffe College for cheerful aid in typing; and Edith D. Haley, Secretary of the Bureau of International Research of Harvard University and Radcliffe College, for efficient assistance in proofreading and indexing.

None of the individuals mentioned above is answerable for the opinions, interpretations or conclusions expressed in the following pages. For these, right or wrong, I alone am responsible.

MERZE TATE.

Bertram Hall,  
Radcliffe College,  
Cambridge, Massachusetts,  
July, 1940.



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# INTRODUCTION

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## CHAPTER I

### RÉSUMÉ OF THE MOVEMENT FOR DISARMAMENT TO 1870

"THE PRESENT is the creation of the past and is big with the future." The great movements in history are not accidental, not casual; they have their roots in bygone ages. Thus the germ of the movement for disarmament can be traced to the individual peace plans advocated by Alberoni, Sully, William Penn, John Bellers, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham; for these philosophers and statesmen envisaged a society in which large armaments would be unnecessary. Sully's *Great Design of Henry IV*<sup>1</sup> called for an international force, and the exact quota of horses, foot soldiers, cannon, galleys, etc., was stipulated therein. But the proposed armament was so inconsiderable when compared with the forces which princes had usually kept on foot to awe their neighbors that, had the plan actually been inaugurated, it would have marked a step towards successful disarmament. William Penn wrote an *Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe, by the Establishment of an European Dyet, Parliament, or Estates*;<sup>2</sup> in this he advocated a permanent international congress and proposed the use of sanctions—of joint force to compel members to submit their differences to the congress and to accept its award. Penn not only philosophized, he put his theories into practice in the wilds of Pennsylvania, where, without a soldier, he founded a colony among savage tribes. Penn built no fortifications; he planted

<sup>1</sup> Edwin D. Mead, *The Great Design of Henry IV from the Memoirs of the Duke of Sully* (Boston, 1907).

<sup>2</sup> Reprinted in *Old South Leaflets*, Vol. III, No. 75 (Boston, 1894-96).

no cannon; he displayed no pikes, no muskets, no swords; and for upward of seventy years, during his administration and that of his successor, the colony never lost a man, a woman or child through violence, nor had a war.

In 1710, after the War of the Spanish Succession had for nine years consumed lives and treasures, John Bellers, a Quaker, published his peace tract, *Some Reasons for an European State*.<sup>3</sup> He proposed that at the next peace there should be established by universal guarantee an annual congress of all the princes and states of Europe, in one federation "to prevent any dispute that might otherwise raise a new war in this age or the ages to come; by which every Prince and State will have all the strength of Europe to protect them . . ." Bellers laid great stress upon the economic arguments against armaments and by a strangely modern use of statistics he estimated the waste of labor and wealth expended on the war. The limitation of armaments that he suggested would prevent the peace from degenerating into an armed truce which would crush the peoples under new expenditures.

The Abbé de Saint-Pierre, like Henry IV and William Penn, proposed in his *Mémoires pour rendre la Paix Perpétuelle en Europe*<sup>4</sup> to establish a confederation of Europe based upon a perpetual alliance between the sovereigns. Moreover, he made the first coherent plan for an international tribunal. The powers in time of peace were only to maintain weak forces for the preservation of civil order. That was real disarmament, a source of economy. If it should be necessary to proceed against one of the powers which refused to submit to an award or to regulations made by the Grand Alliance, or entered into treaties incompatible with it, or made war preparations, each state would have to furnish a contingent of special troops, which

<sup>3</sup> John Bellers, *Some Reasons for an European State* (1710), reprinted in: A. Ruth Fry, *John Bellers, 1654-1725, Quaker, Economist and Social Reformer* (London, 1935).

<sup>4</sup> C. I. Castel de Saint-Pierre, *Mémoires pour rendre la Paix Perpétuelle en Europe* (Cologne, 1632).

would be placed under a generalissimo, appointed by the Senate of Peace, and having no existence in normal times.

Jean Jacques Rousseau in 1756 revised and redressed Saint-Pierre's writings in an attractive fashion and in his *Jugement sur le projet de Paix Perpétuelle*<sup>5</sup> found economic arguments for disarmament. He wrote that great wealth would accrue to the people and to princes from a continual peace, "from the enormous savings effected by the reduction of the military establishments with a multitude of fortresses and an enormous quantity of troops, which swallow up their revenues and become daily a heavier charge on their people and themselves." The confederative army to enforce the necessary decrees of the Diet would place the State "in a much more perfect state of safety than it could obtain by means of its armies and all that machinery of war which is incessantly exhausting it in the midst of peace."

Following Rousseau, Immanuel Kant in 1795, when Europe was already in the third year of a war destined to last for another twenty years, published his philosophic essay on *Perpetual Peace*, which laid the foundation of the modern peace movement.<sup>6</sup> Kant deprecated armaments as a perpetual menace of war to states, through their readiness to appear armed for it. For the realization of world disarmament, Jeremy Bentham, in his *Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace*, advocated the conclusion of general and perpetual treaties limiting the number of naval and military forces to be kept by each state.

The problem of large armaments is not one recognized only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.<sup>7</sup> Montesquieu, in

<sup>5</sup> Jean Jacques Rousseau, *L'Etat de Guerre and Jugement sur le Projet de Paix Perpétuelle* (New York, 1920).

<sup>6</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace* (1795). Translated by Benjamin F. Trueblood, Boston Peace Society, 1897.

<sup>7</sup> Certain Chinese states made a disarmament treaty in the sixth century B.C. Mr. Liang-Chi-Chao in a pamphlet, *China and the League of Nations* (Pekin Leader Office), relates that between the eighth and fourth centuries B.C., "there were in the Hwango-ho and Yang-tse valleys no less than five or six thousand small states with about a dozen powerful states dominating over them." The land

his *Esprit des Lois*, published in 1748, referred to "a new disease" which had spread throughout Europe, taken hold of the princes, and led them to maintain an "inordinate number of troops." Vattel, his contemporary, also criticized the large military forces of the day. "Formerly, and without going further back than the last century," he said, "they seldom failed to stipulate in treaties of peace, that both parties should disarm—that they should disband their troops. Why is not this salutary custom continued? These large armies maintained at all times, deprive the earth of its cultivators, arrest the progress of population, and can answer no purpose but to oppress the liberties of the people who nourish them."<sup>8</sup>

Washington, Jefferson and Franklin also looked upon the enormous armaments of Europe as folly. Benjamin Franklin in his "Observations on War," remarked upon the fact that Europe until lately had been without regular troops. He laid his finger on the reason for the portentous growth of armaments and the great difficulty of disarmament save in concert. "One powerful prince keeping an army always on foot makes it necessary for his neighbours to do the same to prevent surprise." He lamented the frightful loss to the world of the labor of all men employed in war and noted that the soldier loses habits of industry to such a degree that he is rarely fit for sober business afterwards.<sup>9</sup> Franklin was convinced that standing armies diminish not only the population but even the breed and the size of the species, for, he observed, the army in every country

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was subjected to perpetual warfare during this "Age of Confusion." In the sixth century B.C. the great powers in conflict were Ts's and Ts'in, northern Hwang-ho states, and Ch'u, which was a vigorous aggressive power in the Yangtze valley. A confederation against Ch'u laid the foundation for a league that kept the peace for a hundred years; the league subdued and incorporated Ch'u and made a general treaty of disarmament. It became the foundation of a new pacific empire. Cf. H. G. Wells, *The Outline of History* (New York, 1921), I, 151.

<sup>8</sup> Peace Society Publication, *Modern Philosophers and Statesmen on Armaments*, p. 1.

<sup>9</sup> Edwin D. Mead, *Washington, Jefferson and Franklin on War* (Boston, 1913), p. 10.



"is in fact the flower of the nation—all the most vigorous, stout, and well-made men in a kingdom are to be found in the army. These men in general never marry."<sup>10</sup> Jefferson, in a letter to Sir John Sinclair in 1789, expressed his abhorrence of the war system and concluded that "a war would cost us more than would cut through the isthmus of Darien; and that of Suez might have been opened with what a single year has seen thrown away on the rock of Gibraltar."<sup>11</sup> President Washington, in his Farewell Address, spoke with the deepest feeling of the danger of enormous armaments to democracy. "Overgrown military establishments are," he said, "under any form of government, inauspicious to liberty, and are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty."<sup>12</sup>

Eighteenth century propositions for a limitation of armaments were not exclusively confined to philosophic peace plans. An official proposal was made a short time after the Seven Years' War (1766) by Prince Kaunitz, the Austrian Chancellor, who proposed to Frederick the Great of Prussia reduction of three-fourths of the effectives of the two countries; Frederick declined the proposition. Joseph II of Austria renewed the suggestion in 1769, but Prussia again refused to accept it.<sup>13</sup> On August 30, 1787, England and France actually entered into a reciprocal engagement not to augment their naval armaments over and above a peace establishment and not to launch upon the ocean more than six war vessels. In case one of the powers found itself obliged to assume some other arrangements in this respect, it could only do so after having advised the other party.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> John Bigelow (Editor), *The Works of Benjamin Franklin* (New York, 1888), VIII (1782-85), 320 and 420.

<sup>11</sup> Edwin D. Mead, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>13</sup> Alfred Fried, *Handbuch der Friedensbewegung* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1913), Part II, pp. 32-33; Edward Krehbiel, *Nationalism, War and Society* (New York, 1916), pp. 155 and 214.

<sup>14</sup> Gunji Hosono, *Histoire du désarmement* (Paris, 199), pp. 7-8.

PEACE became the watchword of both reactionary and progressive forces after the Battle of Waterloo closed the long Napoleonic Wars. The enthusiasm for peace was strong among the powers, yet it proved incapable of inaugurating a general disarmament. The whole of central and western Europe wanted it, and Prussia and Austria even reduced their armies without waiting for an agreement. On March 21, 1816, Alexander I of Russia addressed a letter to Castlereagh concerning the Holy Alliance, which also contained a proposal for the "simultaneous reduction of the armed forces of every kind"—a proposal which raised the limitation of armaments to the level of international relations. Lord Castlereagh was sceptical, for the Tsar was the only monarch in Europe who was still keeping his army upon a war footing while all other nations were disarming. Realizing the difficulties in the way of an international agreement on arms, the British Government advocated the collateral disarmament of each state in accordance with its necessities and full publicity for the action taken. The Prince Regent, however, developed Alexander's project by suggesting that an International Conference of military men vested with full authority by the European powers should determine the figures for the normal peace footing of the armies of each power.<sup>15</sup> Austria and France expressed their sympathies with the idea. Metternich, in view of the deplorable condition of Austrian finances, promised to support the project and used the occasion to announce, in a special memorandum, his opinion upon permanent armies. In spite of the favorable dispositions of the governments and the exhaustion of the European nations after

<sup>15</sup> F. de Martens, "La Question du désarmement dans les relations entre la Russie et L'Angleterre," *Revue de droit international et législation comparée*, XXVI, 573-85; also F. de Martens, *Recueil des traités et conventions conclus par la Russie avec les Puissances Étrangères* (St. Petersburg: Vol. IV, 1872; Vol. XI, 1892), IV, 36; XI, 258, *et seq.* C. K. Webster, "Disarmament Proposals in 1816," *The Contemporary Review*, CXXII (November, 1922), 621-27. Webster's article is based on documents taken from the Foreign Office Records in the Public Record Office and the Foreign Office Archives at Petrograd. Rolland A. Chaput, *Disarmament in British Foreign Policy* (London, 1935), p. 43.

twenty-five years of war, the question was not seriously considered. Count Metternich and Lord Castlereagh were suspicious of Russia, Alexander had his eye on the unsolved Eastern question, and Europe in general was agitated and excited by French militarism; consequently, the proposition was dropped. But the Tsar's and the Prince Regent's proposals of 1816 had no chance of success, for they presupposed a far more united Europe, with far better established institutions for common action than the vague system of alliances and conferences then in existence.

Although governmental action did not lead to disarmament, the numerous congresses which followed Waterloo laid the foundations of international co-operation and prepared the ground for the work of societies and individuals interested in peace, arbitration and disarmament. Meanwhile there developed the idea of regarding the state as a "moral person endowed with a collective will" and capable of being educated by an enlightened public opinion. In this atmosphere, simultaneously and quite independently, the American and British Peace Societies arose (1815-16). Similar societies developed on the Continent. These organizations were primarily interested in extending the use of arbitration as a means of preventing war, while disarmament was considered as a secondary issue regarding which they proposed only a gradual, mutual and simultaneous limitation. The most successful period of these early Peace Societies was the decade 1843-53; and at their Congresses held in 1843, 1848, 1849, 1850, 1851 and 1853, disarmament resolutions in one form or another were passed, but these had very little, if any, influence on responsible statesmen. By 1854, the Crimean War in Europe and the question of the extension of slavery in the United States were occupying the center of attention, and the Peace Societies, already weakened by internal dissension, declined without having affected the course of history in either Europe or America.

Public petitions supplemented the Peace Societies' resolu-

tions. Christina Phelps finds that between 1845 and 1853 the *British Almanac Companion* or *Year Book* reported 2117 petitions in favor of disarmament and against raising the militia were presented to the House of Commons and they carried over 600,000 signatures. The 249 petitions of 1848 were for arbitration and disarmament; the 213 petitions of 1850 and 1851 were for the promotion of general disarmament and retrenchment; the 1400 petitions of 1852 were against the Militia Bill and the proposed enrolment of the Militia.<sup>16</sup>

Some pacifists believed that nothing practical could be done to advance the cause of peace without a general reduction of armaments; while others, recognizing the evils of large peacetime armaments, were convinced that reduction would be impossible until peoples and their governments had been converted to peaceful policies. "The case for reducing armaments," writes Christina Phelps, "rested on two kinds of arguments: one a compound of morality and expediency, the other economic and financial."<sup>17</sup>

Against any disarmament proposal was ranged an implacable opposition. This opposition was based on distrust of the peaceable intentions of governments; on fear lest the country that reduced its war establishments should find itself defenseless and at the mercy of its neighbors; on disbelief in the efficacy of any peace plan; and frequently on scorn and contempt for the whole peace movement.<sup>18</sup>

Miss Phelps concludes that if a general criticism of the early international reformers' tactics may be ventured upon, "it is that they attempted more than was practicable and that their creed was complex instead of simple. They did not sufficiently clarify the issue, and they failed to present a united front against the forces of militarism and anti-pacifism."<sup>19</sup>

During the first half of the nineteenth century vague sugges-

<sup>16</sup> Christina Phelps, *The Anglo-American Peace Movement in the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (No. 330 in Columbia Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, New York, 1930), pp. 82, 171-72.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 166.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 164.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40.

tions were occasionally made for a consideration of the reduction of armaments, but as will appear on a later page <sup>20</sup> in only one case, and that not in Europe, was definite action taken which led to permanent results. In 1831 King Louis Philippe, as reported by Prince Metternich, made a specific proposal. On May 22 of that year he invited the Ambassadors of England, Austria, Prussia and Russia to a conference on the subject of reciprocal disarmament. The Plenipotentiaries expressed their lively satisfaction with the proposition and their readiness to forward a measure in regard to which the Courts of Austria and Prussia had already made confidential overtures to the French Cabinet. The draft submitted by Count Apponyi, Austrian Ambassador in Paris, to Metternich after the conference of September 29, 1831, provided for the reduction of the land and naval forces of the five great powers to their ordinary peace footing and that the necessary measures for carrying out the disarmament should begin on January 1, 1832, and be completed by May 1 of the same year.<sup>21</sup> According to Metternich the French Government had two motives for inviting disarmament. The first was the inadequacy of its finances to meet the immense and continuous strain made upon them by the maintenance of any army out of all proportion to its political needs, the second, the "serious danger, for a Ministry that aims at stability, necessarily involved in the existence of an armed force far more liable to be influenced by the parties who distract the country than by the shadow of royal authority."<sup>22</sup> The allied powers were influenced only by the first of these considerations, and whether armed or disarmed they were in a

<sup>20</sup> *Infra.*, p. 26.

<sup>21</sup> *Memoirs of Prince Metternich* (New York; 1882), V (1830-35), 110 *et seq.* No. 1008, Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, June 3, 1831; cf. M. Arthur Desjardins, "Le désarmement étude de droit international," *Revue des deux mondes*, October, 1898, pp. 670-71; Hans Wehberg, *Die Internationale Beschränkung der Rüstungen* (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1919), p. 170; René Picard, *La Question de la limitation des armements de nos jours* (Paris, 1911), pp. 29-30.

<sup>22</sup> *Memoirs of Prince Metternich, loc. cit.*, p. 144. No. 1021, Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, October 28, 1831.

better position than revolutionary France. Prince Metternich was convinced that Louis Philippe, by the mere fact of disarming, "would not acquire a spark more of the vitality he lacked." The protocol, on being made public, would draw down virulent attacks upon his Government; and the immense majority of persons in France would unite in blaming the signal weakness of a Cabinet which, oblivious of what it owed to its country, followed in the wake of the Holy Alliance.<sup>23</sup> Although Ambassador Apponyi was authorized to append his signature to the draft of the protocol, there is no evidence that the project was pushed to a successful conclusion.

Ten years later, in 1841, Sir Robert Peel drew attention to the problem of heavy armaments in a well-known speech in which he said:

Is not the time come when the powerful countries of Europe should reduce those military armaments which they have so sedulously raised? Is not the time come when they should be prepared to declare that there is no use in such overgrown establishments? What is the advantage of one power greatly increasing its army and navy? Does it not see, that if it proposes such increases for self protection and defence, the other powers would follow its example? The consequence of this state of things must be, that no increase of relative strength will accrue to any one power, but there must be a universal consumption of the resources of every country in military preparations.<sup>24</sup>

In Sir Robert Peel's opinion, the true interest of Europe was to come to some common accord, so as to enable every country to reduce those military armaments which belong to a state of war rather than of peace.

Lord Aberdeen also looked upon the increasing military establishments of Europe as dangerous to peace and safety. By 1849 he was disposed to dissent from that maxim which is so generally accepted, that "if you wish for Peace you must pre-

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 144-45. No. 1021, Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, October 28, 1831.

<sup>24</sup> *Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, LIX* (August 27, 1841), col. 403.

pare for War." He was convinced that heavy armaments, far from being a security, are directly the contrary, and tend at once to war. Lord Aberdeen believed that a stable peace could not come until the armaments of European countries were greatly reduced. Thus by 1850 statesmen were becoming conscious of the new era of military and naval preparations which had begun as a result, first, of a "panic" in England (1847-48) caused by Louis Philippe's Government extending the dockyards of France, especially those at Toulon; and second, of the revolutions of 1848. But no definite proposals were made to solve permanently the problem before it reached an acute form.

The period from 1815 to 1853 was one of comparative peace for most of Europe, and during the first twenty-five of those years the expenditure on armaments was not extraordinary. In general, the nations were so happy to enjoy peace after the long Napoleonic Wars that they devoted their attention to repairing the ravages of the long period of strife and to paying off debts incurred by it. Considering those years in retrospect we might say today that then the nations of Europe should have disarmed and thus laid the basis of a permanent pacification. They were enjoying years of comparative peace and prosperity, and every year added to the time of peace should have rendered the probability of war more remote. But no general limitation of armaments was attempted. The reason for this lies in the diplomatic tension of the period. The two states which might have taken the lead, England and France, though at peace, did not trust each other's policy. From 1830 to 1853 there were real and imaginary fears in both countries, and on several occasions Anglo-French relations were strained almost to the breaking point. The Government of France was anything but stable and every *coup d'état* furnished an occasion for a "panic" in England and an increase in her army and navy, which France answered in a similar manner. Nor were the relations between Great Britain and the United States during the "roaring forties"

conducive to a limitation of armaments. In addition, dissatisfied elements within the European countries whose agitation culminated in the revolutions of 1848-49 on the Continent and the Chartist Movement in England, caused governments to increase their armaments for protection from internal disturbances. Furthermore, there was nothing like an educated public opinion in Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century. None of the devices for the rapid diffusion of information—the telephone, the telegraph, the cable, the radio, the film, cheap daily newspapers—were known. The people, the great masses of the people, knew little about the affairs of their own country and still less about those of other lands. But if they had known and had wished to change the course of events, they would have been helpless, for very few were privileged to vote. Those who were in power and might have brought about a gradual limitation of armaments devoted most of their time to other issues. Agrarian and social reforms, amelioration of the conditions of the industrial classes and extension of the suffrage were the burning questions of the day.

The whole situation, however, was altered by the revolutions of 1848 and the outbreak of the Crimean War, which sent armament expenditure on that upward trend that has continued to the present day. The revolutions of 1848, emphasizing liberty and self-determination as means of settling European questions, resulted in a new era of military preparations and unrest in Europe. The territorial problems of Italy and the Balkans now assumed an acute form, thus making permanent peace and disarmament visionary; for voluntary European disarmament always has been and always will be impossible until every power not only accepts but is satisfied with and willing to maintain the territorial *status quo*.

The Crimean War brought innovations in fighting methods which proved the value of iron-plating battleships and started the rivalry between armor and projectile that is responsible for the superdreadnought of today and for the tremendous expendi-



ture on naval armaments. At about the same time Prussia began to reorganize her army and the other great powers followed her. Universal compulsory service was copied from Germany after 1870, when the world had seen demonstrated in three short wars how successful could be large conscript armies which were well trained and quickly mobilized. Furthermore, by applying the latest achievements and inventions of science to warfare on land, on water, under the water and in the air, modern war became infinitely more expensive than wars in past centuries and so devastating that serious thinking men feared that it would eventually threaten civilization itself.

Consequently, in the latter half of the nineteenth century there was increased interest in the subject of disarmament. The great augmentation of military and naval budgets caused disarmament, or at least the limitation of armament expenditure, to be treated as a question within the sphere of practical politics. No doubt Richard Cobden's championship of the issue did more than anything else to make the cause honorable. The fact that a person of his reputation as economist and man of affairs advocated disarmament removed the subject from the realm of the Utopian.

Two outstanding official attempts to limit armaments were made during the 'sixties and 'seventies:<sup>25</sup> Louis Napoleon's proposal for a Congress in 1863 and Lord Clarendon's approach to Prussia in the early months of 1870. On November 4, 1863,

<sup>25</sup> In her *Memoirs* (Authorized translation, World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1910), I, 358, and II, 112-13, Baroness Bertha von Suttner refers to a manifesto—inspired by General Stefan Türr, one of her pacifist acquaintances, and sent by Garibaldi in 1860 to the Princes of Europe—proposing an alliance of all the European states. Then there would be no more fighting on land and sea and the enormous funds saved "might be made available for ends that would improve property and lift the level of humanity." The Baroness reports that General Türr handed a copy of this manifesto to her at The Hague during the Conference of 1899. Edward B. Krehbiel in his *Nationalism, War and Society*, p. 214, and Hans Wehberg, *Die Internationale Beschränkung der Rüstungen*, pp. 11, 172, also refers to Garibaldi's manifesto; but the latter cites the Suttner *Memoirs*. The writer, however, has been unable to discover any official reference to the "manifesto."

the Emperor Napoleon <sup>26</sup> made overtures to the governments of the great powers to bring about an International Congress for lightening the burdens imposed on the nations by disproportionate armaments. The Treaties of Vienna that had been "destroyed, modified, disregarded, or menaced" on almost all points were also to be considered.<sup>27</sup> The Emperor set forth his intentions at the opening of the Chamber of Deputies in these words:

Have not the prejudices and rancours which divided us lasted long enough? Shall the jealous rivalries of the Great Powers unceasingly impede the progress of civilization? Are we still to maintain mutual distrust by exaggerated armaments? Must our most precious resources be indefinitely exhausted in the barren display of our forces? <sup>28</sup>

Napoleon invited the nations to meet in Paris, which would thus, he declared, "become the seat of Conferences, destined to lay the basis of a general pacification."

Austria and Russia appeared to be in favor of the Congress; Prussia desired an exchange of views. The British Government, however, was suspicious of the intentions of the French Emperor. Earl John Russell, in writing to the British Ambassador in Paris, expressed the view that nearly half a century had elapsed since the treaties of 1815 had been signed. Half a century from the Peace of Westphalia, or from the Peace of Utrecht found great changes in Europe, but it was not thought necessary

<sup>26</sup> In 1853 Napoleon III stated his design to call a European Conference to reduce armaments. (Edward B. Krehbiel, *op. cit.*, p. 215). In 1859 he again referred to the subject. (Albert Pingaud, "Napoléon III et le désarmement," *Revue de Paris*, Mai 1899 (Vol. III), p. 285.)

<sup>27</sup> *Parliamentary Papers*, LXVI (1864), C. 3239. "Correspondence Respecting the Congress Proposed to be Held at Paris," No. 1, pp. 1-2, His Majesty the Emperor of the French to Her Majesty the Queen; also *Archives diplomatiques*, V (1863), 1899. Identical letters were sent to the other powers. Cf. Albert Pingaud, *op. cit.*, pp. 226-90.

<sup>28</sup> *The Herald of Peace*, December 1, 1863, p. 284; Albert Pingaud, *op. cit.*, p. 290; Hans Wehberg, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

to make a general revision of either at the end of fifty years. Though a certain portion of the Treaty of 1815 had been modified or disregarded, the greater number of its provisions had not in any way been disturbed, and on those foundations rested the balance of power in Europe. He stated that,

Her Majesty's Government would be ready to discuss with France and other Powers, by diplomatic correspondence, any specific questions upon which a solution might be attained, and European peace thereby more securely established. But they would feel more apprehension than confidence from the meeting of a Congress of Sovereigns and Ministers without fixed objects, ranging over the map of Europe, and exciting hopes and aspirations which they might find themselves unable either to gratify or to quiet.<sup>29</sup>

In a second communication to the British Ambassador at Paris, Earl Russell definitely rejected Napoleon's proposal. He was certain that the mere expression of opinions and wishes would accomplish no positive results, that the deliberations of a Congress would consist of demands and pretensions put forward by some and resisted by others; and, there being no supreme authority in such an assembly to enforce the decisions of the majority, the Congress would probably separate, leaving many of its members on worse terms with each other than they had been when they met.<sup>30</sup> Thus the British declined the invitation, although Lord Derby said, "if there was a country in all Europe which had less interest in sending a blank refusal to have anything to do with the Congress it was England." The project was accordingly dropped.

Nevertheless, in France an agitation was continued by Socialist deputies and, though it seemed that the Emperor had renounced his plan by proceeding to increase his forces, he turned again to the idea in 1867. It appears that in this year

<sup>29</sup> *Parliamentary Papers, op. cit.*, No. 3, pp. 3-5. Earl Russell to Earl Cowley, November 12, 1863.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, Earl Russell to Cowley, November 25, 1863, p. 11.

Napoleon discussed the subject with Tsar Alexander II and William I of Prussia,<sup>31</sup> but the plan was soon abandoned. The proposal was, however, taken up by the *Journal de St. Pétersbourg*, which on June 21, 1867, reproduced an article of *The Voice* upon general disarmament expressing the wish that after the pacific solution of the Luxemburg question England or the French Emperor would propose a general disarmament. That question once solved, it would be possible to settle amicably another one more complex—the Eastern question.<sup>32</sup> The Emperor Napoleon was not deterred from making still another attempt; for on December 20, 1869, the *Times* published a telegram from its Berlin correspondent announcing that "France had proposed disarmament at St. Petersburg, Vienna, Florence, Berlin, and, it is supposed, at London."<sup>33</sup> This proposal, like many before it, led to nothing.

The next official proposal for a limitation of armaments came from England in 1870. By 1868 the relations between Prussia and France had become strained, and preparations for war were made on both sides. In April of that year, France, realizing that difficulties were ahead, suggested that the British Government should "give advice" ("*donner des conseils*") to Prussia on the subject of disarmament. But Lord Stanley, the Foreign Secretary, unwilling to draw Great Britain into a Franco-Prussian entanglement, declined to take the initiative in approaching Prussia.<sup>34</sup> Still, early in 1870, before the outbreak of the war, secret correspondence took place between the Governments of Great Britain, France and Prussia concerning a limitation of armaments. Mr. Gladstone was in power, and his Foreign Secretary, Lord Clarendon, was engaged by Comte Daru, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, to act

<sup>31</sup> Hans Wehberg, *op. cit.*, p. 172; Edward Krehbiel, *op. cit.*, p. 215; Gunji Hosono, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

<sup>32</sup> *The Herald of Peace*, August 1, 1867, p. 244, quoting the *Journal de St. Pétersbourg*, June 21, 1867.

<sup>33</sup> *The Times*, December 20, 1867, p. 12.

<sup>34</sup> Sir A. T. Ward and G. P. Gooch, *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919* (Cambridge, 1923), III, 23.

as a middleman in sounding Berlin.<sup>35</sup> It appears that France in order to conciliate the peasants and retain their support against the Socialists, really wanted to reduce her army. Though Lord Clarendon had little faith in the success of his adventure, he wrote Lord Loftus, British Ambassador in Berlin, asking him to invite the attention of Count Bismarck to the enormous standing armies in Europe, which constituted a state of things that "is neither peace nor war, but which is so destructive of confidence that men almost desire war with all its horrors in order to arrive at some certainty of peace." He pointed out that Prussia, better than any other power, might undertake to modify this system. She would not only earn herself the gratitude of Europe, but her effort would be a fitting complement of the military successes she had achieved.<sup>36</sup>

The forebodings entertained by Lord Clarendon were shortly realized. Bismarck wanted to know what guarantees Great Britain could give or proposed to give for the maintenance of peace. "You," Lord Loftus reported the German Chancellor as saying, "live in a happy island and have not to fear an invasion. For 250 years Germany has been exposed to and suffered French invasion; no one can accuse us of being aggressive. Germany as now constituted, has all that she wants, and there is no object of conquest for her. But our position is an exceptional one. We are surrounded by three great Empires with armies as large as our own, any two of whom might coalesce against us."<sup>37</sup>

Lord Lyons, British Ambassador in Paris, was instructed to inform Comte Daru of the result; whereupon the French Minister announced that Bismarck's arguments did not at all end

<sup>35</sup> For a complete story of these negotiations see Lord Newton, *Lord Lyons, A Record of British Diplomacy* (London, 1913), Vol. I, Chapter VII; also Maurice Raoul-Duval, "Projets de désarmement franco-prussien en 1870," *Revue de Paris*, février 1914 (I, 727-39); Albert Pingaud, "Napoléon III et le désarmement," *Revue de Paris*, mai 1899 (Vol. III), pp. 304-8.

<sup>36</sup> Lord Newton, *op. cit.*, I, 251-52, Lord Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus, February 2, 1870; also Ward and Gooch, *op. cit.*, III, 23-26.

<sup>37</sup> Lord Newton, *op. cit.*, I, 254; Lord A. Loftus to Lord Clarendon, February 5, 1870; cf. Hans Wehberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 255-56.

the matter. He was determined to disarm whether Prussia did or not, and resolved to ask the Emperor at once to sanction a considerable reduction of the French army. Of course he could not make this reduction as large as he might have done if Prussia's attitude had been more satisfactory. But he did propose to reduce the annual contingent from 100,000 to 90,000.<sup>38</sup> As the French term of service was for nine years, this was to effect eventually a reduction of 90,000 men—a real absolute reduction.

In Comte Daru's opinion the question of disarmament was a very simple one. The military forces of the great Continental powers bore a certain proportion to each other, a proportion maintained by imposing heavy burdens upon each country; but if, by common agreement, each state reduced its army by a certain number of men, the same proportion would be preserved, while the burdens would be alleviated. He hoped that the British Foreign Secretary would not acquiesce in a first refusal.

Lord Clarendon's second attempt to win Bismarck was made on March 9, 1870, in the form of a lengthy letter to Lord Augustus Loftus, in which the arguments for disarmament were reiterated and endeavors made to convince Count Bismarck that Prussia had really no cause for uneasiness.<sup>39</sup> His correspondence was translated and laid before King William, who viewed the proposal as favoring France without regarding the safety of Prussia. To use Bismarck's own expression, "It was the act of a *cool friend*."<sup>40</sup> The Chancellor remarked to the British Ambassador:

It is all very well for you, living in an island, where no one can attack you, to preach disarmament, but put yourself into our skin.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 258; Frédéric Passy, *Pour la paix* (Paris, 1909), pp. 39-40; *Parliamentary Debates*, Third series, CCLIII, col. 104, Gladstone speaking in the House of Commons, June 14, 1880; Hans Wehberg, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

<sup>39</sup> Lord Newton, *op. cit.*, I, 267-70. Lord Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus, March 9, 1870; Lord A. Loftus to Lord Clarendon, Berlin, March 12, 1870, pp. 270-73.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 275.

You would then think and act differently. What would you say if we were to observe to you that your navy was too large, that you did not require so many ironclads, that you lavished too large a portion of the taxation of the country in building ships, which in the peaceful disposition of Europe were not required? If we recommended you to diminish your naval armaments? <sup>41</sup>

To this home thrust Lord Loftus made the somewhat unconvincing reply that, as evidence of her pacific disposition, Great Britain had just sold an ironclad to the Prussian Government and was ready to sell others—a reply which was received with irreverent merriment. <sup>42</sup>

The utmost that could be obtained from Bismarck was a vague statement that the whole question would be discussed by the Parliament "in a year or so," and that a decision must then be taken as to what was required for the safety of the country.

Thus ended an attempt in whose success, from the first, no one probably felt much confidence. There seems to have been no doubt that the French Government was anxious for a partial disarmament, and the promise to reduce her annual contingent by 10,000 men was evidence of good intentions. What in reality precluded any real settlement was the essential difference between the French and Prussian views as to what constituted aggression. Prussia held it was not aggression or conquest to take possession of any German state, while France considered that the annexation of any of the states south of the Main would be as much aggression on the part of Prussia as it would be on the part of France to annex them herself. The Prussians in 1870 found proposals for disarmament and permanent peace extremely distasteful, because their fulfillment would have meant that the then existing political situation would become stereotyped, that the nations must be content with their existing boundaries and proportion of power. Prussia would remain one of the many German states and the weakest among the great powers; Germany would still be divided and helpless.

<sup>41</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 275-76.

Prussia, however, intended to complete the unification of Germany; France refused to declare that she would not interfere with this aim. Thus any proposition for a reduction of armaments was predestined to failure.

Until all the leading states are approximately content with the world distribution of power, territory, wealth and resources, efforts to change the *status quo* are inevitable. Here is the chief thesis of this study; here is the crux of the problem of disarmament. No plan for a limitation of armaments based upon the acceptance of the *status quo* will ever be generally welcomed. No dissatisfied state will agree to perpetuate indefinitely the conditions prevailing at a given time. Dissatisfied powers may not actually want war, may even dread it, and may be quite as unwilling to run the risk of an appeal to arms as the satisfied states; but in spite of this, they will not voluntarily shut off all possibility of obtaining a state of things which will be to them more acceptable than the present. Satisfied powers are equally determined to retain by force what arms have so successfully gained for them. This is the simple explanation of the failure of most disarmament proposals.

During the negotiations of 1870 Prince Bismarck found convenient arguments against disarmament, but whatever we may think of his attitude towards the subject, we cannot accuse him of hypocrisy. Seven years later, when he paid an official visit to Italy, Count Crispi, who had been instructed by Gambetta to approach the German Chancellor on the question of a reduction of armaments,<sup>43</sup> broached the matter. Crispi fully understood that an alliance between France and Germany was impossible, but he suggested that there was one point on which they might agree, and on which Italy would be with them—and that was disarmament. To this the Prince replied:

An alliance with republican France would be of no use to us. The two countries could not possibly disarm. This question was gone into

<sup>43</sup> Robert Coulet, *La Limitation des armements* (Paris, 1910), p. 75; Hans Wehberg, *op. cit.*, p. 257.



with Emperor Napoleon before 1870, and, after long discussion, it was proved beyond doubt that the principle of disarmament can never succeed in practice. There are no words in the dictionary that accurately define the limits of disarmament and armament. Military institutions differ in every state, and even when you have succeeded in placing the armies on a peace footing, you will not be able to affirm that the conditions of offence and defence are equal with all the nations which have participated in disarmament. Let us leave this question to the Society of the Friends of Peace.<sup>44</sup>

In March, 1870, the question was left to the Peace Societies, and a few months later the Franco-German War burst upon Europe. Out of this struggle grew new hatreds, further dissatisfaction with the *status quo*, a new imperialism which encouraged a tremendous increase in armaments; and the actual conflict checked, for the time being, proposals for disarmament.

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### THE RUSH-BAGOT AGREEMENT

The only voluntary and mutual disarmament achievement of the nineteenth century was carried out in the New World. The Founding Fathers realized the hazard to the new Republic in the British and American fortifications and armaments on the western frontier and the Great Lakes. Thomas Jefferson, General Knox and Alexander Hamilton were all willing to agree to a mutual limitation of armaments on the lakes.<sup>45</sup> When it was decided to send Jay to England to negotiate a treaty of commerce and amity, both Hamilton and Randolph advised that among the objects of the proposed treaty there should be in time of peace no armed force upon the lakes nor troops within a certain distance of them.<sup>46</sup> Jay, on September 30, 1794,

<sup>44</sup> Francesco Crispi, *Memoirs* (London, 1912), II, 37; Hans Wehberg, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

<sup>45</sup> Samuel Flagg Bemis, *Jay's Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy* (Macmillan, New York, 1924), p. 122.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 215; also Henry Cabot Lodge (Editor), *The Works of Alexander Hamilton* (Constitutional Edition), V, 117-18.

tendered a proposal for a complete demilitarization of the lakes. Grenville rejected it.<sup>47</sup>

The proposition for a limitation of armaments on the Great Lakes was again considered at Ghent in 1814. Castlereagh was convinced that Great Britain as the *weaker* party should have military command of both shores of the lakes, though he was disposed to leave the sovereignty of the soil undisturbed provided the American Government would stipulate "not to preserve or construct any fortifications upon or within a limited distance of the shores, or maintain or construct any armed vessels upon the lakes in question or upon the rivers which empty themselves into the same."<sup>48</sup> This unilateral proposal for disarmament was naturally unacceptable to the American Commissioners, but it may have suggested to their minds the idea of mutual disarmament. The first definite approach was made by Mr. Gallatin on September 6, 1814, who, when it seemed that negotiations could not proceed, proposed to refer to the United States Government a stipulation for disarming on both sides of the lakes. Gouverneur Morris also favored disarmament, for he considered both ships of war on the lakes and forts on their shores as idle and useless expense. John Quincy Adams, however, objected to this as not being in accordance with positive instructions. The matter was dropped.

The problem was again taken under consideration when, on November 16, 1815, James Monroe, Secretary of State, instructed John Quincy Adams, Minister of the United States to London, to bring before the British Government a proposal to limit the number of armed vessels on the lakes, "or to abstain altogether from an armed force beyond that used for the revenue."<sup>49</sup> Mr. Adams brought the matter before Lord Castlereagh in January, 1816, and again in March renewed the pro-

<sup>47</sup> Bemis, *op. cit.*, Appendix III, 289.

<sup>48</sup> J. M. Callahan, *The Neutrality of the American Lakes and Anglo-American Relations* (John Hopkins, Baltimore, 1898), p. 61.

<sup>49</sup> John Bassett Moore, *Digest of International Law* (Gov't. Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1906), I, 691-92.

posal to "mutually and equally disarm upon the American lakes." Negotiations were transferred to Washington and formally opened on July 26, 1816, when Sir Charles Bagot, the British Minister, stated in a letter to Monroe that in relation to the naval armaments on the lakes, the Prince Regent was ready to "adopt any reasonable system which would contribute to economy, to peacefulness and the removal of jealousy."<sup>50</sup>

The final and definite reduction of the naval force on the lakes was brought about in April, 1817. On the 28th and 29th of that month a formal agreement was entered into by an exchange of notes between Sir Charles Bagot and Mr. Richard Rush, who was acting as Secretary of State until Mr. Adams could arrive from London. It limited the naval force to be maintained upon Lake Ontario and Lake Champlain "to one vessel not exceeding one hundred tons burden, and armed with one eighteen pound cannon" and "on the upper lakes, to two vessels, not exceeding like burden each, and armed with like force." All other vessels were to be forthwith dismantled and no other vessels of war should there be built or armed. This agreement could be annulled by either party giving six months' notice.<sup>51</sup>

The impossibility of getting the vessels from the lakes to the sea made it necessary to dismantle them on the lakes. This work appears to have been done promptly. By 1820 the feeling of danger had decreased so far that the House of Representatives refused to consider a resolution which proposed a western depot for arms "convenient to those points which are vulnerable to the enemy." By 1825 public vessels had practically disappeared. Temporary difficulties between 1837 and 1841 and again during the Civil War threatened to subvert the friendly agreement, but in spite of numerous vicissitudes the

<sup>50</sup> G. P. de T. Glazebrook, *Sir Charles Bagot in Canada, A Study in British Colonial Government* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1929), Bagot to Monroe, July 26, 1816, pp. 4-5.

<sup>51</sup> Callahan, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85, quoting from the *National Intelligencer*, April 30, 1818.

Rush-Bagot Agreement survived for more than one hundred and twenty years and, with the passage of time, assumed a symbolic importance in the eyes of Americans and Canadians.

Shortly after the first World War modification of the Agreement with a view to making its provisions conform more closely to modern conditions was studied in the United States and Canada and a stage was even reached where the Governments exchanged drafts of suggested changes; but these were never accepted.<sup>52</sup>

When, however, feverish naval construction in Canada incident to the second World War caused congestion at the Atlantic seaboard shipyards, the Canadian Government expressed a desire to have the vessels constructed on the Great Lakes in the most complete form practicable while still on those waters.<sup>53</sup> On November 2, 1940, the United States Government agreed that a further interpretation of the Rush-Bagot Agreement might be made in conformity with the intent of the provision that important naval vessels should not be built for service on the Lakes. This involved recognition that armament might be installed on naval vessels provided that "the vessels are not intended for service on the Great Lakes"; that "each Government furnish the other with full information concerning any vessels to be constructed at Great Lakes ports"; that "the armaments of the vessels are placed in such a condition as to be incapable of immediate use while the vessels remain in the Great Lakes"; and that the "vessels are promptly removed from the Great Lakes upon completion."<sup>54</sup>

Thus, contrary to the letter but in harmony with the spirit of the Rush-Bagot Agreement and the present temper of pub-

<sup>52</sup> *The Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. IV: No. 92, Publication 1583 (Washington, D. C., March 29, 1941), "Naval Vessels on the Great Lakes," p. 366; Daniel C. Roper to O. D. Skelton, Canadian Under Secretary for External Affairs, June 9, 1939.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 371-72; O. D. Skelton to Pierrepont Moffat, October 30, 1940.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 372, Pierrepont Moffat to O. D. Skelton, November 2, 1940.

lic opinion, the construction of small fighting craft on the Lakes proceeds apace. But the vessels which slide down their ways are used only against a common menace. The Agreement was never intended to obstruct the efforts of the two contracting powers in mutual defense.

The Rush-Bagot Agreement was the greatest achievement up to the Tsar's Rescript of 1898 to which the pacifists could proudly point. The unarmed Canadian-American boundary of 3,800 miles, the longest unarmed frontier in the world and the safest of the British Empire, they argued, stands as a rebuke to the militarism of the Old World and a challenge to the courage and faith of every nation. Peace enthusiasts often refer to this treaty as an illustrious example of successful disarmament which should be copied by Europeans. In so doing they fail to take into consideration the differences in geographic, demographic, political, economic and strategic factors and circumstances in central Europe and in the northern part of North America. (Even the United States has made no similar arrangement for the Rio Grande boundary.) At the time of making the agreement the region of the Great Lakes was in a large measure an uninhabited wilderness without the pressure, as in Europe, of dense, antagonistic, nationalistic peoples.

Although it must be conceded that in 1817 there was danger from an expensive and explosive race in armaments, there were no extremely serious or apparently insuperable issues at stake, no "irredentism," no burning desire for revenge on either side. The policies of Great Britain and the United States were not in collision; each could agree to a limitation of armaments on the Great Lakes at a saving in expenditure and without a sacrifice of national interests. The salutary results from the agreement have been due to the fact that there has been no serious clash of national policies between two peoples linked together by race, language, political institutions and geographical proximity. Armaments, like tariffs and embargoes, are merely the means by which a state seeks to give effect to its national policies in

a system of "Power Politics." What is of primary importance in history is the policies of the states; if these are dynamic and therefore aggressive, then their armaments, whether military or naval, are a matter of concern for those nations menaced by their policies.<sup>55</sup>

"It is apparent, therefore," conclude Frank H. Simonds and Brooks Emeny, "that agreement in the matter of armaments is possible only when the policies of states do not clash. If their policies are in collision, no progress can be made in the adjustment of armaments without a previous accommodation in the matter of policy. With political agreement once achieved, moreover, the question of arms loses most of its importance, because dangers of conflict have already been largely removed."<sup>56</sup>

<sup>55</sup> Frank H. Simonds and Brooks Emeny, *The Great Powers in World Politics* (American Book Company, New York, 1937), p. 594. Reprinted by permission.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 608.

*Part I*

PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MOVEMENT  
FOR DISARMAMENT 1870-1898





## CHAPTER II

### LIBERAL AND RADICAL INFLUENCES ON THE MOVEMENT FOR A LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS

THE LIBERAL, humanitarian, rationalistic movement for a limitation of armaments in the latter part of the nineteenth century was promoted by the members of the European Liberal and Radical political parties; in Great Britain it was led primarily by the Nonconformists.

The agitation for peace, arbitration and the limitation of armaments formed a synthesis, a community of interest for diverse groups of men who in politics were designated as "Conservative Liberals," "Moderate Liberals," "Liberals," "Radical Liberals," "Radicals," "Social Democrats," "Socialists," and "Radical Socialists." Though they might differ on forms of polity and ways and means of accomplishing reforms, they were all agreed in advocating peace and governmental retrenchment. The Liberals and parties of the Left were distrustful of militarism and the resurgent emotionalism of the romanticists who were spreading the glory of romance over the realities of war. Although friends of large military budgets argued that one-third of all taxes paid for army expenditure was returned to the taxpayer in some form, the Liberals and Socialists maintained that they benefited little by the forms of returns of taxation; that military expenditure flowed not to the middle urban groups but to a bureaucracy, to certain industries and to agriculture. In contrast to the urban-socialist attitude was that of the agrarians who were won over to militarism by the policy of the French and German Governments in making generous pay-

ments for horses, feed, grain and meat and for actual or pretended damage to crops during maneuvers.<sup>1</sup>

"It is the essence of Liberalism," writes L. T. Hobhouse, "to oppose the use of force, the basis of all tyranny. It is one of its practical necessities to withstand the tyranny of armaments. Not only may the military force be directly turned against liberty, as in Russia, but there are more subtle ways, as in Western Europe, in which the military spirit eats into free institutions and absorbs the public resources which might go to the advancement of civilization."<sup>2</sup> As apostles of peace and as opponents of swollen armaments, the Liberals recognized that the expenditure of the social surplus upon the instruments of progress was the real alternative to its expenditure on the instruments of war.<sup>3</sup>

In nineteenth century England the agitation for a limitation of armaments came from the Manchester School of economists and free traders who looked forward to a period of laissez-faire, free trade and peace throughout the world. The chief exponents of these doctrines were Richard Cobden and John Bright, whose championship of a reduction of armaments probably did more than anything else to give the subject prestige. Cobden was the first person of note to denounce the armaments of Europe as a whole. He made a special study of them on a continental tour in 1847, and in a letter to the Peace Congress of 1848 he furnished various statistics on the subject in the hope that the Congress would open the eyes of European governments to the excessive waste and expense of their war establishments. The great Free Trader looked upon the problem from the economist's point of view and did not leave the agitation to the Peace Societies alone. Moreover, he usually coupled his plea for disarmament with one for retrenchment. As early

<sup>1</sup> Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism* (New York, 1937), p. 359.

<sup>2</sup> L. T. Hobhouse, *Liberalism* (Henry Holt, New York, 1911), pp. 44-45.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 225-26.

as 1848, speaking on taxation in the House of Commons, Cobden pointed out that unless direct taxation were increased expenditure would have to be decreased, and a decrease in expenditure could only be attained by reducing armaments. He took the initiative in introducing in a European parliament the first resolution calling for a reduction of armaments. Speaking in the House of Commons on July 17, 1851, Cobden urged the "Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to enter into communication with the Government of France, and endeavour to prevent in future that rivalry of warlike preparations in time of Peace, which has, hitherto been the policy of the two Governments, and to promote, if possible, a mutual reduction of armaments."<sup>4</sup> He believed that if the French and English reduced their fortifications, other countries might also limit their armies. Lord Palmerston answered in a friendly and complimentary speech; while approving the object, he did not like to be "sent bound and fettered into a negotiation" through which he confessed he could not see any practical way.<sup>5</sup> In consequence of the Prime Minister's conciliatory attitude it was thought advisable not to press for a division; therefore, nothing came of the proposal.

Although Richard Cobden was the first outstanding advocate of a limitation of armaments, he was neither a radical nor a fanatic; he considered the navies of Great Britain and the United States essential to national existence and favored an adequate naval "police force." He emphasized this point at the Edinburgh Peace Conference in October, 1853, when he announced, "we don't say 'Disband your army, sink your fleet, and place yourself prostrate before any enemy that may come to attack you'—but what we say is this, that if England and France have each ten ships of the line in commission watching each other from opposite ports, then their relative strength

<sup>4</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, Third series, CXVII (June 17, 1851), cols. 928-29.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 941.

towards each other would be precisely the same if they would each reduce the number from ten to five.”<sup>6</sup>

Nor was Cobden a “peace at any price man”—an opponent of all war. Some wars and some preparation for war he regarded as hateful necessities for a country living in a world where moral force had not everywhere been recognized as supreme. He did not advance the opinion that war is never justifiable except when undertaken for self-defense; he admitted that a case might arise where a powerful nation was rightly called upon to take up arms for the protection of a weaker nation, or to assist the liberation of a subject and oppressed people. But Cobden would have insisted that such a case must be extremely rare.<sup>7</sup>

The Manchester School's program of retrenchment attracted the sympathy and attention of William E. Gladstone, who, in his position as Chancellor of the Exchequer, was anxious to reduce government expenditure and saw the best means of accomplishing his aim by limiting the outlay on armaments. After the Crimean War had sent military expenditure soaring both in Great Britain and in France as well as in Russia and Turkey, Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Disraeli and Lord John Russell supported Mr. Cobden in his efforts to induce Parliament to return to a more moderate disbursement. But in spite of the agitation of this great combination, the naval estimates for 1857 and 1858 were fifty per cent higher than in 1853. In the years 1859 to 1861, distrust of Napoleon caused a “Third Panic” and a large outlay on Royal dockyards. This fear did not, however, deter Mr. Disraeli from proclaiming the following in the House of Commons on July 21, 1859: “Let us terminate this disastrous system of wild expenditure by mutually agreeing, with no hypocrisy, but in a manner and under circum-

<sup>6</sup> *Report of the Proceedings of the Peace Conference at Edinburgh* (Edinburgh, 1853), Oct. 12-13, p. 53.

<sup>7</sup> J. A. Hobson, *Richard Cobden: The International Man* (London, 1918), p. 387.

stances which may admit of no doubt—by the reduction of armaments—that peace is really our policy.”<sup>8</sup>

Throughout the negotiations of 1859–60 which led up to the Anglo-French Commercial Treaty, Gladstone was brought into close touch with Cobden and through him closer to John Bright.<sup>9</sup> The conclusion of the Commercial Treaty with France did not close but only marked the beginning of the relationship between Gladstone and the Free Traders, who were convinced that if any real and permanent good was to come from the Treaty it must be followed by a reciprocal agreement to limit naval forces. Gladstone’s financial policy opened the way to permanent friendship and co-operation between him and them, for economy was the thread woven close into the texture of Gladstone’s finance. The great Chancellor of the Exchequer persistently deplored the increase in the military estimates and criticized a “system of ubiquitous naval armaments” which seemed to mean that “wherever there are British subjects and British trade, there shall be British force to protect them.” He wished to establish as the true principle “that there shall be ships where there is service.”<sup>10</sup>

Although Gladstone started his political career as a Tory, his financial policy marks his entrance into the field of Liberalism. He became the champion of Liberal progress in England between 1859 and 1867, during which time he waged a ceaseless battle with traditional views and policies. From Cobden and Bright, Gladstone received support and advice on the general question of national expenditure and the particular one of the folly of huge armaments. But even during his battle for economy, when the friendship between the Financier and the Free Traders was formed, Gladstone refused to be associated with all their political ideas.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>8</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, Third series, CLV (July 21, 1859), col. 179.

<sup>9</sup> F. W. Hirst, *Gladstone as Financier and Economist* (London, 1931), p. 202.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 202.

<sup>11</sup> John Morley, *Life of Gladstone* (London, 1903), I, 683.

About 1860, Great Britain and France were beginning to spend millions of pounds on ironclads. Bright wrote to Gladstone that he could see no end to the rivalry so long as the great intellects were absorbed in the question of how to build more deadly instruments of defense and destruction. Hoping to see this competition checked, he proposed, in January, 1861, that the Government should allow Cobden to supplement his treaty success of the previous year by negotiating with the French Emperor for a mutual reduction of armaments. He was convinced that Mr. Cobden could arrange the whole matter with the Emperor in one-tenth the time he spent on the Commercial Treaty, if he knew he would be supported by the British Government. Bright believed that "*never before, in any time*" had there been a government in France more willing to act amicably with England. He pointed out that at least fifteen millions a year might be saved to the two countries by such an agreement.<sup>12</sup>

Mr. Bright had reasons to believe that the French would favor this plan, while it also had the support of Disraeli, then leader of the Opposition. The latter statesman saw clearly that the strength of this country lay, not in increased armaments, but in its growing resources; and that if these resources were squandered in time of peace, they would not be available in time of war. He was of opinion that the power to raise the income tax in an emergency was a far more formidable weapon than any which increased fleets or armies could supply. The wish for an understanding had been "candidly expressed" by France as early as January, 1849, when Napoleon, then President of the French Republic, had offered to make almost any reduction England might suggest in naval armaments, provided that the reduction were reciprocal.<sup>13</sup> Mr. Disraeli,

<sup>12</sup> G. M. Trevelyan, *The Life of John Bright* (London, 1925), pp. 292-93; Mr. Bright to Mr. Gladstone, January, 1861.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 293. In a footnote, p. 293, Mr. Trevelyan writes: "This appears clearly in the F.O. papers, as has been pointed out to me by Rev. F. A. Simpson of Trinity College, Cambridge, author of *The Rise of Louis Napoleon*." The sub-

speaking in the House on July 26, 1861, drew attention to the willingness of the French Government to discuss with Great Britain the question of limiting the naval armament competition.<sup>14</sup>

In October of the same year, Richard Cobden laid a memorandum before the Government, pointing out that the "peculiar and exceptional state of the English and French navies, the result of scientific progress in maritime armaments, offers an opportunity for a reciprocal arrangement between the two Governments of the highest interest to both countries." Since war vessels were being constructed of iron in order to keep out explosive shells, and the old line-of-battle ships, by which naval force had hitherto been measured, were about to be superseded, the obvious course, he thought, was for the two Governments to come to an agreement by which the greater portion of these ships might be withdrawn and rendered incapable of being employed again for war purposes. He suggested an arrangement which would preserve to each country precisely the same relative force after the reduction as before.<sup>15</sup>

When, on June 23, 1862, a member in the House asked why the English Government did not come to an understanding with the Government of France to limit to a certain relative amount the naval forces of both countries, Lord Palmerston replied that this "is not a proposition which one independent country could make to another." Even if England and France were the only powers in the world that had navies, it was a proposal which neither would think of accepting. He explained that Great Britain was not the only naval power, that others were creating ironclad navies as fast as they could.<sup>16</sup> Consequently,

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ject, however is neither mentioned in Simpson's *Rise of Louis Napoleon* (London, 1924), nor in his *Louis Napoleon And The Recovery of France* (London, 1926).

<sup>14</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, Third series, CLXIV (July 26, 1861), col. 1679.

<sup>15</sup> Richard Cobden, *Political Writings* (London, 1867), II, 434.

<sup>16</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, Third series, CLXVII (June 23, 1862), col. 953.

Mr. Bright's suggestion and Mr. Cobden's proposal were not entertained by Lord Palmerston's government.

The Free Traders' recommendations on the subject were supplemented by a considerable agitation for disarmament from a body of peace enthusiasts and Socialists. In the 'sixties, 'seventies and 'eighties numerous resolutions in favor of a limitation of armaments or calling for a study of the problem were passed in Peace Society meetings and Congresses and proposed in national legislatures by pacifist members. Giuseppe Mazzini, the great Italian Liberal patriot, speaking at the Geneva Peace and Liberty Congress of 1867, expressed the opinion that the standing armies of all the states must simultaneously be discharged. He doubted, however, whether this could be accomplished without revolution.<sup>17</sup>

The recognized leader of the disarmament movement in England during the period was Henry Richard, Liberal M. P. and Secretary of the London Peace Society, who used his position in Parliament to urge the British Government to study the problem. On the Continent a group of Liberals, Socialists and Social Democrats, including Dr. Virchow, Baron Dückér and Herr von Bühler in Germany; Dr. Sturm, Dr. Fischhof, Dr. Heilsberg and Herr Fux [also Fuchs] in Austria;<sup>18</sup> Frédéric Passy in France; the Marquis de Marcoartu in Spain; Professor Sbarbaro, Signor Ricciardi and E. T. Moneta in Italy, supported and encouraged the movement.

The first socialist-pacifist resolution came from the French Peace Group in the *Chambre des Députés* when, in 1867, the Minister of War proposed the creation of a "garde mobile." On the occasion M. Garnier-Pages, a Socialist, urged France to set the example of disarmament, and all the nations would imitate her. In support, M. Jules Favre added his conviction

<sup>17</sup> *Annales du Congrès de Genève, 9-12 sept., 1867* (Genève, 1868), p. 339.

<sup>18</sup> Hans Wehberg, *Die Internationale Beschränkung der Rüstungen*, p. 104, *et seq.*



that the most powerful nation ought to be the one the most ready for disarmament.<sup>19</sup>

In 1868 Bright visited several of the capitals of Europe, including Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Berlin, Munich, Vienna and Florence, in order to ascertain by communication with the members of the different representative assemblies, whether some concerted action for a reduction of armaments in the respective legislatures could not be promoted. His first visit bore fruit in Prussia where, early in 1869, Dr. Virchow moved a resolution in the Reichstag of the North German Confederation requesting the Royal Government "to use all its influence with a view to reduce within the narrowest practical limits, the expenses of the military administration of the Northern Confederation, and to seek to bring about, by diplomatic negotiations, a general disarmament."<sup>20</sup> A lively debate followed this resolution before a division took place and, although Dr. Virchow did not succeed, he was sustained by no fewer than ninety-nine votes.

A little later in the same year a similar motion was made in the Chamber of Saxony and carried. In Austria, Dr. Fischhof, a distinguished political writer, published some important articles on disarmament in the *Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna, which led to the matter being taken up there. But for the Franco-German War, which set all Europe to considering new means of destruction, further resolutions would probably have been put forward in other legislatures.

The interruption in the disarmament movement caused by the war was only temporary, for after the conflict proposals

<sup>19</sup> Georges Dubois, *Des Charges de la paix armée et de la limitation des armements* (Caen, 1909), p. 80, citing "Assemblée Nationale, Annexe au procès-verbal de la séance du 22 décembre 1872, no. 1416D."

<sup>20</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, loc. cit., col. 92, Henry Richard speaking on "The Reduction of European Armaments," June 15, 1880. Also Lewis Appleton, *Fifty Years of Disarmament* (London, 1900), p. 3. Deputy Götz had moved a similar motion in the Reichstag of the North German Union in 1867; (Krehbiel, *Nationalism, War and Society*, p. 215; Hans Wehberg, *op. cit.*, p. 40 et seq.)

and resolutions for a limitation of armaments became particularly numerous in the parliaments of Europe. In March, 1875, Sir Wilfred Lawson, a Liberal, presented to the House of Commons a motion to reduce the British Army. His proposal was rejected by 244 votes to 61, but the occasion was valuable at least in having given the Peace body in Parliament an opportunity to express its views. Disarmament proposals were likewise submitted to the Austrian and German Lower Houses in the 'seventies. Ritter von Schmerling declared before the Austrian Chamber in October, 1875, that the Dual Monarchy should "take the initiative in a general disarmament." This proposition was repeated by Herr Fux in the Austrian Parliament in February, 1876. Although because of the lateness of the session the motion was not discussed, it resulted in thirty-six members of both Chambers meeting in April to discuss disarmament and arbitration. A similar motion was also made in the Hungarian legislature. Moreover, negotiations were opened between certain German deputies, led by Baron Dückér and the Austrians under Herr Fux and Dr. Fischhof, for an International Conference on the Reduction of Armaments.

Dr. Fischhof, in his treatise entitled *Zur Reduktion der Kontinentalen Heere*, published in 1875, proposed a proportional reduction of the peace effectiveness of the European countries. In the same year he propounded a scheme for an Inter-Parliamentary Union, his primary objective being to secure a gradual disarmament throughout Europe. The first meeting was actually planned for 1877, when the quota of reduction was to be discussed and agreed upon. Then arrangements were to have been made for the introduction of a disarmament resolution into each Parliament. Unfortunately, the Bulgarian atrocities and the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War checked temporarily the efforts of the pacifists.

So far, the campaign for disarmament was not organized on the entire Peace front; but there was concerted activity in 1878

with the assembling of the Paris Peace Congress, which was comparable to the famous one of 1849. Randal Cremer, a "Radical Liberal," in 1875, proposed that his Workmen's Peace Association should form a new International by means of a Conference in Paris. In the autumn of that year he took fifty British delegates across to inaugurate plans by conferring with French workingmen leaders under Auguste Desmoulins. This gathering, which passed resolutions in favor of arbitration and against "bloated armaments," established a Workmen's Peace Committee in Paris for the purpose of preparing a Congress.<sup>21</sup> In September, 1878, during the *Exposition Universelle* the Peace Congress assembled with representatives from the London Peace Society, *La Société française des Amis de la Paix*, *la Ligue internationale de la Paix et de la Liberté*, the Universal Peace Union of Philadelphia, the Netherlands League of Peace, and the Rome and Milan Peace Societies. The Congress occupied itself with three categories of problems: (1) the best means of fostering peace, (2) the furthering of the serious consideration of arbitration by the governments, and (3) the codification of international law. It made an international approach to the problem of large armaments by submitting the following resolutions on the subject of disarmament:

No. 10. That an International Commission, composed of representatives of each nation, be appointed to secure a reduction of the armaments of each nation.

No. 11. That the Governments of civilized peoples should open as soon as possible negotiations to arrive at a proportional and simultaneous disarmament in each country.<sup>22</sup>

The first European Parliament in which the question was raised after the Congress was the German Reichstag, where the Alsatian Deputy, Jean Dollfus, delivered a speech in condemnation of the enormous military budgets, the withdrawal

<sup>21</sup> A. C. F. Beales, *The History of Peace* (George Bell, New York, 1931), p. 157.

<sup>22</sup> Lewis Appleton, *Henry Richard* (London, 1886), p. 173.

of millions of men from labor, and especially of the murderous character of modern warfare. In March, Herr von Bühler followed up this appeal by proposing a resolution on the subject.<sup>23</sup> His proposal was supported by only twelve members, but undaunted by his defeat, Herr von Bühler addressed to Prince Bismarck a letter enclosing the resolution in which he reminded the Prince of their meeting on the battlefield of Gravelotte, and of the determination made there to prevent a repetition of the horrors of war. To this communication Bismarck replied that Germany could take the responsibility for such projects only after having reconciled her neighbors to her views. Von Bühler re-submitted his motion in 1880, but it was again defeated.

These protests in Germany against enormous armaments encouraged Drs. Sturm, Fux and Fischhof in their activities in Austria, and Signor Ricciardi, Professor Sbarbaro and E. T. Moneta in Italy. On January 26, 1880, Herren Fux and Heilsberg presented a resolution to the Austrian Reichstag expressing the hope that "the united Imperial and Royal Government may take into consideration the plan of such a general proportionate, and simultaneous reduction of arms, as shall not alter the respective position of the states of Europe and that the Government will not withhold such efforts as may be necessary for the attainment of this object."<sup>24</sup> This motion was supported by forty-nine members and, subsequently, the Austrian Minister for War declared that he regarded it as practical. In Italy, on May 11, 1879, a Peace Congress at Milan organized largely by four thousand delegates from Workingmen's Associations, passed resolutions recommending disarmament and arbitration. In October of the same year a Conference for promoting

<sup>23</sup> Lewis Appleton, *Fifty Years of Disarmament*, p. 3; Lewis Appleton, *Henry Richard*, p. 174; also *The Herald of Peace and Arbitration* (Organ of the British Peace Society, published by the London Peace Society. Hereafter: *The Herald of Peace*), XV-XVI, p. 223.

<sup>24</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, Third series, CCLIII, col. 93, Henry Richard speaking June 15, 1880; Lewis Appleton, *Henry Richard*, p. 176.

general disarmament was held at Naples, and a Memorial on the subject was adopted and presented to the Italian Government.<sup>25</sup>

Meanwhile, in England, Henry Richard was preparing for the submission of a disarmament resolution to Parliament. He brought the question before the International Law Association at its conference in London in August, 1879.<sup>26</sup> In October and November Mr. Richard addressed meetings at Warrington and Swansea on the subject of International Disarmament. He invoked the help of his countrymen in the arduous task he had undertaken, as he firmly believed that if the British Parliament adopted his resolution in favor of disarmament, other European legislatures would follow its example. In order to stimulate activity and arouse public attention throughout the country, petitions were circulated in favor of the forthcoming resolution, a circular letter was issued to his supporters, and several conferences and public meetings were held, the most important of which was a demonstration in the St. George's Hall, Liverpool. On June 15<sup>27</sup> Mr. Richard brought forward his resolution in the House of Commons praying Her Majesty's Government "to enter into communication with other Powers, with a view to bring about a mutual and simultaneous reduction of European Armaments."<sup>28</sup> In a form amended by Mr. Bright this proposition passed unanimously. The speaker used the occasion to stress the crushing burden of armaments and to review various disarmament proposals.

Other resolutions were proposed on the Continent. In the summer of 1883, a motion was introduced in the Riksdag at Stockholm urging the neutralization and disarmament of

<sup>25</sup> *The Herald of Peace*, XV-XVI, 268.

<sup>26</sup> Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations, *Report of the Seventh Annual Conference Held at the Guildhall, London, 11-16 August, 1879* (London, 1880), pp. 234-45.

<sup>27</sup> By that date 1100 petitions in its favor totaling 85,000 signatures had been sent to the Prime Minister.

<sup>28</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, Third series, CCLIII (January 15, 1880), col. 80.

Sweden as an example to the world. It failed by a surprisingly large minority of 70 to 112.<sup>29</sup> M. Frédéric Passy, the leader of the peace movement in France, brought the subject before his Government when, in 1887, he made a plea in the *Chambre des Députés* for arbitration and the limitation of armaments.<sup>30</sup> At the same time a colleague, M. Antide Boyer, proposed a meeting of an international conference where the delegates of the powers could discuss the question of a limitation of armaments and search for a means of arriving at an understanding.<sup>31</sup>

In addition to these pacifist proposals in national legislatures, an International Conference, convoked by the International Arbitration and Peace Association of Great Britain and Ireland, was held in Brussels in October, 1882. Its object was to arouse and direct a movement of public opinion in favor of the abolition of war, the establishment of codes of laws and international tribunals, the adoption of international treaties on all questions, and the lightening of the burden of armaments. The Conference examined the problem of international disarmament, and Mr. Hodgson Pratt, the founder of the International Arbitration and Peace Association, sponsored a resolution to the effect that "the Governments of civilized peoples ought to open as soon as possible some negotiations in order to arrive at a proportional and simultaneous disarmament in each country."<sup>32</sup> This proposition was considered inopportune, premature and platonic. M. Godin argued that it could lead to no result because public opinion and the Governments were not prepared for it. "We have not done anything," he said. "We cannot reasonably decide what the Governments ought to do when we do not know what we can do."<sup>33</sup> In consequence of this view, Hodgson Pratt withdrew his resolution.

<sup>29</sup> A. C. F. Beales, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

<sup>30</sup> Georges Dubois, *Limitation des armements* (Caen, 1909), pp. 84-5, citing *Documents parlementaires de la Chambre*, 1887, No. 1416.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 85.

<sup>32</sup> *Procès Verbal de la Conférence Internationale, tenue à Bruxelles, 17, 18, 19 et 20 octobre, 1882* (Bruxelles, 1882), p. 69.

<sup>33</sup> *Loc. cit.*

Although public opinion on the subject had not yet crystallized, there was, throughout the 'eighties, an inchoate movement for peace, arbitration and a limitation of armaments. Numerous pamphlets were distributed by organizations interested in peace. The *Times*, the *Daily News*, the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Leeds Mercury*, the *Figaro*, the *New York Times*, the *New York Herald*, the *Neue Freie Presse* and many other newspapers published articles and leaders on disarmament.

As Mr. Gladstone's financial policy while Chancellor of the Exchequer brought him into touch with the Manchester School of Free Traders and laid the strong foundation of Liberalism in England, so later when he was Prime Minister, his measure for the Disestablishment of the Irish Church welded that remarkable alliance between him and the Nonconformists which lasted until the end of his life. The "Dissenting Interests," composed of the Baptists, Congregationalists, a section of the Presbyterians, some of the smaller Methodist communities and the Wesleyans, slowly but ultimately placed their confidence in Gladstone. The Nonconformists had early admired his financial policy, but not until the agitation prior to the election of 1868 did they take an active part in his support. Disestablishment drew all Dissenters to Gladstone, yet, on theological and ecclesiastical questions he and they stood at opposite poles.<sup>34</sup>

The British Liberal Party of the past century proved flexible and adaptable enough to incorporate and retain all those elements which stood for peace, economy and reform in all their aspects—political, economic, social and religious. Many of the Liberal Party leaders and organizers were the officers, the ministers and lay preachers of the Free Churches, the hereditary enemies of the Church of England and consequently of the Tory Party. Among these were the Reverend Hugh Price Hughes, the most active of the Wesleyans; the Reverend Rob-

<sup>34</sup> J. Guinness Rogers, "Mr. Gladstone and the Nonconformists," *The Nineteenth Century*, XLIV (July, 1898), 36.

ert Forman Horton and the Reverend J. Guinness Rogers, Congregationalists; the Reverend Silvester Horne and the Reverend Dr. Clifford, Baptists. Not they alone, but a large majority of the Dissenting Ministers remained true to the traditional policy of peace handed down from Cobden, Bright and Gladstone. By 1894 their support was being eagerly sought by Lord Rosebery, the Liberal Prime Minister. As the Free Traders advocated a limitation of armament expenditure as part of their program of peace and retrenchment, it was the heterogeneous Liberal Party, and primarily the Nonconformists within it, who furnished the impetus for the disarmament movement in England during the decade 1888-98. The agitation did not involve the entire Party—it was strongest among the rank and file who, however, received sympathy from the Party leaders. But when the Liberals were in power, they did not succeed in reducing the outlay on armaments. Although the Party stood for peace and economy—and a limitation of armament expenditure was considered the best means of reducing expenses—disarmament was not a plank in the Liberal program.

Throughout this period, as in previous years, numerous questions concerning armaments were asked and several resolutions proposing a limitation or the convening of a conference to study the problem were introduced in the European parliaments. At the same time, a number of Liberal authors, editors and journalists furthered the agitation, but the discussion of the problem was more wide-spread and the campaign for a limitation was better organized in Great Britain than in any other country.

On May 30, 1889, Mr. A. Illingworth, Liberal M.P. for Bradford, questioned the First Lord of the Treasury, Mr. W. H. Smith, if Her Majesty's Government had "recently made any proposals to the Governments of the Continental States to bring about a material and prompt reduction of warlike arma-



ments, and with what result"; and, if not, whether they would without loss of time enter into such negotiations, with a view to lessening the burden of military expenditure and the dangers which threatened the peace of Europe? In reply, the First Lord of the Treasury said that if any favorable opportunity presented itself, Her Majesty's Government would be most glad to avail themselves of it to use their influence in the direction referred to, but to interfere in matters of that kind was frequently to defeat rather than forward the object desired. He assured Mr. Illingworth that Her Majesty's Government were as deeply sensible as he and had often expressed the view in the House that the state of armaments was a great misfortune to Europe and a danger to the peace of the world.<sup>35</sup>

In 1894, the Liberal agitation in England for a limitation of armaments reached its climax and on several occasions during the year, the question was brought forward by the Peace Group in the House of Commons. On January 11, Mr. Byles asked Mr. Gladstone whether, "before embarking in new and costly expenditure, the Government could see its way to open communications with other European Powers with a view to a policy of mutual disarmament?"<sup>36</sup> The First Lord of the Treasury informed Mr. Byles that Lord Clarendon, some time before (1870), had made an attempt at progress in that direction but had failed. Gladstone was "not of opinion" that the moment was "one at which any such representation could be advantageously made."<sup>37</sup> Thus the subject was dropped. In fact, Gladstone throughout his career never favored the British Government's taking the initiative in any general limitation of armaments. As early as June, 1870, he expressed his belief "that if you could gather the Plenipotentiaries of Europe round a table to hear a discussion on disarmament, their meeting

<sup>35</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, Third series, CCCXXXVI (May 30, 1899), col. 1419.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, Fourth series, XX (January 11, 1894), cols. 1347-48.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1348.

would end in no positive and substantial result, and that the only way in which a measure of disarmament can be initiated is in detail.”<sup>38</sup>

Only two months later, March 16, 1894, when speaking in the House, Sir James Carmichael, a Liberal, asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the Government would “consider the possibility of coming to an international understanding, either by a Conference or otherwise, as to the relative strength at which the armaments of the respective nations should be maintained.”<sup>39</sup> Sir Edward Grey answered that “Her Majesty’s Government would be quite ready to support any practical proposal for arriving at such an understanding,” but they feared that an invitation on their part would have no useful result.<sup>40</sup> On the 30th of the same month, another Liberal, Sir J. Whitehead, asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, “looking to the reported expressions of the King of Denmark to the effect that he knows that Russia, Austria, and probably Italy, are willing to enter into negotiations with other nations for a general reduction of armaments, the Government are now prepared to take a step with the object of bringing about a Conference on the subject.”<sup>41</sup> Sir William Harcourt replied that he could not answer for reported statements by the King of Denmark, but he would only repeat that the Government would take every opportunity which appeared to them favorable to promote the object indicated in the question. He considered it not possible at that time to make any further statement on the subject.<sup>42</sup>

In addition to these several questions concerning a limitation of armaments which were asked in the House in the early months of 1894, plans were made for introducing a motion on the subject. On April 16, Sir Joseph Pease, a Liberal M.P., a

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, Third series, CCLIII (June 16, 1880), col. 104.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, XXII (March 16, 1894), col. 436.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 437.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.* (March 30, 1894), col. 1008.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1009.

member of the Society of Friends and President of the Peace Society, gave notice that on the earliest possible day he would move "that a humble address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that she may be graciously pleased to communicate with the Powers of Europe with the view of ascertaining how far they are prepared to consent to representatives being sent to a Conference of European Powers for the purpose of considering the International Reduction of Armaments."<sup>43</sup> In consequence of the pressure of business for the remainder of the session, this motion was not brought forward.

The press references in the early months of 1894 to Emperor William's interest in a limitation of armaments led Mr. Byles, on April 20, to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he had observed the statement in the public press that the German Emperor had submitted a scheme of disarmament to the King of Italy, the Emperor of Austria and the Tsar of Russia, and proposed a conference of the powers; whether any communications of that nature had reached the Foreign Office; and whether any such suggestions, if they should be addressed to this country, would be favorably entertained by Her Majesty's Government?<sup>44</sup> Sir Edward Grey answered that he had seen some statements in the press, but no communications on the subject had reached the Foreign Office. He assured Mr. Byles that the Government would give their best consideration to any practical proposals that should be made.

By the spring of 1894, the English peace advocates were convinced that there were numerous indications of the growth of a current of public opinion on the question of a limitation of armaments and that it only needed the proper touch to make it crystallize. On May 9, M. Jules Simon, in a letter to W. T. Stead endorsing the suggestion of the National Memorial, said that he had not the least doubt but that France would be dis-

<sup>43</sup> *The Herald of Peace*, May 1, 1894, p. 62.

<sup>44</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, Fourth series, XXIII (April 20, 1894), col. 980.

posed to enter into an international agreement having for its end the arrest of any increase of military or naval expenditure until 1900.<sup>45</sup> Moreover, the *Times* correspondent in Paris had written that he believed if any one power would begin by suggesting a European Conference to discuss the question of disarmament, or reducing the forces, France, Germany, Italy and Russia would be glad to participate. Since all Europe was professing ardent devotion to the cause of peace, the pacifists thought that Great Britain should take the lead and give the European powers a chance of proving that they were in earnest. If any one state, or several of them, chose to meet her with a rebuff, as the Government said it feared might happen, then the world would know where to place the responsibility. In consequence of this general feeling, Mr. Byles, in addressing the Annual Meeting of the Peace Society on May 22, 1894, thought appropriate to move a resolution to the effect that:

This Meeting regards with deep interest the recent numerous indications of a marked change in the public opinion of Europe, with regard to the burden and perils of vast armaments; and it urges upon Her Majesty's Government the pressing expediency of inviting other Governments to consider the practicability of adopting some immediate and effective means of checking the growth of these burdens, and of reducing those armaments which are a danger to Peace and carry with them many of the evils of actual war.<sup>46</sup>

The British pacifist agitation for a limitation of armaments led to a similar action in the Continental parliaments. On June 28, 1890, during the military debate in the German Reichstag, a member of the Center, Herr Reichenberger, expressed the wish that Germany should set in motion a general disarmament. Although he approved the Government Bill for adding 18,000 men to the peace footing of the army, he wished to say that as the Emperor's decision in summoning a confer-

<sup>45</sup> *The Review of Reviews*, VIII, 294; *The Herald of Peace*, July 2, 1894, p. 84.

<sup>46</sup> *The Herald of Peace*, June 1, 1894, p. 78. Annual Report of the Peace Society.

ence of workingmen from all parts of Europe had been greeted with applause, so would the civilized world with even greater enthusiasm greet the tidings that William II had advocated a general disarmament.<sup>47</sup> In a debate in the Reichstag on February 28, 1890, Dr. Barth, a Social Democrat, introduced the subject of the desirability of establishing a permanent tribunal of international arbitration. Herr Bebel, the leader of the Social Democrats, took the opportunity to urge a general union in favor of arbitration, as tending to afford some relief from the existing intolerable burden of armaments which, he said, was crushing Europe as under the weight of piled-up Alps. His proposition was not favorably entertained.<sup>48</sup>

Mr. Byles's motion of January 11, 1894, in the House of Commons, inspired two Belgian deputies, MM. de Brocqueville and de Ramaix, to express in the Belgian Chamber of Representatives the wish that their country associate itself with all the manifestations made in favor of disarmament, arbitration and peace.<sup>49</sup> On the 20th of the same month, M. Janssens, one of the Chiefs of the Roman Catholic Party in Belgium, again brought the question before the Chamber, when he expressed the opinion that the Powers, in order to bring about a general disarmament, should appoint the Pope as arbitrator of all their differences.<sup>50</sup>

On November 10, 1894, during the debates in the Austrian Lower House on the increase of the army, Herr Scheicher, a Social Democrat, invited the Austrian Government to approach other governments friendly to the idea of disarmament and the creation of an international arbitral tribunal. The Minister

<sup>47</sup> K. P. Arnoldson, *Pax Mundi: Progress of the Movement for Peace by Means of Arbitration, Neutralization, International Law, and Disarmament* (London, 1909), p. 86.

<sup>48</sup> *Archives diplomatiques*, 1890, deuxième série (Paris, 1890), Nos. 4-5, p. 206; *The Herald of Peace*, April, 1893, p. 214.

<sup>49</sup> *Revue générale de droit international public*, I, 1894, 161, citing *Les Annales parlementaires de la Belgique*, Chambre des représentants, séance du 20 février 1894, p. 638.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

of Defense replied that the colossal armaments of Europe were an evil of the time against which Austria could take no initiative. "It is certainly not Austria," he said, "who is at the head of the movement of armaments 'à outrance,' and she would only be delighted to see the end of the enormous charges which they impose upon her."<sup>51</sup> After some discussion the Chamber voted the total of the contingent asked for by the government.

Finally, on December 19, 1896, a group of French Socialists led by M. Dejeante, proposed that the Chamber invite "the Government of the French Republic to summon a conference of all nations in order to proceed to a general, progressive, organized disarmament, in such a manner that up to its completion the general forces of the nations will remain the same."<sup>52</sup> M. Dejeante solicited a vote of urgency in favor of his resolution and asked that it should be sent to a special committee for study, since he was certain that a discussion in the Chamber would be suspended. M. Gauthier (de Clagny), a member of the Right, raised objections to the proposition and expressed the opinion that it should be rejected outright. He drew attention to the fact that on the French frontiers there were three powerful, armed states which were a menace to the independence of the country. It was Utopian to believe that they would disarm. When the declaration of urgency was put to a vote it was rejected by 490 votes to 35.<sup>53</sup>

These questions asked and resolutions introduced in the European Parliaments during the decade 1888-98 occupied an infinitesimal amount of time as compared with the treatment of other subjects. They were propositions brought forward by individual members or small pacifist groups working separately, rather than in conjunction with members of other

<sup>51</sup> *Le Temps*, November 12, 1894, p. 1, col. 2.

<sup>52</sup> *Annales de la Chambre des Députés, Débats Parlementaires*, Session extraordinaire, 19 décembre, 1896, p. 1300. This resolution was signed by MM. Dejeante, Groussier, Sembat, Contant, Toussant, Renou, Vaillant, Faberot, Walter and Bonard.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1301.

parliaments. There was no simultaneous international approach to the problem, and these isolated efforts were therefore doomed to failure.

During the decade 1888-98, however, the question of disarmament claimed more attention from Liberal writers and the press than at any previous time in history. The most outstanding woman pacifist of the period, Baroness Bertha von Suttner, made a tremendous literary effort for the cause of disarmament. Simultaneously with the unification of the peace movement through the organization of the Universal Peace Congresses and the Inter-Parliamentary Union appeared her *Die Waffen Nieder* (*Lay Down Your Arms*),<sup>54</sup> perhaps the greatest peace novel of all times. The book took the world by storm and was soon available in many languages and hundreds of editions. W. T. Stead reprinted it in English in 1896 for a penny. The novel brought its author world-wide renown, for it shares with Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* and Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* the distinction of having been translated into almost every known tongue.

*Die Waffen Nieder* was written as an autobiography of Martha von Tilling, a young woman whose fate was closely involved in the wars fought during the 'fifties, 'sixties and 'seventies. Bertha von Suttner hoped to build up a healthy public opinion against war by depicting the horrors and sufferings that had attended the great conflicts of her day. This she thought she could do more successfully through an emotional novel than a formal treatise. The great literary value of her book consists in the vivid description of the battle scenes, based on accurate historical research. A. C. F. Beales, in his *History of Peace*, writes of the novel: "Psychologically the book was the most trenchant propaganda that Peace had ever had, for its appeal was at once ethical, rational, emotional, and universal. Though its critics scoffed at the author as 'Peace Bertha,' and at the book itself as 'emotional silliness,' 'obtrusive

<sup>54</sup> *Die Waffen Nieder* was first published in Prussia in 1889.

inartistic didacticism,' and 'feminist sentimental pacifism,' there remains its circulation to testify to its world-wide popularity and its overwhelming success. Few books have a more enduring record as both propaganda and literature."<sup>55</sup>

After the appearance of her novel, Baroness von Suttner was sought out by Secretaries of Peace Societies and Arbitration Leagues, and for the rest of her life she worked untiringly for world peace. She inspired the creation of both an Austrian Parliamentary Peace Group and Peace Society. In a periodical of her own, *Die Waffen Nieder*, named for her book, and in the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse*, she appealed for recruits for an Austrian Inter-Parliamentary Group, which she proposed to found. Simultaneously she planned a society to popularize the cause of peace. This materialized in October, 1892, when the *Oesterreichische Friedensgesellschaft* was organized with a membership of 2000. Her warmest friend in the movement, Alfred Fried, took over the publication of the periodical *Die Waffen Nieder*. This peace enterprise flourished from the start, and after 1892 it was largely financed by Alfred Nobel. In 1893 Bertha von Suttner founded a sister peace society at Budapest with the novelist Maurus Jokai among its 1100 members.<sup>56</sup> After 1890 the Baroness attended every Universal Peace Congress until her death, as well as several Inter-Parliamentary reunions and the First Hague Conference. In 1905 she was the recipient of the Nobel Peace Award.

Through the instrumentality of Baroness von Suttner, Alfred Nobel, the inventor of dynamite, became devoted to the peace movement, and at her suggestion became its promoter.<sup>57</sup> Nobel, from the beginning of his conversion, was aware that the peace movement needed not money but a program. To demand disarmament, he thought, was almost to make one's self ridiculous without profiting any one. To succeed one ought to be

<sup>55</sup> A. C. F. Beales, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-2.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 210.

<sup>57</sup> Bertha von Suttner, *Memoirs*, II, 374.



content with modest beginnings. He was of opinion that governments would not refuse to take into consideration for a two- or even a one-year period a modest proposition to refer to a tribunal formed for the purpose any differences arising between them; or, if they should refuse to take this step, to defer every act of hostility until the expiration of the stipulated period. This would be apparently little, but by being content with little we arrive at great results, and the most blustering minister would tell himself that it is not worthwhile to break by force a convention of such duration. At the expiration of the period all the states would make haste to renew their peace compact for another year. Thus, without a shock and almost without realizing the fact, they would come to a period of prolonged peace. Then only would there be any use to think of proceeding little by little to disarmament.<sup>58</sup>

Alfred Nobel believed that scientific progress and technical discoveries were destined to regenerate mankind. Once in expressing his views on armaments to Bertha von Suttner he said: "Perhaps my factories will put an end to war even sooner than your Congresses; on the day when two army corps may mutually annihilate each other in a second, probably all civilized nations will recoil with horror and disband their troops."<sup>59</sup>

Nobel died December 10, 1896, and established by his will a fund for annual awards to five different categories of people who should make contributions to "the good of humanity." The fifth prize goes "to that man or woman who shall have worked most effectively for the fraternization of mankind, the diminution of armies, and the promotion of Peace Congresses."<sup>60</sup>

The amount of space devoted by the Liberal and moderate press during the period 1888-98 to a limitation of armaments was insignificant compared with the interest lavished on armaments, soldiers and militarism. None the less, for the first time

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 387-8.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 437.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 142.

in history the daily newspapers and periodicals published articles written by their leading correspondents and contributors on the subject of disarmament which would have been an object of derision a few years before. Audiences with kings, rumors of emperors' intentions of tackling the problem, speeches by prime ministers, resolutions proposed in parliaments were reported in the press. Articles appeared in the *London Times*, the *Daily News*, the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Standard*, *Le Temps*, *Le Figaro*, *Le Soir*, the *Spectator*, the *Contemporary Review*, *McClure's Magazine* and the *Review of Reviews*. M. de Blowitz, the Paris correspondent of the *Times*, and W. T. Stead, the Editor of the *Review of Reviews*, rendered a great service to the cause by their numerous remarks favoring peace and disarmament.

On January 20, 1894, M. de Blowitz made his first reference to the problem of armaments by reviewing the effects which Mr. Byles's question in the House of Commons<sup>61</sup> had produced on the Continent. The mania of armaments was an epidemic of which all, without publicly admitting it, would be gladly cured. Leading statesmen, and even sovereigns, he said, were reflecting on it. Some were thinking of remedying the state of things by disarmament, but in a way offering the advantages of disarmament without its affecting the principles on which armaments were being increased. The idea was the adoption of twelve months' service obligatory for all. He was aware that technical difficulties would be raised which, however, could be overcome. Blowitz concluded:

Universal service has been considered compatible only with a reduction of the seven or five years to three thus materially lessening the expense. After years of experience it is now seen that three years' service is also incompatible with universal service. Nothing therefore is more logical, humane, and conformable with economic exigencies than to reduce by two-thirds, burdens which are getting intolerable, and from which before long the only way of escape will be the utilizing

<sup>61</sup> January 11.

of the engines of destruction accumulating for years, so that war will have to be made for its own sake, and it will be better to perish in action than in peace.<sup>62</sup>

Only ten days later, on January 30, Mr. William Tallack wrote a letter to the *Times*,<sup>63</sup> pointing out two methods by which the burden of European armaments might be lessened. The first was by a proportionate but considerable disarmament brought about by reviving the medieval principle of the "Truce of God." If the Great Powers would solemnly bind themselves in the event of war to allow from three to six months or more of guaranteed truce before entering on hostilities, this would give time for re-assembling forces, and would also intensify the motives for one more attempt at reconciliation or arbitration. Without some such truce he did not see how disarmament on any large scale was practicable. Secondly, Mr. Tallack suggested that the governments take some practical steps towards the realization of Sir Edmund Hornby's proposal for a permanent High Court of International Arbitration. An international tribunal, composed of arbitrators rendered independent of any government by means of handsome salaries and pensions, and by a guaranteed position of exalted rank and honor, would eliminate the imperfections of *ad hoc* tribunals. After the establishment of such a court a large extension of general disarmament might follow.

The idea of a "Truce of God" in a more expanded form was also recommended by the *Spectator* as a means of limiting armaments. The March 31, 1894, issue pointed to rumors that the great powers were secretly discussing the possibility of some arrangements that would secure an enduring peace, and it stated: "We believe that at this moment if any one Sovereign proposed any reasonable scheme for postponing the Great War for a definite term of years, or for reducing the expense of armaments by one third, the others would study it care-

<sup>62</sup> *The Times*, January 20, 1894, p. 5, col. 3.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, January 30, 1894, p. 3, col. 6.

fully, and with a wish that it might be possible to accept it." <sup>64</sup>

The *Spectator* advocated a scheme under which the desired results could be attained. This was a treaty openly declaring a truce for ten years, and withdrawing all but necessary troops two hundred miles from the frontier of each state. Such a truce would involve no interference with the internal government of any country, and it would permit in each very considerable reductions, especially on the outlay for rapid mobilization. For nine years, if the nations respected the treaty, this special expenditure would not be needed. Although a ten year period would not be sufficient for Europe's internal industrial development, for her canalization and the extension of her railway system, a twenty years' truce would not be accepted by the governments, nor did the *Spectator* deem it expedient to anticipate the future for so long a time. No one could foresee what conditions would prevail in 1915, and if circumstances changed violently the respect felt for treaties would change with them.

The second clause of the treaty decreeing a "Truce of God" for ten years would limit the term of services in each European army. There would be technical difficulties, but once a treaty was made and the sovereigns pledged, the experts would be able to work out the details. The Military Staffs of Germany and France were already considering it possible to make up by intensity of teaching for reduction of time, thus rendering fifteen months with the colors a sufficient period of instruction. The *Spectator* was certain that, although Continental kings and statesmen were concerned with the problem of armaments, nothing would be accomplished except by the most definite proposals.

Following the same line of agitation, M. Jules Simon, a French philosopher, historian and statesman, in the May number of the *Contemporary Review*,<sup>65</sup> advocated the reduction of

<sup>64</sup> *The Spectator*, LXXI (March 31, 1894), 426.

<sup>65</sup> *The Contemporary Review* was then edited by Mr. Percy Bunting, a Liberal.

the three years' service to one, and the acceptance of a "Truce of God" to last from then until the Exhibition with which the twentieth century was to open.<sup>66</sup> He asserted that Italy, Austria and Germany, who were supposed to be allied for war, were really bent upon peace; at the same time France and Russia also aimed at insuring tranquillity. Still, in Europe, where everyone "from the monarch to the mendicant" was in love with peace, he found nothing but war, for, during the last quarter of the century the armed peace had, in reality, been war.

M. Simon described the demoralizing effects of three years' service on the youth of France, and what he said also applied to Russia and the nations of the Triple Alliance. While, on the economic side, one half of the revenue of the State was used for military purposes, bankruptcy was ahead for the European nations, and the end, he said, must come either by a war of extermination, in which humanity would be set back six generations, or by disarmament. The French statesman recommended the convening of an international conference to decide on the reduction of the term of service everywhere from three years to one. In reply to the military argument that it would be impossible to produce expert soldiers in twelve months, M. Simon pointed out that, if the rule were made universal, all would be equally inefficient. For the infantry the objection was obviously meaningless, but he would make exceptions for the cavalry, the artillery and the engineers.

M. Jules Simon's suggestion of a "Truce of God" was in harmony with the National Memorial proposal initiated in England in May, 1894.<sup>67</sup> In that month's issue of the *Review of Reviews*, W. T. Stead asked why the powers should not agree to regard their military budgets as a maximum beyond which

<sup>66</sup> *The Contemporary Review*, Vol. LXV, No. 341 (May, 1894), pp. 609-15. At the close of 1893 Don Arturo de Marcoartu, a Spanish Senator, wrote to M. Jules Simon, then in the French Senate, asking him if it would not be possible to obtain a truce up to and after the Universal Exposition of 1900. Simon expressed his opinion of a Truce of God in *Le Figaro*: "Three hours of Conference and a leaf of parchment would suffice to give it to us." (*La Conférence interparlementaire*, January 1, 1894, pp. 109-11.)

<sup>67</sup> *Infra*, Chapter V, pp. 104-08.

they would not go. All other questions were insignificant compared with the problem of checking the automatic growth of the cost of the European armies and navies. He considered the whole social question bound up with it. "Were it possible," Stead wrote, "for the Great Powers not merely to agree to arrest the growth of their military and naval expenditure, but to reduce it all round, say by ten or twenty per cent., there would be liberated a fund available for the purposes of social improvement which would in the course of a few years transform the whole social position."<sup>68</sup>

In June the *Contemporary Review* published an anonymous article entitled "Halt." The author, generally considered to be W. T. Stead, wrote: "Europe is waiting for one word. It is in the air. It is being muttered everywhere. But as yet the word is not spoken. That word is, 'Halt!'" Since by a process of continual experiment the European powers had that year arrived at the highest expenditure ever made, and since it was reasonable to suppose that after so many years they had succeeded in establishing to their own satisfaction what amount of armor they could afford to carry, he entreated them to agree to regard the War Budgets of 1894 as the high-water mark of military and naval expenditure for the closing years of the century.<sup>69</sup> The question of the hour was not disarmament, "it was simply an arrest, temporary, and positive, peremptory, and universal, of all fresh armaments." After checking the downward plunge the second step might be taken.

Close upon Mr. Stead's plea for a halt in armaments came another message from M. de Blowitz on "The Peace of Europe," published in *McClure's Magazine* for June, 1894. The writer maintained that it was the duty of the nations to reduce the term of service from three years to one and a quarter, and insisted that only by adopting the shorter term could

<sup>68</sup> *The Review of Reviews*, IX (May, 1894), 446-47.

<sup>69</sup> *The Contemporary Review*, Vol. LXV, No. 341 (June, 1894), 763-64; also *The Review of Reviews*, IX (June, 1894), 580.

peace be preserved. "It is impossible to keep under the flag during three years the entire able-bodied population of a country. It is impossible to paralyse during this time all its capable hands, all its brains, all its productive forces. It is impossible to cast every year into the same gulf millions after millions. For I maintain that if they persist in this course, the nations groaning in time of peace under the burdens of the war budget will one day say to themselves, 'All this must have an end.' Whereupon this or that nation, and it may be the smallest, will in a moment of exasperation, unmuzzle its cannon, and, before we have had time to ask whence comes the booming of the guns, all Europe will be in a blaze and be strewn with ruins." <sup>70</sup>

By reducing the effective service from three years to one year and a quarter, there would be two contingents under the flag during a quarter of the year, and the old contingent would be able to instruct the new. After a year and a quarter of service the older contingent would return home while the contingent trained by them would in turn be able to instruct the newest. If this principle were introduced, he argued, it would immediately effect a reduction in the war budgets of at least 35 per cent. At the same time millions of young men would be restored to civil pursuits after only fifteen months' interruption in their normal lives instead of three years, thus saving two years and nine months spent in the barracks.<sup>71</sup>

After quoting pacific statements of the Pope, the Tsar, the Emperor Francis Joseph, the German Emperor, the King of Denmark and Prince Bismarck, M. Blowitz added that he believed it to be absolutely true that France, without giving up any of her hopes, would put no obstacles in the way of pacific solutions, nor handicap any measure of peace upon which Europe might agree. He was of opinion that Great Britain and the United States could best take the initiative in

<sup>70</sup> *McClure's Magazine*, III (June, 1894), 65.

<sup>71</sup> *Loc. cit.*

appealing to the other governments to study the idea of a reduction of the military expenses in time of peace.

Simultaneously with this press agitation, the Churches and Arbitration Alliance Memorial, and the National Memorial, all in the spring and early summer of 1894, the British and Foreign Arbitration Association, founded by Hodgson Pratt, raised a protest against ever-increasing armaments in the following Memorial addressed to the British Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs:

That in the opinion of this Association the increasing armaments of France, Russia, Germany, Austria, and Italy, have now arrived at such a point that unless disarmament, simultaneous and proportionate, takes place, the only escape from the self-imposed and grinding tyranny of the burdens laid upon the people, by the present frightful taxation, will be war with all its horrible consequences.

This Association protests in the name of humanity against the means taken to prevent war, which now in reality fosters and promotes war; while in the name of "Liberty" all freedom is destroyed; in the name of "Equality" one man is made very rich and another very poor; and in the name of "Fraternity" every man is armed against his brother.<sup>72</sup>

Another proposal for lessening the burdens of militarism came from an American in December, 1895. Mr. N. S. Shaler, in an article entitled "The Last Gift of the Nineteenth Century"—published in the *North American Review*—suggested that the United States invite the great powers to appoint an international commission of peace for the purpose of avoiding the dangers of war. Three delegates from each first-class power would meet in Washington in January, 1897. The Conference might advise the institution of a permanent international peace commission, composed of delegates from the several national authorities, which should hold annual sessions and which could be called together whenever it became evident that there was danger of a warlike contest between any of the contracting

<sup>72</sup> Lewis Appleton, *Fifty Years of Disarmament*, p. 5.



parties. This permanent commission would have no actual powers except those of mediation preceding or during a conflict, and of making suggestions concerning the reduction of standing armies and navies. It might agree to make recommendations for the progressive disarmament at some definite and proportional rate, or for the replacement of standing armies by an organized militia, say of the Swiss type.<sup>73</sup> This commission might submit its proposals to the legislatures in charge of the budgets, but there would be no guarantee that the governments would approve the propositions recommended to them.

Finally, on March 13, 1896, an "Increased Armaments Protest Committee" of British Liberal pacifists was formed "for purposes of agitation and education by literature and lectures as an antidote to the jingo and sham-patriotic sentiment prevailing." Dr. Spence Watson, M.P. and President of the National Liberal Federation (1890-1902), and A. H. Perris, M.P., headed the Committee. In the following April, the Committee of the British Peace Society issued a further protest against the enormous expenditure, actual and prospective, upon the navy.<sup>74</sup>

In the last decade of the nineteenth century efforts were made to enlist the support of labor in the movement for a limitation of armaments. Early in 1890 a Committee of the British Peace Society addressed a Memorial to the International Conference on the Labor Question, inviting the consideration of the injurious influences of the great armaments of Europe upon the working classes in particular, and suggesting the special relief to those classes which would be secured by a mutual disarmament. Mr. W. Evans Darby, the Secretary of the Society, journeyed to Berlin in order personally to promote a favorable reception of this Memorial and to interest influential persons in Germany in peace and arbitration.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>73</sup> *The North American Review*, CLXI (December, 1895), 678-79.

<sup>74</sup> *The Herald of Peace*, XXV (April, 1896), 41.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.* (April, 1890), p. 45.

Most of the European Socialist and working class congresses during the period 1888-98 passed resolutions moving the abolition of standing armies. American labor had already placed itself on record as favoring a limitation of armaments. At the conventions of the labor organizations in the United States held in 1846, 1850 and 1868, protests were made against foreign wars, and resolutions were passed demanding disarmament in foreign countries, so that republican institutions might develop and great problems might be solved peacefully.<sup>76</sup> In the early months of 1894, Randal Cremer, founder of the English Workmen's Peace Committee (1870), obtained the signatures of about 500 representatives of workingmen and leaders of Trade Unions to a Memorial to Mr. Gladstone, protesting against an increase of armaments. In the same year the Universal Peace Congress at Antwerp agreed that the Peace Societies should call for co-operation from the Workers' Associations. At the Socialist Congress in London in 1896 considerable attention was devoted to the subject of peace and disarmament. Resolutions were passed demanding (1) the abolition of Standing Armies and the establishment of a National Citizen Force; (2) the establishment of Tribunals of Arbitration to regulate peaceably disputes between nations; (3) the final decision on the question of War and Peace to be vested directly in the people in cases where the governments refuse to accept the decision of the tribunal of arbitration. The Congress, however, while sympathizing heartily with the objects of the Peace and Arbitration Societies, urged them to bear constantly in mind that until the antagonism of social interests which produces conflicts between capital and labor be dissolved, international solidarity would remain impossible.<sup>77</sup>

The persistent Liberal and Radical protest against increasing armament expenditure and the agitation for a limitation in

<sup>76</sup> *The Advocate of Peace*, LXI (May, 1899), III.

<sup>77</sup> *Agenda for the International Socialist Workers and Trade Union Congress, London, 1896* (London, 1896).

the late nineteenth century bore little fruit. It was a dream to suppose that any great reform like disarmament could be accomplished by any one party. Even if a limitation of armaments had been inserted as a plank in the party scheme it would have been very different from having it embodied in an Act of Parliament, or accepted internationally, as any disarmament proposition, if effectual, must be. It is, in fact, a long cry from one to the other. The only reforms which are likely to prove successful and permanent are those which command the assent of a decisive majority of the people. Disarmament, or even a limitation of armaments in the nineteenth century, was not supported by an all prevailing and pervasive public opinion. All propositions, therefore, were bound to fail.

Many pacifists were of opinion that the initiative in calling a disarmament conference could best be taken by the United States and Great Britain—the United States because she was far removed from Europe and, consequently, less likely to be drawn into participating in a European conflict; Great Britain because she was separated from the Continent by the Channel, which in the nineteenth century appeared to render her invulnerable. But the very reasons which peace advocates advanced for Great Britain and America taking the lead would have made disarmament proposals coming from them less acceptable to other powers. Great Continental states, less favorably situated geographically, would have objected that it was easy for England and the United States to propose sacrifices which would cost them nothing; they would not be willing to limit armaments if their independence were only guaranteed by the prestige of their defensive forces. Nor could Belgium suggest propositions for putting an end to the “armed peace,” for her permanent neutrality placed her in an entirely different situation from that of other states. Reasons of national pride and hopes of *revanche* prevented the initiative being taken by vanquished France. If Germany had proposed a limitation she would have been accused of wishing to stabilize the *status quo*

at a time when it was most agreeable to her. Likewise, a proposal from Austria-Hungary would have been opposed by the Balkan Slavs as forever sealing their fate. Any proposition coming from invulnerable Russia on the periphery of the armed camp, with only one European border to defend, would not have been regarded as sincere. Consequently, there was little hope of any one power successfully initiating a proposition for a limitation of armaments.

Moreover, the idea of a guaranteed truce of three to six months before entering on hostilities was not acceptable to the military powers of the late nineteenth century; the Austro-Prussian and Franco-German Wars had demonstrated what large well trained and well equipped armies quickly mobilized could accomplish in a short time. After 1870 every nation studied ways and means of shortening the period of mobilization in order to gain an initial advantage over its adversary. What in Napoleon's day took weeks and even months to perform in preparing for campaigns could, after 1870, be done in as many days. A truce of three to six months would only have worked to the advantage of the weaker and less efficient nations. Nor were the great powers any more willing to agree to a "Truce of God" for ten years or a shorter period, because no great state wished to bind itself in advance not to go to war in any circumstances; for conditions might arise quite different from those at the time the agreement was made.

An understanding not to add to the military and naval expenditure for a period of years, although it appears on the surface perfectly harmless, was considered with scepticism by states whose finances were sound and who could still afford to compete in the race. In their opinion it gave an advantage to states with exhausted treasuries but large populations, like Italy and Russia. These countries could still maintain huge armed forces through conscription, which was cheap in comparison with the building of modern battleships and the perfection of the instruments of war. Moreover, during a breathing

spell due to relief from excessive armament expenditure, a state might substitute money that would otherwise be used for military purposes for the building of railways and canals, which possess great strategical value and play an important part in the speedy mobilization of large armies.

The proposal for limiting the term of military service from three years to one or one and a quarter was, perhaps, the most practical, but technical difficulties in making the transition could always be magnified. Some nations with a large illiterate population, Italy and Russia for example, would have grumbled that the educational effects of military life would be seriously impaired and Russia would have added still another objection based upon the immense distances in her country. Besides, the reduction of the terms of military service would not have affected the naval budgets in the least; in fact, the money saved on military expenditure might have been transferred to the navies.

But if the naval powers had come to some agreement to limit the number or the tonnage of their battleships, the question of naval personnel would still have remained. Experienced seamen have always held it to be as important to provide crews as to build ships; the training of officers and men takes longer than the building of battleships, and it cannot be delayed until hostilities threaten. "In any event," writes Sir Archibald Hurd, "it must be evident that the number of officers and men who are 'borne,' to use the naval phrase, reacts on a country's expenditure, and affects its fighting power at sea quite as much as the building of men-of-war. Calculations of strength which are based on 'tons and guns' only are misleading. A navy is a matter of steel, but of steel mastered by brain and brawn."<sup>78</sup>

Finally, any one of these propositions, to be effective, must have been accepted simultaneously by all the great powers, for no state could disarm in the midst of heavily armed neighbors.

<sup>78</sup> Sir Archibald Hurd, "Navies of To-Day . . . Ships and Men Compared," *The Observer* (London), Sunday, April 14, 1935.

The question arises, which among them would have been willing to take the initiative in making the proposal? If an official proposal had been made and if we accept the hypothesis that the powers would have agreed to a limitation, then we must conclude that after the engagement they would have probably evaded the spirit of the limitation by devising new and more powerful means of destruction. A qualitative race would have superseded the quantitative competition in armaments, and, with the astounding inventions of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the qualitative factor has developed a new and overwhelming significance.

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### CHAPTER III

## THE MOVEMENT FOR DISARMAMENT WITHIN THE UNIVERSAL PEACE CONGRESSES, 1889-1898

THE PACIFIST movement, which before 1889 had manifested itself in numerous, isolated resolutions on peace, arbitration and disarmament, in that year became united in a common effort. This integration was accomplished through the organization of two international peace bodies: the Universal Peace Congresses and the Inter-Parliamentary Union. On May 19, 1889, at a Peace Demonstration in St. James's Hall, London, invitations were issued to the Peace organizations of the world to inaugurate a series of annual World Peace Congresses which should be held in the same city as the Inter-Parliamentary Conference, either immediately before or after it, whereby the whole of the Peace Movement might be represented every year in the same capital.

The work of the Universal Peace Congresses and the work of the Inter-Parliamentary Union have always been more or less complementary, but the two organizations have had different methods of attacking the peace problem. The Union, from its very nature, can approach governments from within; moreover, it has a higher official standing than any Peace Society or Arbitration League. The organizations represented in the Universal Peace Congresses, on the other hand, can address Parliaments only from without. They find their most important field of action in propaganda among their several national publics. Indirectly, they can bring some pressure to bear in Parliaments by encouraging the electorate to vote for those candidates only who are pledged to a peace program.

The Universal Peace Congresses were in effect a revival of the series of 1848-53 which had been curtailed at the outbreak of the Crimean War. In one respect, however, they differed from these earlier Congresses: They represented not one but four distinct types of peace organizations or groups of pacifist and international thought.<sup>1</sup> The first was that of the British and American Peace Societies, together with those of Scandinavia, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Italy and the Swiss branch, *Schweizer Friedensgesellschaft*, founded at Lucerne in 1889. These societies were both pacifist and religious in their outlook. The second group was composed of the societies modelled on the French *Ligue de la paix* founded by Passy in 1867, pacifist also, "but from the standpoint of human and international interdependence." The third was more political and social in outlook and was formed of associations based on the "League of Peace and Liberty" founded by Lemonnier at Geneva in 1867. M. Charles Lemonnier envisaged peace through the creation of an international political organization which would substitute a "juridical state" for a state of war by combining the three principles, arbitration, neutralization and federation. He advocated the substitution of democracy for monarchy everywhere, the separation of church and state and the formation of a United States of Europe. The fourth group was entirely secular and practical, concentrating its attention on arbitration. It was made up of bodies inspired by Hodgson Pratt after 1880, like the "International Arbitration and Peace Association of Great Britain and Ireland," and the *Comité de Paris de la Fédération Internationale de l'arbitrage et de la paix*, founded in 1883, which, after it absorbed Passy's Peace Society, became known as the *Société Française de l'arbitrage entre nations*.

The Universal Peace Congresses of the 'nineties devoted much more attention to the problem of armaments than did the Inter-Parliamentary Union during the same period. Every

<sup>1</sup> A. C. F. Beales, *The History of Peace*, p. 195.



Congress which convened throughout the decade passed in one form or another a resolution on the limitation of armaments. The first Universal Peace Congress, which sat in Paris from June 23 to 27, 1889, placed its chief emphasis on arbitration. Dr. Evans Darby, the newly installed Secretary of the British Peace Society, read a paper entitled "A League of Peace, or How May Arbitration Lead to Disarmament?"<sup>2</sup> This Congress considered the practice of arbitration to be the best road towards universal peace and disarmament.<sup>3</sup>

The next July the second Universal Peace Conference met at London and thoroughly examined the question of a limitation of armaments. Mr. David Dudley Field, an American jurist, speaking of disarmament at the inaugural meeting, emphasized that arbitration and disarmament supplement each other. "If nations disarm," he said, "they do so because of their belief that they can settle their disputes in a manner different from a resort to arms. They have found another and better way. If they agree to arbitrate, and believe in the inviolability of the agreement, they will of course disarm, inasmuch as armaments will then have become useless."<sup>4</sup>

The statement, "If they agree to arbitrate, and believe in the inviolability of the agreement, they will of course disarm," is the crux of the whole problem of the relationship between arbitration and disarmament. The essence of arbitration is that it results in an award which is both authoritative and final. As Sir James Headlam-Morley writes: "A State which has agreed to accept an arbitral award, thereby, so far as the award goes, definitely surrenders its own free will, and irrevocably condemns itself to passive submission."<sup>5</sup> This fact,

<sup>2</sup> W. E. Darby, "A League of Peace, Or How May Arbitration Lead to Disarmament?", *The Herald of Peace*, September 2, 1889, pp. 279-83.

<sup>3</sup> *Bulletin du 1<sup>er</sup> Congr s Universel de la Paix, Paris, 1889* (Berne, 1901), p. 23.

<sup>4</sup> *Report of the Universal Peace Congress held at London, 1890* (London, 1890), p. 11.

<sup>5</sup> Sir James Headlam-Morley, *Studies in Diplomatic History* (London, 1930), p. 14.

together with the one that arbitration means a settlement in accordance with existing treaty rights, is the reason that on the vital questions which disturbed Europe in the nineteenth century states were reluctant to adopt the method. So long as they regarded war as the normal method of settling their important disputes, they could not possibly disarm.

During the morning session of July 17, the Reverend R. B. Howard of Boston presented a paper on disarmament and moved a resolution of four parts, the third of which suggested that "the Government which should first dismiss any considerable number of soldiers would confer a signal benefit on Europe and mankind, because it would oblige other Governments, urged on by public opinion, to follow its example." The Congress recommended that the Peace Societies "carry on an active propaganda among the people, especially at the time of Parliamentary elections, in order that the electors should give their votes to those candidates who have included in their program, Peace, Disarmament, and Arbitration."<sup>6</sup>

In his paper Mr. Howard said that it seemed to him before governments could be brought to change the ancient for the modern policy of determining the questions at issue between them, they might enter upon disarmament with no sacrifice of either principle or pride if the conditions suggested in the program of the Congress were met. These were:

1. Disarmament should be *gradual*. This is to save the sudden shock of the dismissal to civil life of millions of men now under discipline untrained to labour, and thus unprepared for citizenship. There is danger that sudden disarmament would at once augment the idlers, the strikers and the mobs. . . .

2. Disarmament ought to be *simultaneous*. As nations are now constituted it *must* be. One nation, if both are equally armed, will be slow to lead another in disarming. . . . Simultaneousness can then be secured only with the co-operation of two, possibly three, leading Powers, . . . in this, one nation must take the initiative.

<sup>6</sup> *Report of the Universal Peace Congresses held at London, 1890*, pp. 166-67.

3. It must be *mutual*. Neither France nor Germany would consider disarmament except as a mutual act. If thus entered upon the lesser Powers might easily follow their example. . . . As soon as a mutual agreement could be made between the leading Powers a general disarmament would naturally follow.

4. The disarmament must be *proportional*. This is in the interest of equity and the balance of forces.<sup>7</sup>

At the same Congress, Signor E. T. Moneta of Milan read a paper, "Le Désarmement," in which he described the military condition of Europe in 1890.<sup>8</sup> Mrs. Belva A. Lockwood followed him with her dissertation, "Is Any Scheme For Disarmament Practical at The Present Time?"<sup>9</sup> Her main thesis was that "the way is open for Treaties of Arbitration by the nations of the World, and under its disarmament becomes easy."<sup>10</sup>

The third Universal Peace Congress in session at Rome in November, 1891, decided to invite all the Peace Societies, the societies of workers and all the friends of peace to pursue simultaneously in all the countries a popular and parliamentary agitation to obtain:

1. The conclusion of permanent arbitration treaties between the people, under the reciprocal guarantee of the autonomy of the contracting nations, and the constitution of a Tribunal of International Arbitration;

2. The election, as members of all the Parliaments, of partisan representatives of reforms advocated by the Congress;

3. A Conference of European Powers in order to bring about a mutual, proportional and simultaneous disarmament.<sup>11</sup>

In August, 1892, Dr. Darby presented the question of the limitation of armaments to the Berne Peace Congress in another paper, "Armed Peace or the Value of the Principle,

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 168.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 169-71.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 171-73.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 173.

<sup>11</sup> *Bulletin Officiel du Troisième Congrès Internationale de la Paix tenu à Rome, Novembre 1891* (Rome, 1891), pp. 173-74.

Si vis Pacem, para Bellum, as Illustrated by the Present Condition of Europe," and in the name of the Peace Society of London he proposed three resolutions, the first of which was: "Inasmuch as the policy based on the principle 'Si vis pacem, para bellum' has proved to be ineffectual to prevent the greatest wars of modern times, this Congress invites the European Powers to substitute for this policy that of definitive disarmament."<sup>12</sup> This resolution was adopted by a large majority.

A disarmament proposition with definite provisions was also submitted to the Peace Congress at Berne by M. H. William Blymyer, who in his *Mémoire sur la sanction des arbitrages* (second part) proposed:

1. That beginning with January, 1895, each of the signatory nations of the treaty shall have reduced the number of its soldiers to a figure which shall not exceed one for every 1,000 inhabitants and that this figure shall be maintained during the duration of the treaty;
2. That soldiers of every class be included in this figure; but that it shall be permitted to retain officers on condition that the aforementioned proportion shall not be exceeded;
3. That it shall be forbidden every nation to construct, within one year, more vessels of more than 3,000 tons of displacement which may, with or without modifications, be used as vessels of war;
4. That it shall be forbidden every nation to construct fortifications, unless they be more than 20 km. distant from its frontiers;
5. That the fortifications which now exist in this zone may be preserved, but not improved.<sup>13</sup>

Discussion of the limitation of armaments ran throughout the sessions of the Fifth Universal Peace Congress convened in Chicago in August, 1893. On August 18 the Reverend G. Dana Boardman, speaking on the "Relation of Nationalism to Inter-

<sup>12</sup> *Bulletin Officiel du IV<sup>me</sup> Congrès de la Paix, tenu à Berne, 1892* (Berne, 1892), p. 88.

<sup>13</sup> *Bulletin Officiel du IV<sup>me</sup> Congrès Universel de la Paix, tenu à Berne, 1892*, Annexe VII, p. 210; also reprinted in the *Bulletin Officiel du XII<sup>e</sup> Congrès Universel de la Paix, tenu à Rouen et au Havre, 1903* (Berne, 1903), Annexe IV, pp. 261-62.

nationalism or Mankind one Body," stated his belief that the Divine Master was summoning the nations to a policy of disarmament. He suggested that America should propose disarmament to other nations, substituting arbitration, or some other pacific policy for armaments.<sup>14</sup>

A second appeal for disarmament was addressed to the Congress by the Reverend Philip S. Moxon, D.D., of Boston, at the Sunday service on August 20. At the ninth session on August 18 a paper by Mme. Griess-Traut<sup>15</sup> containing arguments and reasons for the conversion of destructive armies into productive ones, and a scheme for disarmament by W. H. Blymyer were referred to the Business Committee.<sup>16</sup> Finally, on August 19 there was adopted a resolution urging the maintenance of the Rush-Bagot Agreement between the United States and Great Britain, a treaty practically prohibiting the keeping of armed vessels on the Great Lakes and thus dedicating them to permanent peace.<sup>17</sup> The Congress appealed to the press of both countries to use its great influence on behalf of the maintenance of this important agreement.<sup>18</sup>

The Sixth Universal Peace Congress met at Antwerp in August, 1894. Before the Conference gathered, the Peace Societies expressed in a special report their diverse ideas upon the subject of a truce or a suspension of armaments; this report was followed by a text of an address of the Committee of "International Arbitration and Peace Association" to the Government of Great Britain in order to engage it to take the initiative of a proposition tending to disarmament.

<sup>14</sup> *Report of the Fifth Universal Peace Congress Held at Chicago, August, 1893* (Boston, 1893), pp. 222-23. The Reverend Boardman, President of the Christian Arbitration and Peace Society, made a similar proposal in his address, "The Disarmament of Nations," before the annual meeting of the society in Washington, D. C., March 4, 1890, *Public Opinion*, VIII (1889-90), 535.

<sup>15</sup> Mme. Gress-Traut was one of the organizers of the Paris Peace Congress in 1889.

<sup>16</sup> *Report of the Fifth Universal Peace Congress*, pp. 260, 262.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 293, Resolution No. 3.

<sup>18</sup> An agitation among the Great Lakes Shipbuilders for the right to build and launch warships on the lakes called forth this resolution.

Two motions, however, deviated a little from the responses to questionnaires sent previously to the Peace Societies. The *Unione Lombarda* desired that there should be a discussion of the support that the Peace Societies ought to give to the governments which had "proved by some acts their intention of transforming as much as possible the costly and dangerous armed peace into a durable peace based upon law."<sup>19</sup> At Zürich *La Société académique de la paix* proposed that the Swiss Peace Societies make use of the initiative procedure to enable the Swiss Federal Council to call a Congress of European powers, where the question of disarmament would be conscientiously discussed; and that the other Peace Societies of Europe support this initiative by a mass petition which could be considered as the expression of the popular wish.<sup>20</sup>

Dealing with the question of a truce in armaments, the International Bureau of Peace had addressed a circular to all the pacifist societies of the world, the responses to which were summarized in a report of May 10, 1894. The Legislative Section, taking this report as a basis, formulated a resolution attempting to embody the various opinions. In this proposition the Congress expressed its conviction that the conclusion of the treaty of permanent arbitration advocated by it would permit the European Powers to decrease their armaments. The hope was voiced that a favorable response would be made by all the European Powers to an invitation which could be issued by any one of them, to an international conference relative to a truce in armaments. Finally the Congress entreated the governments to claim no new increase of their war budgets or of their navies in the meantime, and invited the Parliaments to reject entirely all demands which would have for result the direct or indirect augmentation of the military charges weighing upon their people. The Bureau of the Congress was charged with transmitting the resolution to the Inter-Parliamentary

<sup>19</sup> *Bulletin Officiel du VI<sup>me</sup> Congrès de la Paix, tenu à Anvers, 1894*, p. 9.

<sup>20</sup> *Loc. cit.*

Conference at The Hague.<sup>21</sup> This proposal was adopted unanimously.

The same question was placed on the agenda of the Peace Congress which assembled at Scheveningen in 1895. Moreover, the German Peace Society formulated the proposition that parliamentary delegates be invited to oppose all augmentation of the military charges so long as no negotiations for a general disarmament have taken place.<sup>22</sup>

The problem of a limitation of armaments also occupied the attention of the Budapest Peace Congress of September, 1896. Mme. Griess-Traut again presented a proposal for the transformation of unproductive and warlike armies into pacific and productive ones.<sup>23</sup> Mr. W. P. Byles, a former British Liberal M.P., moved a resolution to the effect that the Congress protest against the constantly increasing expenditure on armaments and urge the members of the various legislatures throughout the world to vote against any further increase, and also call upon the voters in every country to vote only for those candidates who would support this policy.<sup>24</sup> Mr. Byles proposed only to prevent new armaments; he did not advocate disarmament.<sup>25</sup> The proposition was opposed by Dr. Kolben on the ground that the projected resolution was only a repetition of the one passed at the Congress of 1894. Nevertheless, the resolution was accepted, and on its being embodied in the report, it was unanimously adopted by the Congress.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>21</sup> *Bulletin Officiel du VI<sup>me</sup> Congrès de la Paix, tenu à Anvers*, pp. 98-99.

<sup>22</sup> *Bulletin Officiel du VII<sup>me</sup> Congrès Universel de la Paix, tenu à Budapest, 1896* (Berne, 1896), pp. 84-85.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 65-68.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 84.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 85.

<sup>26</sup> No doubt it was the action of the seventh Universal Peace Congress on the limitation of armaments that M. Basili, Russian Consul-General in Budapest, reported to St. Petersburg instead of the supposed Inter-Parliamentary resolutions and reports of 1896, as was claimed by Stead, the St. Petersburg correspondent of the *Times*, a special correspondent of the *Daily News*, de Lapradelle and Nicholas Notovitch. Cf. *infra*, Chapter IV, p. 95 *et seq.* and Chapter IX, p. 173 *et seq.*

During the interval between the 1896 meeting and the Congress at Hamburg, a committee studied the idea of the transformation of destructive armies into productive armies. A report and *mémoire* of M. Raoul de la Grasserie, *La Transformation des armées destructives en armées productives*, was prepared and transmitted to the various Peace Societies before the Congress met. He recommended the reduction of the national armies to a minimum. The army should be an international army of peace, for so long as armies remain national, they would of necessity be armies for war. The end desired by La Grasserie was the substitution of an international army reduced to the necessary minimum and recruited by voluntary enlistment. This army should be used for great public works, with the result that the people would lose their military idolatry. Thus through a gradual transformation, the army of labor would become an army of peace. His pamphlet of thirty-two pages concluded by advocating the adoption of a system recommended by Mme. Griess-Traut in 1893, namely, that during the suppression of the armed peace, an army of labor should serve as the intermediary between the present army of war and the future army of peace.<sup>27</sup> M. Gaston Moch, also a member of the Committee, drew up and distributed at the opening of the Congress a memorandum entitled, "Comment se fera le désarmement." The Congress took note of the pamphlets of M. Moch and M. La Grasserie and requested the Committee to continue its labors.<sup>28</sup>

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Thus every Universal Peace Congress between 1889 and 1898 passed a resolution either protesting against increasing armaments or proposing a limitation of them or a study of the

<sup>27</sup> Raoul de la Grasserie, *De la Transformation des armées destructives en armées productives* (Paris, 1894), p. 32.

<sup>28</sup> *Bulletin Officiel du VIII<sup>e</sup> Congrès Universel de la Paix, tenu à Hamburg, 1897* (Berne, 1897), pp. 87 and 99.



problem. All the members of the Peace Congresses were more or less agreed in sentiment, and if passing their propositions would have saved the world from the heavy burden of armaments, they should have done an immense amount of good at their conferences and at home. But after their resolutions were voted they were faced with a much greater problem: how to carry them into effect. Peace congresses are not official; they are merely meetings of unauthorized persons who are not elected by the citizens of their respective states. The work of peace societies and peace congresses is to create and develop an enlightened public opinion on questions of peace, arbitration and disarmament. Judged from the actual results achieved during the 'nineties, the deliberations of the Universal Peace Congresses on the subject of disarmament must appear a little disappointing. In spite of their resolutions urging a limitation of armaments and the convening of an International Conference to study the problem, they do not seem to have greatly impressed governments, for when at last the initiative was taken, it happened not in one of the countries which might have been expected to be influenced by the agitation of pacific organizations, but in an autocratic land where all peace propaganda was carefully censored and where no peace society existed until 1899.

These Congresses also advocated the general use of arbitration; for their members looked upon it as the best means of securing disarmament and, eventually, peace. They hoped to build up a complete and water-tight system which would necessarily, without equivocation, provide a peaceful settlement of every kind of international dispute.

The theory that disarmament will come through the adoption of arbitration is irrational, for governments refuse to accept it for the settlement of *all* their differences. The limited sphere of operations to which it must be confined renders arbitration a partial substitute for war in international relations. Arbitration is useful to decide only certain types of cases. "Dis-

putes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparations to be made for any such breach," are declared, in Article 13 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, "to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement." Arbitration is not applicable when one party or the other wants to change existing law, to revise a treaty or to alter the *status quo*. There is territory on the Continent of Europe to which more than one state considers it possesses an indefeasible national right; thus there will be in the future, as in the past, some power or group of powers dissatisfied with the territorial arrangement. No territorial settlement can ever be permanent; change is necessary from time to time. Yet, if arbitration means the enforcement of the existing law and the acceptance of the *status quo*, it is obvious that either some efficacious method of peaceful change must be devised or states will have to rely on war for its accomplishment. To a certain extent the League of Nations attempted to solve this difficulty by providing machinery, as yet imperfect, for the settlement of *political*, as distinct from *judicial*, disputes. But in international society, if peace is to be maintained, there is need for a legislature, an executive, and an armed force as well as a judicature.

Arbitration is inapplicable to a question which has reference to the existence of a state or its relative position amongst other states. "Arbitration can only declare relations which already exist, whereas war brings about new relations, or converts relations *in posse* into relations *in esse*." War is a process of readjustment and as such is one of advance or retrogression; it does not deal simply with accomplished facts as is the case with litigation in all its forms. *It accomplishes the fact.*<sup>29</sup> James

<sup>29</sup> James Lorimer, *Studies National and International* (Edinburgh, 1890), Chapter VIII, "The 'Three Rules of Washington' Viewed in Their Relation to International Arbitration," p. 100.

Lorimer, Professor of Law in the University of Edinburgh in the 'eighties, states that in so far as the Franco-German War was a fight for the hegemony of Europe, it did not admit of arbitration. The "Eastern Question," being a question of the preponderance of Russia in the west of Asia and the east of Europe, he considered also beyond the reach of arbitration.<sup>30</sup>

These questions, along with many others which divided Europe in the nineteenth century, were incapable of adjustment along juridical lines; they involved considerations distinctly beyond and higher than law, as international law then existed; whereas a Permanent Tribunal, to take cognizance of all cases, must perforce be governed by law as it exists. States were unwilling to submit to a tribunal the general principles of which had not been crystallized into a code. They were only willing to arbitrate legal disputes and insisted on the exclusion of all political issues that could not be reduced to legal terms. These "non-justiciable" disputes were interwoven with questions of "national honour" and "vital interests," and on these points most states even today prefer to fight rather than arbitrate.

Since "Arbitration is a contract by which two parties agree to abide by the decision of a third,"<sup>31</sup> it is possible only between two parties, both of whom possess a rational and consenting will. This eliminates arbitration as a means of settling disputes between civilized nations and barbarians. The latter could not appoint arbitrators whose decision civilized nations could trust, nor could civilized nations trust to the acceptance of their decisions by barbarians. Professor Lorimer writes: "If opinion, moreover, be but a slender compulsitor in the case of civilized men, in the case of barbarians it is no compulsitor at all. Arbitration is a proceeding which makes very high claims on the intellectual and moral qualities of the parties as well as of the judges. It consequently is applicable only between civilized nations probably of a somewhat dispassionate

<sup>30</sup> *Loc. cit.*

temperament.”<sup>32</sup> For this reason it has proved most successful between the two great Anglo-Saxon nations, Great Britain and the United States.

Further, the fact that arbitration results in an award which is authoritative and final makes states reluctant to adopt it for the settlement of their most important questions. Reference to a mixed commission is, however, radically different from real arbitration; for by the former procedure, each of the governments concerned knows that an adverse decision cannot be given against it, except with the consent of at least one of its own representatives. This type of investigation provides security that the commissioners will not be guided by rules of law which are not recognized by one or another of the contending parties. The settlement of disputes by a mixed commission, therefore, eliminates the danger which many governments fear in arbitration; namely, that they may be compelled to surrender interests of real importance, by virtue of a judgment, the justice and impartiality of which is not convincing.<sup>33</sup>

Nonetheless, where vital interests are concerned, something may be accomplished by conciliation and mediation. But if these fail, Sir James Headlam-Morley writes, “then arbitration, compulsorily imposed, involving as it does a final and definite decree from which there is no appeal, might easily do more harm than good. Far better leave the problem unsettled, hoping that, as has often happened in the past, time and delay may help to bring a solution.”<sup>34</sup> Moreover, compulsory arbitration, if it is to be effective, presupposes the creation of an International Army, charged with executing the decrees of an International Tribunal upon a recalcitrant state. But this will only come when the nations are ready for the intermediate step of moral compulsion, imposed by a self-assumed obligation—by a promise. Captain A. T. Mahan of the United States Navy wrote as follows in 1899:

<sup>32</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>33</sup> Sir James Headlam-Morley, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 48.

Compulsory arbitration as yet means only the moral compulsion of a pledge, taken beforehand, and more or less comprehensive, to submit to arbitration questions which rest still in the unknown future; the very terms of which therefore cannot be foreseen. Although there is a certain active current of agitation in favor of such stipulations, there is no general disposition of governments to accede, except under very narrow and precise limitations, and in questions of less than secondary importance.<sup>35</sup>

Thus international arbitration is to be regarded as an aid to diplomacy rather than as a substitute for war. It has proved extremely successful in removing causes of irritation which have disrupted international cordiality and which eventually might have led to war. But voluntary arbitration must always be of the nature of a friendly suit, and the first condition of its possibility must be that both parties have determined not to go to war.<sup>36</sup> Even in the minor matters where it has been most successful, Headlam-Morley states, investigation seems to show first of all that the two states in controversy have decided that it is to their common advantage to arrive at a peaceful settlement.<sup>37</sup> There is an absolute indisposition on the part of most states to promise beforehand that any arbiters other than themselves shall be accepted in questions of the future, the import of which cannot be discerned. For the settlement of their most serious differences governments rely on the arbitrament of war. Although they "trust in God," they "keep their powder dry"; consequently, general disarmament for the great powers will always remain an idle dream.

History proves that the mere passing of resolutions, even unanimously, by peace conferences, will not suffice to bring about peace and a limitation of armaments. Many of the nineteenth century pacifists did not seem to realize that the only way to stop war is to remove its causes. But these causes lie far deeper than arbitration can reach, and if war is to

<sup>35</sup> Captain A. T. Mahan, "The Peace Conference and the Moral Aspects of War," *The North American Review*, CLXIX (October, 1899), 438.

<sup>36</sup> James Lorimer, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

<sup>37</sup> Sir James Headlam-Morley, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

be averted it must be by other means. Peace cannot be compassed by an enforcement of or half-hearted acquiescence in the *status quo*. It will be realized only with time and progress which will lead to a juster conception of international relations and with the establishment of a rational international political system under which each nation feels that its reasonable demands have been met. Until then war is to be expected; although it may be avoided on one occasion, it will inevitably occur on some other.

\* \* \* \* \*

## CHAPTER IV

### THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION AND THE QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT

#### THE IDEA

THE FIRST person to draw attention to the necessity of closer contact being established between Members of Parliament in all countries was undoubtedly the Austrian Deputy, Robert von Walterskirchen.<sup>1</sup> Certainly the idea of an Inter-Parliamentary Union was mooted as early as 1874 when Dr. Lowenthal<sup>2</sup> of Berlin expressed his views in favor of an international parliament. In the autumn of the next year Dr. Albert Fischhof<sup>3</sup> of Austria brought the subject forward at a meeting of the Austro-Hungarian Delegations, his primary object being to secure a gradual disarmament throughout Europe. He proposed the calling of an annual Conference of the deputies of all nations, whose main task should be the endeavor to reduce the heavy burden of standing armies. This proposal was communicated to a number of French and Italian Deputies, who warmly approved it. Baron Dücker<sup>4</sup> laid it before members of the German Reichstag, of whom nearly fifty expressed their adhesion.

<sup>1</sup> Professor L. Quidde, "The Creation of the Inter-Parliamentary Union," *The Inter-Parliamentary Union from 1889-1939* (Lausanne, Geneva, 1939), p. 3. Cf. p. 3 *et seq.*

<sup>2</sup> In January, 1874, Edward Lowenthal formed a Peace Committee in Berlin, and a year later he began the publication of a pacifist journal, *Deutsche Laterne*.

<sup>3</sup> In 1875 Adolph Fischhof published an article entitled "The Reduction of Continental Armies," and early in 1876 introduced a motion for the reduction of arms in the Austrian Chamber of Deputies.

<sup>4</sup> Baron Dücker also pursued the idea of establishing contacts between members of Parliaments but with arbitration, instead of the reduction of armaments, in the foreground.

The first Conference was to have been held in 1877, when the quota of reduction was to be discussed and agreed upon. Arrangements were to have been made for the introduction of the following resolution into each Parliament:

The House expects with confidence that the Government will shortly declare to all continental Powers, or at least to all the great Powers on the Continent, their readiness to reduce their standing armies by the quota arranged by the Conference in case the respective Powers do the same.<sup>5</sup>

This movement proved abortive, for the Bulgarian atrocities and the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War for the time paralyzed the efforts of the friends of peace. It was utterly useless to discuss a reduction of armaments while Russian was invading Turkey, while Austria was pouring troops into Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the British Fleet lay anchored in Besika Bay, only awaiting instructions for an advance through the Dardanelles to Constantinople.

Four other men, Don Arturo de Marcoartu,<sup>6</sup> Dr. Virchow,<sup>7</sup> M. Edmond Thiaudière and Henry Richard also suggested or elaborated plans for an Inter-Parliamentary Peace Party or Union. Marcoartu examined the idea in his *Internationalism* published in 1876, and mentioned it to Italian and Austrian delegates in the same year. Finally he incorporated the notion in his scheme of International Arbitration of 1885. He proposed that, pending the building up of a code of international law and the appointment of an International Assembly and Court, a system of inter-parliamentary conferences should be

<sup>5</sup> Howard Evans, *Sir Randal Cremer* (London, 1909), p. 135.

<sup>6</sup> Marcoartu, the pioneer of the peace movement in Spain, secured, in 1870, the insertion of an arbitration clause in a treaty concluded by Spain with the Republic of Uruguay. In 1885, he elaborated a scheme of International Arbitration noteworthy for the manner in which it provided for gradual evolution as against direct creation. Throughout his senatorial career he regularly introduced motions for a Permanent International Tribunal.

<sup>7</sup> Dr. Virchow, a Social Democrat, attracted notice when, on November 5, 1869, he proposed in the Prussian Chamber of Deputies that the North German Confederation should give a lead to Europe in the matter of disarmament.



resorted to for the settlement of international problems.<sup>8</sup> In 1878, before the Paris Peace Congress, Dr. Virchow advocated that members of the different European Parliaments should also meet in Paris to examine the question of disarmament.<sup>9</sup> While at this Universal Peace Congress, M. Thiaudière proposed to convoke "an annual Congress composed exclusively of members of parliaments belonging to the different nations." He believed that the influence which the decisions of such a European Parliament were bound to have upon public opinion would reverberate upon the Governments and orientate their politics. In addition, these reunions would have the immense advantage of accustoming Europe to the federal mechanism.<sup>10</sup> Henry Richard, Secretary of the London Peace Society, who for years before the birth of the Inter-Parliamentary Union corresponded with various statesmen with a view to bringing about its creation, wrote, in January, 1882, as follows to his French colleague, Frédéric Passy:

You know that the idea of a certain number of members of different Parliaments coming together has often been expressed. It is evident that if one such project could be wisely conducted to a good end it would result in considerable advantages. Do you wish to make known to me your opinion on this subject, and tell me if we can count upon the participation of a certain number of your colleagues of the Chamber?<sup>11</sup>

#### THE FORMATION

The formation of the Union Interparlementaire was the result of a concerted movement in Great Britain, France and the United States in favor of the conclusion of treaties of arbitration between the United States on the one hand and Great Britain and France on the other. But the practical initia-

<sup>8</sup> *Herald of Peace*, 1885, p. 153.

<sup>9</sup> Frédéric Passy, *Pour la Paix* (Paris, 1909), p. 94.

<sup>10</sup> Gaston Moch, *Autour de la Conférence Interparlementaire* (Paris, 1895), pp. 9-10.

<sup>11</sup> Frédéric Passy, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

tive in founding the organization came from an Englishman, William Randal Cremer (later Sir),<sup>12</sup> who was assisted by a Frenchman, M. Frédéric Passy, the well known economist and philanthropist. Beyond the comparatively small circle of social reformers and peace enthusiasts Cremer's name is almost forgotten. Nevertheless, "for nearly forty years," writes his biographer, "he set before himself a task which might have daunted the greatest statesmen of Europe. . . . He said, 'This one thing can I do' and to this one thing every other consideration was subordinate." In 1870, he founded the Workmen's Peace Committee, out of which grew, in 1883, the Workmen's Peace Association, which in turn, in 1888, became the International Arbitration League; <sup>13</sup> in 1887, his association initiated an address to President Cleveland in favor of a treaty of arbitration between the United States and Great Britain. This address, signed by 223 members of Parliament, was delivered to President Cleveland by a deputation headed by Mr. Andrew Carnegie, on October 31, 1887, exactly a year before the preliminary meeting of the "Conference interparlementaire pour l'arbitrage international" which subsequently was called the Union Interparlementaire.<sup>14</sup>

Mr. Cremer knew that if his project were to be a success, it would be necessary to enlist the co-operation of representative fellow-workers in other lands; he therefore communicated with an old colleague—a veteran in the cause—M. Frédéric Passy. Cremer went to Paris in June, 1888, interviewed some French deputies, and was received by M. Goblet, Minister for Foreign Affairs. A nucleus of devoted men, Simon, Clémenceau, Siegfried, Périn and others was formed in France, while Cremer occupied himself with organizing the participation of the English. Later, the French Committee addressed an invitation to

<sup>12</sup> In 1903 Sir Randal Cremer received the Nobel Peace Prize of 7,000 pounds which he devoted to the cause of peace and arbitration.

<sup>13</sup> Howard Evans, *Radical Fights of Forty Years* (London, 1913), p. 113.

<sup>14</sup> Christian L. Lange, *Histoire documentaire de L'Union Interparlementaire*, Conference de 1888 (Bruxelles, 1915), pp. 1-2.

the British group to come to Paris. Accordingly, on Sunday morning, October 31, 1888, in the Salle du Zodiaque of the Grand Hotel, a meeting was convened under the presidency of M. Jules Simon, an ex-Premier of France.<sup>15</sup> The thirty-four men assembled, nine British and twenty-five French,<sup>16</sup> resolved to call a conference for the following year to which peace advocates in other Parliaments should be invited for a special discussion of the most practical means of organizing world peace by simultaneous concerted action in the national legislatures.

The invitation was issued in the spring of 1889, and the first Inter-Parliamentary Conference opened in Paris on June 29, 1889. About one hundred delegates attended, nearly all French or English, with a small number from six other parliaments. Although the early advocates of an inter-parliamentary peace organization considered that it should deal with the question of disarmament, the Union was actually founded with a rather limited scope—that of promoting the practice of arbitration in the settlement of international differences. In the words of Lord Weardale, who as the Honorable Philip Stanhope assisted in organizing the Union, its basic principle was the “co-operation of the Parliaments of the world in the maintenance of Peace by the promotion of the principles of arbitration and the establishment of international courts of justice.” The Union Interparlementaire has contributed more than any other agency to the extensive use of arbitration. It exercised a great influence upon the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration by the First Hague Conference and took the initiative in requesting the convening of the Second Conference at The Hague. Moreover, it elaborated the model treaty of arbitration which served as a basis of deliberations for the Second Conference.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Frédéric Passy, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

<sup>16</sup> Twenty-four deputies and one senator.

<sup>17</sup> *Annuaire Interparlementaire*, 1931, p. 630; also *Compte Rendu de la XIII<sup>e</sup> Conférence tenue à Bruxelles*, September, 1905, pp. 153–67. English and French texts of Draft of A General Arbitration Treaty suggested for approval of the XIII Interparliamentary Conference and for submission to the Second Hague Conference, by Richard Bartholdt, President of the American group.

In the Union Interparlementaire are representatives of all types of political opinion, all the religious faiths as well as free thought, all the social institutions—monarchies as well as republics. But a vast majority of its early members were "Liberals," "Advanced Liberals," "Radicals," "Democrats" and "Social Democrats" in politics; and, as far as British representatives were concerned, Nonconformist in religion. Many were pacifists in the strict sense of the term and attended and took a leading part in the Universal Peace Congresses. Sir Randal Cremer was a "Radical" as were his colleagues, the Honorable Philip Stanhope (later Lord Weardale), Thomas Burt, Thomas Snape and Charles Fenwick. Sir Joseph Pease, Wilfred Lawson and W. P. Byles were Liberals. In the early records of the Union one finds the names of the most outstanding liberal, progressive and democratic figures in European affairs: M. Frédéric Passy, French economist, pacifist and philanthropist; Jules Simon, ex-Premier of France; MM. Gaillard, Siegfried, Arnaud, and Moch, French deputies; M. Gobat, Swiss National Councillor and Chief of Public Instruction in the Canton of Berne; M. Charles Lemonnier, Swiss deputy and founder of the League of Peace and Liberty; M. Beernaert, President of the Belgian Chamber; M. Henri La Fontaine, Belgian Senator and author of *Histoire documentaire des arbitrages*; M. F. Bajer, member of the Danish Folkething and untiring advocate of the neutralization of Denmark; M. Horst, President of the Norwegian Odelsting, and M. Lund, President of the Storting, the first person of the Kingdom after the King; Marquis Don Arturo de Marcoartu, Spanish Senator and pioneer advocate of arbitration; Marquis Pandolfi, Italian deputy; and Count Apponyi, Hungarian deputy.

Inasmuch as the Inter-Parliamentary Union is chiefly composed of British Liberals and members of the Continental Parties of the Left, it is not completely representative of the nations. The Conservatives and parties of the Right do not appear to take an important part in its work. As the qualifica-

tion for membership in the Union is membership in a national parliament, any Member of Parliament or deputy who feels inclined may join the organization. Representatives to the Conferences are chosen by each national group, but any member of the Union who wishes may attend the reunions and take part in their proceedings. The Inter-Parliamentary Union has received valuable assistance from the governments. The Norwegian Storting set the first example; after about sixty of its members had joined the Union, and had chosen three representatives to the Conference in London in 1890, it voted (July, 1890) 1,200 krone for the traveling expenses of the delegates.<sup>18</sup> In 1906 the British Parliament voted £500 towards the expenses of receiving the Inter-Parliamentary Conference which met in the Royal Gallery of the House of Lords.<sup>19</sup> After the establishment of a permanent Secretariat of the Union on a satisfactory basis, Mr. Lloyd George decided, in 1908, to propose to Parliament the provision of an annual grant to the Inter-Parliamentary Union of a sum not exceeding £300. Other countries also have made contributions to the Union.<sup>20</sup>

Each national group has its Council and its Secretary and is represented in the Inter-Parliamentary Bureau,<sup>21</sup> or Council, as it was afterwards called. When finally organized in 1892, the Union could assail governments from within. Its work is positive and practical, while its declarations have a recognized standing which is higher than that of any peace society or arbitration league petition. The members, although belonging to numerous countries and representing various shades of political thought, meet in conference for one purpose only—to foster peace. The special significance of the Inter-Parliamentary Conferences lies in the fact that they are composed of

<sup>18</sup> K. P. Arnoldson, *Pax Mundi* (London, 1909), p. 132.

<sup>19</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, Fourth series, CLXII, col. 1048.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, CXCIV, cols. 308-9.

<sup>21</sup> The headquarters of the Union were first fixed at Berne, but in 1909 were transferred to Brussels. During the World War they were temporarily moved to Christiania, and now Geneva has become the permanent seat of the Union Interparlementaire.

legislators chosen by the people; they speak with authority because they are supported by millions of electors in many lands. The national groups carry the resolutions passed by the Conference to the knowledge of their governments and parliaments and endeavor to bring about action along the lines indicated.

The beginnings of the Inter-Parliamentary Union movement were modest. At first the chief discussion was on the theme that "the differences between States shall be submitted to an arbitral tribunal to be definitely settled." But the deliberations ultimately spread to other questions of public international law, with the purpose of maintaining peace. The Union has occupied itself with questions embracing the organization of a Society of Nations and an International Tribunal, neutrality, armaments, the laws of war, prizes, the treatment of foreigners and private international law.

#### THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION AND THE DISARMAMENT QUESTION

The Inter-Parliamentary Union has not devoted so much attention to the question of the limitation of armaments as it has to that of arbitration. In fact, its primary purpose is evident from its first name, "Conférence interparlementaire pour l'arbitrage international." This does not mean that the burden of military and naval armaments has not been considered by the organization; on the contrary, there has hardly been a single conference where the overwhelming burden of armaments has not been pointed out. But the Union in its early years concentrated its activity on the problem of Inter-State Arbitration and only rarely studied the possibility of an arrest of the armament competition.<sup>22</sup> A Secretary General, Christian L. Lange, writing in 1911, states that "one cannot say that the question of a limitation of military charges has yet found on

<sup>22</sup> Christian L. Lange, "The Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Reduction of Armaments," *The Inter-Parliamentary Union from 1899-1939*, p. 61; also, Christian L. Lange, *Union Interparlementaire, Résolution des conférences et décisions principales du conseil* (Bruxelles, 1911), p. 20.

the part of the Union, all the interest that it merits.”<sup>23</sup> This was, indeed, true of the first ten years of its history. At the Conference in Paris in 1889 M. Jules Gaillard, a French deputy, submitted the following propositions signed by several members present:

The Inter-Parliamentary Conference, for the purpose of exciting in Europe a current of opinion favorable to disarmament, takes note of the declaration of several of its members affirming their intention to propose and support, in their respective Parliaments, a motion tending to a simultaneous and proportional disarmament.<sup>24</sup>

This proposition gave rise to a lively discussion. M. Georges Périn opposed it, while several observations were made by MM. Sabbatier, Wickersheimer and Marquis Pandolfi.<sup>25</sup> The procès-verbal of the session does not report the objections and observations; but on being put to the vote, the resolution was rejected and, it is said, so strongly ran the current of feeling that the proposer withdrew from the Conference. Subsequently, however, a better understanding was reached, and the temporary alienation was removed.<sup>26</sup>

At The Hague in 1894, another attempt was made to have the Conference consider the question of a limitation of armaments. On September 5, Mr. Snape introduced the following motion:

Considering that the excessive and always increasing armaments crush the peoples, considering that these armaments are frequently regarded as a menace towards other nations and have a provocative rather than a preventive character, considering that the mutual, proportional and simultaneous reduction of armaments would extenuate this evil, without disturbing the relative force of the different powers for their national defence.

The Interparliamentary Conference desires that the European Governments appoint a commission to resolve or conclude the meas-

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>24</sup> Christian L. Lange, *Histoire documentaire de l'Union Interparlementaire, procès-verbal, première conférence interparlementaire*, p. 115.

<sup>25</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>26</sup> *The Herald of Peace*, September 2, 1889, p. 277.

ures as a means by which the reduction of armaments could be accomplished.<sup>27</sup>

The next day a group of deputies, MM. Byles, Clark, Lund, Fyre, Wavorinsky, Stanhope, Cremer and Caldwell, proposed that the different parliamentary groups invite their governments to take the initiative of an international conference charged with arresting the increase of military and naval expenses in Europe and of formulating some propositions, tending to the mutual, simultaneous and proportional reduction of armaments.<sup>28</sup> This proposition does not appear to have been considered, but when the Conference passed to the discussion of a motion concerning the reunion of an International Congress whose object would be to study the process of arbitration as a means of solving pacifically all conflicts arising between the states, Mr. Snape proposed an amendment to the effect that the Congress should also study the question of disarmament. The President observed that Mr. Snape's proposition was not a simple amendment but an additional proposal. After a discussion the latter withdrew his proposition but reserved the right to reintroduce it.<sup>29</sup> Consequently, the Conference of 1894, like that of 1889, regarded itself unable to take the question into consideration.<sup>30</sup>

Before the next meeting of the Union, Mme. Griess-Traut sent a letter to the Bureau advocating the progressive transformation of the destructive, warlike armies into pacific, productive armies. While combating the argument that the release of a great number of troops would be a danger from the economic point of view, she earnestly asked that the Conference examine this question with all the attention that it merited.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>27</sup> *La Conférence Interparlementaire*, No. 15 (Berne, November 1, 1894), *procès-verbaux des séances de la conférence interparlementaire*, La Haye, 1894, p. 236.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 237.

<sup>29</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 240.

<sup>31</sup> *La Conférence Interparlementaire*, No. 20, May, 1895.



But the assembly of delegates, for some motives of opportuneness, eliminated the question of disarmament from the provisional agenda,<sup>32</sup> and it was not introduced again until the Vienna Conference of 1903.

After the appearance of the Tsar's Rescript, some—among whom were Mr. W. T. Stead, Nicholas Notovitch, the St. Petersburg correspondent of the *Times*, and M. A. Geouffre de Lapradelle of the Law Faculty of Grenoble, a special commissioner of the *Daily News*—traced its origin partly to the proceedings of the Inter-Parliamentary Conference of 1896 at Budapest. They state that M. Basili, then Russian Consul-General in the Hungarian capital, sent a copy of the Union's resolutions to the Minister in St. Petersburg and reported to his government strongly in favor of action in the stay of armaments. Two years later, in consequence of a discussion over high expenses on armaments, a report of the Conference at Budapest, which was calculated to suggest a remedy, was sent to the Emperor. This was supposed to have greatly interested Nicholas II, and in a short while he issued his Eirenicon.<sup>33</sup>

Nicholas Notovitch, a Russian pacifist, who, in his own language, was "a modest collaborator of the first days of the preparation of the imperial message for world pacification communicated by Count Mouravieff," and author of the *Pacification of Europe*, published at that time to set forth the opinions and reasoning of both sides of the question, claims that he drew Muraviev's attention to the Budapest Inter-Parliamentary Congress report, the presentation of which before the Emperor "produced a very great impression."<sup>34</sup>

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 24, September, 1895, *La VI<sup>e</sup> Conférence interparlementaire*, p. 344.

<sup>33</sup> F. Whyte, *The Life of W. T. Stead* (Jonathan Cape, London, 1925), II, 123; Howard Evans, *Sir Randal Cremer*, p. 179; *The Times*, December 16, 1898, p. 5, col. 6; A. Geouffre de Lapradelle, "La Conférence de la Paix," *Revue générale de droit international public*, VI (1899), 662-63.

<sup>34</sup> Letter of Nicholas Notovitch to Honorable Franklin Delano Roosevelt, May 26, 1933, p. 7, enclosure in a letter from the Department of State, Washington, D. C., to the writer, R.P. 116.3/4445, November 18, 1939.

The above accounts appear to be unsupported by Inter-Parliamentary documents. An examination of the proceedings of the Budapest reunion does not reveal a single reference to disarmament or a limitation of armaments; no resolution on the subject was passed, and there is no evidence of a special report having been prepared. The Conference considered the question of creating a Permanent International Court of Arbitration, the protection of foreigners and the right of expulsion, the development of the principle of neutrality, and the organization of a central information service.<sup>35</sup> It is possible that M. Basili submitted the proceedings of the Conference concerning international arbitration and suggested its adoption as a path leading to disarmament; it is still more probable that he reported the action of the Universal Peace Congress meeting simultaneously at Budapest. At that Congress Mme. Griess-Traut presented her proposal for the transformation of unproductive armies into productive ones,<sup>36</sup> and Mr. Byles of England proposed a resolution to prevent the further increase in armament expenditure.<sup>37</sup> The Russian Consul-General certainly could not have forwarded an Inter-Parliamentary Conference report or resolution on the limitation of armaments.

Furthermore, responsible officials, like Christian L. Lange, assert that after ten years of intense work the Inter-Parliamentary Union had the satisfaction of seeing the First Hague Conference act upon its repeated resolutions and proposals by creating the Permanent Court of Arbitration and by recommending the conclusion of arbitration treaties;<sup>38</sup> but, so far as the writer has been able to determine, they do not assume the least credit for having swayed the Tsar in any way.

In its early years, the Inter-Parliamentary Union found itself

<sup>35</sup> *Compte Rendu de la VII<sup>e</sup> Conférence Interparlementaire de Budapest, Session de 1896* (Budapest, 1897).

<sup>36</sup> *Bulletin Officiel du VII<sup>e</sup> Congrès Universel de la Paix, tenu à Budapest, 1896*, pp. 65-68.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 83, 84.

<sup>38</sup> Christian L. Lange, "The Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Reduction of Armaments," *The Inter-Parliamentary Union from 1889-1939*, p. 61.

unable to deal with the question of disarmament or to propose a scheme for a limitation or even an arrest of armaments. It was much more interested in extending the use of arbitration as a means of preserving peace. Being a practical body, it dealt with only those problems on which it believed it could make recommendations to the governments with some chance of their being seriously considered. Therefore, it concentrated attention on the elaboration of a General Arbitration Treaty and a project for an International Court of Arbitration and other problems of international law. It appears during the first twelve years of the Union's history that the consensus among its members was that there could be a serious study of disarmament only after the liquidation of the causes of pending conflict. Then the states would have sufficient confidence to consent to a diminution of their military contingents.

## CHAPTER V

### THE CHURCHES AND THE ARBITRATION ALLIANCE

THE GREATEST moral success in the movement for disarmament in the decade preceding the First Hague Conference was achieved in definitely enlisting the organized co-operation of the churches of England, a large part of the Continent and America. The person most responsible for this was Dr. W. Evans Darby, the Secretary of the London Peace Society.

The question of engaging the churches in the work of peace was the bitterest problem the religious pacifists had to solve. The lack of support from the Christian churches had been one of the strongest grievances of the early peace societies. The revived Societies also condemned the political servitude of the churches. In the *Herald of Peace* for January, 1907, we read: "The whole aim and method of the Christian Church, in all its directions, seems to be to adapt itself, its teachings and its conduct to its temporal conditions. And the result is a hybrid, emasculated form of Christianity, in which the fundamental assumptions and seeming necessities of the temporal state are accepted as axioms and truisms of the Christian faith."<sup>1</sup>

This was not only true of the Established Churches, as could be expected, but also of the Dissenting Churches. The Society of Friends, which had been the core of the first Peace Societies set an example to all other Christian organizations. But only the Friends and a few minor sects in America, the Mennonites and the Moravians, for example, could point to an uncompromising ruling on the subject of war and peace. Only occasionally could a voice be heard from the churches in England and

<sup>1</sup> *The Herald of Peace*, January, 1907, p. 7.

America. In an annual report of 1885 the Committee of the British Peace Society referred to the little help they received in prosecuting what they claimed to be their eminently Christian work, from the churches of the land. Apart from the activity of the British and American Friends, they complained there was no organized peace effort within any church.

Perhaps the first protest from a religious body, outside the Society of Friends, came in 1889. On July 11 at a meeting of the Canterbury Diocesan Conference held at Lambeth Palace, Canon Westcott took the opportunity to discuss the Church's duty to promote the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Seven million men in arms, he argued, constituted a great calamity, and he pointed to the use of arbitration as a means of furthering peace.<sup>2</sup> At the Methodist Conference held at Sheffield in August of the same year, the Reverend Hugh Price Hughes moved a resolution expressing strong sympathy with all reasonable proposals to substitute arbitration for war.

After 1889, Methodist opinion on the peace question grew rapidly. The annual conference of the Primitive Methodist Church meeting at Sunderland on June 14, 1890, carried unanimously a resolution of the Reverend T. Mitchell to the effect "that national controversies ought to be settled by friendly Arbitration, and that the huge armaments of our time should cease to exist."<sup>3</sup>

But these isolated utterances from the Methodist Churches were not enough: the religious pacifists wished to direct the way in which all the Dissenting, if not the Established Churches, in all countries might help in the work of peace by moral encouragement. Many of the Dissenting bodies were international organizations; they met in international conferences, which could be used for pacifist purposes and their message conveyed to large numbers through a channel of national, provincial, state, county and parish gatherings. Dr.

<sup>2</sup> *The Herald of Peace*, August 1, 1889, p. 257.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, July 1, 1890, p. 101.

Darby realized that to enlist the sympathetic co-operation of the churches of England and America was to secure for peace the greatest force in the social and political life of these countries, and he labored for four years, amid the opposition even of his own allies, until eventually he organized the "Arbitration Alliance," which officially described itself as an "Association of British Christians in behalf of International Arbitration." As early as 1889, Dr. Darby had urged that the Universal Peace Congress should consider the question of propaganda in the churches, but to no avail. At the Paris Congress of that year, religious issues were excluded from the agenda. In London, however, a resolution was passed urging ministers to recommend the third Sunday in December in each year as Peace Sunday. At Rome, in 1891, when members were invited to give notice of new business, a resolution was handed to the Bureau of the Congress resolving that the Christian churches co-operate in securing the prevention of war and its final abolition from earth.<sup>4</sup> The next year, at Berne, a similar resolution was handed to the President, but the Congress was not permitted to consider even whether it would receive the resolution. It was passed on to the Bureau without having been read to the Congress, and the resolution appeared only on the pages of the Report without the Congress having the opportunity of determining its own business. It was not until 1893 at Chicago that the Universal Peace Congress for the first time recommended the churches to support and forward the cause of arbitration.<sup>5</sup>

The "Arbitration Alliance" was the outcome of the movement which was endorsed in a resolution at Chicago. But it had its rise still earlier in the endeavor among the Presbyterian Churches of the United States "to bring to bear the combined

<sup>4</sup> *Bulletin du Troisième Congrès International de la Paix, Rome, 1891* (Rome, 1892), p. 158.

<sup>5</sup> *Report of the Fifth Universal Peace Congress, Chicago, August, 1893* (Boston, 1893), p. 294; cf. W. Evans Darby, "The Arbitration Alliance and the Universal Peace Congress," A Paper Presented to the Peace Congress at Antwerp, August, 1894, published in *The Herald of Peace*, September and October, 1894, p. 109.

influence of the religious bodies of Christendom upon the Governments of Christian nations, by means of petitions, with a view to securing the substitution of arbitration for war in settling international disputes." <sup>6</sup> The Presbyterians adopted a petition to be addressed to the several governments and asked the representatives of other churches to concur with them. The petition was drawn up in the respective language of each government and the representative bodies of leading Christian denominations were requested to authorize its signature on their behalf. A number of them did so; and their delegates constituted a conference held in New York City in December, 1891, at which steps were taken for the further prosecution of the work, and arrangements made for another conference at Chicago in 1893. This conference met on August 16 and 17, at the same time as the Universal Peace Congress. The latter body passed a resolution approving the work of the Ecclesiastical Peace Conference and appealing to the "Christian Churches, everywhere, to give their hearty and undivided support to this special work, and also to use the great influence which God has given them, in promoting the permanent peace of the world." <sup>7</sup>

In order to carry out the main design for which it was called, the Chicago Conference empowered the Executive to organize a Committee in each country to represent it in the accomplishment of its purpose, the Executive being instructed to place the respective petitions in the hands of these several Committees with the twofold object of getting them properly signed and then suitably presented to the governments. In fulfillment of these instructions the Executive invited a number of prominent and representative ministers of the churches in Great Britain to act as a Committee for the proposed object, and appointed Dr. Darby, Secretary of the Peace Society (who was present and took part at the Chicago Conference), as Chairman and Convener. Up to this point the object of the Committee was

<sup>6</sup> *The Herald of Peace*, July 1, 1895, p. 227.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, September and October, 1894, p. 109.

simply the completion and presentation of the proposed International Petition on Arbitration, but soon it was asked to undertake a new task.

On April 17, 1894, a Conference of the leading members of the various churches, convened by the Society of Friends in conjunction with the Peace Society, was held at Devonshire House, London, for the purpose of considering their duties and responsibilities in reference to the militarism and armaments of Europe. Mr. Joseph S. Fry presided and was supported by Sir J. W. Pease, M.P., Mr. J. A. Bright, M.P., Mr. M. T. Snape, M.P., and Secretary of the Friends' Association, Mr. Percy Bunting (Editor of the *Contemporary Review*), Mr. W. T. Stead, Dr. W. Evans Darby, Reverend Canon Benham, Madame Novikoff and Reverend J. P. Gledstone. There was a lengthy discussion as to the form their resolution should take. W. T. Stead objected to the body urging the British Government to call a "Conference" to promote the reduction of armaments. He considered it a danger to dictate to the Foreign Minister, who should be left perfectly free as to the way he approached the powers of Europe. Stead thought that the Church Conference should only endeavor to make it quite plain that it wanted the Government to make a move and that it trusted that they had the common sense to make it and to await the issue. Mr. Bright was strongly of the opinion that they should urge the calling of a conference of the powers. He could not conceive how an agreement could be reached without an International Conference; there was no danger in that method of procedure; it merely meant that the powers would meet and talk things over. Mr. Bunting raised objections to the resolution including two distinct points—disarmament and arbitration; he thought it would be wise to keep these two things distinct. Mr. Snape offered a solution by suggesting that the body should adhere to the one point of approaching the government on the question of a limitation of armaments and that the churches should be urged to continue their agitation in favor of



arbitration. His suggestion was eventually accepted and embodied in two resolutions.<sup>8</sup>

On April 24, a meeting of The Committee of the British Churches on Arbitration was held for the purpose of considering the request, and, after considerable discussion, it was resolved to undertake the new duty; but inasmuch as that would involve an enlargement of its objects, the Committee decided to adopt the title of the "Arbitration Alliance, being an Association of British Christians in behalf of International Arbitration." Without a single exception the churches agreed, by formal action of some kind, to "the duty of unitedly approaching the Government, and also of promoting some system of International Arbitration."<sup>9</sup>

In the majority of instances the churches appointed representatives to take part in a proposed deputation to the Premier and the Foreign Secretary. Lord Rosebery at first showed some reluctance to receive such a deputation at that period of the session of Parliament, but gave the assurance that the question which interested the Alliance was constantly engaging the attention of Her Majesty's Government, and that they would not fail to take any opportunity which might present itself of furthering the principle of International Arbitration. On receiving this reply, the representatives forwarded the Memorial, which had been prepared for presentation by the deputation, on August 18 to both Lord Rosebery and Lord Kimberley, with an intimation from the Executive that they would be asked to receive the deputation at some future time. The Memorialists felt that the initiative in mitigating the burdens of militarism could be best taken by Great Britain. They stated:

. . . The neutral policy of this country, the smallness of her offensive armaments, her insular position, the commanding personal influence of Her Majesty and the friendly relations in which she finds

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, May 1, 1894, p. 63.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, July 1, 1895, p. 227, from the "Annual Report of The Arbitration Alliance, 1894-1895."

herself with all European Powers, appear to give her a unique opportunity, and to impose upon her in this matter a unique responsibility. While not presuming to suggest the precise line of action which may be expedient, we desire earnestly to ask Her Majesty's Government to propose to the other Powers the adoption of some practical step designed to promote the international reduction of armaments and the establishment of some permanent system of International Arbitration.<sup>10</sup>

Among the signers of the Memorial were the Bishops of Durham and Ripon, the two Archbishops of Dublin and the Bishop of Killaloe, the Deans of Winchester, Hereford and Canterbury, and the official representatives of twenty-seven religious denominations.<sup>11</sup>

The Memorial was suitably acknowledged by Lord Rosebery, and Lord Kimberley sent a reply through his Secretary stating that "the objects advocated in the Memorial have the sympathy of Her Majesty's Government, who will not neglect any favourable opportunity of promoting them." But his Lordship considered that no useful object would be served by the formal presentation of the Memorial, by a deputation, at that time.<sup>12</sup>

Meanwhile, W. T. Stead had set on foot another and a wider movement in favor of a National Memorial addressed to the British Government urging it to open negotiations with all the European powers as a first step towards an agreement on armament limitation. After the Devonshire House Conference, he had interviews with Lord Rosebery, the Russian Ambassador and Cardinal Vaughan on the subject of action to bring about a European disarmament.<sup>13</sup> In the month of May Stead submitted various proposals to the Executive of the Arbitration Alliance in favor of promoting an agreement among the powers as to an arrest in the increase of armaments, and to the organizing of public meetings throughout the country. A special meet-

<sup>10</sup> *Review of Reviews*, X (August, 1894), 133.

<sup>11</sup> *The Herald of Peace*, September and October, 1894, p. 105.

<sup>12</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, May 1, 1894, p. 53.

ing of the Executive was called to consider these proposals. In the interim, however, Stead ascertained that while Lord Rosebery was in sympathy with the proposed Memorial, he was strongly opposed to public meetings. This part of the scheme was therefore abandoned; but a Memorial was drawn up and submitted to Lord Rosebery, Lord Salisbury and Mr. A. J. Balfour for approval before publication. The following is the text of the National Memorial which appeared in the *Review of Reviews* for June:

The continuous and unchecked growth of European armaments has now reached a point which necessitates some concerted action to secure relief. The pressure of military and naval expenditure threatens States with bankruptcy, cripples the industries and impoverishes the homes of the people, and diverts to wasteful preparation for slaughter funds that would otherwise be available for purposes of social amelioration and reform.

This ruinous rivalry in armaments is the inevitable, although deplorable, result of the absence of any international understanding. It can only be arrested by an international agreement.

We would, therefore, respectfully but earnestly suggest that communications should be opened with European Powers, in order to ascertain whether it may not be possible as a first step towards arresting the further growth of national armaments, and reducing burdens almost intolerable, to secure a common and general agreement that, until the close of the century, no State will sanction any increase of its military and naval expenditure beyond the maximum of the estimates of the present year.<sup>14</sup>

This practical proposal was intended only to call a halt in armaments. It proposed to introduce a law of maximum for six years, and it involved no interference with the absolute liberty of every power to fix its own armaments according to its conception of its requirements. Each power was to be absolutely free to vary to any extent the sums devoted to each branch of service, subject to one limitation only—the total war

<sup>14</sup> *Review of Reviews*, IX (June, 1894), 580; *The Herald of Peace*, July 2, 1894, p. 83.

budget was not to be increased beyond the point at which each country had fixed it for that year. They could, of course, reduce their expenditure as much as they pleased; there was no law of minimum. The aim of the National Memorial was not immediate disarmament but the maintenance of the existing conditions. It was believed that after the powers had shown a willingness to abide by the law of the maximum they would be in a much better position to consider the question of the possibility of a simultaneous modification of the *status quo*.

The energies of the Arbitration Alliance were devoted to obtaining signatures to the Memorial, which commanded the sympathy of the leaders of both political parties, and was put forward on the distinct understanding that it would strengthen the policy which Her Majesty's Ministers were determined to adopt. Tens of thousands of sheets, and thousands of single forms for signature were sent out from the office of the Alliance. The Memorial secured the enthusiastic support of the representatives of labor, of religion, of the municipalities, of the professions, of the bench, of the press, of literary men and scientists, of members of both Houses of Parliament and a large number of others of position and influence.<sup>15</sup>

At first it was proposed that the signatures should be gathered and the Memorial presented to Lord Rosebery without delay. The close of the Parliamentary Session, however, made that impracticable, and it was decided to utilize the recess in collecting further signatures. On the re-assembling of Parliament, Lord Rosebery expressed his willingness to receive the Memorial through the delayed deputation from the Associated Churches, but his illness caused further delay. On his return to Downing Street, the Prime Minister wrote to Dr. Darby expressing his regret that pressure of business compelled him to postpone making an appointment for a deputation, but he promised to keep the matter in mind. The Memorial, which had involved much labor, was then quite ready for presentation,

<sup>15</sup> *The Herald of Peace*, August 1, 1894, p. 95.

and the Alliance was only awaiting an intimation of Lord Rosebery's convenience.

No opportunity occurred during 1895 and 1896 of presenting the National Memorial, and in the meantime a change of government took place and the times grew more unsuitable than ever. But the effort was not lost. Through the press, in which the results were published, the Memorial was virtually and effectively presented to both the Government and the people. Nevertheless, those who had worked hard to obtain signatures naturally felt and expressed disappointment that their labor seemed wasted. Practically, the work of the Arbitration Alliance was completed. That it was not so actually arose from circumstances beyond the control of the Committee.

Finally, to the gratification of those who had labored so persistently, an opportunity for the presentation of the National Memorial came in November, 1897. On the 9th of the month, Lord Salisbury, in his speech at the Guildhall, proclaimed as the one hope of the nations "the coming together of the Powers for the purpose of giving effect to the consciousness of solidarity which had been fostered by all the distinctive discoveries of the century. He went on to declare that the competition in armaments, unless curtailed, would end in a terrible effort of destruction, fatal to Christian civilization. The one hope that sustained him in face of this menacing catastrophe was this: "that the Powers may gradually be brought together, to act together in a friendly spirit on all questions of difference that may arise, until at last they shall be welded together into some international constitution which shall give to the world, as the result of their great strength, a long spell of unfettered commerce, prosperous trade, and continued peace." <sup>16</sup>

The next day, November 10, the Arbitration Alliance presented the National Memorial and the Anglo-American Arbitration Memorial (which also had been promoted by W. T. Stead)

<sup>16</sup> *The Herald of Peace*, XXV (December, 1897), 326; *Review of Reviews*, XIX, 7.

to Lord Salisbury. In a covering letter, Dr. Darby reminded the Prime Minister that the wording of the Memorial relating to an arrest of armaments was the same which Stead had submitted to him three years before, when Rosebery's government was in power; although a little out of date in form of expression, it was still valid, as it conveyed a strong expression of opinion on the subject. The National Memorial, when presented, bore 34,390 separate signatures.<sup>17</sup>

Lord Salisbury acknowledged receipt of the two Memorials and assured Dr. Darby that they would "receive his best consideration."<sup>18</sup> Thus the work of the Arbitration Alliance was completed, except the raising of the sums necessary to balance its accounts.

The movement for disarmament within the churches which reached its zenith in the years 1894-97 was primarily confined to the dissenting bodies. The leaders in the movement were Nonconformists in religious tenets and "Liberals" or "Advanced Liberals" in politics. It will be recalled that the Presbyterian Churches of the United States were the first to urge religious bodies to petition governments with a view to securing the substitution of arbitration for war in settling international disputes. The Society of Friends furnished the chief impetus to the movement in England, for it was they who, in conjunction with the Peace Society, convened the Devonshire House Conference of April 17, 1894, which definitely launched the campaign. Mr. Joseph Fry, Sir J. W. Pease, Mr. John Bright and Mr. M. T. Snape, who took an active part in the agitation, were all Friends. The Wesleyans, Methodists and Congregationalists gave their assistance to the project. Dr. W. Evans Darby, Honorary Secretary of the Arbitration Alliance and an indefatigable worker for peace, was a Primitive Methodist; while W. T. Stead, who used his journalistic talents to further the cause, was the son of a Congregationalist minister. The moral sup-

<sup>17</sup> *The Herald of Peace*, July 1, 1895, p. 228.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, December 1, 1897, p. 333.

port which these pacifists received from the government, the House of Lords and the House of Commons, came chiefly but not exclusively from Liberal and dissenting members. After 1898 the interest of the churches in peace and disarmament lagged and was only revived in 1914 when the World Alliance for Peace through the Churches was founded, but the chorus of 1894-97 transcended that of later years.

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## CHAPTER VI

### THE JURISCONSULTS' APPROACH TO THE DISARMAMENT QUESTION

ALTHOUGH the Institute of International Law as an organized body refrained from expressing definite opinions on the question of disarmament or a limitation of armaments, the International Law Association and individual jurists from time to time during the period 1875-98 turned their attention to the problem.

At the Hague Conference of 1875 the International Law Association, composed of jurists, economists, legislators, politicians and others interested in the reform and codification of public and private international law, adopted a resolution deprecating the ever-increasing armaments of Europe and stating that it was "the duty of Governments, in the interest of humanity and civilization, and for the welfare of their own subjects, to enter into communication with each other, with a view to effect a mutual reduction of those armaments which, far from being a security for peace, are a perpetual menace of war."<sup>1</sup>

The subject was again considered by the International Law Association at its London Conference in August, 1879, when Henry Richard presented his paper, "International Reduction of Armaments," a comprehensive statement of facts embracing numerical, financial and political aspects of armaments.<sup>2</sup> At its close an important debate followed, but owing to some dif-

<sup>1</sup> *Transactions of the International Law Association, 1873-1924* (London, 1925), pp. 23-24.

<sup>2</sup> *Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations, Report of the Seventh Annual Conference Held at the Guildhall, London, 11-16 August, 1879* (London, 1879), pp. 234-45.



ferences of opinion in regard to the resolution submitted, the subject was referred to a committee for investigation and report the next year.

Meanwhile, in 1876, David Dudley Field, an American jurist, published his *Outlines of an International Code*, in which he advocated that the number of persons employed in the military service of a nation in time of peace should not exceed one for every thousand of inhabitants. After pointing out the economic burden entailed by the military establishments of Europe, he writes:

A large standing army is not only the enormous burden that it has been described, but it is a provocative to war. The arming of a nation should be looked upon very much as the arming of individuals. A man may keep arms in his house, to be used on occasion, but if he walks abroad, always armed to the teeth, he speedily gets into a quarrel. So with a nation. The peace of society would certainly be endangered by the general practice of wearing arms. It was once so. And since social manners have been benefited by a general disarmament of individuals, it should seem that, for a similar reason, national manners would be benefited by a like process.<sup>3</sup>

Field would, however, have retained and especially encouraged the militia, or a large body of drilled citizens, for home defense. But this body, consisting of men not restricted, as were regular soldiers, in regard to marriage, not subjected to demoralizing barrack life, and not permanently maintained at the cost of the country, would have furnished a relief from the great immorality and excessive expenses which necessarily accompanied the European system of standing armies.

Count Kamarowski, Professor of International Law in the University of Moscow and a member of the Institute of International Law, turned his attention to the problem in a pamphlet entitled *Les Tendances des peuples à la paix et la question du désarmement*. Later writing in the *Revue de droit interna-*

<sup>3</sup> David Dudley Field, *Outlines of An International Code* (New York, 1876), Article 528, pp. 367-68.

*tional et de législation comparée*, he pointed out the danger to the world of the competition of armaments which was threatening civilization in general.<sup>4</sup> Simultaneously, Professor James Lorimer, of the Faculty of Law of the University of Edinburgh, advocated the idea of proportional disarmament.<sup>5</sup>

Also in 1887, M. G. Rolin-Jaequemyns,<sup>6</sup> a Belgian jurist and ex-Minister of State, published a pamphlet entitled *Limitation conventionnelle des dépenses et des effectifs militaires*. The object of his essay was to commend to his colleagues in Parliament the consideration of the possibility of limiting, by specific treaties between two or more of the chief states of Europe, the extent of their respective armaments, and also the best means of bringing about and rendering effective so desirable a result. He asserted that the indefinite increase of armaments must result in the general ruin of Europe, and, therefore, it had become the manifest duty of all jurists and statesmen at least to attempt measures to obviate such a catastrophe.

M. Rolin-Jaequemyns communicated his ideas on the subject to members of the Institute of International Law, of which he was at the time president. At their conference at Heidelberg in September, 1887, he pointed out that the public debt of the states had been augmented by 80 per cent from 1866 to 1886 and proposed that the Institute examine "from the point of view of international law, whether and to what extent, and by what means, it would be possible to restrict the effective forces of European States and the amount of their military expenses in time of peace within certain proportional limits to be determined by treaties between those States."<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup> *Revue de droit international et de législation comparée*, XIX (1887), 481.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 474.

<sup>6</sup> Gustave Henri Ange Hippolyte Rolin-Jaequemyns (1853-1902) was a founder of the Institute of International Law and of the *Revue de droit international et législation comparée*, of which he was editor in chief for many years. He served as Minister of the Interior of Belgium (1878-84), general adviser to the Siamese Government (1892-1901), as that Government's delegate to the First Hague Conference, and later was a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

<sup>7</sup> *Revue de droit international et de législation comparée*, XIX (1887), 398.

M. Rolins-Jaequemyns raised three pertinent questions:

1. From the point of view of the principles of international law, is it possible for two or more States to engage themselves reciprocally by treaty to limit their respective armaments?
2. To what extent could such a mutual agreement be made by the different European States, and, if it were made, would it bind them?
3. What would be the means of assuring an efficacious sanction to such a treaty? <sup>8</sup>

He asked the Institute to consider how far the generally admitted principles of international law oppose or support the fixing of such a limit by treaty, and in case of necessity, the adoption of the necessary measures to guarantee the observation of such a treaty. Rolin-Jaequemyns was aware that the greatest difficulty to be overcome in any plan for limiting armaments is the maintenance of the complete sovereignty of the state, and as a corollary thereof, the right and duty which it has to defend its existence by every means within its power. But he asked whether there is not,

. . . alongside the individual right to exist and defend oneself, a right, and a common right and duty, for all States forming part of one and the same group, to prevent the constant increase of the means of defence from becoming the cause of exhaustion, decadence, economic and social disorganization, for the entire group. . . . If it is suicidal for a nation to remain unarmed in the midst of armed neighbors, is it not another method of suicide for a group of nations, united by a common civilization, to allow themselves to be carried away in a body, in a mad rush to cast each year a constantly increasing proportion of their money, credit, physical and intellectual activities into the ever expanding gulf of military expenditures and armaments.<sup>9</sup>

It appeared to M. Rolin-Jaequemyns that the Institute ought to be free from all suspicions of partiality and, therefore, a better place than any other for discussing the question of disarmament. Professors Lorimer and Kamarowski supported the project; but several members of the Institute declared that it

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 400.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 402-3.

would have no result, it was a question foreign to international law, and it would be ridiculous to discuss it. They argued that such proposals might carry them beyond the bounds of strictly legal considerations and introduce political partisan discussion, and especially bring down upon themselves the danger that "their Institute might thus possibly become confounded with some other Societies, whose ideas are more generous than practical"; consequently, the proposition was withdrawn.

Professor James Lorimer of Edinburgh University, who supported Rolin-Jaequemyn's proposal, examined the question of disarmament and the difficulties which it raised from the point of view of international law in the *Revue de droit international et législation comparée* for 1887. He considered three points as the premises from which he derived the final solution. Lorimer was of opinion that: 1. *No free State will consent to a change whatever in its relation to other States, if this change is to result in diminishing its defensive strength, or hindering its future development.* A modification of the *status quo* or a reestablishment of the balance of power, he thought, could not be attained by peaceful negotiations. To impair the then existing conditions in this regard nothing less than war would have been required. If, however, the jurists' purpose was to diminish the chances of war, they must accept the equilibrium as established, however unstable or unsatisfactory it might seem. 2. If the preceding proposition is correct, it follows that jurists' efforts in the direction of disarmament should inevitably be based upon the principle of proportionality. By following this principle, whatever may be the absolute reduction in the effective force of a state, its relation to other states will remain the same, because corresponding reductions will have been made in the effective forces of all other states with which it might come in conflict. 3. *No independent State will submit to any supervision of the administration of its revenues or of its domestic affairs.*<sup>10</sup>

Each state ought to be left free to decide for itself the man-

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 473-74.

ner in which it should proceed to reduce its armaments, either by the decrease of the strength of the armies (standing armies, volunteer troops or others), or by the abandonment of fortresses, of war vessels, gunboats, torpedo boats and so forth. The requirements for the defense of the different states as between themselves vary so constantly that Professor Lorimer thought it neither possible nor desirable for them to agree upon a uniform application of their military expenditures. It seemed to him that all the jurists could reasonably hope for was to persuade the powers to agree to a uniform reduction of expenditures. He recommended a treaty by which they would engage themselves to reduce by 25 or 50 per cent their actual war budgets, or, in view of the inevitable changes which must occur in the basis of taxation, to diminish the fraction of their total revenue which they would devote to military expenses. Such a fractional reduction of their total military expenditure would result in the maintenance of the actual relation between the respective forces of the states, while leaving them free to organize them according to their own needs. The risk of war would be diminished by the limitation of combustible material in each country, while the relief from taxes and the burden of obligatory service would augment the wealth and direct the attention of each generation more towards the occupations of civil life.<sup>11</sup>

Professor Lorimer, on the question of the employment of chemical discoveries and of mechanical inventions, was convinced that no state would consent to limit itself as to their use, or, if it did, judging from the manner in which treaties had been respected in the past, it would not observe its engagements in a war *à outrance*.<sup>12</sup> In the absence of an international executive there would be no power to enforce engagements entered into. Therefore the final problem of international politics, as Lorimer conceived it, was the formation of an international legislature,

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 474-75.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 476.

judicature, and executive.<sup>13</sup> But the question of disarmament was too urgent to await the creation of an international organization, which he believed could not be dreamed of, however desirable or even indispensable it might be in the final analysis.<sup>14</sup>

From the economic point of view and in consideration of the disadvantage of a partial disarmament upon the labor market, Lorimer recommended a gradual reduction, limiting it, for example, to 5 per cent per year until the agreed limit was attained.<sup>15</sup>

Count Kamarowski also considered that disarmament is a question that can be solved only along international lines, that is, with the formation of a juridical organization. No one single state can diminish its forces in the presence of neighbors better armed.<sup>16</sup> Although the question ought to be placed on an international plane and studied by all states, he thought it incumbent upon the great powers par excellence to take the initiative in the direction of this reform because they, by their military preponderance, menaced general peace. The first example of sincerity and good will should come from those powers which were most responsible for keeping Europe in constant fear of war, namely, Germany and France, and after them, England and Russia. If the governments were in reality, as they pretended, animated by the love of peace, they ought to be ready to make some sacrifices and to renounce many of their prejudices to secure peace for their people, which is the first and fundamental condition of all human progress. They should be willing to

<sup>13</sup> In Volume II, Chapter XVI, pp. 279-87 of his *Institutes of the Law of Nations*, published in 1884 (Edinburgh and London), Lorimer elaborated a "Scheme for the Organization of an International Government." He proposed a treaty for the establishment of an International Government in which all recognized States should be invited to participate, to be negotiated in Two Parts; Part I. "An undertaking by the parties to reduce, simultaneously and proportionally, their national forces to the limit which they may reciprocally recognize as necessary for municipal purposes, but so as to preserve the relative power of each State unchanged." Part II. "An undertaking by the parties to establish a government for international purposes exclusively, consisting of a legislature, judicature, executive, and exchequer."

<sup>14</sup> *Revue de droit international*, XIX (1887), 476-77.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 477.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 482, "Quelques Reflexions sur les armements croissants de L'Europe."

examine first in some preliminary conferences and later in a definite Congress the causes which fostered the most antagonism and enmity among the European nations.<sup>17</sup>

Kamarowski envisaged disarmament not in the absolute sense of the word, "but as a simultaneous and gradual measure, executed by all the European States conforming to the ordered principles of a common accord."<sup>18</sup> He pointed out that the numbers of the armies should be regulated according to the states' population, the exigencies of their internal security, and the extent of their territories and colonies outside Europe. In view of the complexity and novelty of the reform, Count Kamarowski recommended its application for a certain term, in order to accustom the governments and the peoples to its full realization in the future. For guaranteeing the execution of the arrangements, he looked to the "collective safe-guard" of the states adopting them, and later to a more efficacious protection—that of an international organization. A state which violated the conditions set forth in the act of disarmament would by that very fact excite all the other states against it. On this point there might be provided in the act of progressive disarmament a complete system of repressive measures carefully worked out. Subsequently, an international police force might be organized, composed of part of the forces concentrated in the different armies but which, acting in all its fields, according to the strict principles of international law, would become the guardian of general peace and justice upon earth. Although the organization of such a force would be a difficult task, its exponent was convinced that the benefits which would emanate from it would be so great that the internationalists ought to work with zeal for its realization.<sup>19</sup>

Such were the views of Professor Lorimer and Count Kamarowski on the subject of the limitation of armaments; but their opinions were of an individual character as they neither represented nor committed the Institute of International Law.

M. Rolin-Jaequemyns, the Secretary-General of the Institute,

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 483.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 484.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 485.

after it had rejected his proposition of 1887, made no further attempt to encourage the international jurists to consider the problem of disarmament. But in a summary review of the year 1888 from the point of view of peace and international law, he pointed out that one of the most striking contradictory phenomena in regard to pacific protestations was the continued increase of armaments. Quoting figures from the *Daily News* of January, 1889, Rolin-Jaequemyns stated that the total war effectives for Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Italy and Russia were 9,610,000; the second reserves 7,860,000; and the final reserves 8,660,000, making a total of 24,630,000.<sup>20</sup> *The Statesman's Year Book* and Hazell's *Annual Cyclopaedia* of 1889 gave generally more moderate figures, approximately 16,000,000. But even these large numbers prepared for war represented a contradiction between armaments and the sincere desire for peace which the governments and people professed to entertain.<sup>21</sup>

In 1894, M. F. de Martens, Professor of International Law at the University of St. Petersburg and a member of the Institute, published an article in the *Revue de droit international et législation comparée* entitled, "La Question du désarmement dans les relations entre la Russie et l'Angleterre." At the outset he stated: "We have no intention of solving this problem which so highly interests the life of civilized nations. We confine ourselves to placing under the eyes of our readers some data, found in the archives of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and up to the present unpublished."<sup>22</sup> This material related to the 1816 proposal of Alexander I to Lord Castlereagh for a simultaneous reduction of the armed forces and the Prince Regent's project of an International Conference of military men to decide on an exact quota for the normal peace footing of the armies of each power.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>20</sup> G. Rolin-Jaequemyns, "La Année 1888 au point de vue de la paix et du droit international," *Revue de droit international et de législation comparée*, XXI (1889), 98.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 100.

<sup>22</sup> *Revue de droit international et législation comparée*, XXVI (1894), 573.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *supra*, Chapter I.



Three French jurists, however, Raoul de la Grasserie, A. Souchon and A. Mérignhac, turned their attention to the problem of disarmament and made definite suggestions for solving it. In 1894, Raoul de la Grasserie, Doctor of Law and judge in the court of Rennes, published his monograph, *Des Moyens pratiques pour parvenir à la suppression de la paix armée et de la guerre*. He spoke of the inertia of the people and urged public opinion to formulate a popular wish clearly expressed to the governments of the different countries. This he deemed necessary in order to constitute a vast international society. In his project of an International Convention for the suppression of war and the armed peace he advocated the formation of a United States of Europe and a United States of America for the purpose of assuring perpetual unarmed peace. He envisaged three steps in the creation of this international society: first, the preparatory period or the organization of the international army; second, the transitory period or disarmament; and, third, the definitive period or period of international government. Under Title IV he provided for a period of extension during which the United States of Europe and the United States of America might, while remaining distinct, unite in a world federation for lending mutual assistance in certain cases. Asia, Africa and other parts of the world might adhere either to one or the other of the federations under the same conditions as other member states.

La Grasserie was of opinion that we ought not to have force without law and law without force. He was convinced that no state will or should take the initiative in disarming, for national disarmament before international armament is a danger. Moreover, an international tribunal without an international force is a vain word; and finally, the abolition of war without the abolition of the armed peace is Utopian, while an international tribunal, with an international army to support it, is a reality. National disarmament after international armament cannot victimize nor endanger any state, not even the one which

disarms first. The abolition of war after that of the armed peace would come of itself.<sup>24</sup>

The jurist took for the basis of his Convention the acceptance of the *status quo*. Although he realized that the map of Europe ought to be remade according to the objective principle of nationality, he knew that would be possible only by cession of territory which would not be yielded except as the result of a series of wars. In virtue of his Convention there would be created at once: (1) an international tribunal, (2) an international army, and (3) an international administration.<sup>25</sup>

The *international tribunal*, composed of delegates of the parliaments of each state, would reside permanently at the seat of the delegation, located in some small country. Each state would send a number of delegates proportional to its population but decreasing following a progressive scale in order not to leave the decisions to the great powers. Each state, regardless of its size, would have a minimum number of delegates.

The *international army* would have its seat also in one of the small countries in the union. Each state would furnish a contingent proportioned to its population, and a contribution of money in advance. The army would be raised by voluntary engagement, and in default of sufficient numbers volunteering, by recruitment. The duration of service would be five years, with facilities for re-engagement for two years. At the expiration of this term the men would be sent to their homes, there to form an international reserve which could be called up to increase the international force in case of need. As soon as this force was organized all the states would disarm their individual armies. They would no longer have to fear the inconvenience and danger resulting from having disarmed before the others, for the army of peace would come to their aid before their neighbors could attack them. The mere existence of this force

<sup>24</sup> Raoul de la Grasserie, *Des Moyens pratiques pour parvenir à la suppression de la paix armée et de la guerre* (Paris, 1894), p. 60.

<sup>25</sup> *Loc. cit.*

would suffice to impose silence upon all. The chief argument raised against disarmament would disappear; for the international administration, possessing the right of inspection and of visiting all ports and arsenals and the federal force, would stop armaments in the process of formation.<sup>26</sup>

The *international administration*, with its seat at the same place as that of the international army and tribunal, and composed of emissaries of the different parties, would supervise the disarmament or the non-armament. The President, named by the members of the Administration, would have the role of Minister of Public Affairs and the title of President of the United States of Europe.<sup>27</sup>

As soon as the tribunal was formed, all the differences between states which could not be settled by diplomacy would be submitted to it. War between federated states would be forbidden, for the international government would take up the cause of the menaced party, while war against a non-federated state might be declared only with the consent of the tribunal. In a war between states or against savages, if it were "just" (and the tribunal would decide that point), the federated nation interested would not wage it; the international army would do the fighting with contingents from other countries. Each nation would be free to colonize at will, but it might maintain only a defensive force in its colonies. Colonial wars would only be authorized after investigation.<sup>28</sup>

The battle fleet of each state would cease to exist. But the international army would be assisted by an international navy, of which the contingents would be furnished in the same manner by the states possessing a navy. This fleet would be sufficient to protect the operations of the army and to combat the national marines which might be armed in defiance of the federal pact.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>26</sup> La Grasserie, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64, and *Appendix*, p. 93.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64, and *Appendix*, p. 89.

With the establishment of the international army, each state would start immediately to disarm; this disarmament should be, as much as possible, simultaneous, or should commence with the parties most strongly armed and finish with the small powers. But disarmament could not be absolute, because each state would have need of a certain contingent of armed force to preserve domestic order. La Grasserie recommended a national gendarmerie composed of all the men who had once been part of the army of peace and had been dismissed. In case of an emergency they would be supported by all the armed citizens.<sup>30</sup>

The diminution of the national army would commence immediately by the contingent detached for the international army not being replaced. At the end of two years, the national army of each country should be reduced by one-fifth; two years later, by another one-fifth; two years later, by a third one-fifth, and so on. The international administration would supervise this successive disarmament by means of emissaries visiting each country.<sup>31</sup>

Under Title II La Grasserie proposed that ten years after the initiation of the convention the international government would order by decree the disarmament of all the contracting states. This would affect both military and naval armaments and should be carried out in a period of six months. Each state would, however, preserve effectives in the form of a land army and sea forces for the purpose of maintaining internal order; and the size of these forces would be fixed in each case by the international tribunal which would also determine the amount of arms and ammunition of every kind that should remain in the arsenals.<sup>32</sup>

This organization accomplished, that is to say, general disarmament effected, especially after it had been sincerely prac-

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 58, 63, and *Appendix*, p. 90.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, *Appendix*, pp. 90-91.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, *Appendix*, pp. 91-92.

ticed during a certain time, La Grasserie thought that the army of peace could be decreased. It would, however, always maintain a figure necessary to assure that the decisions of the international tribunal would be respected.<sup>33</sup>

Such was La Grasserie's project for abolishing war and compassing disarmament: an international tribunal for judging disputes between states, an international army capable of executing decrees by force, an international administration to supervise the disarmament; once the disarmament were effective, the international army, called the army of peace, could be reduced to the figure necessary to constrain any one of the disarmed states. His proposal suggested a more complete system than that established under the Covenant of the League of Nations, for he was aware that there can be no law of peace without force—an international force. He believed moral compulsion alone inadequate; hence, his proposal for military sanctions to be carried out by an international army. Thus he overcame one great obstacle to national disarmament; namely, that an unprotected state may be left at the mercy of neighbors better armed. The jurist's proposition, insofar as it did not advocate the complete abolition of war and total disarmament, was not Utopian. His aim was to diminish the causes of war, to make it when waged a "just" war, and then only to punish a recalcitrant state with an international army in strict conformity with the international rules of war.

Certain features of La Grasserie's plan were, however, bound to be unacceptable to the great powers. The first, and no doubt the greatest, difficulty would have been to secure the acquiescence of all the states in the then existing *status quo*, thus renouncing the right to obtain by war new territorial limits. They could only hope for a modification of frontiers by international accord. Would Germany have ever agreed to reopen a question which she considered definitely closed by treaty? Can one imagine that France, with Alsace-Lorraine in mind, and Russia,

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, *Appendix*, p. 59.

with a protective eye on the Balkan Slavs, would have accepted the *status quo* of 1894? Yet, without this condition there was no basis for the proposed convention. La Grasserie's proposal to abolish all battle fleets would certainly have raised serious objections on the part of the naval powers. Can one imagine Great Britain, at any time since the days of the Spanish Armada, agreeing to abandon her battleships? Can we visualize the greatest imperial power voluntarily relinquishing the right to wage a colonial war or to dispatch a punitive expedition? Moreover, few great powers would have been willing to submit *all* their differences, regardless of their "justiciability," to the international tribunal, for most states prefer to fight rather than run the risk of having to surrender "vital interests." Furthermore, the tribunal, as conceived by La Grasserie, was to be composed of delegates of the national parliaments. He did not specify that they should be juriconsults learned in national and international law; which omission, in view of the gravity of the disputes that might have to be referred to the Court, seems fatal. In addition, Title IV, or the Period of Extension, providing for a world federation in which the United States of America might in certain cases come to the aid of the United States of Europe and vice versa, would, no doubt, in the light of the fate of Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, have been considered impracticable. Finally, the basis of La Grasserie's project was federation—a United States of Europe and a United States of America. But a federation with its central power imposing itself upon all states is a possibility only between homogeneous people, of a common origin, having similar traditions, customs, ideas, and one would like to say related languages, for different languages are the greatest intellectual frontier between nations. Thus one can conceive of Latin American Federation, a federation of the Scandinavian States, and, perhaps, a federation of the British Dominions, although here the great distances which separate them and the diversity of their problems act as handicaps. Autonomy, rather than federation, has proved the means of realizing the British Com-

monwealth of Nations. Federation is unrealizable between peoples who are not united by at least some of the above-mentioned ties. Strong national sentiment is in itself a potent contradiction of federation; to think of universal confederation is to dream the impossible.

In the first volume of the *Revue générale de droit international public* for 1894, M. A. Souchon, a Fellow in the Faculty of Law at Lyon, examined the problem of disarmament. Replying to the arguments of some that a limitation of armaments could be brought about by regulating two or three particularly irritating European questions, he stated his belief that the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France and the death of the "sick man of Europe" would not necessarily mean that there would be no more causes of war.<sup>34</sup> Neither did he wish to subordinate the success of disarmament to that of arbitration, which would mean retarding it for a long time.<sup>35</sup> International jurists should not confine their efforts to working for a general peace in a far distant time which would lead to the disappearance of military expense. They should look for a method by which the nations, without renouncing anything of their rivalry or their ambition, could conclude treaties limiting the permanent forces of each of them. A good convention, in M. Souchon's opinion, ought not to demand of the states sacrifices of a nature to compromise their national defense; at the same time its mechanism should be simple enough for frauds to be easily prevented. He outlined three types of agreements:

1. A disarmament convention fixing the maximum number of permanent troops for each of the great States.
2. A system to consist in establishing an age limit (30 years, for example) beyond which States would engage themselves never to call their subjects under the flag.
3. A general agreement to limit the service in all the active armies to a minimum duration of one year.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>34</sup> A. Souchon, "La Question du désarmement," *Revue générale de droit international public*, I (1894), 514-15.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 515.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 516.

The first two propositions M. Souchon considered unrealizable, for how could the number for each state be determined? How could it be guaranteed that a state would not augment the appearance of its population in order to give it a right to stronger effectives? How could the system be supervised? <sup>37</sup> The second, he indicated, is completely contrary to the true conception of disarmament. It would not have a serious effect during a war, when it would become inapplicable. During peace it would not diminish the permanent armies nearly exclusively composed of men from twenty to twenty-five years. Such a system of limitation must remain ineffective against the evils of the armed peace.<sup>38</sup>

There remains, however, the third idea. This he recommended by reason of its reducing to a minimum the sacrifices required of the powers. Yet, in time of war they would have recourse to armies just as numerous, composed of men who would have served with the colors. "It is true," writes Souchon, "they would have remained there only a year, but this should offer no difficulty when one recalls with what facility France passed from the seven years' service to the five-year period and then to the three-year period. Let us also remember that Germany dismisses her contingents after two years of service. It must be admitted that the reduction of military service to one year would not seem to anyone an excessive sacrifice." <sup>39</sup>

The French jurist did not intend that the limitation to a year of service would be absolute. In each country it would be necessary to admit that the officers, the non-commissioned officers, such as the *gendarmérie* or the colonial garrison, would remain in training more than one year. The great problem here would be to determine the execution of the exception. Whether such a proposition for a limitation of armaments would have an early success, M. Souchon thought depended entirely upon public opinion, i.e., on the people seeing clearly the necessity for disarmament.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 517.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 518.

<sup>39</sup> *Loc. cit.*



In 1895, M. A. Mérignhac, Professor of Public and Private International Law at the University of Toulouse, published his *Traité théorique et pratique de l'arbitrage international*. In this treatise he expressed the opinion that there could be a *détente* which would permit the substitution of pacific solutions for war only after the liquidation of the causes of pending conflict. Then only would the states have sufficient confidence to consent to a diminution of their military contingents. After the settlement of outstanding questions one could think of disarmament, which would be the natural consequence of their disappearance, and of the establishment of a juridical state which would prevent all new causes from developing, or would settle them pacifically as they arose.<sup>40</sup>

Professor Mérignhac did not examine the practical ways and means by which disarmament could be effected after the actual disappearance of the causes of war. He believed that a general Congress, called to alleviate the dangers which threaten peace, would have to take the necessary measures, it being understood that the question interested the whole of Europe and that specialists would arrange the numerous technical details. He confined himself to indicating the general rules along which disarmament should, in his opinion, be carried out. In the first place it should be *simultaneous* and *collective*, because, as such, it would become a possibility. Otherwise, it must constitute a trickery and an imprudence of such gravity that no nation could take the responsibility. In the second place, disarmament could only be *partial*, since an internal force is necessary for each state. Finally, it ought to be *proportional* and *progressive*.<sup>41</sup>

M. Mérignhac considered universal confederation or even European federation a dream.<sup>42</sup> An international state, with legislative, judicial and executive powers, the last supported by a permanent army, appeared to him to excite the same fears

<sup>40</sup> A. Mérignhac, *Traité théorique et pratique de l'arbitrage international* (Paris, 1895), pp. 508-9, Paragraph 545.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 512, Paragraph 549.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 406, Paragraph 438.

as the principle of universal federation, the same defiance in respect to a central power which might become tyrannical. To pursue the creation of an international state was, in the French jurist's opinion, to set back indefinitely international reform. The conception of such a state, coming to complicate problems already complex, was useless to attain the end pursued. He believed that peace could be maintained by solving international litigations by juridical means. This he considered necessary and at the same time sufficient.<sup>43</sup>

To secure peace M. Mérignhac thought it essential to establish some judicial institution which would assure the triumph of law over violence. This new organization should unite two indispensable conditions—acceptability and durability. It would be acceptable, if it were not complicated and did not frighten the people by innovations too radical and too costly for their budgets; if it did not lead to convulsions in the actual *status quo*, such as would bring on war while having peace for their objectives; if it did not constitute a powerful organization frightening the states on the subject of their actual and future independence. On the other hand, it would be durable if flexible enough to meet all the ulterior changes which might result from circumstances, and especially from the evolution of nationalities, without becoming the motive or the pretext, and providing its decisions applied to all the litigants and were sanctioned in a sure and efficacious manner.<sup>44</sup>

The jurist did not explain what a "sure and efficacious" manner would be. He was opposed to the creation of an international executive and police force capable of enforcing international decisions on a recalcitrant state. But moral compulsion alone was not in 1895, any more than it is in 1942, sufficiently strong to guarantee the enforcement of international arrangements. Moreover, he appears to have overlooked the fact that certain types of cases are unsuitable for settlement

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 409-10, Paragraph 443.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 426-27, Paragraph 459.

along juridical lines and that sovereign states refuse to submit *all* their differences to arbitration.

M. Mérignhac thought it prudent to change as little as possible, to realize only the absolutely indispensable reforms; consequently, he advocated only the establishment of an international judiciary and not a legislature and executive. But on this point he was opposed to a permanent tribunal composed of judges, unimpeachable, having a fixed term, and exercising a function comparable to that filled by the national magistrates. Permanent judges, he feared, might become too powerful; that which he considered should be rendered lasting was the principle and not its functions, the jurisdiction but not those who were to exercise it.<sup>45</sup> In place of permanent jurists, unimpeachable, he preferred judges named for each case—juries in a word. The jurisdiction would thus be permanent, but the people exercising it would be chosen as arbitrators.<sup>46</sup>

The conclusion drawn by Professor Mérignhac in his study was that when the questions of the Orient and Alsace-Lorraine should be liquidated and disarmament acted upon, the moment would have come to consider the establishment of an international jurisdiction, which subsequently would prevent war between the nations. Up to then, this jurisdiction appeared to him absolutely impossible of realization, because the great powers would reject it from fear of seeing it intervene in the great questions dividing them. Moreover, supposing it were established, its decisions could be violated with impunity by those states to which they appear prejudicial. The jurisdiction destined to secure the reign of justice was, he thought, scarcely conceivable in the bellicose atmosphere of Europe, for law dwells in regions more serene and less tormented. If the substitution of law for force in the solution of international disputes were possible and if there existed certain obstacles which rendered it unrealizable in the eyes of those who did not live in abstractions but sanely envisaged the actual condition of in-

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 428, Paragraph 460.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 429, Paragraph 461.

ternational society, then the first step was to remove the obstacles.<sup>47</sup>

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During the period 1875-98 individual jurists condemned the ever-mounting armaments and hoped to see the governments restrict their military budgets within certain proportions, but the international jurists as a body refrained from enunciating theories on a subject for which they saw no practical solution of the difficulties involved. Disarmament is indeed a question of policy for governments and not one of international law; jurisconsults were therefore under no obligation to consider it. In spite of their realizing the constant danger to peace in the increasing armaments, they nevertheless remained officially silent on the question. At the annual conference of the Institute of International Law not a single resolution on the subject was proposed;<sup>48</sup> nor did the International Law Association pass a disarmament resolution after 1875 or discuss the problem between its 1879 and 1907 conferences.<sup>49</sup> From 1888 until Tsar Nicholas II issued his famous Rescript, only two articles on armaments and disarmament appeared in the *Revue de droit international et de législation comparée*,<sup>50</sup> one in the *Revue générale de droit international public*,<sup>51</sup> not one in the *Revue de droit public et de la science politique en France et à l'étranger*,<sup>52</sup> not one in the *Juridical Review* or the *Harvard*

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 514-15, Paragraph 550.

<sup>48</sup> *Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International and Resolutions of the Institute of International Law Dealing with the Law of Nations* (New York, 1916).

<sup>49</sup> *Transactions of the International Law Association, 1873-1924*, compiled by W. A. Bewes, p. 39, p. 234, p. 251.

<sup>50</sup> *Revue de droit international et de législation comparée*, XXI (1889), 77-103 and XXVI (1894), 573-85. There were, however, three articles in XIX (1887), 398-407; 472-78; 479-86.

<sup>51</sup> *Revue générale de droit international public*, I (1894), 513-22.

<sup>52</sup> In Vol. III (1894), p. 183, there was a one-paragraph notice concerning M. Souchon's proposal and a short unsympathetic reference (p. 390) by M. Moureau, of the Law Faculty at Aix, to M. Jules Simon's recommendation for the reduction of military service to a year.

*Law Review.* The great majority of the jurists saw no means of solving the technical difficulties involved in the limitation of armaments and then supervising and enforcing any arrangement that might be made. Seeing no method of removing the nightmare which weighed upon the world, they remained silent.

If the governments had been willing to limit their armaments and had turned to the jurists for a draft treaty on the subject, the jurisconsults would have had difficulty in agreeing on its actual form. Some would have recommended the reduction of the term of military service as the most practicable step, but that is only one form of reduction of armaments which does not take into consideration naval armaments, fortifications, weapons of war and *war potential*. Raoul de la Grasserie, for example, hoped to bring about disarmament through the creation of a vast international society; M. Mérignhac believed that general disarmament could come only after the liquidation of the causes of conflict; while M. Souchon was of opinion that international jurists should not await a far distant peace before approaching the subject, but that they should recommend the conclusion of treaties limiting the permanent forces of each state. He considered the most efficacious approach to the problem to be the limitation of military service in general to one year. But this, he understood, was not in reality disarmament, for the great powers had already augmented their effectives by the same laws which diminished their military term, for example, France in 1889 and Germany in 1893. M. Mérignhac, on the other hand, considered one year of service inadequate.

Still the few international jurists who did approach the problem of limiting armaments went far more deeply into it than did most members of the Universal Peace Congresses, who thought that disarmament could be solved through the use of arbitration. The jurisconsults realized that peace and disarmament would only come with the formation of an international government. Although they differed as to the form this

organization should take, they agreed on one point—that a strong public opinion in favor of disarmament would have to express itself before governments would feel compelled to act upon the problem.

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## CHAPTER VII

### OFFICIAL OPINION AND THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS

By 1888 the excessive armament expenditure of the Great Powers was considered one of the major problems facing Europe. A survey of the statements—both auspicious and inauspicious—made about armaments during the decade 1888–98 offers sufficient proof that in the various countries the question of a limitation was making headway among the official class. The two British Prime Ministers of the period, the Marquis of Salisbury and Lord Rosebery, turned their attention to the problem. The German Emperor, the Tsar of Russia, the Kings of Italy and Denmark, by their behavior caused vague rumors of their interest in disarmament to be circulated in the press. Yet so cautious and so shrouded in secrecy was the official approach to the problem that it is almost impossible today to determine its exact nature; one thing, however, is certain: never before was the question of heavy armaments considered by governments with such gravity and foreboding.

The Marquis of Salisbury, who in his Lord Mayor's Day Speech of 1887 had referred to the ever-increasing European armaments, again drew attention to the problem at the Guildhall on November 9, 1888. Speaking on the "Peace of Europe," he said:

And there is another danger, or, if not a danger, a cause of disquietude—a cause which if it does not disquiet us, must at least attract our earnest attention, and that is that, year after year, we see that new necessities of fresh armaments are recognized. Fresh forces are brought into the ranks, larger and larger armaments are constructed, vaster and vaster sums are devoted to the purposes of

defence. And as the process goes on we ask—Where is it to end? Will the time come when the nations will think that they have prepared enough and will begin to decrease their accumulations of armaments and men? I see it stated on good authority that there are no less than 12 millions of men, of armed men maintained by the five Powers of Continental Europe.<sup>1</sup>

The Prime Minister did not conclude on a note of hope of seeing the burden diminished but rather by appealing to his country to prepare even more to face the impending danger. "I do not say," Lord Salisbury continued, "that this should diminish our confidence in peace, but I feel that there is a general impression pervading the community—one of those wide public impressions affecting every mind and every class which carries by its very universality the warrant of its truth—which tells us that in the midst of so much preparation we must not remain unprepared."

This was typical of Lord Salisbury's attitude towards the armament problem. He saw no chance of permanent peace in Europe so long as the powers continued to increase and perfect the instruments of destruction which they might use against each other; still, having regard to the dangers surrounding Great Britain, he felt compelled to provide the necessary precautions.

Several writers interested in peace and disarmament—among whom were W. T. Stead, an English journalist; "Diplomaticus" (the poet Mr. Austin); A. Geouffre de Lapradelle, a French Professor of Law; Robert Coulet and Dr. Hans Wehberg, both authors of books on the limitation of armaments—stated that about 1890 Lord Salisbury had a report on the financial aspects of armaments drawn up for the private information of the Foreign Office. The memorandum is said to have been "very confidentially" communicated to Emperor William II, who was astonished by it and made known his intention of calling a European Congress to concert practical means for assuring uni-

<sup>1</sup> The *Times*, November 10, 1888, p. 10, col. 4.



versal peace. His project, vaguely announced in the press, was badly received, especially in France; in consequence, it was dropped. W. T. Stead, in the *Review of Reviews Annual* for 1899, entitled the "United States of Europe," traced the germ of the Tsar's Rescript to this document.<sup>2</sup> Stead,<sup>3</sup> Coulet,<sup>4</sup> Dubois,<sup>5</sup> and de Lapradelle<sup>6</sup> claim that the Kaiser intended to call a conference. Mr. Austin,<sup>7</sup> a whole-hearted supporter of Lord Salisbury's policy and a frequent visitor at Hatfield,<sup>8</sup> stated his belief that it gave rise to an exchange of views among the Powers.<sup>9</sup>

These men may be partly correct, but the writer has been informed that the report in question was not drawn up on Lord Salisbury's instructions; it was produced from Italian records, on his own initiative, by Mr. Henry Nevill Dering of the British Embassy at Rome, and communicated by him to the Marquis of Dufferin, who forwarded it to Lord Salisbury.<sup>10</sup> The document was not published.<sup>11</sup>

The Marquis of Salisbury may have communicated this statistical report to the German Emperor, who may have wished and even intended to call a Peace Conference. In fact, numerous rumors to that effect circulated in the press in the early 'nineties. It is possible that there may have been an exchange of views among the powers: although it is conceivable that

<sup>2</sup> F. Whyte, *The Life of W. T. Stead*, II, 122-23.

<sup>3</sup> *Loc. cit.*; also Stead, *La Chronique de la Conférence de la Haye 1899*, p. 3.

<sup>4</sup> Robert Coulet, *La Limitation des armements*, pp. 75-76.

<sup>5</sup> Georges Dubois, *Des Charges de la paix armée et de la limitation des armements*, pp. 85-86.

<sup>6</sup> *Revue générale de droit international public*, VI (1899), 622-23.

<sup>7</sup> Lady Gwendolen Cecil, *The Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury* (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1932), IV (1887-92), 56.

<sup>8</sup> Hatfield House, Lord Salisbury's Hertfordshire Home.

<sup>9</sup> "Diplomaticus," "The Vanishing of Universal Peace," *The Fortnightly Review*, LXXI (New series) (May, 1899), 875.

<sup>10</sup> Letter from the Assistant Librarian at the Foreign Office to the writer. L733/449/405, February 22, 1935. The writer has examined this unpublished document in the Foreign Office.

<sup>11</sup> Foreign Office Archives, Enclosure 2 in Despatch No. 72 sent by the Marquis of Dufferin to the Marquis of Salisbury, April 29, 1890.

W. T. Stead, de Lapradelle, Coulet, Dubois and Wehberg may have been mistaken, as not one gives a primary source for his statement and no doubt the latter four copied Stead or "Diplomaticus"; one would hardly expect Mr. Austin to have made so important a statement involving Lord Salisbury without any foundation. There is the possibility that the Prime Minister had a special report on the financial aspects of armament—other than the one sent to him by the Marquis of Dufferin—drawn up for the private information of the Foreign Office and that he submitted it to William II. On this point, however, the Assistant Librarian at the Foreign Office has informed the writer that "the only memorandum which can be traced in that Department having any resemblance to the one described is a report on the revenue and expenditure of the Seven Great European Powers for the period 1882–88, including the figures for naval and military expenditure."<sup>12</sup> The Marquis of Salisbury, when accepting the Tsar's invitation to a Peace Conference, inferred that some attempts to limit armaments had previously been considered. He wrote to Sir C. Scott, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that "serious and successful efforts have on more than one recent occasion been made with that object by the Great Powers."<sup>13</sup> If anything was done by Lord Salisbury and the Kaiser it must have been "strictly confidential" and it remains so, for Lady Gwendolen Cecil states that she has not come across any document at Hatfield House referring to the subject.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, the Foreign Office Librarian, on the instruction of Sir John Simon, informed the writer that "there is nothing in the Foreign Office archives to suggest that the contents of the despatch No. 72 of 29th April, 1890, from His [sic] Majesty's Ambassador at Rome regarding the cost of armaments in Europe, were ever communicated to

<sup>12</sup> Letter from the Assistant Librarian at the Foreign Office to the writer, L733/449/405, February 22, 1935.

<sup>13</sup> B. D., I, 221, The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. Scott, London, October 25, 1898.

<sup>14</sup> Letter from Lady Gwendolen Cecil to the writer, December 31, 1934.

the German Emperor.”<sup>15</sup> There is, of course, the remote possibility that some other document was submitted to the Kaiser, but this does not appear probable in view of the fact that the Editors of *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914* write that the statement made by W. T. Stead and others to the effect that William II planned a peace conference in the early 'nineties is unsupported by any documents they have found in Berlin.<sup>16</sup>

Although the Marquis of Salisbury appears to have made no official proposal for a limitation of armaments, Lord Rosebery in 1894 approached the Russian Ambassador, Baron de Staal, on the problem. For years Rosebery had been in close touch with the Liberal and Dissenting movement for a limitation of armaments. This agitation reached its highest point in the summer of 1894; in May and June, articles urging a reduction of the term of military service and a halt in armament expenditure written by M. Jules Simon and W. T. Stead appeared in the *Contemporary Review*. In May Stead also suggested in his *Review of Reviews* that the Powers should agree not to allow their military and naval budgets to pass beyond the 1894 limit until the end of the century. Ever since April, the Churches and the Arbitration Alliance had been busy collecting signatures to a Memorial to the Government on the limitation of armaments.<sup>17</sup> In May Stead initiated a National Memorial addressed to the British Government, urging the opening of negotiations with all the European Powers as a first step towards an agreement on armament limitation.<sup>18</sup> Consequently, Lord Rosebery believed that public opinion was in favor of a limitation and that the time was opportune. When, in August, the Prime Minister received from the Associated Churches their Memorial asking Her Majesty's Government to propose some practical

<sup>15</sup> Letter from S. Gaselee to the writer, L2079/449/405, April 9, 1935.

<sup>16</sup> *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914*, XV (Berlin, 1924), p. 141 footnote. Hereafter, *Die Grosse Politik*.

<sup>17</sup> *Supra*, pp. 103-04.

<sup>18</sup> *Supra*, pp. 104-08.

step to promote the international reduction of armaments, he gave the assurance that the subject was "constantly engaging the attention" of the Government. His statement was quite true, for in May he confidentially approached Baron de Staal on the question of an international agreement to arrest the growth of armaments. Lord Rosebery's latest biography, written by the Marquess of Crewe,<sup>19</sup> contains no reference to the conversation and correspondence to which Rosebery did not wish to give a strictly official appearance. Although in 1894 it was known that he had sounded the Russian Government on the idea of a limitation of armaments, the official revelation did not occur until the publication in 1929 of the *Correspondence diplomatique de Baron de Staal, 1884-1900*.

On May 2 de Staal informed Giers, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that Lord Rosebery had invited him to his home to discuss the problem of limiting armaments. Inasmuch as the British Minister wished their conversations to be strictly confidential he had chosen this method of approach rather than the more official Foreign Office. Rosebery considered the Emperor Alexander as the strongest guarantee of general tranquillity and his will as the cornerstone of the pacific edifice of Europe. The Prime Minister would take no step without the moral support of the Tsar. Therefore, he wanted to know if de Staal would sound the ground on the subject.<sup>20</sup>

M. Giers replied that he could not give a precise answer to this question, "as important as delicate," without first submitting the details to his august Master. This "vaste projet," with many difficulties to surmount, would require prolonged study and, in consequence, a sympathetic but non-committal reply was all that could be given at the time.<sup>21</sup>

At the Prince of Wales's Levée, Lord Rosebery and Baron de

<sup>19</sup> The Marquess of Crewe, *Lord Rosebery* (London, 1931).

<sup>20</sup> *Correspondence Diplomatique de Baron de Staal, 1884-1900* (Paris, Le Baron A. Meyendorff, 1929), I, 241-42, Staal à Giers, London, April 20/May 2, 1894.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 242, Giers à Staal, Saint Petersburg, April 27/May 5, 1894.

Staal had another conversation on the question of disarmament. The end of the official reception having interrupted their informal talk, the Prime Minister promised to resume the consideration of the subject in a private letter, which he begged Staal to make known to M. Giers. On June 6 Lord Rosebery communicated with the Russian Ambassador and asked that his letter should "preserve the most strictly confidential character." He believed that the time was propitious for a general consideration of the question and that, if a conference were assembled for the relief of Europe from its terrible war burdens, it would not separate without practical and beneficial results.<sup>22</sup> The problem was: how could such a conference be convoked? In writing to Baron de Staal, Rosebery stated that the "Emperor of Russia by his high, pure character, and his single-minded desire for peace is the Sovereign who appears to me to be marked out as the originator of such a meeting." He went on to say that the Tsar was above suspicion, while at the same time the splendor of his position and his spirit of conciliation would attract powers who would not care to be represented at a conference elsewhere. The Prime Minister pointed out that the armies of Great Britain were, in comparison to those of the Continent, numerically so small that an invitation from her would not carry the weight which should properly attach to a measure of this nature. "In the second place," he wrote, "the policy of colonial expansion on which some nations have embarked, has caused a certain amount of friction which would make it desirable that the presiding Power at such a Conference should not be one engaged in colonial enterprise." Various reasons would make it difficult for other nations to move, and in fine he could conceive no Prince or Personage comparable to His Imperial Majesty for the purpose of summoning the conference.<sup>23</sup>

On August 3, Baron de Staal again reported to M. Giers

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 246, Staal à Giers, London, May 31/June 12, 1894.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 243-44, Rosebery à Staal, London, June 6, 1894.

that he had made use of a conversation with Lord Rosebery to speak to him on the question of disarmament. This time the Ambassador directed his language along the lines which the Russian Foreign Minister had indicated in a letter dated June 12/24.<sup>24</sup> Lord Rosebery was still of opinion that, if a common action was destined to solve the question which responded to the most elevated interests of civilization, it could be effected only under the powerful initiative of the Russian Sovereign, Alexander III, considered by Europe as the arbiter of peace. Staal wrote that he took care not to discourage the British Minister.<sup>25</sup>

Lord Rosebery, no doubt, was actuated by the most sincere intentions in approaching Baron de Staal. Although he earnestly hoped for peace and freedom throughout the world, he could scarcely be considered a pacifist since by peace he did not mean "peace at any price."<sup>26</sup> He considered it a melancholy and humiliating confession that the peace of Europe mainly depended, not on the divine precepts of the Christian religion, but on the awe inspired in every nation by the existence of vast armaments.<sup>27</sup> MM. Staal and Giers do not appear to have been very enthusiastic over the idea of the Russian Government's summoning a peace conference, but they were careful not to reject it definitely. The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War made the moment inopportune, and the sudden death of the Tsar completely stopped the further discussion of the proposal. But one of the last official acts of the Emperor was to express his sympathy and admiration for the attempt initiated in England for promoting the reduction of armaments, for the maintenance of peace was one of the main objects of his policy and he was glad to know that a movement was on foot in Great Britain directed towards so desirable an end. When his strong hand was removed, it was not expected that the young Tsar

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 249 footnote. This has not been found.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 249.

<sup>26</sup> T. F. G. Coates, *Lord Rosebery His Life and Speeches*, I, 346. Speech at the annual banquet of Glasgow University Gladstone Club, March 29, 1880.

<sup>27</sup> The Marquess of Crewe, *op. cit.*, II, 556.

Nicholas would attempt to take action in the matter. It was thought that even if his sympathies were entirely in accord with those of his father, he would not want to incur the ill-will of the General Staff of the Russian army. Thus the chance for a mutual agreement on the limitation of armaments seemed to have passed.

Besides Lord Rosebery's unsuccessful attempt to bring about a conference to consider the problem of armaments, there are various unofficial reports that the German Emperor entertained similar ideas. From time to time in the early 'nineties it was rumored that William II intended to call a European Congress to discuss practical measures of arriving at Universal Peace and general disarmament. In March, 1890, some London journals reported that "the Emperor has planned sensations which will startle the world, among which is the convoking of an International Congress for abolishing Standing Armies, with the exception of a small force, in proportion to each country's population."<sup>28</sup>

In April the "Continental Gossip" of the *Glasgow Herald* wrote: "What will the German Emperor do next? is now the general cry. He has done so many startling things already, and takes such an evident delight in making men's tongues wag, that nobody would be much surprised if he were to propose a Congress for universal disarmament. Men have already become convinced that he is sincerely religious, and that he has no ambition for bloodshed."<sup>29</sup> Whatever may have been the source of these hearsays, they certainly were not related to any communication which Lord Salisbury might have made to the Emperor concerning the expenditure memorandum forwarded by the Marquis of Dufferin to the British Prime Minister on April 29 and received May 5, 1890. Any action on the part of the Kaiser in March and April, that is, before the document arrived at Downing Street, must obviously have been quite independent of this report.

<sup>28</sup> *The Herald of Peace*, April, 1890, p. 45.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, May, 1890, p. 63.

It would appear that throughout 1890 and 1891 the Kaiser at least entertained the idea of convoking a conference and probably discussed it with his cousin, the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria, for, on January 11, the Berlin correspondent of the *New York Sun* stated that the Emperor was engaged upon negotiations for a proposition concerning European disarmament and that he had entirely won over Francis Joseph to the idea.<sup>30</sup> Rumors of this nature circulated in the press during January, and though unreliable, they were not altogether without significance. The Berlin correspondent of one journal wrote: "Unless I am much mistaken he (William II) is at the present time, and has been in fact this very week, engaged upon negotiations for a momentous proposition for European Disarmament. What I actually know, on the subject, is that His Majesty has an ally whom he personally influences, and whom he has entirely gained over to the idea of disarmament of the military forces of the Continent. That ally is his Imperial cousin, the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria."<sup>31</sup>

In February, 1891, the Empress Frederick visited Paris ostensibly for the purpose of trying to induce French artists to send their pictures to the Berlin Exhibition. But it was rumored that in reality the journey was intended to prepare the way for a visit of the Emperor whose aim was more far-reaching than an act of courtesy to the French nation. His visit was to be the forerunner of a scheme for partial disarmament. But the Kaiser's plans failed to materialize, for his mother's visit did not prove so successful as it had been hoped. The Emperor's project, vaguely announced in the press, was badly received, especially in France, where he was accused of acting in his personal interest, of wishing to make other powers acknowledge his supremacy and to compel France to abandon her pretensions to Alsace-Lorraine.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>30</sup> *The Times*, January 12, 1891, p. 6, col. 1.

<sup>31</sup> *The Herald of Peace*, February, 1891, p. 193.

<sup>32</sup> Robert Coulet, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-76; Georges Dubois, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-86; Dr. Hans Wehberg, *op. cit.*, p. 13; F. Whyte, *op. cit.*, II, 122-23.



In July, 1891, William II paid an official visit to England, and the British and Foreign Arbitration Association, acting upon the strength of these various undenied rumors in the press, used the occasion for presenting to His Imperial Majesty a Memorial on the subject of European Disarmament. Among the statements in this petition were these:

We believe that the solution of the great problem of the severe struggle for existence among the masses of the people in Europe is to be chiefly found by the diminution of the vast Armed Forces, that result in a ruinous competition in preparation for war, and of the oppressive system of Military Service and Taxation.

It would be a great relief to the people of Europe, if, by mutual arrangement, the Military and Naval Forces could be reduced, for it would set men free for the development of peaceful industries and enterprises, whose energies are now absorbed in Military Service, and thus greatly add to National prosperity and contentment.

We therefore humbly pray your Majesty graciously to receive this Memorial, and to consider seriously the important subjects herein referred to, and we have reason to hope and believe that if your Imperial Majesty will graciously take the lead, the Rulers of the other Great Powers of Europe will cordially co-operate with your Imperial Majesty, and thus great and lasting good will result therefrom. . . .<sup>33</sup>

The Memorial was received at the German Embassy by Count Hatzfeldt for presentation to William II, and by command of the Emperor, the German Ambassador conveyed his thanks to the Association. The following day, July 10, at a banquet given to His Majesty at the Guildhall, the Emperor said:

"My aim is above all, the maintenance of Peace. *For peace alone* can give the confidence which is necessary to the healthy development of science, of art, and of trade. *Only so long as Peace reigns* are we at liberty to bestow our earnest thoughts upon the great problems, the solution of which, in fairness and equity, I consider the most prominent duty of our time. You may therefore rest assured that I shall continue to do my best to maintain, and constantly to increase

the good relations between Germany and the other nations, and that I shall always be found to unite with you and them in a common labour for peaceful progress, friendly intercourse and advancement of civilization.”<sup>34</sup>

This statement, beautifully indefinite on the subject of disarmament, was interpreted by the pacifists as evidence of the Emperor's pacific sentiments and his willingness to co-operate with others in limiting armaments.

While in England, William II visited Lord Salisbury at Hatfield, and the Paris *Figaro* published some notes on their conversation. It reported that the question of European disarmament was touched upon and the Emperor is reputed to have said, “Germany cannot go on arming, arming, arming.” Lord Salisbury replied, “It is only a great monarch like your Majesty who could dare to set an example on this subject.” The Emperor comprehended Lord Salisbury's meaning and renounced his original intention of suggesting that England should initiate a proposition of disarmament.<sup>35</sup>

Similar rumors to those in which the Kaiser figured in 1891 were repeated in the early months of 1894. In April of that year it was positively asserted in diplomatic circles in Paris that the German Emperor had submitted an initial scheme of disarmament, not only to the King of Italy and the Emperor Francis Joseph, but to the Tsar.<sup>36</sup> After sounding the King of Denmark, who is said to have shrunk from the responsibility, the Emperor William, it is reported, asked the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg to submit the plan of a conference to Alexander III. The convoking of the pacific gathering was to be left to the Tsar himself and the Russian capital was to serve as the meeting place.

Whether the Emperor really approached the Tsar and whether Alexander III answered William II as he is reported to

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>35</sup> *The Herald of Peace*, August, 1891, p. 277.

<sup>36</sup> *The Spectator*, LXXII (April 21, 1894), 529.

have done, we cannot know as certain. The French newspapers, however, published something very like what he may have said, or what he might have said, had he been approached in the way in which the Emperor is claimed to have approached him. What the Tsar is reputed to have stated when Count Schuvaloff "returned a polite refusal" to the German monarch's message is briefly this:

"Gigantic armies are not a cause, but an effect. They are due to the wars of the last quarter of a century, and to the Treaties in which these wars ended. The Triple Alliance was entered into to defend the state of things arising from these Treaties. Therefore it is hostile to France and Russia, for these Powers suffered from these Treaties. Neither of these Powers wish for war, but they have to place themselves on the defensive, and to be ready to put a stop to a state of things which threatens both, should the offensive be taken against them. Russia, besides, could take no step in the matter of disarmament unless Germany first came to an understanding with France, and Austria expressed herself ready to leave the whole Balkan Peninsula to its legitimate owners, the Slavs and the Turks. Were this done, every State in Europe would spontaneously disarm, because there would be no more need for great standing armies."<sup>37</sup>

These references in the press to William's desire to see a disarmament conference convened, led Mr. Byles, on April 20, to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if any communications of that nature had reached the Foreign Office. Sir Edmund Grey answered that none had been received.<sup>38</sup> Whether, therefore, the Emperor actually made the advances attributed to him we cannot know. But if he did they were certainly quite unofficial, for we have the statement of the Editors of *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette* that they have found no documents in Berlin relating to the Kaiser's intentions of calling a peace conference.<sup>39</sup>

After Alexander's death rumors of the German Emperor's

<sup>37</sup> *The Spectator*, LXXII (April 21, 1894), 529.

<sup>38</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, Fourth series, XXIII, col. 980.

<sup>39</sup> *Die Grosse Politik*, XV (Berlin, 1924), 141, footnote.

pacific intentions again circulated in the press. *La Conférence Interparlementaire*, the organ of the Union Interparlementaire, referred to these in April, 1895. In an article entitled, "À propos de désarmement," it stated: "The German Emperor is evidently considering in his mind the great and grave question of disarmament. It should not be doubted in the presence of noises so often repeated, that he intends to convoke a diplomatic conference." <sup>40</sup>

It would appear that, although European monarchs might not agree to call a conference to consider disarmament, they were, at least, unofficially discussing the problem in 1894. On March 26, M. de Blowitz, the *Times* Correspondent, forwarded from Paris a telegram which embodied what King Christian IX of Denmark was reported to have said a few days previously to a Spanish statesman whom he had received:

I hope to live long enough to see Europe enter upon the pathway of military retrenchment and to behold the Sovereigns of Europe taking measures to protect their several peoples against the constantly-increasing burdens of military armaments. My dear son-in-law, the Tsar of Russia, whose mission consists in maintaining Peace, is quite ready to enter upon this pathway (they had evidently discussed it together), and my great and good friend the Emperor of Austria is equally disposed to do his utmost to this end. I have never ventured to speak to the German Emperor because a young Sovereign is always dreaming of winning new laurels, but I am sure the King of Italy would have no objection to discuss the question of military burdens, while as for you, the great Princess who watches over the throne of Spain has proved, by so ostensibly drawing closer to France, that she has in view only that prolonged peace which is so necessary to her people. I am sure, therefore, that Russia, Austria, Spain, and even Italy are equally eager for an unbroken period of peace, and to see all people relieved of a portion of the burdens which weigh them down. <sup>41</sup>

Too much importance must not be assigned to this royal utterance, for its authenticity was subsequently questioned, and

<sup>40</sup> *La Conférence Interparlementaire*, April 1, 1895, p. 302.

<sup>41</sup> *The Times*, March 26, 1894, p. 3.

a sort of semi-official denial of its delivery published. Nevertheless, it is to be noted that the embryonic idea of a lasting peace was beginning to take shape in the minds of sovereigns.

In the same issue of the *Times*, the Berlin correspondent quoted an interpretation by the *Germania* of a statement made by Count von Caprivi at Danzig. According to this the German Emperor was at the time occupied with the problem of reducing the burdens of military expenditure. This article completed, so to speak, the words of King Christian, for it permitted the addition of the Emperor William's name to the list of sovereigns cited as desirous of reaping the benefits of peace.

Throughout the decade 1888-98 there was among the official class in most countries a growing feeling that the competition in armaments was becoming ruinous and that some concerted steps should be taken to arrest it. French public opinion, however, appeared to oppose any suggestion of a limitation of armaments or any congress which might stabilize the *status quo*. When, on December 19, 1896, a group of Socialists in the Chamber of Deputies led by M. Dejeante solicited a vote of urgency in favor of a proposition to the effect that the French Government should "summon a conference of all nations in order to proceed to a general, progressive, organized disarmament,"<sup>42</sup> their declaration was rejected by 490 votes to 35.<sup>43</sup> M. Gauthier pointed out that on the French frontier there were three powerful, armed nations which were a menace to the independence of the country. It was a dangerous Utopia to believe that they were disarming. Moreover, for twenty-six years two provinces, torn from the mother country, had looked forward to better days and had awaited the hour of inevitable reparations. Finally, it was argued, the integrity of the French territory and the power of the Republic were indispensable for assuring to the world the realization of democracy and social

<sup>42</sup> *Annales de la Chambre des Députés, 6<sup>me</sup> Législature, débats parlementaires, session extraordinaire, 19 décembre 1896*, p. 1299.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1301.

reforms.<sup>44</sup> No doubt, it was the French hostile attitude which deterred William II from making an official proposal for a peace conference; for the latent enmity between Germany and France was the center of the strained European relations. Germany could afford to be pacific because, so far as the Continent was concerned, she was satisfied and would have been glad to have the European Powers express their official approval of the map of Europe. She might even have been willing to agree to an international understanding on standing armies, so long as populations were used as the basis of proportionality, for then her army would be able to maintain its supremacy over that of France. Such an agreement would have left her free to concentrate on the development of a strong navy, as demanded by her expanding trade and her colonial aspirations. But an ambitious naval program in the 'nineties would, as is proved by later events, have opened a new phase of competition in an Anglo-German naval armament race. Austria, too, was pacific, for she could hardly afford to relish the thought of war which would be almost certain to disrupt the Habsburg Empire. Great Britain, the government and especially the people, desired to check armament expenditure. The three doubtful countries were Russia, France and Italy. The first two were determined not to limit their armaments until the injustices of past wars were rectified—they were nations dissatisfied with the *status quo*. Had France and Russia agreed to disarm, they would have relinquished for a long time all hope of re-acquiring the lost provinces and opening Constantinople to the Slavs. Furthermore, Russian autocracy demanded large armaments. The Tsar Alexander's personal love of peace, which was so often paraded in the press, was considered by many as "cobweb and moonshine." An autocratic system like the Russian, it was argued, must always be prepared for waging aggressive wars on frivolous pretexts, because war might at any moment be an indispensable help in its internal policy.

<sup>44</sup> *Loc. cit.*

Italy increased and wanted to increase her armaments, not so much for protection, as the Triple Alliance was sufficient defense of Italian rights, but because she wished to rival the military establishments of the greater powers in order to play a more prominent part in international affairs. Still King Humbert made repeated declarations of his love of peace. On April 5, 1894, when he received M. Gaston Calmette, the *Figaro's* special representative in Rome, he is reported as having declared:

There exists absolutely nothing that would allow us to go to war, neither our budget which unfortunately shows a deficit, nor our inclination, nor our desire, nor reason. . . . We are, then, not a danger of war, but, on the contrary, a guarantee of peace; rest assured of that. And I know that the pacific sentiments I express to you are shared by the Emperor of Austria and the German Emperor, as well as by the Tsar. Moreover, which is the Sovereign in Europe who would, at the present moment, with the existing armaments, with the incessant improvements in modern artillery, engage his people in a war? Whichever side may be victorious, victory will be so terrible, accompanied by such hecatombs of men, followed by such rivers of blood, that no King, no Emperor can think of it without shuddering for his armies. . . .<sup>45</sup>

This pacific declaration was scoffed at in France, where the blackest designs were attributed to the Italian sovereign. It was said that King Humbert should demonstrate his peaceful intentions by disarming.

Thus statesmen, kings and emperors professed to the utmost their love of peace but continued ceaselessly to prepare for war. All, more or less, considered a limitation or an arrest of armaments desirable, yet each attributed ulterior designs to any suggestion of a proposition from another. No one personage of the decade appeared willing to initiate a definite, official proposal for a limitation of armaments, or a conference to study the problem. Armaments increased at an even faster rate. Lord Salisbury, in his Guildhall Speech of November 9,

<sup>45</sup> *Le Figaro*, April 10, p. 1, col. 1.

1897, declared that the competition, unless curtailed, would end in a terrible effort of destruction, fatal to Christian civilization. His one hope was that the powers might some day be welded together into some international constitution which would give to the world "a long spell of unfettered commerce, prosperous trade, and continued peace." <sup>46</sup>

Less than a year after Lord Salisbury's Mayor's Day Speech the world was greatly surprised by an invitation from the young Tsar Nicholas II to meet in conference to discuss "a possible reduction of the excessive armaments which weigh upon all nations." The last Tsar of all the Russias gave a lead to the rest of Europe by making an official proposal for the all-round limitation of armaments. Whatever his motives may have been he crystallized in a definite form the thoughts of many who were alarmed at the ever-increasing armament expenditure of the period.

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<sup>46</sup> *The Times*, November 10, 1897.



## CHAPTER VIII

### CONCLUSION

#### THE INFLUENCE OF PUBLIC OPINION UPON THE MOVEMENT FOR A LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS

PUBLIC opinion is a new compelling political force which has come into the world since the Middle Ages. In fact, it is a development of the last century; before the French Revolution nothing of the kind was known or dreamed of in Europe. This new force in political life may be divided into two types. One is the popular belief in the fitness or rightness of something, a belief that certain lines of conduct should be followed or a certain opinion held by good citizens or right-thinking persons. This is what Mr. Balfour calls "climate." Such a belief does not impose any duty on anybody beyond outward conformity to the accepted standard. But public opinion in the true sense is a consensus among large bodies of persons which acts as a political force, imposing on those in authority certain enactments or certain lines of policy.<sup>1</sup> This study is concerned with public opinion in the second meaning, and its influence, if any, upon the movement for a limitation of armaments.

Although it cannot be measured with a tape, public opinion in a modern constitutional state, we are all agreed, should prevail. But creating and formulating public opinion is the great problem. In the nineteenth century there were two accepted methods of expressing public opinion: by elections and by the use of the press. But the elections were held only at intervals, and they served only as a medium through which this force

<sup>1</sup> E. L. Godkin, "The Growth and Expression of Public Opinion," *The Atlantic Monthly*, LXXXI (January, 1898), 2.

manifested itself in action. We must, therefore, turn to the press, which as an organ of public opinion not only expresses views and tendencies already in existence but is a factor in further developing and moulding the judgment of the people.

According to Lord Bryce, newspapers are influential in three ways: "as narrators, as advocates, and as weather cocks. They report events, they advance agreements, they indicate by their attitude what those who conduct them and are interested in their circulation take to be the prevailing opinion of their readers." <sup>2</sup> He continues:

It is chiefly in its third capacity, as an index and mirror of public opinion, that the press is looked to. This is the function it chiefly aims at discharging; and public men feel that in showing deference to it they are propitiating, and inviting the commands of public opinion itself.<sup>3</sup>

Although newspapers reflect and mould a general state of mind, the public mind must be ripe for moulding and directing. The moulding process may have been due to newspaper agitation over a period of time, but even then the public mind must have been receptive.<sup>4</sup> In order to build a strong structure of public opinion there must be unanimity of thought in the newspapers, and there is no such unanimity except in the state controlled and censored press. In the last half of the nineteenth century the press did not play an important part in the formation of a strong current of public opinion favoring disarmament. If all the newspapers and magazines, or a great majority of them, had said the same thing about the heavy armaments of the period or if they had all come out in favor of a limitation of armaments they would have wielded a powerful influence; but this they did not do.

On the subject of armaments, both the liberal and conserva-

<sup>2</sup> James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, II (Macmillan, New York, 1911 edition), 275 and 277.

<sup>3</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>4</sup> R. D. Blumenfeld, *The Press in My Times*, pp. 44-45.

tive journals of Great Britain showed a tendency to extreme caution. An occasional paper like the *Daily News* might call attention to the need for reducing standing armies. Another might offer advice. The *Manchester Times*, for example, called attention in 1848 to the fact that the London daily press was, on the whole, unfavorable to peace proceedings. It advised the friends of peace to concentrate on enlightening opinion at home, and to undertake the conversion of the *Times* and its satellites.<sup>5</sup>

English papers and periodicals of the mid-century Christina Phelps divides according to their attitude to the peace movement into three classes: the eulogistic, the neutral, the hostile. In a case apart were the London *Times* and *Punch*, the former antagonistic, the latter friendly to the cause. The *Times*, most influential of the daily papers, was actively opposed to the early peace movement and its editorials alternately ridiculed and denounced the whole movement.<sup>6</sup> The *Year-Book* regularly mentioned the Peace Congresses; the *Annual Register* noticed briefly the London Convention of 1843 and made flippant comments on the Frankfort Convention of 1850. The *Daily News* supported the peace movement in 1848, then gradually lost interest in it, ceasing in 1851 even to report the peace congresses. Twenty-two papers gave unqualified, though spasmodic support to the movement. Ten of these were provincial papers including the *Leeds' Mercury* and the *Manchester Examiner*. The sympathetic London papers were either liberal, free trade or religious, and they included the *Morning Advertiser* which had the second largest circulation in the kingdom.<sup>7</sup> Of the opponents of the peace movement, *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* was the most consistently denunciatory, and the *Morning Chronicle* was the most intelligently hostile. They

<sup>5</sup> Christina Phelps, *The Anglo-American Movement in the Mid-Nineteenth Century*, (No. 330, Columbia Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, New York, 1930) p. 184.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 181.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 180.

argued that the friends of peace were impracticable and unpatriotic, that arbitration was no guarantee against the use of force, and that disarmament would never be practicable so long as human nature remained unchanged.<sup>8</sup>

A survey of the articles on disarmament published in the newspapers and periodicals of the decade 1888-98 shows that the press was not moulding public opinion on the subject; nor was it, on the other hand, being noticeably influenced. True, more was published on the topic than at any other previous time in history; but the number of articles compared with those on wars, battles, armies, navies and soldiers was very small. Disarmament items in the *Times*, the *Daily News*, the *Daily Telegraph*, *Le Temps*, *Le Figaro*, the *New York Times*, and the *New York Herald* were tucked away in inconspicuous columns and probably read by only a few.

Many British magazines which might have exerted a great influence upon public opinion completely ignored the existence of the problem. The *Athenaeum*, the *Edinburgh Review*, the *Fortnightly Review*, the *Quarterly Review* and the *Humanitarian* remained silent on the question of disarmament. In the August number of the *Nineteenth Century*, Henry Geffcken referred to the question briefly by stating that all attempts to limit armaments were futile; disarmament comes only when it imposes itself by exhaustion. The *Contemporary Review* for May and June, 1894, published articles on the limitation of armaments as did the *Spectator* and the *Standard* for March and April of the same year. But only the *Review of Reviews*, edited by W. T. Stead, took a definite stand on questions of peace and disarmament.

The American periodicals played no better part. The *International Journal of Ethics*, devoted to the advancement of ethical knowledge and practice, did not treat the problem until after the Tsar's Rescript appeared. The *Atlantic Monthly*, *Harper's Monthly*, *Scribner's Magazine*, the *Century Maga-*

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 181.

zine, the *American Review of Reviews*, *Littell's Living Age* and the *Living Age* devoted ample space to the treatment of "The Benefits of War," "The Study of War," "Warlike Europe," "The Evolution of the Naval Officer," "The French Navy," "The Standing Army of Great Britain," "The Russian Army," "Austro-Hungarian Army," "The French Army," "The Italian Army," "The German Army," "Side Lights on the German Soldier," "The Problem of the Philippines" and "The Economic Basis of Imperialism," yet never once during the decade did these magazines touch the question of disarmament.<sup>9</sup> M. de Blowitz contributed an article entitled "The Peace of Europe" to *McClure's Magazine* for June, 1894, but that same periodical completely ignored the Tsar's Rescript. At the time it was engrossed in the Spanish American War and devoted its space to "The Cost of War," "The Fighting Leaders," "Theodore Roosevelt," "Dewey at Manila," etc.

If we agree with Mr. Walter Lippmann that public opinions, if they are to be sound, must be organized for the press not by the press; and if this organization is the "task of a political science that has won its proper place as a formulator in advance of a real decision, instead of apologist, critic, or reporter after the real decision has been made,"<sup>10</sup> then again, there was no organized opinion favoring disarmament in the decade before 1898. The *Revue de droit public et de la science politique en France et à l'étranger*;<sup>11</sup> the *Juridical Review*, a quarterly review of juridical and political science published in Edinburgh; the *Political Science Quarterly*, edited by the Faculty of Political Science at Columbia University; the *Yale Review*, a quarterly journal for the scientific discussion of political, economic and social questions; the *Journal of Political Econ-*

<sup>9</sup> The *Atlantic Monthly*, *Harper's Monthly*, the *American Review of Reviews*, the *Century* and *Scribner's Magazine* on several occasions published articles on arbitration.

<sup>10</sup> Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (Macmillan, New York, 1921), p. 32.

<sup>11</sup> In Vol. III (1894), pp. 183, 390-91, there were two short notes concerning M. Souchon's and Jules Simon's proposals.

omy, issued by the Department of Political Science in the University of Chicago; the *Journal of Political Science*, published for the American Social Science Association and containing papers of the Department of Jurisprudence; and the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, published for Harvard University, paid no attention to the economic burdens of huge armaments and their limitation.

The *Revue des deux mondes* published three articles by M. G. Valbert on International Arbitration and Peace but none dealing directly with disarmament until after Nicholas had issued his Eirenicon.<sup>12</sup> Likewise the *Revue de Paris* did not touch the problem of armament limitation until May, 1899,<sup>13</sup> and remained silent on the Tsar's manifesto in its 1898 and 1899 issues. Its only reference to armaments was in an article contributed by Maurice Loir in May, 1894, entitled "L'Armement de la réserve navale" in which the author criticized the French Navy for having so long neglected a program of armament. Finally, the volumes of *Public Opinion*, a comprehensive summary of the press throughout the world on all important current topics, contained only three short references to disarmament before the appearance of the Rescript;<sup>14</sup> and one of these, "Disarmament—A Lesson from Armenia," advocated an armed Europe. "Until the East is christianized and free," it reads, "the disarmament of Europe would be a measureless calamity to the world."<sup>15</sup> Thus, if we look upon the press as a medium through which public opinion is formed

<sup>12</sup> Arthur Desjardins, "Le Désarmement, Étude de droit international," *Revue des deux mondes*, XXVI (October, 1898, 573-83.

<sup>13</sup> Albert Pingaud, "Napoléon III et le désarmement," *Revue de Paris*, Mai, 1899 (Vol. III), pp. 296-308.

<sup>14</sup> "Disarmament of Nations"—Address of Rev. Dr. Dana Boardman, President of the Christian Arbitration and Peace Society, at the annual meeting, Washington, March 4, 1890, *Public Opinion*, VIII (March 15, 1890), 535; "A Plea and a Plan for Disarmament," M. Jules Simon, in the *Contemporary Review*, London and the London Standard, *Public Opinion*, XVII (May 17, 1894), 155; "Disarmament—A Lesson from Armenia," (The Commonwealth [Bapt.] Philadelphia), *Public Opinion*, XX (May 21, 1896), 652.

<sup>15</sup> *Public Opinion*, XX, 652.

or through which it is expressed, we must conclude that in the decade 1888-98 there was not a dominant current of opinion in favor of disarmament.

If we look elsewhere than in the press for disarmament agitation, we are forced to draw practically the same inference. A. Lawrence Lowell maintains that the political community as a whole is capable of public opinion only when the great bulk of the citizens is united and agreed upon the ends and aims of government in regard to a particular problem.<sup>16</sup> In the nineteenth century there was not a body of men agreed upon the means whereby the action of governments on the limitation of armaments should be determined. "Public opinion," writes Charles W. Smith, "is composed of individual opinions that have been subjected 'to a process of consolidation and clarification' until they have attained unity of direction. If individual opinions are not similar enough to flow together, there cannot be a public opinion."<sup>17</sup> Individual opinions on disarmament had not arrived at unity. In the national parliaments there were isolated complaints by liberals, pacifists and radicals against armaments, and resolutions were proposed requesting the governments to consider the convoking of an international congress to deal with the problem; but these were neither supported by the chambers in which they originated nor considered seriously by the governments. There was no concerted, simultaneous approach to the problem in the various parliaments. The Inter-Parliamentary Union, a practical organization which might have organized a unified international effort to bring about a limitation of armaments, carefully avoided taking a definite position on the problem at its conferences. International jurists in their official bodies—the Institute of International Law and the International Law Association—refrained from touching the question of disarmament.

<sup>16</sup> A. Lawrence Lowell, *Public Opinion and Popular Government* (Longmans Green, New York, 1914), p. 9.

<sup>17</sup> Charles W. Smith, *Public Opinion in a Democracy* (Prentice Hall, New York, 1939), p. 19.

If it is true that "only when a conflict imposes heavy sacrifices on us that an opinion makes itself felt in favor of preserving or cutting loose"; if "we develop opinions when called upon to act, to fight, or to pay";<sup>18</sup> then the laboring class and women should have been the leading agitators for a limitation of armaments. Although the burden of war and armed peace weighs heaviest upon the working classes, who have to support the largest part of the taxes and suffer the most from obligatory military service, labor, as a class did not, in the nineteenth century, take a firm and determined stand on the question of disarmament.<sup>19</sup> Neither did women. It is only natural that women should hate war—which breaks up their homes, robs them of their sons, husbands and support—but this hatred had done little by 1898 to assist in the struggle for a limitation of armaments. In the decade 1888–98 women took a greater interest in peace and Peace Societies than at any time before in history, and they occasionally uttered isolated complaints and warnings against war and heavy armaments; but a great international organization of women, supporting disarmament and opposing war because the members comprehended that it is an evil for the whole human race, did not exist. As early as 1868, Marie Georgg, the Treasurer of the Geneva League of Peace and Liberty, had urged the formation of an international league in "Les États-Unis de l'Europe"; but not until 1895 was an International Peace League of Women founded. In November, 1896, *La Ligue Internationale des Femmes pour les Désarmement Général* called a Congress of international journalists to meet in Paris to examine the question of disarmament. The members hoped to find a practical method of approach to the problem. But no truly international Peace Congress of Women met in the nineteenth century. It took the cataclysm of a World War to awaken women from their leth-

<sup>18</sup> L. B. Namier, "Public Opinion and Representative Government," in *Skyscrapers and Other Essays* (London, 1931), p. 37.

<sup>19</sup> Only the Socialist wing of the laboring class directed attention to the problem of armaments.



argy. At the few women's international meetings of the 'nineties disarmament was not touched. For example, the chief aim of the International Council which convened the London Congress of 1899 was "to promote greater unity of thought, sympathy and purpose amongst women workers of different nations"; therefore, the Conference was not permitted to identify itself with any "movement of a controversial nature."<sup>20</sup> But the Council pledged itself to support the cause of peace through furthering the principle of arbitration.<sup>21</sup>

Statesmen, kings and emperors "secretly" and "confidentially" considered and discussed the armament enigma but not one ventured to take an open official step to alleviate the heavy burden of the "armed peace." Only the national Peace Societies, the Universal Peace Congresses, and the Churches of Great Britain took a definite stand in favor of a limitation of armaments. But the churches, slow to participate in the peace movement, gave only a temporary and half-hearted support to the cause. Their agitation reached its zenith in the years 1894-97 and then declined so that by 1898 they were not actively engaged in promoting a disarmament policy. Consequently, we must conclude that a public opinion favoring a limitation of armaments, being "something always there—always being influenced and influencing—an invisible public meeting of the whole country in perpetual session, with the press a new and indispensable organ of government,"<sup>22</sup> was non-existent in the decade 1888-98.

If we go deeper into the question of public opinion and try to discover what moves large bodies or groups of people or parties to demand that their government take action along a certain line on any matter, we learn that by the latter part of the nineteenth century utilitarianism had become the primary

<sup>20</sup> The Countess of Aberdeen, "The Woman's International Parliament," *The North American Review*, CLXIX (1899), 146.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 147.

<sup>22</sup> A. D. Lindsay, *The Essentials of Democracy* (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1929), p. 27.

motive.<sup>23</sup> Utilitarianism had fully taken possession of political discussion. A writer or speaker on a political subject had to show that his proposition would make people richer or more comfortable. Historical experience no longer influenced political affairs. Religious and moral authority which, from the Middle Ages down to the eighteenth century had been so powerful, had ceased to exert much influence on the affairs of the world. Any attempt to mould public opinion by its instrumentality was almost certain to prove ineffectual. Therefore, the disarmament resolutions of the Universal Peace Congresses and the National Memorial sponsored by the Churches and Arbitration Alliance were not destined to compel the governments to take action. For, as Dicey writes, "it is difficult to make emotion, however respectable, the basis of sound legislation."<sup>24</sup> This does not imply that Peace Societies and the Church can play no part in a movement for disarmament. Their field lies, however, not in petitioning governments but in educating the public to a sense of its responsibilities. Mr. Elihu Root once said: "The open public declaration of a principle in such a way as to carry evidence that it has the support of a great body of men entitled to respect has a wonderfully compelling effect upon mankind."<sup>25</sup> When the educative process has been worked out and the multitude of men have reached the point of genuine and not perfunctory acceptance of a new standard, they can, through their chosen representatives, bring pressure to bear on the governments which eventually must conform themselves to it.

Mr. Walter Lippmann is convinced that the public is not a

<sup>23</sup> A. V. Dicey, *Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century* (Macmillan, London, 1914), p. 450; and E. L. Godkin, "The Growth and Expression of Public Opinion," *The Atlantic Monthly*, January, 1898, p. 2.

<sup>24</sup> A. V. Dicey, *loc. cit.*

<sup>25</sup> *Addresses on International Subjects* by Elihu Root (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1916). Collected and edited by Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott. Address in Opening the National Arbitration and Peace Congress, in the City of New York, April 15, 1907, p. 134.

fixed body of individuals; it is merely those persons who are interested in an affair and can effect it only by supporting or opposing the actors.<sup>26</sup> The group most actively interested in the problem of limiting armaments always has been the international armament ring, which in the nineteenth century as well as in the twentieth naturally used its influence and great resources to prevent a limitation. If we agree with Professor E. H. Carr that propaganda is ineffective until it becomes linked with military and economic power—"that power over opinion cannot be dissociated from military and economic power"<sup>27</sup>—then we must recognize the fallacy of a belief in an international opinion on a limitation of armaments; for the military and naval experts, the high governmental officials and those who controlled the factors of production were all opposed to disarmament. In the nineteenth century movement for a limitation of armaments, numbers did not make public opinion; numbers did not give the directive for the particular decisions made; numbers were not consulted on the matter; numbers did not consider what road should be taken until the Tsar's decision was made. For the late nineteenth century disarmament movement at least, it appears that we must accept Lippmann's and Namier's conclusions that the public was a mere phantom, an abstraction,<sup>28</sup> that there was no public opinion with regard to a thing so delicate as the limitation policy to be pursued.<sup>29</sup>

Although Europe enjoyed a period of peace after 1878, it was an "armed peace." Governments grew more and more nervous at the ever increasing expenditure, and they realized that the competition must cease or end in a war of annihilation. The public, for the most part, ignorant of the actual figures, apprehended in a general way what was happening, for they

<sup>26</sup> Walter Lippmann, *The Phantom Public* (Macmillan, New York, 1925), p. 77.

<sup>27</sup> Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939* (Macmillan, London, 1939), p. 17.

<sup>28</sup> Walter Lippmann, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

<sup>29</sup> L. B. Namier, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

were finding the burden of military charges heavier to bear. The majority of the people were uninformed and apathetic on the question of disarmament. Peace Societies and some journalists attempted to point out the economic and humanitarian advantages of a limitation of armaments, but their efforts were outnumbered by the numerous arguments of the necessity for national defense, of the impossibility of limiting armaments while neighboring states were continually increasing theirs. The belief that a limitation of armaments would bring the greatest happiness and good to the greatest number had not penetrated the public mind. The mass of the people looked upon disarmament as a Utopian dream. They did not trouble to weigh seriously the idea of the possibility of its realization; they stood by indifferently and often obstinately opposed to it. The people were perfectly convinced of the hideousness of war, they found armaments a heavy burden, and they had hope of being eventually freed from them by some future evolution; but the idea that they themselves, by a powerful effort, could and must bring about this evolution did not occur to them.

In short, in 1898 there existed in England, the United States, and to a lesser extent in France and Germany, an inchoate opinion in favor of a limitation of armaments, but this opinion did not exert a great influence upon governments. At the close of the century it was beginning to affect statesmen only in what they said, not in what they did.<sup>30</sup> When diplomats, kings and emperors approached the problem of limiting armaments they did so not on account of the pressure of public opinion but because they were finding their budgets increasingly more diffi-

<sup>30</sup> Public opinion on the question of disarmament asserted itself more strongly after 1900, so that by 1907 statesmen were consciously regarding it. Public opinion was not responsible for the Rescript of 1898; but later it exerted sufficient influence upon British statesmen, especially upon Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and Sir Edward Grey, to induce them to include the subject of a limitation of armaments on the agenda of the Second Hague Conference against the wishes of the power that had proposed the same idea in 1898. Public opinion succeeded in placing the subject on the program, but it was not strong enough to force governments to discuss and consider the problem seriously in conference.

cult to balance, and, in some instances, were piling up huge deficits in time of peace; they dreaded the terrible hazards of modern war; they feared internal revolution and economic and political convulsions in the social order—all of which might prove fatal to their position. When finally the initiative of proposing a conference to deal with the problem of armaments was taken it came from a country where even pacifist opinion on the subject was only in a nascent form and still inarticulate, where all peace propaganda was carefully censored and where no Peace Society existed. The proposal came from above and was not forced by pressure of opinion from below; it emanated from a monarch who least of all considered public opinion, but, who, perhaps more than any other, feared the consequences of the “armed peace” and could gain most politically, economically and strategically, from a respite in the armament race.

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*Part II*

THE TSAR'S RESCRIPT





## CHAPTER IX

### THE ORIGIN OF THE RESCRIPT: INFLUENCES WHICH MAY HAVE MOVED THE TSAR

EUROPE was indeed amazed when, on August 27, 1898, the famous Rescript of Tsar Nicholas II was announced, amazed and bewildered. Could the proposal be the outcome of some crafty political design, or was it meant sincerely? The political situation at the time was certainly most unpropitious. Though the threat of war between France and England over Fashoda seemed dispelled, military preparations continued on both sides, unabated; at the very moment the United States and Spain were engaged in war; all nations were rapidly increasing their means of defense and offense. Talk of peace measures at such a moment appeared quixotic and impractical in the extreme. Nevertheless, this famous official document was addressed to the leading governments of the world in the name of one of the highest war lords, urging them to meet in conference to deal with the "grave problem" of armaments.

#### THE TSAR'S RESCRIPT

August 12/24, 1898

The maintenance of universal peace and a possible reduction of the excessive armaments which weigh upon all nations represent, in the present conditions of affairs all over the world, the ideal towards which the efforts of all Governments should be directed.

This view fully corresponds with the humane and magnanimous intentions of His Majesty the Emperor, my august Master.

Being convinced that this high aim agrees with the most essential interests and legitimate aspirations of all the Powers, the Imperial Government considers the present moment a very favour-

able one for seeking through international discussion, the most effective means of assuring to all peoples the blessings of real and lasting peace, and above all of limiting the progressive development of existing armaments.

During the last twenty years aspirations towards general pacification have particularly asserted themselves in the consciences of civilized nations. The preservation of peace has been made the aim of international policy; for the sake of peace the Great Powers have formed powerful alliances, and for the purpose of establishing a better guarantee of peace they have developed their military forces in an unprecedented degree, and continue to develop them without hesitating at any sacrifice.

All these efforts, however, have not yet led to the beneficent results of the desired pacification.

The ever increasing financial burdens strike at the root of public prosperity. The physical and intellectual forces of the people, labour and capital, are diverted for the greater part from their natural application and wasted unproductively. Hundreds of millions are spent in acquiring terrible engines of destruction which are regarded to-day as the latest inventions of science, but are destined to-morrow to be rendered obsolete by some new discovery. National cultural, economical progress, and the production of wealth are either paralysed or developed in a wrong direction.

Therefore, the more the armaments of each Power increase, the less they answer to the objects aimed at by the Governments. Economic disturbances are caused in great measure by this system of excessive armaments, and the constant danger involved in this accumulation of war material renders the armed peace of to-day a crushing burden more and more difficult for the nations to bear. It consequently seems evident that if this situation be prolonged, it will inevitably lead to that very disaster which it is desired to avoid, and the horrors of which make every humane mind shudder by anticipation.

It is the supreme duty, therefore, at the present moment of all States to put some limit to these unceasing armaments, and to find means of averting the calamities which threaten the whole world.

Deeply impressed by this feeling, His Majesty the Emperor has been pleased to command me to propose to all Governments who have Representatives at the Imperial Court the meeting of a Conference to discuss this grave problem.

Such a Conference, with God's help, would be a happy augury

for the opening century. It would concentrate in one powerful effort the strivings of all States which sincerely wish to bring about the triumph of the grand idea of universal peace over the elements of trouble and discord. It would, at the same time, cement their agreement by a united affirmation of the principles of law and equity on which rest the security of States and the welfare of peoples.

Signed

MOURAVIEFF.<sup>1</sup>

St. Petersburg, 12, 1898.

This document, which—as Count Muraviev declared—originated entirely with his Imperial Majesty, was distributed to members of the foreign diplomatic body on Wednesday, August 24, during the usual weekly reception at the Foreign Office. As each Ambassador entered the room, the Foreign Minister took a paper from a pile ready on his table and handed it to the visitor, who ran his eyes over it with some amazement.

Were men to gather grapes of thorns and figs of thistles? If the invitation had come from the Queen of England, or the President of the French Republic, or the President of the United States, no one would have been much astonished. But the Tsar of Russia seemed the very incarnation of militarism. He was the sovereign of the largest military power, with resources for increasing its military strength unrestricted by constitutional and parliamentary limitations. He was the man who was supposed to be the absolute master of unnumbered legions of armed men, the man who was regarded as a menace to peace and progress wherever Russia had a frontier—in China, Persia, Asia Minor and the Balkan Peninsula; even in free Scandinavia men did not reckon themselves safe from the colossal power which had absorbed Poland and Finland. The

<sup>1</sup> The *Rescript* was officially dated August 12/24, 1898 (12, "Old Style Russian Calendar"). It was made known to the public through a Reuter Telegram dated St. Petersburg, August 27, 1898.

Source: *Parliamentary Papers*, 1899, CX, *Russia*, No. 1, pp. 1-3; official French text and English translations. Also *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1898, p. 541.

Finns bitterly complained that simultaneously with the issue of the Rescript the Russian Government was occupied with a study of the ways and means for considerably increasing the military forces of the Grand Duchy and for piling up financial burdens upon a loyal people—schemes which a sincere peace policy should render unnecessary. The Hungarians professed surprise at Russia's attempting to inaugurate the peace era at a time when she was making presents of enormous quantities of arms and ammunition to a restless and warlike Balkan Prince. In Tsarist Russia of 1898 there were certain backward eddies which ran counter to the St. Petersburg peace current. Up to 1898 nothing had been done by Russia in matters of foreign policy to show that a new and more conciliatory line of action had been resolved upon.

Indeed, it did seem strange that the head of the greatest force of armed men in the world should call a cry of peace throughout the world at the moment when there were wars and rumors of wars and agitations in every portion of the globe. Still, writes Dr. E. J. Dillon, opinion in Russia was almost unanimous in claiming the absolute sincerity of the Tsar's proposal.<sup>2</sup> The project emanated directly from the Emperor himself, it was thought, not from any of his advisers. The idea had been suggested in many ways from without; four years earlier by Lord Rosebery, later on by the Tsar's own father, Alexander III, and lastly by Bloch's *War of the Future in Its Technical, Economic, and Political Relations*. It was alleged that Nicholas II had pondered over it for nearly three years; he had statistics on the subject specially prepared; he had reports on the advantages and disadvantages of certain methods of realizing the scheme laid before him; and he had consulted the Kaiser and the King of Denmark on the more general aspects of the measure. Lastly, he took counsel with his Foreign Secretary as to the advisability and ways and means

<sup>2</sup> E. J. Dillon, "The Tsar's Eirenicon," *The Contemporary Review*, LXXIV (November, 1898), 612.

of embodying the idea in a workable shape; and only after it had successfully passed through all these preliminary stages did it finally appear before the world as the celebrated circular letter signed by Count Muraviev.<sup>3</sup>

To the young Russian sovereign universal peace was an hereditary question, for it represented the highest aspirations of a father whose principles and whose passion were peace. Certainly the Tsar's forefathers furnished numerous examples of a sincere, though somewhat spasmodic and eccentric, interest in humanitarian projects. In 1815 Alexander I, inspired by Christian and mystical motives, conceived the Holy Alliance, whose members were to be guided by the precepts of "Justice, Christian Charity, and Peace." Alexander II freed the serfs in 1860, procured the condemnation of explosive bullets by international convention in 1868, and in 1874 made a strenuous but unsuccessful attempt to induce all the states of Europe to agree upon a code for regulating military operations on land. Alexander III was aptly called the "Peace Keeper of Europe." With this strain of idealism and enthusiasm in his blood, the young Tsar may well have resolved to signalize his reign by a great effort to lighten the war burdens of the nations. This is rendered all the more probable through what we know of the strength of his domestic affections. His mother was the widow of the peace-loving Alexander; his wife was celebrated for her humanity and gentleness no less than for her beauty. He could expect from the Tsarina sympathy and support in his humanitarian projects.

There were, however, influences other than heredity which acted as undercurrents at the Court of St. Petersburg. One of the many channels through which the humane suggestion came to the Tsar was J. von Bloch, a banker of Polish Semitic origin and a member of the Russian Council of State, who forsook finance at Warsaw to devote himself to the study of political economy and to examine particularly the question of the future

<sup>3</sup> *Loc. cit.*

of war in its politico-economical aspects. Eight years he applied himself to the special study of which his work, *The War of the Future in Its Technical, Economic and Political Relations*, is the monument. It is composed of six volumes; the first three deal with the then existing machinery of war on land and on sea, the fourth and fifth with the influence of modern armaments on the social and economic conditions of the world. The last volume embodies the author's conclusions: that the conditions of warfare had so changed in late years that the future of war would be "not fighting, but famine, not the slaying of men, but the bankruptcy of nations and the break-up of the whole social organization," and, further, this Titanic trial of strength would not furnish or define any final solution of the problems which it was intended to settle; it would merely give rise to a revised gospel of revenge and inaugurate a new period of ruinous rivalry in military preparations. When the impossibility of war is apparent to all, Bloch maintained, other means of a less impractical character must be devised for the settlement of international disputes.

"The object of this exhaustive investigation," writes Dr. E. J. Dillon, "is to create a powerful current of opinion against militarism and wars, and in favor of peace and arbitration among those social classes from which spring the men who can transmute subjective views into objective facts."<sup>4</sup> With painstaking thoroughness von Bloch examined each question discussed, displayed exact knowledge of matters technically obscure, and arrived at conclusions many of which have since been proved correct. Some of the chapters were first brought out as articles in a Moscow Liberal journal. The book itself was published in the early part of 1898; owing to difficulties with the Censure Office, its existence was brought to the notice of the Tsar. Many of the facts relied upon by von Bloch were said to have struck the Emperor as new, startling and instructive. All the promised fruits of universal peace were of a

<sup>4</sup> E. J. Dillon, *op. cit.*, pp. 614-15.

character that appealed to Nicholas, and the ways and means suggested by the author of establishing a permanent European Court of Arbitration appeared to him admirable.

Baroness Bertha von Suttner wrote in her *Memoirs* that she learned that Bloch's book had made a deep impression on the Tsar. She was also delighted to learn, from a very trustworthy source, that Nicholas II had read her *Die Waffen Nieder* before the appearance of his manifesto; <sup>5</sup> yet the Baroness was firmly convinced that a long chain of many influences, among which that of reading a novel could have been of only small effect, must have preceded such an action. While at The Hague during the Peace Conference (May 9, 1899), she inquired of Bloch regarding the reception of his book by the Tsar. The famous author tells the following story:

Yes, the Tsar has studied the work thoroughly. When he received me in audience, the maps and tables from the book lay spread out on the tables, and he had me carefully explain all the figures and diagram. I explained until I was tired out, but Nicholas II did not grow weary. He kept asking new questions or throwing in observations which testified to his deep appreciation and interest. "So *this* is the way the next war would develop," he said: "*those* would be the results, would they?"

The Ministry of War, to which a copy had to be submitted, furnished the Emperor with a report and voted to authorize its publication. In justifying its report it said: "Such a comprehensive and technical book will not be much read; it is therefore far less dangerous than the Suttner novel, *Die Waffen nieder*. Inasmuch as the censor passed the latter, Bloch's "War of the Future" may *a fortiori* be admitted." <sup>6</sup>

The proceedings of the Inter-Parliamentary Congress at Budapest in September, 1896, were also considered as one of the influences under which it was believed that the Tsar decided to approach the governments of the world to consider the

<sup>5</sup> Bertha von Suttner, *Memoirs* (World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1910), II, 193, Letter from Prince Peter Dolgorukof.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 252.

possibilities of arresting the ruinous progress of military armaments.<sup>7</sup> The St. Petersburg correspondent of the *Times*, on December 16, 1898, published the following statement from an informant:

You will remember that about a couple of years ago an inter-Parliamentary peace conference on disarmament was held at Budapest, and was attended by Members of the different Parliaments of Europe. At that time the Russian Consul-General in the Hungarian capital was M. Basili, who has since been appointed under Count Muravieff, Chief of the Asiatic Department of the Russian Foreign Office. The promoters of the Conference, and especially Count Apponyi, wished to have a Russian delegate, but, unfortunately—or perhaps fortunately, as some persons prefer to think—Russia was the only country not blessed with Parliamentary institutions. The Imperial autocratic Government naturally found it quite impossible, and contrary to its professed principles, to send an official delegate to sit together with the chosen representatives of self-governing peoples. Therefore Russia was not officially represented. When, however, the conference came to an end, M. Basili sent a copy of its resolutions to the Ministry in St. Petersburg, where they were duly relegated to the archives, and, for the time, forgotten.

Meanwhile Count Muravieff came into power, and M. Basili was recalled and placed at the head of the Asiatic section of the Ministry in the place of Count Kapnist. His report of the peace conference at Budapest would probably never have been heard of again had it not been for the discussion in very high places over the heavy call to be made upon the Russian exchequer for military improvements and the increase of the navy. . . .

In consequence of the discussion that took place in these circumstances as to the expense of armaments, it is said that the Report of the Conference at Budapest, which was calculated to suggest a remedy, was taken out of the pigeonholes and sent to the Emperor.<sup>8</sup>

In his *The United States of Europe*, as well as in a private letter to Randal Cremer,<sup>9</sup> W. T. Stead has confirmed the above

<sup>7</sup> *Supra*, p. 95 *et seq.*

<sup>8</sup> *The Times*, December 16, 1898, p. 5, col. 6; Howard Evans, *Sir Randal Cremer*, p. 179.

<sup>9</sup> Founder of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and Workmen's Peace Committee, later known as Workmen's Peace Association and still later as the Arbitration Association.



statement. He also wrote that M. Basili, after attending the Inter-Parliamentary Conference of 1896, reported to his government strongly in favor of action in the stay of armaments. His suggestion was not received with approval by his official superiors, and it remained for a long time in abeyance; then came the notable utterance of Lord Salisbury on November 9, 1897, deprecating the increasing competition of the nations in armaments. After this M. Basili renewed his representations in favor of an attempt to arrive at an international agreement on the subject. The idea commended itself to Count Lamsdorff, who submitted the proposal to the Emperor. After a short time the Rescript was issued.<sup>10</sup>

Subsequently a semi-official denial of the statement made by the *Times* appeared in the *Journal de St. Pétersbourg*, but the Special Commissioner of the *Daily News* declared that the story was quite true. He stated: "M. Basili is so much in earnest about securing a successful issue for the conference that he is willing even to deny he ever existed, if he could thereby gain a point for peace. But facts are not affected by such excess of zeal, and Mr. Cremer will be glad to know that the only result of the official correction has been to establish more firmly the truth of the original statement."<sup>11</sup>

In a letter of May 26, 1933, addressed to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Nicholas Notovitch, a Russian author and journalist and an acquaintance of Count Muraviev, claims credit for having drawn the Foreign Minister's attention to the minutes for the Budapest meeting. Muraviev presented them to the Emperor.<sup>12</sup>

So far as the writer has been able to discover, these assertions that the proceedings of the Inter-Parliamentary Confer-

<sup>10</sup> Howard Evans, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-80; Georges Dubois, *Des Charges de la Paix Armée, et de la Limitation des Armements*, p. 88.

<sup>11</sup> Howard Evans, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

<sup>12</sup> Letter of Nicholas Notovitch to the Honorable Franklin Delano Roosevelt, May 26, 1933, enclosure in a letter from the Department of State, Washington, D. C., to the writer, R.P. 116.3/4445, November 18, 1939.

ence of 1896 influenced the Tsar in issuing his Eirenicon, are unsupported by Inter-Parliamentary Union documents.<sup>13</sup> It may be that M. Basili attended the sessions of the Universal Peace Congress meeting simultaneously in Budapest and reported its proceedings on the limitation of armament expenditure, which report, as stated above<sup>14</sup> may have been presented to Tsar Nicholas. If so, the Russian ministers simply used this memorandum to reinforce their economic arguments.

Still other theories have been formulated regarding the influences which moved the Tsar. In the *Review of Reviews Annual* for 1899 William T. Stead traced the germ of the Rescript to Lord Salisbury's confidential state paper on the armaments of Europe.<sup>15</sup> The *Westminster Gazette* remarks that the genesis of the Tsar's message was to be found in the suggestion which Lord Rosebery made to Baron de Staal in 1894.<sup>16</sup> Others argued that Nicholas II was afraid of the inner enemy, namely Nihilism, which would be let loose by war. They contended that the young Tsar feared social revolution in every country and first of all in Russia. They characterized him as saying, "do not let us fight one another for the present; keep down expenditure and set about reducing the political freedom of the nations; keep your armies to fight your own people with, and I will lead off with the suppression of Home Rule in Finland."<sup>17</sup>

It was inevitable that many attempts should be made to trace the origin of the memorandum, and as inevitable that they should be unsuccessful. What the Tsar's motives may have been will probably always be questioned. No doubt he was moved by a genuine sense of the evils of the armed peace and by a desire to alleviate it for moral and economic reasons.

<sup>13</sup> Howard Evans, *Radical Fights of Forty Years* (London, 1913), p. 118.

<sup>14</sup> *Supra*, Chapter IV, p. 96.

<sup>15</sup> F. Whyte, *The Life of W. T. Stead*, II, 122-23; also *Review of Reviews*, XVIII, 296. *Supra*, Chapter VII, p. 135 *et seq.*

<sup>16</sup> *Review of Reviews*, XVIII, 297. *Supra*, Chapter VII, pp. 137-40.

<sup>17</sup> Anonymous, *The Tsar and Tolstoi Played Out*, p. 28.

But, since nineteenth century Russia was the Tsar in a much more literal sense than that in which the French Monarchy had been Louis XIV, the personality of the young ruler ought to be understood in any attempt to trace the origin of the Rescript. Dr. E. J. Dillon—who lived and worked for years in close contact with the liberal movement under three Tsars, and in various capacities as a student, as a graduate of two Russian faculties and universities, as Professor of Comparative Philology at the University of Kharkov, as the author of several literary and scientific works, as leader writer of two Russian newspapers and editor of one, as representative of the *Daily Telegraph* and as adviser to Count Witte—enjoyed the advantage of meeting many of the Emperor's foreign friends, some of his teachers and his Finance Minister. Having discussed with them the Tsar's character in general and those traits in particular which throw most light upon his aptitudes as a ruler, Dillon writes that he is not hesitant to affirm that, according to all those sources, Nicholas II was a "true idealist of a somewhat mystic but cautious type," freely speculative in theory and giving loose reins in his humane feelings, but careful in practice—when the weal of his subjects was at stake—"never to cut himself loose from his earthly moorings and drift before the winds towards castles in the air."<sup>18</sup> Despite a quickness of apprehension which was almost intuitive and a delicacy of sensitiveness which seemed well-nigh preternatural, the Tsar, maintains the English journalist, never indulged in the luxury of acting on the spur of the moment or playing the effective but dangerous part of a *deus ex machina*. He sent all his gleanings to the administrative mill to be ground in the ordinary humdrum way.<sup>19</sup>

This extreme caution seemed to Dillon to be one of the most noteworthy traits of the Tsar's character. He writes of the monarch:

<sup>18</sup> E. J. Dillon, *op. cit.*, pp. 612-13.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 613.

To him lofty idealism comes natural, but education or intuition has wedded it to a rigorous sense of what is practicable and worth striving for. He takes an eminently human view of all things human, and is a firm believer in adjusting means to ends. Hence his sensibility of intellect, his susceptibility to new impressions and generous impulses, is rendered beneficial or harmless by his tenacious adherence to traditional forms. He is keenly sensible that no one can grasp all the elements of such a complicated machine as the administration of a mighty empire, and his relations towards his Ministers are based upon a frank recognition of the fact. Having selected the men whom he believes to be well qualified for their respective posts, he makes them the channels through which his own ideas must pass before assuming visible shape in the statute book.<sup>20</sup>

Perhaps, as Notovitch maintains, Nicholas II did suggest to Count Muraviev the calling of a conference to make a common study of grievances and by an entente to put an end "to the pillaging of the people through the too costly maintenance of armies looking forward to absurd war."<sup>21</sup> While the Emperor was sojourning in the Crimea Admiral Grigorovitch, his Minister of the Marine, came to him with his customary report and requested that the Emperor authorize a national loan for 300 million rubles for the reconstruction of the war fleet; for the Admiral bore in mind that Germany was surpassing them in naval strength. The Tsar refused, indicating that he did not see the necessity of such an expenditure which would undermine the well-being of the people, all because of the fear inspired in the Minister by the construction of some new ships by a neighboring country. Later, however, 190 thousand rubles of an unclaimed fund in the public treasury was placed at the disposal of the Minister of the Marine.<sup>22</sup>

Apparently inspired by the success of Admiral Grigorovitch, the Minister of War, General Kuropatkin, appeared eight days later with the request that the Emperor authorize a program

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 614.

<sup>21</sup> Letter of Nicholas Notovitch to Honorable Franklin Delano Roosevelt, May 26, 1933, p. 5.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

calling upon the Minister of Finance to raise a national loan for the purchase of new method firearms and for the re-equipment of the entire army according to the latest methods in use in France.<sup>23</sup> The Tsar did not favor the proposal; furthermore, he did not foresee the danger of imminent war. Kuropatkin informed His Majesty that the military intelligence of both France and Russia were well informed of a program of great surprise which the Kaiser was preparing and Russia must therefore be ready in any event. Moreover, the Minister added that the military convention with France obligated Russia to have a common system of armament with her ally. Nicholas replied that he would consult with Count Muraviev to see what could be done to avoid this kind of expenditure.

The next day the Emperor received his Foreign Minister, who was coming with his periodic report, and during the conversation the former demanded that he be told frankly just "what is taking place in Europe. Particularly what is it that my very agitated cousin is stirring up?" Muraviev is reported by Notovitch to have replied: "Europe is quite tranquil and is maintaining a position of watchfully awaiting developments in what concerns our neighbor who is a little too active and is taking every precaution, anticipating an unexpected 'coup de theatre.' We too, are however watching carefully, for this agitation seems to us dangerous and not of the customary kind."

Nicholas asked if it would not be useful to invite all the powers large and small to make a study of their common grievances. The Minister could foresee no success in such a project for pacification through the simple means of a conference of the powers among whom were some who wanted a war to break out. "Well then, make a study of the question. I am very much for it and I am quite confident that such a proposal on my part will be accepted" were the final words of the Emperor.<sup>24</sup>

Nicholas Notovitch reports that on the very day of this con-

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

versation he met Muraviev along the quai of the Black Sea. The Count said: "Well, I am glad to see you, you who are always attacking us as the fomenters of war, and chiding us for doing nothing to pacify the hostile agitations among the various peoples. How now? What would you do if you were now in my place?" Notovitch referred him to the minutes of the Budapest meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, a copy of which was sent for and its presentation to the Tsar produced a great impression. In deciding to call a conference the monarch expressed the "hope that the world of parliamentary governments will support my taking the initiative though we are not a constitutional form of government."<sup>25</sup>

Dr. Dillon, who, after the Tsar's own family and Ministers, perhaps knew more about the source of the Rescript than any other person, infers in his article published in November, 1898—and therefore written soon after the appearance of the famous document—that Nicholas II did not act independently but with the full cognizance and approval of his Foreign Minister. Dillon probably knew much more than he was able to write in 1898. It would have been ungracious as well as dangerous for a foreigner making his livelihood and home in Russia and enjoying the confidence of Count Witte to divulge state secrets; but after the overthrow of the Tsarist regime, in 1918, Dillon wrote his *Eclipse of Russia* in which he gives what was probably the true source of the Rescript.<sup>26</sup> If we accept his story together with that of Witte, we must conclude that the Rescript did not originate with the idealistic Tsar but was suggested to him by his Ministers and promulgated in his name as a means for furthering Russian policy. Or it may be that the sagacious Muraviev, acquainted with the humanitarian tendencies of the Tsar, only hinted at the idea, letting it be known that he himself approved, and the young monarch then acted.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>26</sup> E. J. Dillon, *The Eclipse of Russia* (Curtis Brown, London, 1918), pp. 269-87. Cf. the following chapter.

Whatever its origin may have been the Tsar and his Ministers brought the proposition into the realm of actual facts. They showed that the idea of a general limitation or arrest of armaments is a serious project which merits the attention and study of statesmen.

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## CHAPTER X

### THE ORIGIN OF THE RESCRIPT: MOTIVES WHICH MAY HAVE ACTUATED THE TSAR'S MINISTERS

IT MAY be that the young Tsar—whose “enlightened humanity and heroic courage” are deserving of the utmost praise—earnestly proposed putting an end to a state of things abhorred by all thoughtful people; certainly there is little doubt that the Russian Ministers seriously approved the project, which they adopted. But when the same thing is done by two persons it ceases to be the same, and it would be fallacious to contend that the object and the motives of the Russian statesmen were identical with the aims and aspirations of their monarch. The Foreign and Finance Ministers could safely approve or even promote the scheme since their policies were bound to profit by its success. Russia needed peace for consolidating her new acquisitions, for improving her economic and financial system, for the completion of her strategical railways and canals and for carrying out her new naval program. Accordingly, to suspect Count Muraviev and Count Witte of insincerity is tantamount to suspecting them of complete lack of astuteness.

A respite in the armament competition would have been advantageous to Russia for political, strategical, economic and financial reasons. Russia by 1898 had acquired more territory than she could assimilate in twenty-five years. Her advances in the Orient could continue without a great army and navy. But good finances and pacific activity wisely directed were the most certain means for her to prepare against the rival powers which would oppose her ambitions in the East.

Count Sergius Witte, Russian Minister of Finance and the greatest statesman who had arisen in the country since the



days of Peter, was immutably bent upon peace. In his confidential talks with Dr. E. J. Dillon, his adviser, he often emphasized the fact that Russia occupied a place in the hierarchy of nations to which she was nowise entitled; if ever the discovery were made by the Kaiser, he feared the consequences might be calamitous. The Russian Empire was weak, disunited, about to explode into tiny fragments, and a campaign against a great power like Germany would very soon reveal this condition. All wars had therefore to be avoided because of the fatal revelation to which they would lead.<sup>1</sup>

Count Witte wanted peace also in order to place the country's finances on a sound basis and to foster its industries by opening, through railways and "peaceful penetration," vast new markets in the East for Russian produce. That was the key to his grandiose scheme of railway building. After the Russo-Turkish War railroad construction was practically suspended; it fell to Witte's lot, as Minister of Ways and Communications, and later as Minister of Finance, to resume the work. In this respect he succeeded in achieving a good deal, for during his administration the railway mileage of the country was doubled. In the seven years alone from 1891 to 1898 Russian railroad mileage was extended from 18,441 to 28,442 English miles; the gross receipts mounted from 296,087,000 to 457,549,541 paper rubles; and the number of passengers carried increased from 47,942,765 to 70,877,406.<sup>2</sup>

The vast enterprise of constructing the Trans-Siberian Railway, covering a distance of 4,950 miles and involving an expenditure of approximately 150,000,000 rubles, was carried out owing to Witte's efforts, assisted first by Emperor Alexander III and then by Nicholas II. It would seem that this great railroad in its conception and its early years was an enterprise of a purely economic nature. Witte states that its great originator had no political or military designs in connection with the road.

<sup>1</sup> E. J. Dillon, *The Eclipse of Russia*, p. 40.

<sup>2</sup> *The Statesman's Yearbook*, 1900, p. 979.

Alexander III wished to establish communication by the shortest possible route between the distant Maritime Province and Central Asia. Both Alexander and his successor attributed a strategic importance to the road of a strictly defensive nature. The Trans-Siberian was not intended to serve as a means for territorial expansion.<sup>3</sup>

Although military and strategical considerations may thus not have influenced the early construction of the famous railroad, they certainly played an important part in its history after the Sino-Japanese War altered the political situation in the Far East. By the Peace of Shimonoseki, 1895, Japan acquired the peninsula of Liaotung, including the harbors of Ing-Kow and Port Arthur. The Russian Government regarded this arrangement with alarm, for it gave Japan a footing on the continent in the neighborhood of the Russian sphere of interest. Witte realized that it was to Russia's best interests to have as her neighbor a strong but passive China, which would assure Russia's safety in the East. He accordingly insisted on the necessity of thwarting the execution of the peace treaty. The Russian Foreign Minister, Prince Lobanov-Rostovski, won over Germany and France to the Russian point of view, and Japan was forced to accept a war indemnity in lieu of the Liaotung peninsula.

Simultaneously, Count Witte entered into negotiations with China and offered her Russia's services for the conclusion of the large loan which she needed in order to pay the indemnity. Russian resources were pledged as security for the Chinese loan. The Finance Minister took practically complete charge of and arranged for the transaction on the French money market by founding the Russo-Chinese Bank in which French financiers were the chief share-holders. In April, 1896, the Chinese Government sent Li Hung-chang to St. Petersburg as Ambassador Extraordinary to carry through the negotiations.<sup>4</sup> In confer-

<sup>3</sup> *The Memoirs of Count Witte*. Translated and edited by Abraham Yarmolinsky (London, 1924), pp. 86-87.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 85.

ence with him, Count Witte dwelt on the services which Russia had rendered to China. He assured the Ambassador that, having proclaimed the principle of China's territorial integrity, Russia intended to adhere to it in the future; but to be able to upholding this principle, she must be in position in case of emergency to give China armed assistance. Witte argued that to give the Chinese Empire military aid it was necessary to have a railroad running along the shortest possible route to Vladivostok, across the northern part of Mongolia and Manchuria. By 1896 the Trans-Siberian Line had reached Transbaikalia, and if it were continued straight across Chinese territory instead of deflected to the north along the Amur, some 514 versts<sup>5</sup> would be saved. Technically the Amur section presented great difficulties. Besides running along the river it would compete with the Amur steamship companies. Moreover, the Mongolian route possessed the advantage of a more productive soil and a more favorable climate. Witte pointed out to Li Hung-chang that the projected route would raise the productivity of both the Russian possessions and the Chinese territory it would cross.<sup>6</sup>

As a result of these negotiations a secret Russo-Chinese pact was concluded. The Chinese Government granted to Russia permission to build a railroad within Chinese territory along a line between Chita and Vladivostok, but Li Hung-chang stipulated that the road must be in the hands of a private corporation. For that reason Russia formed the Eastern Chinese Railway Corporation. This organization, nominally private, lay completely in the hands of the government. China agreed to cede to Russia a strip of land sufficient for the construction and operation of the railroad, within which territory the corporation was permitted "to have its own police and to exercise full and untrammelled authority." Finally, the two countries obligated themselves to defend each other in case

<sup>5</sup> A Russian measure of length equal to 3,500 feet or approximately two-thirds of an English mile.

<sup>6</sup> *The Memoirs of Count Witte*, pp. 86, 89.

Japan attacked the territory of China or Russia's Far Eastern maritime provinces.<sup>7</sup> The terms of the railway concession granted by China were favorable to Russia. The agreement provided for China's right to redeem the road at the expiration of thirty-six years, but the conditions were so burdensome that it was highly improbable that the Chinese Government would ever attempt to effect the redemption. It was calculated that should China wish to redeem the road at the beginning of the thirty-seventh year she should have to pay at least 700 million rubles.<sup>8</sup> Thus the history of the Russo-Chinese negotiations for the construction of the Chita-Vladivostok section of the Trans-Siberian Railway shows clearly the military and strategical importance of this great route.

Count Witte was not definitely bent upon the building of railroads in general for strategical purposes. His aim, above all, was peace; he looked on railways as commercial and industrial adventures and as means of increasing the productivity of labor by enabling it to move from place to place with the seasons, a very important consideration in Russia where the climate in the north and central regions imposed upon labor a long period of idleness. While the Minister of Finance strained every effort to develop a network of railroads, the Minister of War only supported him when he proposed to build railroads of a strategical importance. Often lines were built counter to Witte's recommendation, and sometimes the direction of non-strategic routes was distorted to suit the purposes of the War Minister. Count Witte complained of the great harm done to his work by General Kuropatkin and especially the Chief of Staff, Obruchev, whose monomania was strategic railways.<sup>9</sup> Nicholas II often sided with the military authorities and prevented the Minister of Finance from building the lines most productive economically. After dealing with communications for forty years, Count Witte was convinced that a country will be best off if, in building railways, it is guided by purely economic considerations.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 90.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 95.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 75.

On the whole such lines would also meet strategic needs. It was his opinion that these factors should become the basic principle of railroad construction.<sup>10</sup>

In connection with Russian railway construction and expansion eastward it should be borne in mind that in December, 1897, a squadron of Russian warships occupied Port Arthur and Talienwan. The German occupation of Kiao-chow offered a favorable occasion for the Russian action, which the Minister for Foreign Affairs attempted to justify by reporting that if Russia failed to occupy these seaports England would.<sup>11</sup> In January, 1898, the Russian Government drew up a set of demands which included not only the cession of Port Arthur and Talienwan but also that part of the Liaotung peninsula which is known as the Kwantung Provinces. These were to be leased for thirty-six years without any compensation to China, and permission was demanded for the construction of a branch line linking them with the Trans-Siberian.<sup>12</sup> Largely under the influence of the fact that a number of Russian warships, cleared for action, lay off Port Arthur, the agreement was signed by the Chinese Government on March 15, 1898.

Thus it is evident that at the time of the appearance of the Rescript the Russian Government was pursuing a consistent policy of railway construction and expansion eastward. The young Tsar was personally interested in railway development, and, though he had no definite program of conquest, he was possessed, Witte states, of an unreasoned desire to seize Far Eastern lands.<sup>13</sup> The military authorities continually insisted on still more railway lines to meet their needs. And it was they who, because of the enormous strategical importance of the ports, urged the seizure of Port Arthur and Talienwan. Therefore, it is quite possible and highly probable that Nicholas II and his Ministers saw in the Rescript a possibility of diminishing armament expenditure, thus ensuring that there would be money for further railroad development. Certainly this was a

<sup>10</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 101.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 102.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 83.

strong accusation brought against them in other countries, especially in England.

Critics of the Rescript argued that the great public works which Russia had undertaken with a view to military exigencies required an enormous amount of money and general tranquillity, and that when the works were finished, with the economic development which would come within a number of years, Russia would be able to cope, on land if not on the sea, with any force which could be brought against her. Russian statesmen were accused of attempting to reduce the weight of the military debt—which at that time was absorbing 21.37 per cent of the total expenses—in order to reorganize the means of communication, then taking only 2.95 per cent.<sup>14</sup> A reduction of armaments would not require Russia to drain her treasury in defense of her western frontier but would leave her free to aggrandize, cover and exploit her Asiatic and European territories by means of new railways. In the Russian budget published on January 1, 1899 (O.S.), the department of communications received more than 397,000,000 rubles, which was 37,000,000 rubles more than the credit allotted to the Minister of War.<sup>15</sup> In this respect the Russian budget on the eve of the Peace Conference was a peaceful one. On the surface, the railways look pacific and civilizing; but, as has been pointed out, a Russian railway in Asia is not exclusively, or even primarily, intended for purposes of trade and passenger conveyance; it is often a strategical work of the first importance.

A British "Soldier," writing on "The Tsar's Appeal for Peace," states that certain shrewd statesmen were set upon the cautious and steady expansion of Russian territory. They aimed to carry Russian influence and railways through Persia so as to place Western Afghanistan, Herat, the Heri-Rus, and the most convenient approach to India completely at the mercy of Russia; to complete the Siberian and Manchurian railways,

<sup>14</sup> *Revue générale de droit international public*, VI, 101.

<sup>15</sup> *The Times*, January 13, 1899, p. 3, col. 6.

to drill and organize Manchurian levies and to accumulate stores in view of further aggression against China; and to work by Norwegian disaffection towards securing from Norway the ice-free Varanger fiord.<sup>16</sup> The most effective increase of Russian power in all these directions could best be realized by at least ten years of peace.

In 1898, the "Soldier" points out, Russia was busily engaged on a network of strategical canals and railways; she was planning the construction of the Riga-Kherson canal to join the Baltic with the Black Sea, which would double the value of her fleet,<sup>17</sup> while the canal from the Caspian towards Herat was then within a short distance from the capital of Afghanistan. A railway through Samarkand was due to reach Tashkent in 1899 and the next year a branch-line was to be constructed which, for military purposes, would turn the Pamir Highlands from the east. Russia was at the same time working on the Trans-Siberian, the Manchurian, and the Liaotung railways whose completion would give her effective possession of Manchuria, Talienwan and Port Arthur. The "Soldier" claimed that Russia was pushing investigations along the whole line of the eastern frontier of Persia where it borders upon Afghanistan and Beluchistan with a view to the construction of a railway southwards towards the Persian Gulf. When Persia was traversed by a railway guarded by Russian troops it was feared that the country would become for all practical purposes a Russian province and a secure base for further advance towards India.<sup>18</sup> Once these railway projects were completed, her enemies argued, Russia would enjoy the advantage of occupying the inner line from which she could strike at her foe with force and directness. But all those plans required money and peace. Consequently, the idea of the Rescript was an admirable stroke of Russian diplomacy.

<sup>16</sup> "A Soldier," "The Tsar's Appeal for Peace," *The Contemporary Review*, LXXIV (October, 1898), 500-501.

<sup>17</sup> *The Statesman's Yearbook*, 1900, p. 957.

<sup>18</sup> "A Soldier," *op. cit.*, p. 501.

Moreover, Poland in 1898 was a thorn in the Russian side and contributed to bring about a state of things under which peace at any price was practically a condition of existence to the Russian Empire. A secret report of Prince Imeretinsky, Governor General of Poland, a report dealing with the feelings of the Polish people—especially the attitude of the peasantry and the Roman Catholic clergy—showed after a hundred years of Russian domination of Poland that authorities in St. Petersburg only faintly entertained the hope of bringing Russia and Poland together. Peace had been maintained in Poland since 1863, yet the Poles were still striving for their independence, and this they were endeavoring to obtain by educating the lower classes in patriotism. Prince Imeretinsky was of the opinion that a Polish insurrection in 1898 would be more widely supported by the Polish people than on the occasion of the last rising. The Minister of War and the Minister of the Interior were agreed that the state of feeling in Poland was still as menacing to Russia as it had been in 1863.<sup>19</sup>

Economic and financial considerations too were certainly among the causes underlying the Rescript. Shortly before its appearance the Russian Minister of Finance had reported that a suspension of armaments must come if bankruptcy and the horrors of a wide-spread famine were to be avoided. At the time Russia's indebtedness amounted to 3,062,147,280 gold and 3,046,644,837 paper rubles, making a total of 6,108,792,117 rubles.<sup>20</sup> The War Minister's expenditure was 303,277,000 rubles and that for the marine 67,289,000. On the other hand, public instruction received only 26,921,000 rubles, or less than one-thirteenth of the amount spent on war preparations.<sup>21</sup> Since 1891, over ten million of the moujiks had been enduring continuous famine, the old nobility were insolvent and the Excheq-

<sup>19</sup> "Secret Official Report of the Condition of Poland," *The Times*, August 13, 1898, p. 11, cols. 1-3. A Polish revolutionist stole a copy of this report, smuggled it out of Russia, and sent it to London to be used among the Poles.

<sup>20</sup> *The Statesman's Year Book*, 1900, p. 947.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 942.



uer had every year to contribute approximately £1,500,000 in subsidies to appease actual hunger. The money markets of Berlin and London were practically closed to Russia and an attempt to secure a loan of \$125,000,000 from the United States failed because the Americans distrusted the security.

Mr. Charles Conant, writing in the *North American Review* for February, 1899, states that in making his proposal the Tsar was actuated by the far-sighted motives of public policy which had governed the economic measures of the Russian Government for many years. Russia was trying to organize the machinery of her economic system in such a manner as to make her the early and dangerous rival of the great industrial nations; all she needed to complete this work was relief from the heavy burden of taxes necessary for maintaining her great armies. Count Witte furnished the key to the policy of the Russian Government by this declaration contained in his report of 1898 to the Tsar:

The principal support of the economic and financial prosperity of Russia consists in the traditional policy, pacific and just, of her sovereign. The principles bequeathed by the late Emperor Alexander III, and the sincere spirit of peace which animates your Majesty are guarantees that, in the future, as in the past, the foreign policy of Russia will be exempt from every aggressive position towards other States, with the view to the promotion of the well-being of our country, and that from this source our economic and financial system shall be menaced with no danger.<sup>22</sup>

As Minister of Finance, Witte was also in charge of commerce and industry. He saw in industrial development the creation of a new source for the application of labor. He considered it imperative to develop Russian industries not only in the interest of the people, but also of the State, for a modern body politic cannot be great without a well-developed national industry. Count Witte tried to facilitate the formation of

<sup>22</sup> Charles A. Conant, "Russia As A World Power," *The North American Review*, CLXVIII (February, 1899), 178.

joint-stock companies, and he arranged industrial loans from the Imperial Bank. He claims to have increased Russian industry threefold during the time that he was in power.<sup>23</sup> His attempts to improve the financial and economic condition of the land were known and watched outside the country. In fact, his introduction of the gold standard of currency (1896) attracted world-wide attention, for it definitely established Russia's credit and put her financially on an equal footing with the European powers. M. Arthur Raffalovich, Russian financial agent in Paris, declared in the Government's annual volume on the financial development of the world, *Le Marché financier* (1898), that the economic life of Russia had become the center round which converged all the care of the Government, the interest of the public and the attention of foreign observers.<sup>24</sup> In Mr. Conant's opinion the whole energy of the State was being applied to making the nation capable of competing in the fields of manufacture, industry, commerce and credit with the great western European nations and the United States. This was easy in a state where the absence of parliamentary institutions gave force, directness and promptness to every measure decided upon for the development of the country. In Russia, it was necessary to convince only the Tsar and the Council of Ministers, composed of men well trained for statecraft and undeterred by the exigencies of party politics from following their economic convictions. After discussing the economic development of Russia as illustrated by her incorporated stock companies, her deposit, check and railway systems, Mr. Conant concluded that it was not surprising that Russian statesmen decided that Russia would gain enormously in the race with other industrial nations by devoting her whole energy to economic development. Hence the Tsar's proposition that the world lay aside its arms and give its people an opportunity to devote themselves to industrial pursuits looked directly to the

<sup>23</sup> *The Memoirs of Count Witte*, p. 76.

<sup>24</sup> Charles A. Conant, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

future dominance of Russia in the commerce and finance of the world.<sup>25</sup>

Count Witte played, perhaps, a greater part in bringing about the Rescript than is generally attributed to him. As Russia's Finance Minister he was laboring under great difficulties, and certainly desired to see military expenditure limited. Dr. E. J. Dillon, his close friend, states that Witte grudged every ruble he had to spend on armaments; he loathed the very name of war and was never weary of denouncing it. "It is my conviction," he wrote in Mrs. Dillon's album, "that the burden of armaments without limitations may become more irksome than war itself."<sup>26</sup> As early as the autumn of 1894, during an interview in Vienna, Count Witte is reported to have expressed himself strongly in favor of the reduction of armaments. He regretted that preparations for war were increasing despite the continued peace pronouncements by the three most powerful sovereigns. The result of the competition between the states was that the relation of the forces of the respective powers remained the same, while their general strength was fruitlessly exhausted.<sup>27</sup>

The financial situation of Russia regarding armaments appears to have reached a climax in the summer of 1898. In that year the total expenditure on the Navy, which had been 59,902,166 rubles in 1897, was increased to 68,055,417 rubles.<sup>28</sup> On January 13 the Russian budget and estimates of expenditure for the following year showed an increase of 66,226,351 rubles for 1899. On the same day War Minister Vannovski<sup>29</sup> retired and was succeeded by General Alexy Nikolaievich Kuropatkin, who had been Governor of Transcaspia. In June the War Minister informed Muraviev that Austria was about to increase and rearm her artillery, which would compel Russia to do like-

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 189.

<sup>26</sup> E. J. Dillon, *The Eclipse of Russia*, p. 275.

<sup>27</sup> *Review of Reviews*, October, 1894, p. 322.

<sup>28</sup> *Statesman's Year Book*, 1900, p. 957.

<sup>29</sup> Also written Wamowsky.

wise. In a memorandum to the Emperor, Kuropatkin stated that since France and Germany had stolen a march on the other powers by providing their armies with improved guns (field and heavy guns), Austria and Russia could not and would not lag behind. But the cost of rearming the artillery was a deterrent, for Russia was at that time engaged in rearming her entire infantry. Neither Russia nor Austria was wealthy. Could they not agree to a simple compromise that would commend itself to both governments all the more readily that the two empires belonged to opposite camps? Why should they not agree to keep the money in their respective treasuries? <sup>30</sup> Witte, in his *Memoirs*, tells us that the War Minister suggested that his country should open negotiations for the purpose of inducing Austria to give up her plan, on the understanding that Russia would refrain from increasing or perfecting her artillery. The Finance Minister did not favor this step, for he was convinced that it would produce no practical results and would merely reveal Russia's financial weakness to the whole world. He explained to Dr. Dillon that what was wanted was some ruse by means of which Russia could induce Austria to stay her hand and discuss disarmament instead of investing large sums in the improved gun. His thoughts centered round an idea of a league of pacific nations vying with each other in trade, industry, science, arts and inventions; and he believed that even though the opportunity had not yet come to draw nearer to this, there would be no harm in setting the powers to thinking about it.<sup>31</sup> In speaking to the Foreign Minister, Witte stated that he would apply the principle underlying General Kuropatkin's plan not only to Austria and Russia but to all the nations of the world. In this way the Russian Government would avoid invidious distinction and leave no ground for misgivings. He "expatiated on the incalculable harm which the growing militarism was doing to the peoples of the world and the boon which would be conferred on humanity by limiting

<sup>30</sup> E. J. Dillon, *op. cit.*, pp. 272-73.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 274.

armaments." Apparently his ideas produced a profound impression.

Several days later a special council was called to consider the War Minister's project. As soon as Kuropatkin had read and explained his proposal, Witte criticized it sharply. A lively debate ensued in the course of which Count Muraviev and Count Lamsdorff, the Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, endorsed Witte's idea unreservedly, whereupon the proposed scheme was dropped. Then to the amazement of those present, Muraviev calmly took out a sheet of paper and read the rough draft of a circular to the powers on the subject of the limitation of armaments, the contents of which he said His Majesty favored. It was Count Witte's idea expressed in diplomatic phraseology. The Minister of Finance recognized the fruit of his suggestion and smiled at the humanitarian wrapping, for he knew that the whole scheme was a piece of hypocrisy and guile.<sup>32</sup> General Kuropatkin, however, opposed the project; Witte approved it, for it appeared to him less impracticable and odd than the proposal for an agreement with Austria, previously suggested by the War Minister.<sup>33</sup> This rough draft, which was placed in a finished form by Count Lamsdorff, was ratified by the Tsar and subsequently handed to all the foreign diplomats accredited to the Court of St. Petersburg.<sup>34</sup>

If we accept the explanation of Count Witte and Dr. Dillon, we are bound to conclude that the Rescript was not in its genesis directly due to idealistic motives but that it originated with Witte and Muraviev as an attempt to extricate the Russian Government from financial difficulties. Certainly Russia's eco-

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 277.

<sup>33</sup> For Count Witte's part in the Rescript see Dillon, *The Eclipse of Russia* pp. 270-78; *The Memoirs of Count Witte*, pp. 96-97; Ward and Gooch, *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783-1919*, III, 258-59. NOTE: The last two references differ slightly; the latter states that it was Kuropatkin, the Minister of War, who saw in a partial arrangement with Austria confession of weakness (p. 259). The writer's statements are based on Count Witte's *Memoirs*.

<sup>34</sup> E. J. Dillon, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

monic and political policies at the time point to that conclusion. What the Emperor's motives may have been will probably always be disputed. No doubt they were a politico-humanitarian composite, but those of his Ministers do not appear to fall in quite the same category.

Dr. E. J. Dillon writes:

There would in all probability have been no Hague Conference if General Kuropatkin had asked in the ordinary way for the necessary credit to enable him to follow the example of his German colleague and supply the Russian army with the new gun. It is equally probable that if Witte had simply accepted or rejected the War Minister's suggestion of a "deal" with Austria, the peace conference would not have been convoked or thought of. With a touch of that irony which generally accompanied his frank talks about the Tsar with an intimate friend like myself, Witte, who was sentimental rather than cynical, remarks that the Tsar's peace proposal was one of the greatest mystifications known to history, and at the same time a beneficent stimulus. However high we may rate the contributory causes of the peace movement inaugurated by Nicholas II, history will retain the decisive fact that the motive of its prime author was to hoodwink the Austrian Government and to enable the Tsar's War Minister to steal a march on his country's future enemies.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> E. J. Dillon, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE PACIFISTS AND THE TSAR'S RESCRIPT

THE Tsar's manifesto was hailed with enthusiasm by the apostles of peace, for it was the most significant event which, up to 1898, the peace movement had to show. It filled all the pacifists with jubilation, because that which is colossal and at the same time unexpected overpowers. "On the whole," wrote Baroness von Suttner, "from our standpoint, the event cannot be estimated highly enough. One of the most powerful of rulers acknowledges the peace ideal, comes out as an opponent of militarism; from this time on the movement is incalculably nearer its goal; new ways are opening before it, and it is to be carried on to a new basis of operations."<sup>1</sup>

To the pacifists the time seemed eminently favorable for making a disarmament proposal because on the one hand the governments were proclaiming through their statesmen in the strongest language possible their fervent desires for the maintenance of the general peace and further that no efforts should be spared on their part to secure it; on the other hand, the peoples of every country were complaining beneath the heavy burden of taxation and appealing for deliverance from military conscription. Throughout the world the peace movement seized its great opportunity. The various types of peace organizations, national and international, bombarded the Tsar with congratulations and petitioned and memorialized their governments.

Tsar Nicholas II's invitation to the powers to hold a Peace Conference, while quite unexpected, came as a fulfillment of the hopes of the Peace Societies. At last someone had been found

<sup>1</sup> Bertha von Suttner, *Memoirs*, II, 190, citing her periodical, *Die Waffen Nieder*, VII (September, 1898), 344.

to make a beginning. Here was a significant admission that the so-called Utopian dreams of the "amiable enthusiasts" who were working for peace and the prosperity of nations were practical and within the realm of government. Regardless of what motives or political reasons had actuated the Tsar and his ministers, a proposal had at last been made to carry into effect what the Peace Societies had urged for over eighty years.

One of the first acts of the Secretary of the British Peace Society, Dr. Darby, was to telegraph the Society's gratification to the Tsar.<sup>2</sup> On September 2 the Executive Committee held a meeting at which it adopted a resolution hailing with satisfaction the Russian Emperor's proposal and expressing the Society's deep gratitude to "Almighty God that, at length, after such long advocacy of the beneficent object proposed . . . its ideals should be recognized as practicable, and such a proposal be made to carry them into effect by one of the greatest potentates in the world"; and trusting that all civilized governments, notwithstanding the difficulties that would have to be faced, would persevere until the noble object of the Tsar of Russia should be attained, "and a new era of Peace and Prosperity be inaugurated."<sup>3</sup>

The Committee also embodied in a letter addressed to the Friends and Members of the Society various practical suggestions which seemed desirable.<sup>4</sup> There was no need, they said, to bring the pressure of the electorate to bear upon a reluctant government, for they had heard on good authority that the Foreign Office was not only in agreement with, but had practically given its cordial adhesion to, the action of the Tsar. Nevertheless, there was much to be done in the way of combating the influence of those parties interested in the maintenance of the present military system, as well as the influence of all those who distrusted the Tsar and his proposal. The Government would need popular support, and it would be of

<sup>2</sup> *The Herald of Peace*, October 1, 1898, p. 125.

<sup>3</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>4</sup> *Loc. cit.*



great assistance to the cause if the strong sentiment of the British people were expressed so as to give encouragement to the Tsar. The Committee recommended that the Rescript should be accepted in good faith and cordially supported by everybody in authority and especially by the leaders of opinion and those who had the ear of the Government. They suggested the holding of public meetings to stimulate and give expression to popular sympathy. These, they thought, should be in the character of public demonstrations, with the best speakers and strongest supporters; and care should be exercised to prevent the meetings being captured or utilized by opponents of peace.<sup>5</sup>

The auxiliary branches of the Peace Society took the matter up, and large meetings were held throughout the British Isles at which resolutions were passed hailing with thankfulness the Tsar's invitation to the powers and expressing the earnest hope that the British Government would not only heartily accept this invitation but also exert its utmost influence to secure the success of the deliberations.

The Society of Friends, too, took immediate steps and on September 8, the members resident in Essex and Suffolk assembled at a Quarterly Meeting at Saffron Walden, drafted a Memorial to the Marquis of Salisbury, a Memorial earnestly desiring that the statesmen of Europe and Her Majesty's Government in particular would see to it that the Conference, notwithstanding the complexity of the situation, might "not separate without inaugurating some real steps towards a true and lasting Peace."<sup>6</sup>

Later, the General Body—the Meetings for Sufferings—representing the Religious Society of Friends in Great Britain, adopted a minute expressing its deep thankfulness for the proposal made by the Tsar of Russia and respectfully urging the Queen's Government to respond cordially to the invitation. "We believe," the minute concluded, "that our Heavenly Father is

<sup>5</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 126.

preparing the hearts of the nations for this proposal, and it is our prayer that He will guide their action upon it and direct their counsels into issues of Peace.”<sup>7</sup> Moreover, the Yearly Meeting of 1899 sent a deputation to The Hague with a message of congratulation and prayerful good wishes to the various Ambassadors there.<sup>8</sup>

The Christian Churches of the world, especially the Dissenting Churches of Great Britain and the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States, gave expression to their great satisfaction both in particular congregations and in their general gatherings. The Bishop of Carlisle trusted that God might “dispose the deliberations of the proposed Conference to the attainment of a general and abiding peace.” The Bishop of Bath and Wells spoke of the Tsar’s Rescript as “a noble proposal, the highest watermark yet reached by the tide of Christianity.” The Reverend Hugh Price Hughes, speaking for the Wesleyans, declared that the Circular was “the wisest and most Christian proposal ever made by a European Sovereign.” The London Congregational Board of Ministers, which met on September 14, at the Memorial Hall, Farringdon Street, adopted a resolution expressing its profound gratitude and satisfaction with the Tsar’s Eirenicon and trusting that the British Government would “exercise its utmost power to bring to a successful issue the deliberations upon a subject so fraught with consequences in connection with the happiness of the whole human family.” Copies of their resolution were sent to the Tsar and to Lord Salisbury. At a large gathering of the National Council of the Free Evangelical Churches of England and Wales at Liverpool in April, 1899, a resolution was passed expressing thankfulness for the Rescript. The Reverend Dr. Clifford, President of the Free Church Federation, reports that local and district councils throughout the land, embracing nearly

<sup>7</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>8</sup> M. E. Hirst, *The Quakers in Peace and War* (Swarthmore Press, London, 1923), pp. 271-72.

2,000,000 Free Church Members, passed with unbroken unanimity resolutions expressing the desire of these Churches that Her Majesty's Government should use this unique opportunity for furthering as far as possible the cause of universal peace.<sup>9</sup>

Mr. Maddison, M. P., spokesman for the labor groups of Great Britain, claims that whenever they had the opportunity of collective expression of opinion, labor unanimously favored the proposed Conference.<sup>10</sup> The Trades Union Congress, representing the industrial classes of Great Britain and Ireland, distinguished itself by being the first representative body of Englishmen to express approval of the Rescript. On August 31 this Congress of organized workers passed unanimously a resolution in which it hailed with satisfaction the message of the Tsar in favor of international disarmament and called upon the Government to use all its legitimate means to give effect to it.<sup>11</sup> Throughout the autumn, local labor bodies and Liberal and Radical Associations adopted similar resolutions. In the United States the Labor Convention meeting in Kansas City in 1898 placed itself on record as approving any movement which would tend to bring peace to the world.<sup>12</sup>

On the announcement in the public press of the Tsar's Rescript the Committee of the British and Foreign Arbitration Association<sup>13</sup> took immediate action<sup>14</sup> by the adoption of a lengthy Memorial on the subject of armaments which it presented to the Governments of Great Britain, Germany, Russia, Austria, France and Italy. This Memorial appealed to the Governments of Europe to give serious consideration to the question of a proportional and gradual disarmament. The Association was convinced that "the enormous and ever-increasing armaments of Europe imperil equally the prosperity of the

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 271.

<sup>10</sup> *Review of Reviews*, XIX (1899), 330.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, XVIII (September, 1898), 331.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 296.

<sup>13</sup> Founded by Hodgson Pratt.

<sup>14</sup> *The Advocate of Peace*, LXI (May, 1899), 111.

competing nations and the happiness of the people individually, while at the same time, they greatly increase the imminence of war." Europe had practically 18,000,000 armed men, most of whom were withdrawn from peaceful pursuits and spending the flower of their strength in fanning the flame of military antagonism and cultivating a spirit of revenge, vainglory and bloodshed. The annual expenditure of Europe on means of defense and aggression, including the interest on public debts, mainly incurred for these purposes in past years, had risen in the preceding thirty years from £210,000,000 to £416,000,000; and yet none of it was destined to promote either national prosperity or the reproduction of wealth. In the same period of time the national debts of Europe had nearly doubled, having risen from £2,626,000,000 to £5,223,000,000, thus imposing upon the different countries a burden almost insupportable. Taxation had reached a height never before endured in the world's history. Throughout Europe the ruinous military rivalry was spreading a dangerous discontent so wide and deep that Anarchists and Nihilists easily found a fertile soil upon which to carry out their revolutionary practices. The Memorial pointed out the madness of the naval rivalry between Great Britain on the one hand and Russia and France on the other. The Arbitration Association implored the Governments of Europe in the highest interests of humanity and real prosperity to begin to disarm and disband the greater part of their vast forces in order that the soldiers might return to peaceful pursuits, "and be no more a burden to their fellow country-men, or a menace to the peace of nations." <sup>15</sup>

In presenting this Memorial the British and Foreign Arbitration Association used economic and not religious arguments to appeal to the governments. It tried to emphasize that competition in armaments only piles up enormous national debts and adds to the burdens of taxation which the people must bear,

<sup>15</sup> Lewis Appleton, *Fifty Years Historic Record of the Progress of Disarmament*, pp. 6-7.

thus creating discontent without increasing the security of nations. The Memorial was typical of Hodgson Pratt's approach to the problem of peace—eminently practical and entirely secular.

On the Continent the friends of peace carried out a similar though not quite so intensive program as that in England. A universal campaign was promoted by the Peace Bureau at Berne and by an extensive tour begun by Baroness von Suttner early in 1899, well supported in the *Neue Freie Presse* and the *Neue Wiener Tageblatt*. In Germany the pacifist movement for supporting the Tsar's initiative was led by the German Peace Society in Berlin and by the Burgomaster of Munich. Mme. Selenka too worked indefatigably in organizing meetings with the result that peace demonstrations were held in Munich, Mainz, Frankfort, Nuremberg and Breslau. In France M. Emile Arnaud, President of the Société Internationale de la Paix et de la Liberté, and Frédéric Passy organized meetings and conferences. The Women's International Disarmament League, with headquarters at Paris, had over two hundred thousand adherents by December, 1898.<sup>16</sup> The French Peace Crusaders organized and were received at the Sorbonne, the Paris City Hall and the Grand Hotel. In Belgium the Peace Societies, under the presidency of Comte Goblet d'Alviella, drafted a Memorial, to which 50,000 names were affixed, thanking the Tsar for his initiative in calling the Conference.<sup>17</sup> In the Netherlands Mme. Waszkiewicz van Schilfgaarde, founder and President of the Netherlands Women's League for International Disarmament, obtained a great number of signatures to an international address expressing the hope of a successful outcome, to be presented to the Peace Conference.<sup>18</sup> The Swedish Peace and Arbitration Association and the Swedish Women's Peace Society circulated more than fifty thousand

<sup>16</sup> *The Advocate of Peace*, LX (December, 1898), 254.

<sup>17</sup> *Review of Reviews*, XIX (1899), 332.

<sup>18</sup> Jonkheer B. de Jong van Beek en Donk, *History of the Peace Movement in the Netherlands* (The Hague, 1915), p. 13.

copies of an appeal to the Swedish nation asking for support of the Tsar's manifesto. Similar appeals were made in Norway, Denmark and Holland.<sup>19</sup>

Finally, an attempt was made to rally the women of the world in support of the Tsar's peace proposal. Frau Selenka of Munich, Bertha von Suttner of Vienna, Dr. Leopold Katscher of Budapest, Princess Wiszniewsky of Paris, and Mme. Waszkiewicz van Schilfgaarde of The Hague, all organized women's demonstrations. They proposed that in the week prior to the meeting of the Conference all the women's associations throughout the world should hold simultaneous demonstrations in favor of peace, pass identical resolutions and telegraph their names and numerical strength to a central committee which would compile and present to the Conference on its assembling a statement of the prayers of the womanhood of the world.<sup>20</sup>

In response to a request from the Women's Association for Peace and Disarmament in France and Germany, Countess Aberdeen, President of the International Council of Women, appealed to the women of Great Britain and Ireland to take steps in each community for the purpose of securing as numerous and as influential a meeting of women as possible. On May 15, 1899, an Address of British Women, signed by the Countess of Aberdeen, Lady Henry Somerset, Mrs. Wynford Phillips and many others, was submitted to meetings throughout the world. It pointed out that for the first time in history women were making "their advent as a distinct force and factor in international politics." It appealed to sisters, daughters, wives and

<sup>19</sup> *The Advocate of Peace*, LXI (February, 1899), 37.

<sup>20</sup> *Review of Reviews*, XIX, 332. The following National Secretaries were named to organize these demonstrations: Mrs. Wright-Sewell for America, Signora Emilia Mariani for Italy, Mme. Waszkiewicz van Schilfgaarde for Holland, Frau Niewstadt for Denmark, Mlle. Saint-Croix for France, Mme. Selenka for Germany, Miss Mary I. Stead for England, Frau Anna von Schabanoff for Russia, Dr. Bella S. de Ferrero for Spain, Frau Bramee for Sweden, Baroness Bertha von Suttner and Fräulein Aug. Fickert for Austria, Frau Dr. Mejoen for Norway, Frau Professor Heller for Hungary, Herr von Bailow for Egypt, Sir Jeejeebhoy Merwanjeed Adabhoi for India, and Mrs. Fashima for Japan.

mothers in every land to unite in resolving to wage unceasing war against war and the spirit which makes for war, in order that they might "no longer have to bring forth sons to be corrupted in the barrack and slaughtered on the battlefield." <sup>21</sup>

The Universal Peace Congress, which was planned to meet in Lisbon in 1898, was given up because of the decision of the Inter-Parliamentary Union not to hold its annual conference, but a general meeting of the Bureau was convened at Turin on September 26. The Assembly immediately sent a telegram to the Tsar expressing its respectful gratitude for his peace proposition. Then a sub-commission was charged with elaborating some propositions for the most proper steps to render fruitful the initiative of the Russian Emperor.<sup>22</sup> After expressing the hope that all the governments would give a sincere adhesion to the proposal of the Tsar <sup>23</sup> and that the projected Conference should meet without delay, the Assembly suggested that the Conference "propose to the nations the conclusion of a general Treaty of permanent arbitration." It also expressed the hope that the work of the International Conference would "serve as the point of departure for the gradual adoption of international laws safeguarding the autonomy of each nation and assuring justice between peoples," and that "the reign of Peace" would be "substituted for the barbarous regime of war and the ruinous regime of armed peace." <sup>24</sup>

British delegates raised objections to these propositions. They pointed out that a General Treaty of Arbitration and a formal code of International Law might be attained in the distant future but would not be reached at the Conference. They warned their colleagues against coupling Utopian projects with the one definite proposal of the Tsar, the abatement of

<sup>21</sup> *Review of Reviews*, XIX, 449.

<sup>22</sup> *Procès-Verbal de l'assemblée générale des délégués des sociétés de la paix* (Turin, 1899), p. 2.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

the armament competition. But their advice was not heeded; the propositions of the sub-commission were adopted by 21 votes against 4.<sup>25</sup>

The Peace Society Assembly at Turin has been criticized for not having acted with more sagacity at a most opportune moment. The commonest prudence would have dictated a great and united effort to concentrate opinion upon the primary object of the Rescript—the arrest of armaments; but this did not happen. The enthusiasm of the pacifists who for so long had looked forward to the reign of peace and law carried them too far afield. A mighty autocrat had suddenly and unexpectedly adopted as his own the best of the arguments which they had for generations addressed to deaf ears. At last governments were going to listen and to consider. Is it to be wondered that the jubilation of the lovers of peace swept them beyond the practical?

In the meantime the Peace and Arbitration organizations in Great Britain joined forces. Dr. Darby, Randal Cremer, Hodgson Pratt and Felix Moscheles divided the British Isles into districts and, during the twelve months following the Rescript, distributed about 300,000 pamphlets. The man who did most to foster what favorable public opinion there was for the Conference was Mr. W. T. Stead. Although the most vociferous and theatrical representative of British pacifism, Stead was not a pacifist in the usual sense of the term, for in his 1894 articles on the "Truth About the Navy" and later in his advocacy of the formula, "two keels to one," he showed himself a protagonist of a strong British Navy. From 1883, when he took over the editorship of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, he had devoted his energies to an attempt to keep the public correctly and sanely informed on questions of foreign policy, and to fostering by his "new journalism" an international outlook conditioned by "sober defence, no jingo, and more arbitration."<sup>26</sup> Stead felt that the psychological moment had come to relieve the

<sup>25</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>26</sup> A. C. F. Beales, *The History of Peace*, p. 203.



strained tension among the various states. He originated a grand scheme of a peace crusade through the countries of Europe, in which ten influential representatives from every state were to take part, to visit the governments and address public meetings. This scheme failed; whereupon, its originator made the journey all over Europe alone.

Mr. Stead was anxious to ascertain how the Emperor's manifesto was received in various countries, especially in official circles; above all, he wished to learn what direction the Tsar and his ministers intended to give to the coming Conference. Acting on his own initiative, after interviewing Mr. Balfour,<sup>27</sup> who refused to assume any responsibility for the trip, Stead started out in September on a tour of Europe which was eventually to take him to the Russian Court. In Belgium, King Leopold refused to see him, but in answer to a second note beseeching an interview, the King sent this frank statement: "You wish to speak to me of disarmament. I desire with all my heart that it may take place, but I could not in any case usefully say anything to you on the noble aspiration which it is better to leave in the interest of its success to the care of the generous and powerful Emperor who has conceived it."<sup>28</sup>

In Paris, Stead found M. Clémenceau, M. Blowitz, and Monson, the British Ambassador, all sceptical over the Rescript. There was only one opinion in the French capital, namely, that the Conference could do absolutely nothing and that it might precipitate war.<sup>29</sup> In Berlin the British Ambassador refused to secure him an interview with the Kaiser. Mr. Stead's letters to the *Daily News* from Paris and Berlin reflected candidly the unfavorable attitude of most of the people with whom he had talked. Of the French and Germans this is what he reported:

<sup>27</sup> In the absence of Lord Salisbury, Mr. Balfour was in charge of the Foreign Office.

<sup>28</sup> Frederick Whyte, *The Life of W. T. Stead*, II, 131, King Leopold to W. T. Stead.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 132.

Men of the world, men of experience, men of affairs, above all, men who are deeply versed in the tortuous wiles of diplomacy, agree in expecting nothing from the Conference of Disarmament and in fearing much. If the hard-pressed toilers of the world are to obtain any appreciable relief from the crushing load of Militarism, they will have to extend to the generous initiative of the Tsar a much more hearty reception. . . . The Democracy may help the Autocracy to achieve this boon for the English race. It will certainly not reach them at the hands of Bureaucracy.<sup>30</sup>

Stead's St. Petersburg visit compensated to some extent for his preceding disheartening experiences. Mr. Whyte, his biographer, thinks it safe to say that no foreign journalist ever interviewed so many notabilities in the Russian capital in so short a space of time (a fortnight). His most important talk was with Count Witte, Minister of Finance, who was apparently jubilant over the Eirenicon. "Henceforth," he said, "if my colleagues should clamour for more millions for the army and the navy I shall have no more trouble in rebutting their demands. I shall simply hold up the Emperor's Rescript and they will not be able to say a word."<sup>31</sup>

At Livadia, in late October, Mr. Stead was received several times by the Tsar. It was perhaps inevitable that the ambitious journalist, after so many disappointments, should on this occasion form too exalted an opinion of the ill-fated Nicholas. The Tsar was typically Russian in his responsiveness and anxiety to please, and Stead's enthusiasm over the Rescript must naturally have been gratifying to him. The Englishman was well pleased with the autocrat in whom he found four excellent qualities—"alertness, exactness, lucidity, and definiteness."<sup>32</sup> Stead's appreciation of the Emperor was, no doubt, real and not merely worked up in the interest of the peace movement. He actually liked Nicholas II and saw great possibilities in him. After his first interview he wrote to a friend in

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 134-35.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 136-37.

<sup>32</sup> For a full and rather effusive description of Tsar Nicholas II which is interesting in the light of his tragic end, see Whyte, II, 138-40.

England: "He is much better than I expected. If only we back him up, we get the best chance we ever had of saving millions. It is a perfect godsend to have such a man in such a place with such ideas." <sup>33</sup>

On his journey home W. T. Stead stopped in Rome, where, after twice appealing to "the Pope of the Middle Ages and of the Truce of God" to "come to the help of a weary and war-worn world," he was favored with a letter from the Cardinal Secretary of State.

Back in London the English journalist started his International Crusade of Peace which was definitely launched at a great public meeting at St. James's Hall on December 10. Mr. Balfour was present, and in a letter Mr. John Morley showed that he sympathized with the demonstration. On December 23 the General Committee of this International Crusade appealed to their fellow citizens, especially those in positions of influence and authority, to support the objects of the Rescript and to cooperate in an effort "to secure such a vigorous and comprehensive expression of the will of the people" as would assure to Her Majesty's Government the support of the nation in realizing the earnest desire of the Tsar that something practical should be done. This Appeal to the People by the International Crusade of Peace was signed by the Bishop of London on behalf of the Committee.<sup>34</sup>

In January W. T. Stead founded a new weekly journal, *War Against War*, expressly to canvass the coming Conference. He reported to Cardinal Rampolla what had been done and transmitted to the Holy See an account of the St. James's Hall Conference and the prospectus of *War Against War*, soliciting the approval of the Pope. In response to his appeal he received from the Cardinal Secretary an autograph letter with an expression of appreciation for his peace work.

The first stage of the International Crusade of Peace culminated in the presentation to Mr. Balfour of a Memorial

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 140.

<sup>34</sup> *Review of Reviews*, XIX, 132.

which summed up and embodied the resolutions passed at more than 200 town meetings in all parts of the United Kingdom. This was decided upon at the National Convention held in St. Martin's Hall, Charing Cross, on March 21, 1899. Lord Salisbury was asked to receive the Deputation bearing the Memorial, but because of his absence the function had to be performed by Mr. Balfour, who, as First Lord of the Treasury, Leader of the House of Commons and Acting Secretary at the Foreign Office, was the natural recipient of the Memorial. The Earl of Aberdeen introduced the Deputation, which included the Bishop of London; Mr. Leonard Courtney, a Liberal M. P. and Editor of the *Contemporary Review*; Mr. Shaw Lefevre, a Radical Liberal M. P.; the Reverend Dr. Clifford, representing the Free Churches; Mr. Maddison, a Radical M. P., representing Labor; and Mr. John O'Connor, a Liberal M. P., representing Ireland.

Mr. Balfour said, in receiving the Memorial, what he was sure Lord Salisbury desired him to say, that the sentiments "collected from this long list of important gatherings throughout the length and breadth of the land, have the heartiest sympathy of Her Majesty's Government." He was certain that Lord Salisbury would receive the account of the Conference with the greatest interest and would reciprocate in the heartiest manner the wishes of the Deputation that the Emperor's scheme might, in the immediate future, bear all the fruit which was anticipated.<sup>35</sup>

Finally, on April 26, another Liberal Deputation, including Lord Monkswell; the Hon. Philip Stanhope, M. P.; Dr. MacEwan, M. P.; Thomas Bart, M. P.; George Jacob Holyoake, M. P.; Mrs. Jacob Wright; Hodgson Pratt; and W. T. Stead, presented to Baron de Staal, the Russian Ambassador at the Court of St. James, a Memorial to His Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, thanking him for the initiative which he had taken in summoning the Peace Conference.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 331-32.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 445-47.

Among the first American organizations to take action upon the Tsar's Rescript was the legislative body of the Protestant Episcopal Church, known as the General Convention, which at its meeting in Washington, D. C., on October 5, 1898, passed two strong resolutions on the subject, one addressed to the Tsar, commending his action, the other calling upon the United States to do what it could for the establishment of a permanent court to settle controversies among nations. The General Convention consisted of bishops of the Episcopal Church and several hundred representative clergymen and laymen. Among the names signed to the resolution was that of Mr. Robert Treat Paine of Boston, President of the American Peace Society.<sup>37</sup> The Tsar's initiative was also warmly applauded by the United Society of Christian Endeavor. Likewise the Boston Association of Ministers placed itself on record as approving the Rescript.

The Boston Peace Society undertook the task of organizing meetings and conferences throughout the land. The Directors of the American Peace Society appointed Dr. Charles G. Ames to co-operate with other organizations and citizens of Boston in promoting public interest throughout the country in the Tsar's proposal. A Peace Crusade was formed, with Dr. Edward Everett Hale as Chairman, which published *The Peace Crusade*, the temporary organ of the movement for promotion of public interest in the Conference. Although the American Peace Societies appear to have been a little less active than those in Europe, in general they gave a hearty response. In so far as other organizations considered the project they pronounced in its favor.

On February 21, 1899, a meeting was held in Dr. Hale's church preparatory to a series of public meetings for March and April in Tremont Temple. These Monday noon meetings were conducted under the auspices of the Massachusetts Good

<sup>37</sup> J. L. L., "The Czar's Truce of God," *Boston Evening Transcript*, February 18, 1899, p. 5, col. 4; *The Advocate of Peace*, LX (November, 1898), 225.

Citizenship Society to promote public interest in the proposed Hague Conference. Among those who participated on the program were Edwin D. Mead, Robert Treat Paine, Edward Everett Hale, long an advocate of peace, Dr. Lyman Abbott of Brooklyn, Dr. William Cunningham of Trinity College, Cambridge, England, Dr. George C. Lorimer, pastor of the Tremont Temple, Dr. Francis E. Clark of the United Society of Christian Endeavor, and Mr. Samuel Gompers of the American Federation of Labor.

Professor W. Rauschenbusch of the Rochester Theological Seminary, Dr. Richard Henry Thomas of Baltimore, and Mr. W. J. Mann and Mr. F. L. Hutchins of Worcester led the movement in support of the Conference in their home cities.<sup>38</sup>

After the appearance of the Rescript, Dr. George Dana Boardman of Philadelphia, President of the Christian Arbitration and Peace Society, published a revised and enlarged edition of his brochure on the *Disarmament of Nations, or Mankind One Body*. Practically all the April, 1899, issue of the *Advocate of Peace*, the organ of the American Peace Society, was devoted to the Hague Conference.

American women, like their European sisters, organized to promote the purposes of the Conference. At least 2,500 persons attended the Women's Peace Crusade meeting in Tremont Temple on April 3, 1899. Addresses were made by Julia Ward Howe, Alice Freeman Palmer, Lucia Ames Mead, Mary A. Livermore and Miss O. M. E. Rowe, President of the Massachusetts State Federation of Women's Clubs.<sup>39</sup>

The Peace Department of the National W.C.T.U. considered the Conference at The Hague as "the beginning of the end of war." The State Superintendent of peace and arbitration and the general officers of the W.C.T.U. held meetings in their several communities to promote public interest in the Con-

<sup>38</sup> *The Advocate of Peace*, LXI (March, 1899), 77.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.* (May, 1899), pp. 112-14.

ference. For these the National Superintendent provided a suggestive program.<sup>40</sup>

Finally, Benjamin F. Trueblood was named by the Board of Directors of the American Peace Society to represent them at The Hague during the sitting of the Conference and to co-operate with other experienced peace workers to promote the purpose of the Conference.

N. W. J. Hayden of Lowell, Massachusetts, in a letter to the Editor of the *Boston Evening Transcript*, stated that it was a matter for regret that so little had been done in the United States to answer the Tsar's proposal for a conference for a limitation of armaments. He referred to the fact that the largest part of the detail work had been done in Boston. It seemed to Mr. Hayden that the Americans at large were acting to the cold-blooded sentiment of "let them look out for themselves," which Dr. Albert Shaw had expressed in his editorial in the *American Monthly Review of Reviews*.<sup>41</sup> "It is not often that the people can act effectively as a unit"; Hayden wrote, "but there is an opportunity for Vox Populi to be Vox Dei indeed." He wanted the American people to speak to their President with no uncertain voice, that he might see to it that when the Conference met the United States should be represented by men instructed not only to express America's great desire that the European people should find it possible to rid themselves of so oppressive a burden, but also able to show how such a long-wished-for end might be attained.<sup>42</sup>

This is the brief story of what the peace organizations and enthusiastic individuals did to create a public interest in the Rescript and to urge the governments to give their best consideration to the Tsar's proposal. They have been criticized on the one hand for having done too much and on the other

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.* (June, 1899), p. 127.

<sup>41</sup> *American Monthly Review of Reviews*, XIX (January, 1899), 19.

<sup>42</sup> N. W. J. Hayden, "The Czar's 'Truce of God,'" *Boston Evening Transcript*, February 17, 1899, p. 6, col. 5.

hand for not having done enough. The enthusiasm of the pacifists led them to read more into the Rescript than it contained and to ask for more than could possibly be attained from the then existing state of European Society, without definite international machinery for settling disputes and enforcing agreements. The peace groups have been ridiculed for passing numerous resolutions and for petitioning and memorializing the governments and the delegates at the Conference. When the Peace Conference assembled, Count Münster reported to Berlin that it had attracted the roughs and the rabble of the entire world; journalists of the worst type, like Stead; Baptist Jews, like von Block; and women of peace, like Baroness von Suttner. In his *Autobiography*, Andrew D. White, the American delegate, refers to shoals of telegrams, reports of proceedings and societies, hortatory letters, crankish proposals and peace pamphlets sent to The Hague.<sup>43</sup>

It is argued that the pacifists should have bent all of their energies towards educating and arousing the electorate to demand that their representatives in the parliaments should support the peace proposal and bring pressure to bear upon the Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries. They should have created and developed an enlightened public opinion throughout the various nations, which would have led them to understand that their true interests were involved. Statesmen must feel a force behind them impelling them to act; if they are to be moved to translate their ability and experience into deeds, they must be convinced that the people they represent desire them to act. The statesmen of 1898, if they were to have striven with all their might for the realization of the Tsar's proposition, would have had to understand that the bulk of their fellow-citizens would hold them responsible for any failure their efforts might have prevented. Unless the public opinion of the civilized world had, in 1898, declared unmistakably in

<sup>43</sup> Andrew D. White, *Autobiography* (D. Appleton-Century, London, 1905), II, 285.



favor of some stop to the expansion of armaments, they were bound to increase. But there was no strong current of public opinion on the question of armaments. It is unjust, however, to blame Peace Societies and Peace advocates for not creating one. Public opinion on a question cannot be created overnight; its development is a slow process. The pacifists attempted, through public meetings, conferences, pamphlets and memorials, to arouse the inert public. They thought they were doing their best. They certainly did practically all that was done to create the little opinion there was in favor of the Rescript and the Conference. And it should be remembered that they had always to face and to attempt to dissipate the strong opposition of the greater part of the public press. They were toiling in an age when the public was more influenced by the daily newspaper and periodicals than by religious enthusiasts and pacifists.

Perhaps some individual Peace Societies might have done more. For example, the Netherlands Society has been censured for having done so little to bring the Peace Conference to the public notice. The Netherlands Women's League for International Disarmament obtained signatures to an international address presented to the Conference, and this was about all that was done. The Secretary of The Hague branch wrote in his annual report for 1899 that for the branch in question 1899 was a year of repose; in spite of the Conference not one public meeting was held during the whole year. It was proposed that the Netherlands Peace League should convoke representatives from all the Peace Societies to a great public Peace demonstration during the time of the Conference. This proposition, however, did not materialize for several reasons: lack of financial resources; too short a time for the preparation (from the end of March to the middle of May); and the fact that the Netherlands Society was unqualified to take the initiative for such a peace congress, this being the task of the International Bureau of Berne.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>44</sup> Jonkheer B. de Jong van Beek en Donk, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

Regardless of the criticism that for one reason or another may be directed against peace enthusiasts, the ethical value of the Tsar's Rescript, when looked at from the Christian point of view, must be ranked very high. We must admit that the overgrown armaments of Europe in 1898 and of the world today were and are a negation of Christian principles, and any proposal to limit their further increase should receive the whole-hearted support of the Christian universe. Professor Lawrence, in an article in the *International Journal of Ethics*, pointed out the ethical value of the Tsar's proposal. If we believe in the teachings of Christ, he writes, "we must range ourselves with those who see in the Rescript of the Tsar an attempt to bring the practice of civilized states into some approximation to agreement with the principles of the religion which most of them profess."<sup>45</sup> But, unfortunately, such considerations do not meet with universal acceptance, and they certainly do not greatly influence statesmen whose personal acquaintance with the wiles of diplomacy is bound to make them sceptical. Religious arguments must be reinforced by others of a more utilitarian nature if they are to have any noticeable effect.

<sup>45</sup> J. W. Lawrence, "The Tsar's Rescript," *The International Journal of Ethics*, IX (January, 1899), 142-43.

## CHAPTER XII

### PUBLIC OPINION AND THE TSAR'S RESCRIPT

THE Tsar did not suggest anything in the nature of general disarmament. His project was much more modest, for all he asked was that the governments should concert measures for stopping the increase of armaments, and, if possible, reduce proportionally those that already existed. The European press at first echoed a grand sentiment of sympathy for the ideas proposed by the Russian sovereign; but at the same time, especially in the journals connected with the diplomatic circle, it expressed uncertainty upon the ways and means of arriving at the desired end.<sup>1</sup> Soon, however, the humanitarian side of the circular lost the importance that was first attached to it, and more than that, it became in many cases a weapon in the hands of opponents of the undertaking. Its secret enemies delighted in talking and writing about it, in the hope that the realization of the proposed measure would thus be lost in words. Its open enemies put forward the axiom that fighting is an element of human nature, that war cannot be abolished, and that to try to accomplish its abolition is beyond the sphere of practical politics. They ridiculed the Rescript and held it up to the world as visionary and Utopian.

The English newspapers and magazines, after recovering from the first amazement of the Rescript, settled down to a sceptical examination of the document. The periodicals, which had either ignored or only slightly concerned themselves with the problem of armaments before August, 1898, now published

<sup>1</sup> "Le Désarmement général et la presse européenne," *Le Temps*, August 31, 1898.

scathing articles casting out and out derision on the "invitation by the Russian Emperor to a general rubbing of noses and exchange of fine sentiments on the subject of peace and good will among men."<sup>2</sup> Almost all contributors expressed their confidence in the integrity of the Tsar and agreed that he had acted nobly and with the finest intentions, but they were convinced that the best motives in politics avail little as against the prosaic opposition of stern facts. The Emperor's views and wishes, it was claimed, were not those of his ministers. Most writers saw ulterior motives in the proposal. The bad financial condition of the country, together with continuous famine, rendered it impossible for the Finance Minister to provide the necessary funds for the ever-increasing armaments.<sup>3</sup> The Russian Government wished relief from military burdens in order to carry out a program of public works undertaken with an eye to military exigencies.<sup>4</sup> Strategical railways on the confines of Afghanistan, destitute of commercial value, were being built with the simple object of harassing British rule in India.<sup>5</sup> Russia desired peace because a war, she feared, would mean the loss of Poland.<sup>6</sup> The Foreign Office, alarmed at the scarcity of cash and warships, and disturbed by the world's sudden discovery of Russia's impotence in the Far East, was also glad of a respite.<sup>7</sup> Further, a real and durable peace would enable the heads of departments in the War Office to conceal defective transport, a jobbed and plundered commissariat, im-

<sup>2</sup> Henry H. Howorth, "Some Plain Words About the Tsar's New Gospel of Peace," *The Nineteenth Century*, XLV (February, 1899), 203; cf. Sidney Low, "The Hypocrisies of the Peace Conference," *The Nineteenth Century*, XLV (May, 1899).

<sup>3</sup> "A Note on the Peace Conference," *The Quarterly Review*, CXC (October, 1898), 540.

<sup>4</sup> Arnold White, "The Tsar's Manifesto," *The National Review*, XXXII (October, 1898), 210.

<sup>5</sup> "A Soldier," "The Tsar's Appeal for Peace," *The Contemporary Review*, LXXIV (October, 1898), 500.

<sup>6</sup> Arnold White, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 202.

perfect medical arrangements and the notorious incapacity of the Russian Staff to stand the strain of a war with a first class naval power at a distance from a Russian base.<sup>8</sup>

Some English people found it difficult to reconcile the Tsar's love of peace with a proposition for increasing the Russian Army by two army corps and the reorganization of the navy involving an expenditure of nine million pounds. Moreover, the Russian treatment of Finland at the moment of the Eirenicon was severely criticized in Great Britain and Scandinavia as being contrary to the spirit of the peace proposal. In May, 1899, the *Nineteenth Century* published an article, "Russia in Finland," by J. N. Reuter, in which he pointed out that in October, only two months after the Rescript, the Imperial Government sent to the Senate of Finland a proposition for a new Army Bill which would, among other things, raise the military force in the Grand Duchy from 5,600 to about 35,000 men. On February 15, 1899, an edict was passed which practically swept away the Finnish constitution.

About the middle of April the Diet was informed of the Emperor's approval of General Kuropatkin's proposition that the army proposal, then under discussion by the Finnish Diet, should be regarded as an affair "concerning the interests of the Empire and, consequently, the Finnish Assembly would have no right of rejecting or modifying it." Thus the increase of the Russian Army could be arranged before the close of the conference which was intended by the Tsar to put a stop to further armaments. It was claimed that if the Manifesto of February 15 had not been applied to this particular Bill, the question would not have been decided in time, because for a law of this kind the constitution of Finland distinctly required the consent of the Diet, and the Russian Government had every reason to believe that the Diet would not give its consent. Sidney Low, writing on "The Hypocrisies of the Peace Confer-

<sup>8</sup> *Loc. cit.*

ence," concluded that: The destruction of the Finns' national liberties, and the sacrifice of their local institutions had to be consummated in hot haste, in order that these poor peasants might be caught in the military net "just too soon to be protected by any international agreement against increasing existing military establishments. Such is the wedding-garment in which holy Russia arrays herself to prepare for the bridal feast of Peace to which she is good enough to invite her rivals among the nations." <sup>9</sup>

Two very different poets were among the many serious-minded men who conscientiously held aloof. Mr. Kipling, for one, placed his faith in the discovery of some new engine of death so devastating that war must end and "peace arrive by herself." <sup>10</sup> Mr. William Watson (later Sir) could not sympathize with a war against war, for he held "that the Turk should be erased out of existence as a Power, having dominion over peoples foreign to himself"; and if this erasure could only be effected by act of war, then he was for war. The Tsar "seems sincere in his so-called Disarmament proposal, yet my confidence in him is shaken by the recollection that he saw all those atrocities <sup>11</sup> perpetrated at his door, and never lifted a finger (which was all he needed to have done) to stay the horror." <sup>12</sup>

Those who did not directly criticize the policy of the Russian Government questioned the idea of disarmament. Mr. W. J. Stillman, the *Times* correspondent at Rome, observed that a suspension of the increase of armaments would only lead to a closer study directed to the efficiency, and therefore the aggressive power, of the present armaments. He was of opinion that a halt in the competition would have the result of enabling the less efficient armies to overtake the more efficient, and put all on the terms of equality, which would render war more

<sup>9</sup> Sidney Low, *op. cit.*, p. 697.

<sup>10</sup> F. Whyte, *The Life of W. T. Stead*, II, 149.

<sup>11</sup> Armenian massacres of 1896.

<sup>12</sup> F. Whyte, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

rather than less probable. The suspension of the increase of armaments would appear to operate to the disadvantage of England chiefly, and to the advantage of Russia.<sup>13</sup>

Sidney Low, in an article entitled "Should Europe Disarm?"<sup>14</sup> set out to glorify war and its "priceless blessings." He argued that the "Aryan race" should not disarm in the face of the yellow and black menace. "It would be a crime against humanity to hold all the precious gifts, that Latin, Celtic, Teutonic, and Saxon civilization has given to the world, at the mercy or the forbearance of Slavonic and Asiatic hordes."<sup>15</sup> Neither did he believe that the world would be any better or any richer for disarming, as some countries had combined to make themselves uncommonly prosperous in spite of the "blood tax." Sidney Low was convinced that great armaments did not tend to promote war, but the contrary. The conscript army, he argued, is too cumbrous a weapon to be used lightly, and the tremendous risks attendant on failure in a modern war act as a deterrent from fighting. He noted that the only country that had been almost continually at war was that one which had a comparatively small mercenary army and did not depend upon conscription. England from 1870 to 1898 had done more fighting than the rest of the world put together.<sup>16</sup>

The *Spectator*, in considering the Russian Eirenicon, was convinced that the Tsar's scheme was not only bound to fail, but its promulgation had actually done a grave injury to the cause of peace. It had unsettled men's minds and drawn their attention to the instability of the *status quo*. Peace means the continuation of the existing *status quo*, but were all the powers agreed in its continuance? France most assuredly was not, and she was politically as well as geographically the pivot state of Europe. All France regarded the *status quo* as infamy. Her

<sup>13</sup> W. J. Stillman, "The Peace of Europe," *The Contemporary Review*, LXXV (March, 1899), 312.

<sup>14</sup> Sidney Low, "Should Europe Disarm?" *The Nineteenth Century*, XLIV (October, 1898), 521-30.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 524.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 529.

provinces were still in the hands of the robber, and until they were redeemed there could be no thought of acquiescence. Even in England, which had gained so much and held so wide an empire, there were half a dozen active and eager bodies of men wanting to expand more rapidly and thoroughly in several parts of the globe. As for Russia, she might respect the European *status quo* and might wish other people to respect it, but she did not wish for the *status quo* in China, in Persia or in Asia Minor. Even the United States, once the most contented of the powers, did not intend to be kept a prisoner to the North American Continent. The *status quo* was not what the powers desired. How, then, could they be expected to agree to a proposal which, if it meant anything, meant the permanency of the *status quo*? To the *Spectator* the notion of a conference at which pledges to disarm or not to arm any further seemed illusory or positively dangerous. "It would either settle nothing, or else end in 'fighting like devils for conciliation,' and arming to enforce disarmament."<sup>17</sup>

The London *Times*, however, made this favorable comment on the Circular:

The note breathes a spirit of generous, perhaps, indeed, almost quixotic humanity—a spirit familiar in the effusions of visionaries, but too seldom found in the utterances of great sovereigns and responsible statesmen. Never, perhaps, in modern history have aspirations, which good men in all ages have regarded as at once ideal and unattainable, found so responsive an echo in the counsels of one of the greatest and most powerful of the world's rulers. In principle the proposals of the czar, put forth on a solemn occasion with every mark of disinterested sincerity, will command the sympathy and respect of all men of good-will. So far as Great Britain is concerned, we long ago abandoned continental ambitions, and there is no power in the world which has less to gain or more to lose by any disturbance of the existing territorial *status quo*. . . . If Russia, which has also a great, but still undeveloped industrial future before her, is becoming fully convinced, as we in England

<sup>17</sup> *The Spectator*, LXXXI (September 3, 1898), 296.



long have been, that resources are better devoted to the beneficent arts of peace than to the destructive uneconomic energies of war, Englishmen, as essentially peace loving people, can only hail the czar's pronouncement with the utmost cordiality as glad tidings of great joy, which, whatever may be the practical issue, casts honor upon that sovereign's generous and lofty spirit and humanity. The difficulties are great, but nothing can henceforth deprive the czar of having brought peace and disarmament into the sphere of practical politics.<sup>18</sup>

Finally, an anonymous writer using the pseudonym, "A Soldier," saw in the Rescript a Russian attempt "to revivify in England the old Manchester peace party; to shake the confidence of Germany and other powers in any possibility of firm alliance with Britain; to demonstrate to the world that it is at any time easy to tickle the ears of Englishmen by well-selected phrases; and that in the long run not far-seeing statesmen but phrase-mongers determine the policy of Britain."<sup>19</sup>

In spite of the rather hostile criticism of the Rescript in the leading British periodicals, public opinion in favor of the Peace Conference was more pronounced in England than in any other country. It spoke with no uncertain voice at public meetings, religious conferences and trades organizations. It would have been impossible to obtain anywhere from any open meeting a resolution requesting the Government to take no part in the proposed Conference. The Marquis of Salisbury, Lord Rosebery, Lord George Hamilton, the Marquis of Lansdowne, Sir William Harcourt, Mr. John Morley and Mr. Balfour, when addressing public meetings, spoke of the Rescript and the Conference in sympathetic and hopeful terms.<sup>20</sup> Mr. Goschen gave proof of the sincerity of the Government's good wishes by announcing that if the other great naval powers were ready to

<sup>18</sup> *Public Opinion*, XXV (September 8, 1898) (New York, 1899), 299.

<sup>19</sup> "A Soldier," "The Tsar's Appeal for Peace," *The Contemporary Review*, LXXIV (October, 1898), 504.

<sup>20</sup> W. T. Stead (Editor), "War Against War," *Special Supplement to the Review of Reviews*, January, 1899.

reduce their program of naval construction, Great Britain would be prepared to modify hers.<sup>21</sup> There was not one leading British statesman who would have openly and avowedly tried to wreck the Peace Conference.

On the Continent opinion was less favorable. This was true even in Russia where the statesmen either approved of the Rescript or were forced by circumstances to appear to do so, and the few peasants who were aware of it dimly discerned that the grandson of the Tsar who had liberated them from serfdom was endeavoring to free them from the heavy burden of militarism. Naturally, government officials were unwilling to give full expression to any opinions they may have had. The American Chargé d'Affaires in the Russian capital reported that the press had been forbidden to discuss the Rescript.<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, the St. Petersburg *Novosti* wrote:

It stands to reason that the disarmament question cannot be solved without a previous removal of the causes for the armaments. The conference must accurately determine the respective pretensions of the nations and propose means for a peaceful arrangement. It may come to pass that at the close of the 19 century a liquidation may be effected of the international policies which are so prolific in troubles and dangers.<sup>23</sup>

According to the St. Petersburg *Novoe Vremya*:

The true friends of peace are, naturally, on the side of Russia, but it is impossible to guarantee that some of the western cabinets will not raise objections, prompted by the fact that the armed peace which has existed since 1871 is the main source of their international strength.<sup>24</sup>

There was no strong current of Russian opinion in favor of peace and disarmament, for the ignorance and isolation of the peasants made all campaigns of pacifism among them ex-

<sup>21</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, Fourth series, LXVIII, 323-24.

<sup>22</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1898, No. 179, p. 547, Mr. Pierce to Mr. Hay.

<sup>23</sup> *Public Opinion*, XXV (September 8, 1898), 298.

<sup>24</sup> *Loc. cit.*

tremely difficult. Moreover, all pacifist publications were carefully censored and the Mennonite immigrants who endeavored to spread their evangelical doctrines were persecuted. Only a few attempts to create a public interest in disarmament and peace had been made. Vasili Vereshchagin, famous for his picture "Apotheosis of War," through his paintings, and still more through his realistic books on the abominations of war, did much to dispel from the popular mind its romantic ideas of war. In 1897, he advocated an international congress to hasten the simultaneous disarmament of the European nations.<sup>25</sup> Prince Peter of Oldenburg, a grandson of Tsar Paul, had, as early as 1873, outlined to Bismarck a plan to abolish war by means of "international commissions of arbitration."<sup>26</sup> But pacifist ideas did not quickly strike root in Russia. In the middle 'nineties, Prince Peter Dolgorukof attempted to organize a Russian Peace Society, but failed.<sup>27</sup> It was not until 1899, after the close of the Hague Conference, that he succeeded in founding such a society under the patronage of the Imperial Government.<sup>28</sup>

The masses of the Russian people did not hold a definite and clear cut opinion on the question of disarmament, and had they held one, it would not have counted. The public opinion of the military caste was omnipotent in pre-war Russia and really determined her fate and policy. The Russian Army offered almost the only career to five-sixths of the poor gentry of the country, and army officers do not like theories about reduction of armaments, and tendencies towards perpetual brotherhood and universal peace. Promotion, glory, all the inducements to men to enter the ranks are stifled by "the rust and corrosion induced by peace and theories of peace." So far as the writer has been able to determine, no army official in

<sup>25</sup> *The Herald of Peace*, XXV (October 1, 1897), 304.

<sup>26</sup> A. C. F. Beales, *The History of Peace*, p. 215.

<sup>27</sup> Bertha von Suttner, *Memoirs*, II, 194, letter from Prince Peter Dolgorukof (also spelled *Dolgoruki*).

<sup>28</sup> A. C. F. Beales, *loc. cit.*

Russia of any great importance supported the Emperor's Rescript. Prince Peter Dolgorukof, in a letter to Baroness von Suttner, states that when the Eirenicon was announced, he, in his capacity as reserve officer, was taking part in maneuvers. His fellow-officers regarded the matter without excitement, although the best among them could not help recognizing the correctness of the ideas embodied in the Rescript. The others were of opinion that all the peace projects concerned them very little, and that the military service to which they had been brought up would still for a long time fill their lives.<sup>29</sup>

Apathy among the population showed itself also in other European countries. In Germany a few peace enthusiasts raised their voices in jubilation over the Rescript and the Conference, but pacifist ideas were not widely disseminated; the masses of the people received the Tsar's proposal with coldness and suspicion. They thought of the difference in the defense of Russia and Germany; the former had only one frontier to defend, the latter two—one on the East, the other in the West. Germany, situated as she was in the center of Europe with three great powers on her frontiers, was dependent upon armaments for her very existence.

The *Neue Hamburger Zeitung* sent a note to distinguished contemporaries, requesting opinions on the Russian manifesto. Very interesting replies were received. Many approved, some, like Leo Tolstoi, enthusiastically. But replies sent by opponents were in a majority, and they show that public opinion in Germany was not yet ripe for a limitation of armaments. Here are a few utterances of individuals:

The history of many thousand years unfortunately argues against the possibility that war will ever cease. . . . At all events the Russian proposal for disarmament is one of the cleverest diplomatic moves of modern times.<sup>30</sup>

B. VON WERNER

<sup>29</sup> Bertha von Suttner, *op. cit.*, II, 195.

<sup>30</sup> Suttner, II, 198.

These are questions of high politics with which I have nothing to do. In my opinion, so far as our trade is concerned, all interests are subordinated to one that is paramount, namely, that Germany be respected and feared, but so far as possible without being hated, in the world. Therefore, the mercantile class has a vital interest in seeing the safety of the empire assured in the ways understood by those who are responsible for it.<sup>31</sup>

FERDINAND LAEISZ,  
Chairman of the Ham-  
burg Board of Trade.

I cannot assent to the general notion that armies prepared for battle are unproductive. Armies are a protection to the nations against attacks. . . . The idea of disarmament is unfortunate. We should be glad that slouchy men can be trained in a manly education.<sup>32</sup>

REINHOLD BEGAS,  
Sculptor.

I do not waste time thinking of Utopias. France lays down as a condition for every debate the return of the imperial lands; we lay down as our condition the exclusion of every discussion of this question. I think this is a sufficient answer. The talk of the private friends of peace is mere nonsense: the Tsar's advocacy of peace is perhaps a stimulus to war.<sup>33</sup>

FELIX DAHN

The present proposal of Tsarist Russia for disarmament is a fraud.<sup>34</sup>

W. LIEBKNECHT

The stronger the armaments the greater the fear of assuming the responsibility of starting a war. Disarmament would make wars more frequent. Reduction of the present force would withdraw a part of the people from the school of military discipline and very generally diminish their efficiency. . . . The vital questions of the nations will always be settled by war. Germany must always lead the great powers in its armaments, because it is the only country that has three great powers as neighbours and may at any time be exposed to the danger of waging war on three frontiers. With the increasing solidarity of states, wars will naturally become more and more infrequent. It is a

<sup>31</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>32</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>33</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>34</sup> *Loc. cit.*

dream to expect anything more, and not even a beautiful dream; for with the guarantee of perpetual peace the degeneracy of mankind would be confirmed.<sup>35</sup>

DR. EDWARD VON HARTMANN

Herr von Metzger, the Social Democratic delegate to the Reichstag from the third electoral district in Hamburg, wrote to the editor that "he did not feel the slightest inclination to waste even a quarter of an hour on that Russian diplomatic trick."<sup>36</sup>

The following quotations typify the tone of the newspapers opposed:

The Tsar's proposal for disarmament goes against nature and against civilization. This alone condemns it. Baroness von Suttner who a few years ago gave the command *Die Waffen nieder*, and thereby won among all men a brilliant success, is now indeed experiencing the great triumph of having the Tsar join in her summons; but there will be only a short lived joy in this for Frau von Suttner and all good souls, for, as we have said, disarmament is contrary to nature and inimical to civilization.<sup>37</sup>

HEIDELBERGER ZEITUNG,  
August 30, 1898.

A stranger official document than the Tsar's peace manifesto, his summons to disarm and his proposal for a general conference, has never before thrown official and unofficial Europe into astonishment. The question rises to the lips, is this an honest Utopia, or is there hidden behind it a deep calculation of Russian politics, which, as is well known, is excelled in slyness by the diplomacy of no other state? It remains at all events a Utopia, in spite of all the European "Friends of Peace," and all the other chatter about international brotherhood.<sup>38</sup>

GRENZBOTEN, Number 37,  
September 15, 1898.

The czar and his ministers have not deluded themselves with the idea that they can rid the world of the causes which for years have been responsible for the growing armaments. When a great power,

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 199.

<sup>36</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 199-200.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 200.

however, addresses such proposals to others, they will be recognized everywhere as deserving of the most serious consideration.<sup>39</sup>

BERLIN NATIONAL ZEITUNG.

Remembering Russia's political history, we do not believe in her sudden disinterestedness, and are satisfied that the emperor would not have conceived the idea of universal peace if Russia had been, like Germany, the greatest land power. It is absurd to believe that Russia will abandon her plans in connection with Persia, China, and Afghanistan.<sup>40</sup>

KÖLNISCHE VOLKSZEITUNG.

Germany will support the czar's peace proposition as far as possible, but will have to keep her powder dry. For the immediate future she must prevent immature and therefore harmful influence upon her home and foreign politics.<sup>41</sup>

KÖLNISCHE ZEITUNG.

Many German newspapers, while eulogizing the Emperor's humanitarian benevolence, argued that the expenditure of money and the employment of men for military purposes were not impoverishing the state, since the money was expended and redistributed through the country, while the men found employment which they would not otherwise obtain.<sup>42</sup>

Professor Hans Delbrück, a distinguished German historian and editor of the *Preussische Jahrbücher*, declared that the only power which, without difficulty could still increase its military forces was Germany, for she was the only great power to have men as well as money. Therefore, Germany desired no reduction of effectives, because she would lose the advantage of men, and no reduction of budgets because she would lose the advantage of money.<sup>43</sup>

Professor von Stengel of Munich, who believed that war is

<sup>39</sup> *Public Opinion*, XXV (September 8, 1898), 299.

<sup>40</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>41</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>42</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898, op. cit.*, p. 548.

<sup>43</sup> "Zukunftskrieg und Zukunftsfriede," *Preussische Jahrbücher*, XCVI (May, 1899), 203 *et seq.*

a God-given institution and a part of most of the virtues and arts, went so far as to publish a pamphlet, *Der Ewige Friede*, which glorified and praised war and pointed out the mischievous absurdity of endeavoring to abolish armaments. In this all the arguments of the opponents, all the glorification of war and of armaments that had been brought against the notion of peace were summed up and there was added complete derision of the Conference, which the author characterized as a day-dream. This work became rapidly celebrated, especially when the German Government nominated Baron von Stengel as one of its representatives to The Hague.<sup>44</sup> This action, however, raised consternation in pacifist circles and the German Peace Societies protested publicly.<sup>45</sup>

Public opinion in Germany was with Professor Delbrück; the German Empire was the only power which, without difficulty, could still increase its military forces. Even the Social Democrats, supposedly advocates of peace, did not encourage the Conference. They were sympathetically inclined to the thought underlying the manifesto, for, as a political party, they had opposed the development of militarism and had consistently upheld the idea of national brotherhood for the purpose of promoting the common interests of mankind. The fact that the sovereign of an empire like Russia, whose policy had hitherto demanded militarism, should suddenly appear as its opponent was highly noteworthy, but could not prevent the Social Democrats from looking upon his action with some distrust. They were convinced that important internal political reasons had led the Russian Government to undertake the advocacy of the imperial plan, and they looked upon it as a purely diplomatic trick; consequently, the party could not participate heart and

<sup>44</sup> The Emperor's naming of Baron von Stengel as an official representative to the Hague Conference was, according to a famous German caricature, comparable to introducing a bull into a bed of tulips: *Revue générale de droit international public*, VI (1899), 665.

<sup>45</sup> Suttner, *op. cit.*, II, 239.



soul in an agitation in favor of the Rescript and the program of the Conference.<sup>46</sup>

Public opinion in France was from the first hostile to the Rescript, partly owing to offended *amour propre*, because France had not been taken into her ally's confidence, and partly because of the fear that an acceptance of the invitation would involve an acquiescence in the territorial *status quo* of Europe. The immediate reaction of the most important newspapers showed that the press would not furnish the necessary leadership for the mostly inarticulate elements which were gradually developing a saner point of view in regard to Franco-German relations.

The Paris correspondent of the London *Times* reported that M. Faure and the French ministers knew nothing beforehand and that the Tsar's proposal plunged the entire official world into terrible embarrassment and almost stupefaction. Everybody asked with dismay what it meant. It was a sad awakening for France, and her newspapers made an immense effort to restrain their feelings in the face of what was regarded as Russian perfidy.<sup>47</sup> The following comments were typical:

It is to be hoped that Europe, like France, will consider the czar's proposal in a spirit similar to that with which it was inspired. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that if France owes it to herself to aid in such an attempt there is another portion of her moral patrimony which she cannot abandon without abdicating the very reason of her existence. . . .<sup>48</sup>

LE TEMPS.

The powers, invited by France's ally to study the means of universal peace, are divided into two classes. In the first must be included those whom the fortune of war has favored during the last

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 231-32, Letter from Herr A. Bebel, Berlin, January 13, 1899; also p. 199, opinion of Herr von Metzger, Social Democrat delegate to the Reichstag from the third electoral district in Hamburg.

<sup>47</sup> *Public Opinion*, *op. cit.*, p. 299.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 298.

thirty years; in the second those who have suffered cruel territorial mutilations. Adhesion to the international conference is easy for the first, as it would mean solidifying forever the conquests of the past, but for the second it would create more delicate and complicated problems.<sup>49</sup>

LE FIGARO.

Universal peace is a dream that has never been realized, and in which it would be well not to put too much faith.<sup>50</sup>

LE GAULOIS.

The past, which we can not forget, is a stumbling-block in the way of the success of the conference.<sup>51</sup>

JOURNAL DE DÉBATS.

The general consensus of press opinion was that France as one of the powers dissatisfied with the *status quo* could not accept a limitation of armaments based upon the relative strength of existing armies.<sup>52</sup> It was admitted that she would have to participate in order to avoid the charge of being responsible for the failure of the Conference, but this concession was made with the understanding that Alsace-Lorraine should not be mentioned.<sup>53</sup> After diplomatic assurance had been obtained that the Conference would be limited in its scope to the questions of armaments and arbitration, the French people became indifferent, taking no strong views on either side. The Conference might meet, but France had no intention of abandoning the idea of *revanche*, which did not exclusively imply a private or national vengeance. France thought it incumbent upon her to vindicate her national honor not only in her own eyes, but also in the eyes of others. So long, however, as she imagined that she could retrieve the defeat of 1870, and prepared to do so, European armaments were bound to increase.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 299.

<sup>50</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>51</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>52</sup> E. Malcolm Carroll, *French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 1870-1914*; (D. Appleton-Century, New York, 1931), p. 184, citing "Aurore," August 30, 1898, "Le Temps," August 31, 1898, "Autorité," September 1, 1898.

<sup>53</sup> *Le Temps*, August 31, September 3, 1898.

Serbia, like France, demanded justice before permanent peace. The public opinion of that little country was opposed to the reduction of armaments before its justified claims were assured. The Serbs had worked and fought for more than four hundred years to free themselves from Turkish dominion; they were going to work and fight to deliver their people still divided among five different sovereignties. "As there is an individual honor," wrote Professor Milenko R. Vesnitch, "there is also a national honor, of which France has given the best example." "National honor" and "national dignity" he considered the most certain factors in the preservation of general progress. Until Serbia's justified demands were met, until the grand principle of equality in international relations was accepted, M. Vesnitch declared, "We shall arm ourselves down to the infants in their cradle; we shall all perish, one after the other, before the threshold of the supreme tribunal, demanding at the top of our voices, *justice*, and then *peace*."<sup>54</sup>

*Le Temps* states that the Italian press, while praising the initiative of the Tsar, expressed doubts upon the achievement of practical results. It asked, for example, if the plenipotentiaries would take for their point of departure the actual territorial *status quo*, or if, in order to place peace upon a sure foundation, they would occupy themselves with questions which at that moment divided Europe. Some newspapers expressed the fear that the discussion of these questions would precipitate war rather than lead to the result for which the Conference was called. The official Italian journals guarded a certain reserve, merely stating that the Italian Government, not having any grave international question pending, could only encourage the tentative of Nicholas II.<sup>55</sup>

But there was one issue on which both Italian public opinion and the Government united in opposing, and that was the

<sup>54</sup> *Revue générale de droit international public*, V (1898), 742.

<sup>55</sup> "Le Désarmement général et la presse européenne," *Le Temps*, August 31, 1898.

question of the representation of the Holy See at the Conference. Signor Zanichelli, in the *Nuova Antologia*, pointed out that the Pope was no longer a head of a state, that he no longer had personal sovereignty. The writer concluded that the Pope could not be invited to the Conference and that if by chance he were, it would be the duty of the Italian Government to absent itself. This was a rigorous stand to take because the Tsar naturally saw in the Pope a great arbitrator who had settled so many differences and the minister of peace who constituted the highest moral authority of the world.<sup>56</sup>

At the same time Professor Pasquale Fiore, Professor of Law at the University of Naples, tried to show Italian public opinion that it was wrong to call the projected meeting a Disarmament Conference while it had other objects. He considered the limitation of armaments impossible.<sup>57</sup> Moreover, disarmament would have scarcely any advantage for Italy, because lacking money and not men, she was interested only in the reduction of budgets, not of effectives. As Crispi wrote in May, 1899, Italy wished to keep her sword unsheathed in order to enter into possession of her territories still under foreign subjection.<sup>58</sup>

Public opinion in the United States generally approved the Tsar's Rescript without, however, attaching much importance to it. The following comments appeared in some of the leading daily newspapers:

Whatever else the czar's proposal for disarmament brings about, it will be apt to put an end to the Russo-French alliance, and leave France isolated in Europe, and helpless to right what she thinks her great wrong.<sup>59</sup>

NEW YORK TIMES.

<sup>56</sup> *Revue générale de droit international public*, VI (1899), 103, citing *Nuova Antologia*, February 16, 1899, p. 682 et seq.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 336, citing Pasquale Fiore, "L'Imperatore di Russia e la Conferenza," in *Nuova Antologia*, CLXV (May, 1899), 665.

<sup>58</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>59</sup> *Public Opinion*, op. cit., p. 300.

We do hope that this impressive episode of European affairs will not be lost upon Americans. When the czar prays for peace and disarmament, he prays that the world be allowed to "stand still" and devote itself to the quiet pursuit of peaceful production. The forward policy which our imperialists desire means great armaments and the constant threat of war, and it is of these that the war lord of Russia speaks impressive words.<sup>60</sup>

SPRINGFIELD (Mass.) REPUBLICAN.

There is and always has been a "queer streak" in the mental make-up of the Russian Imperial house. The present czar seems to be in a dreamy mood in which men aspire to do good deeds for the execution of which they make no preparation. The Romanofs dream of empire when they are asleep, and of peace when they are awake.<sup>61</sup>

BOSTON TRANSCRIPT.

The czar's Quixotic suggestion that the nations drop their iron burdens and join hands in a universal peace does credit to his generous heart, but we cannot hope it will have more material result than when offered by less powerful personages. It is not original, and it is hardly within the realm of the practical.<sup>62</sup>

CHICAGO JOURNAL.

If Russia could induce the European governments to reduce their military establishments, thus making it possible to correspondingly decrease her enormous standing army, Russia could devote her energies exclusively to the conquest of China, Tartary, Persia, and Turkey by the slow process of absorption; and the savings from her military budget would swell the corruption fund needed for the purchase of sultans, khans, and mandarins.<sup>63</sup>

PHILADELPHIA RECORD.

Some journals feigned to believe that the Russian Circular was the consequence of the Spanish-American War. The tone of the *Nation* was sympathetic. In an article entitled "The Czar Disarmer,"<sup>64</sup> the Rescript was considered "an event, an achievement of the first magnitude." It was a confession of the folly and futility of the military spirit, coming from the most

<sup>60</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>61</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>62</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>63</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>64</sup> *The Nation* (New York), LXVII, No. 1731 (September 1, 1898), 160.

unexpected quarter. Its issuance alone was an achievement which would crown the young Nicholas with the brightest glory that the dying century had to bestow. Later the same periodical referred to the close connection between disarmament and arbitration and pointed out that when "two or more nations have provided a peaceful means of settling all quarrels, there must seem less and less reason for keeping themselves armed to the teeth in order to settle them by violence. . . . Historically, arbitration and disarmament have gone hand in hand." <sup>65</sup>

In general, the American newspapers and periodicals were much more interested in depicting the exploits of the United States Navy and describing war heroes, like Theodore Roosevelt and Admiral Dewey, than in critically examining the Eirenicon. The *Century*, *Scribner's Magazine*, the *Living Age*, the *American Monthly Review of Reviews*, the *North American Review*, the *Political Science Quarterly*, the *Yale Review*, the *Journal of Political Economy* and the *Quarterly Journal of Economics* did not mention the Tsar's Eirenicon in their 1898 issues. Their space was occupied with the "Problem of the Philippines," "What Is To Be Done With Cuba?" "The Economic Basis of Imperialism," and so forth. The few who troubled to write about the proposal considered the idea of disarmament impractical and the limitation of armaments a problem which did not concern the American Republic.

In January, 1899, Albert Shaw, the editor of the *American Monthly Review of Reviews*, answered the statement of W. T. Stead that the people of the United States and England might exert a well-nigh decisive influence on the Conference by writing that "the situation to which the Czar addressed his famous manifesto is purely and strictly a European situation. The United States is in no sense a military power." While this country held itself responsible in a general way for the peace and good order of the western hemisphere, it belonged to the

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, LXVIII (June 1, 1899), No. 1770, 410.

concert of Europe to deal with matters of common interest and concern in Europe and the adjacent parts of Asia and Africa. Since the invitation to the Conference was a general one, the United States ought to be well represented by men instructed to express America's great desire that the European people should find it feasible to rid themselves of so oppressive a system. This country would have to increase its army, but we should not enter upon any program of armament that would affect in any manner the questions of European policy proposed for discussion at the Conference. Mr. Shaw thought something might be done in the way of fixing arbitrary limits to the extension of European military preparation, but in the long run the cause of peace would be promoted most effectively, "first by the final adjustment of those unsettled questions which threaten the peace of nations—Alsace-Lorraine, for example—and, second, by an increased use of such means as arbitration for the settlement of disputes." <sup>66</sup>

Many in the United States, as in England, doubted the Tsar's sincerity. Henry Boynton, in an article published in the *Boston Evening Transcript*, February 16, 1899, compared Russia to an immense glacier from northern Asia, a Russia "steadily and silently sliding down from the Arctic frosts towards the rich plains of middle and southern Asia to the open sea beyond. The southern edge of this mighty avalanche can be outlined all the way from Turkey to the eastern shores of China. Obstacles may temporarily check, but cannot change this movement. Its objectives are never lost sight of." Boynton stated that the other nations were not going to sit still while Russia thus climbs to greatness and grandeur. The most the powers could do would be to increase their naval armaments as fast as possible and thus present a threatening attitude towards this growing colossus of the North, and meantime compel her to maintain a naval force as nearly equal to theirs as she may be

<sup>66</sup> Albert Shaw, "The Progress of the World" (America and the Conference), *American Monthly Review of Reviews*, XIX (January, 1899), 19-20.

able. The writer referred to Russia's railroad program and pointed out that to build and equip such railroads as were contemplated and building must bring a tremendous strain upon the best treasury. How plain it was that if all the great powers would build no more warships and largely reduce what they had, Russia would have the money thus saved from naval expenditures to put into railroads. Boynton suggested that the other great powers agree to stop building warships if Russia reduced her own war fleets and promised to send down no railroad lines into China. He concluded that if the great Eastern question unfolded itself as he indicated, it would be desirable for "England's good that the United States should be on 'working terms' with her and both governments have the Philippines as a working base for naval operations."<sup>67</sup>

Mr. Charles Conant, writing in the *North American Review*, without ridiculing the Rescript, traced its roots to an economic motive—the desire of Russia to become the great competitor of the Anglo-Saxon race for the commercial and military supremacy of the world.<sup>68</sup> The impression that prevailed in the press was that not much would be accomplished in the way of a limitation of armaments but that something might be done to extend the use of arbitration.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Henry Boynton, "Is the Czar In Earnest?" *Boston Evening Transcript*, February 16, 1899, p. 7, col. 1.

<sup>68</sup> Charles A. Conant, "Russia as a World Power," *The North American Review*, CLXVIII (February, 1899), 178-90.

<sup>69</sup> A Diplomatist at The Hague, "The Peace Conference; Its Possible Practical Results," *The North American Review*, CLXVIII (June, 1899), 771-78.



## CHAPTER XIII

### THE OPINIONS OF INTERNATIONAL JURISTS ON THE DISARMAMENT PROBLEM

JURISCONSULTS of international law, in examining the Tsar's peace proposals, were perhaps more detached in their judgments, more rational in their criticism than any other group. Less passionate than the national press in their differences, less enthusiastic than the absolute pacifists, less sceptical than statesmen and diplomats, they had some chance of being more just and more in harmony with the reality of facts.

A majority of international jurists were agreed that disarmament was desirable, but they could not devise an efficacious scheme for its accomplishment. The greatest difficulties which they confronted in any plan for limiting armaments arose from the necessity of combining disarmament with the fundamental principle of international law—the sovereignty of the state—from the problems of inspection and application of sanctions, from the attempt to define the exact nature of armaments, from an effort to arrive at a proportional equality, and finally from the opposition of some states to the permanent acceptance of the *status quo*. Here are obstacles as numerous as those obstructing the abolition of war; here are difficulties surpassing all measure; in fact, the solution of even one of them will touch the Utopian.

Assuming that the powers were, in principle, willing to disarm, the difficulty would arise when the delegates at the Hague Conference attempted to carry the idea into reality. First they would have to solve the perplexing problem of combining disarmament with the independence of states. M. Rolin-Jaequemyns, the renowned Belgian jurist, recognized this diffi-

culty when, in September, 1887, he presented his proposition to the Institute of International Law at its session in Heidelberg. He said:

The essential principle is that of the independence, the autonomy of every sovereign State, and as a corollary thereof, the right and the duty which it has to defend its existence by all preventive or immediate means within its power. This principle, which will doubtless be invoked in opposition to my proposition, I recognize and claim, not merely as a patriot, but as a jurist. I agree that the State which renounces the right to defend itself commits suicide as much as the State which renounces the right to exist. I would not admit the legality of such a hypothesis for my little country any more than for the largest State.<sup>1</sup>

States will not disarm so long as they claim complete national sovereignty. For the idea of absolute sovereignty involves in the last resort the right to do anything which may be held to serve the interest of the nation regarded as a unit, irrespective of the consequences which this action may have for the rest of the world. Sovereignty necessarily includes the right to make war in the national interest, and as long as nations exist there will be causes of war between them, if only because there always will be territory to which more than one power considers it possesses a legitimate right.

Moreover, each state exercises complete sovereignty within the limits of its territory and allows no other authority to interfere with the direction of its domestic affairs. But, to ensure the execution of any agreement, there must be inspection and control. No jurist was able to suggest how these could be accomplished without intolerable interference. MM. Pillett and Fauchille, the editors of the *Revue générale de droit international public*, were of opinion that the powers agreeing to limit their armaments would have to appoint a commission to which they would delegate the power of executing the decrees of the Conference. But the more the attributes of such a commission

<sup>1</sup> *Revue de droit international et de législation comparée*, XIX (1887), 402.

were considered, the more difficult it would be to constitute. These jurists and M. Desjardins were agreed that a disarmament pact could not leave material sanctions unprovided, for necessity would demand the formation of an international army capable of enforcing the arrangements arrived at. It would have not only to check the insubordination of the little states, but in case of need, to reduce to obedience even great powers like Germany, Great Britain, the United States or Russia. This international army would have to be at least equal to the strongest of the individual establishments, because, being formed of heterogeneous units from the national armies, it would be mobilized more slowly.<sup>2</sup> But what great powers would agree to this international force limiting their sovereignty in any way?

MM. Pillet and Fauchille realized that official investigations would be necessary for discovering by what ruse a state might try to exceed the figures assigned to it. If, however, a commission were given the right to investigate, objections would be raised to its entering the barracks and arsenals with a view to taking a census of the men and to verifying the material. Under this system the states, they feared, in place of arming without mystery, would arm secretly; thus the scheme would prove not only impracticable but dangerous to peace. To all the other causes of conflict would be added the irritating supervision of a third party and perhaps the accusation of secretly arming or manipulating figures; the nations would become more nervous and the political atmosphere charged with electricity. If it were discovered that a state had surpassed its budgetary figures, there would be no way to force it to obedience other than by declaring war on it, which would mean falling into the very peril that was to be avoided.<sup>3</sup>

It would prove almost impossible, Professor Félix Stoerk argued, to restrain the governments to a loyal observance of

<sup>2</sup> *Revue générale de droit international public*, V (1898), 694; also, M. Desjardins, "Le Désarmement, étude de droit international," *Revue des Deux mondes*, October, 1898, 677-78.

<sup>3</sup> *Revue générale de droit international public*, VI (1899), 99.

their engagements, for the international community was not sufficiently organized to admit institutions of control which could preserve the proportional reduction of its forces without impairing the sovereignty and the free movement of the European states. In international society there was need for a system of legal means for determining the rights of each state and for settling, according to justice, controversies which arose among them. But in his opinion the establishment of a new administrative community, an international union for the common reduction of armaments, was, in the then existing system of European society, with complications in Europe, Asia and Africa, a much greater source of danger to peace than would have been the temporary material advantages that the powers would have drawn from a reduction of their armies and navies.<sup>4</sup>

Stoerk pointed out that all tentatives of international control would augment the importance of information of an official character, and the difficulties of obtaining this would vary between states governed absolutely and constitutionally. Germany, France, England and the United States, in 1898, could not build guns, equip soldiers or construct warships without parliamentary discussion. The same acts could be accomplished in Russia behind an impenetrable screen, where parliament and the press exerted no control; and while some countries would in good faith restrict their preparations, she could go on, unmolested by curiosity, doing pretty much what she liked. It appeared to Professor Stoerk that before official investigations could be carried out with any degree of success, the contracting powers would have to demand first some conditions of an identical constitutional nature.<sup>5</sup> But to have insisted that Imperial Russia should have adopted a constitutional system, with all it implies, would have been tantamount to interfering with the sovereignty of that state.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, V (1898), 705. Opinion of Félix Stoerk, Professor of International Law in the University of Greifswald and member of the Institute of International Law.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 703.

Even if one were to accept the hypothesis that the states were disposed to consent to a temporary reduction of their armaments, the first great, practically insoluble problem would have been the task of defining and delimiting the term armaments. In regard to this problem Professors Brusa and Stoerk raised many questions without attempting to answer them. Under the name of armaments, they asked, would one understand only guns with their attendants and their munitions, fortresses and their ramparts, cruisers with their torpedoes, depots of powder and projectiles and soldiers of the first line or also commercial vessels, susceptible of transformation for war purposes, reserve armies, money or war treasures, borrowings, budgets, and the means and lines of transportation, such as canals and strategical railways? Under the name of armaments would one include only the *matériel* of war ready for use, or artificial and natural products? Is it a question of the sum of the means of attack and defense? Ought one to understand by the term the people capable of bearing arms, or those actually under arms? Would the reduction include also the means of defense or only the means of attack? Is it possible to draw a line of demarcation between the one and the other corresponding to their real meaning? Is it necessary also to take account of alliances, of population ready at a call, outside of legal prescription? <sup>6</sup>

Furthermore, MM. Brusa, Pillet and Fauchille drew attention to the fact that war and industrial progress are so closely interwoven that it is impossible to reduce military expenditure without proportionally reducing pacific expenses. Not only the construction of battleships would have to be limited but also the building of commercial vessels because they can, if necessary, be transformed into warships, either as transports or squadrons of cruisers. The power to make war effectively depends not merely on direct warlike machinery, but on the development of the means of communication and applied science

<sup>6</sup> *Revue générale de droit international public*, V (1898), 704. Opinion of Félix Stoerk. *Ibid.*, VI (1899), 884. Opinion of M. Brusa, Professor in the University of Turin and member of the Institute of International Law.

among peoples. Thus railways, though apparently pacific works, are also instruments of strategic value of the first order because they increase the power of effectives and their means of action. On this point, those who were sceptical over the Tsar's Rescript claimed that after five years the completed Trans-Siberian and other railways in Asia would, at least for strategical purposes, treble the military forces of Russia without adding a single cossack to her standing army. Jurists asked: Was Russia to be required to cease these enterprises, and, if so, for how long?

MM. Pillet and Fauchille pointed out the obstacles which would arise in attempting to establish a sure basis of proportional equality in armaments between the several states. The maximum could not be the same for Switzerland as for France, for Germany as for Russia, for a large and a small state, for a neutralized state and for one without such an international guarantee. A proportion would have to be fixed.<sup>7</sup> Who would say what reduction in the British Navy would be equivalent to the striking off of one hundred men from the muster-rolls of the German Army? Who would decide whether small and slightly armed states, like Holland, or a neutralized state, like Switzerland, were to be called upon to diminish their defensive forces when France or Austria disbanded an army corps? Who would tell the United States whether it might not increase its army until it approached in strength the establishments of European powers? In arriving at a proportionality would it not be necessary to take into consideration the vast natural resources of the British Empire and the United States as compared with the rather limited ones of a power like Italy?

The maximum of the military budgets could not be absolute, but would have to be relative to the whole budget; that is to say, the military expenses would be proportioned to the others, one-fifth or one-eighth of the global expenses. All the states, moreover, would not have the same *quantum*. Some peculiar geographical circumstances of Spain, Italy, Great Britain and

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, VI (1899), 100.

Germany would have to be considered. The neutrality of Switzerland and Belgium ought to lower their figures. Who would have the power to determine the quota? It would be too delicate and perilous a task for the Conference to tackle,<sup>8</sup> yet the failure to settle this particular point would reduce the whole attempt at disarmament to failure.

Besides, certain states have colonial possessions. Would they be entitled to two budgets, one for a European war and the other for an overseas conflict or a punitive expedition? To refuse them a supplementary budget would be to place them in a state of inferiority to the others, while to accord it would be to place them in a state of superiority, since they could, in case of need, cast the resources of the two budgets into the same fund. In addition, the practice of private individuals opening a subscription in order voluntarily to supplement the military budgets would also require some international supervision and limitation.<sup>9</sup>

Finally, there was the problem of the acceptance of the *status quo*. Some states had rival and irreconcilable pretensions upon certain territories: France looked forward to the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, the Slav States of the Balkans were determined to liberate their brothers under foreign domination, Italy dreamed of "Italia Irredenta," England and Russia were open rivals in the Far East, and the future status of Egypt was still undetermined. Professor Mérignhac at the University of Toulouse and Professor Vesnitch at Belgrade stated emphatically that France and Serbia could not think of reducing their armies before their justified aspirations were assured. Their "national honor" and their "national dignity" prevented their serious consideration of the Tsar's proposal; they demanded justice before peace.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>9</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>10</sup> *Revue générale de droit international public*, V (1898), 742. Opinion of M. Milenko R. Vesnitch, Professor in the University of Belgrade, member of the Institute of International Law.

The problem of the permanent acceptance of the *status quo* has been and always will be the greatest stumbling-block in the path to a limitation of armaments. It was in the background when the war-weary powers in 1816 failed to come to an understanding; it prevented Prussia from considering Lord Clarendon's proposal of 1870; after France lost Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, it assumed a much greater significance. No plan for disarmament based upon the acceptance of the *status quo* was possible in 1898. In 1916, during the war which altered so radically the political and territorial status of Europe, a paper was written in which this point concerning the acquiescence in the *status quo* was critically examined. It reads:

"Any general limitation of armaments implies that every State accepts for itself a definite standard of force not to be exceeded. This standard cannot be equal for all." On what principle is to be determined? None seems to be possible, except "the empirical method of accepting the present distribution of force as indicating the normal to be varied, if necessary, in such a manner as to preserve the same proportion between the different States." How can we expect all countries to accept a rule by which this existing proportion should be stereotyped and made permanent?

The existing proportionate distribution of force is the outcome of history, of past wars and territorial arrangements. It is the result of victories and defeats, of national achievements and of national disasters. At every given moment there are States who hope to retrieve past errors and misfortunes, and who strive to build upon stronger foundations the power of their nation. Such ambitions are natural and just. The nation that has them not is despised. To perpetuate indefinitely the conditions prevailing at a given time would mean not only that no States whose power has hitherto been weak relatively to others may hope to get stronger, but that a definite order or hierarchy must be recognized, in which each State is fated to occupy a fixed place. Is this a condition which can be expected to meet with general acceptance?<sup>11</sup>

General disarmament presupposes the solution or the regulation of all outstanding quarrels and burning questions among

<sup>11</sup> Sir James Headlam-Morley, *Studies in Diplomatic History*, p. 262.



states which render armaments indispensable. But the governments in accepting the Tsar's invitation laid down as the condition of the Conference the exclusion of all questions actually pending. They were justified in so doing; for the previous discussion of these complex, delicate and threatening problems, touching the life of many countries and exciting their national sentiments, would certainly have constituted a grave danger.<sup>12</sup> The mere raising of any of these contentious points would have frustrated the purpose for which the Conference was called. In the words of Professor Lawrence: "When there are so many lighted matches about, any attempt to sweep up all the loose gun-powder strewn over the face of the earth is far more likely to end in disaster than in the removal of inflammable material."<sup>13</sup> If, however, the settlement of all outstanding quarrels between states was a necessary preliminary to any agreement for arresting the growth of armaments and, if, at the same time, these smoldering questions were excluded from discussion, here was the great enigma, the sphinx of the Conference.

Although the obstacles in the path to total disarmament or even to a partial and proportionate diminution of armaments were insuperable, Professor Lawrence considered that an agreement not to proceed any further in the competition, which was constantly endangering the security of the states without altering their relative position, was not an impossibility. There would be no need to solve a host of knotty problems before a solution were reached, and when it was reached, some machinery for seeing that it was honestly kept could be devised. There would be difficulties: a dishonest government, especially one uncontrolled by parliament and the press, might be able to conceal forbidden preparations. But Professor Lawrence be-

<sup>12</sup> *Revue générale de droit international public*, V (1898), 733. Opinion of M. Pasquale Fiore, Professor of Law, in the University of Naples, member of the Institute of International Law.

<sup>13</sup> J. W. Lawrence, Professor of International Law in Downing College, Cambridge, "The Tsar's Rescript," *International Journal of Ethics*, IX (January, 1899), 149.

lieved that if public opinion proved strong enough to force statesmen to devise a working plan for preventing the further increase of armaments, it would probably be strong enough to stop any attempt to persevere in a proved breach of the agreement. The success or failure of the Tsar's scheme depended, he thought, upon the amount of enlightened sentiment that could be rallied in its support.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

## CHAPTER XIV

### THE ATTITUDE OF GOVERNMENTS TOWARDS THE TSAR'S RESCRIPT

WHILE the Tsar's Eirenicon was welcomed by some, it was denounced by others; while some applauded it, many more scoffed; while the pacifists were jubilant, the diplomatists remained sceptical; while the daily press, with few exceptions, guarded a rather hostile attitude, the jurisconsults indicated the difficulties in the way of a limitation of armaments.

Soon the powers accepted or made known their intention of accepting the invitation with what appeared on the surface to be general satisfaction. But official answers to official communications often give little insight into the real minds of their authors. The first official reply to the Tsar's message was sent by William II of Germany. Prince von Bülow states in his *Memoirs* that the Emperor was so surprised and excited by the imperial Rescript that, without consulting either him or Hohenlohe, he sent on his own initiative a telegram to Nicholas II. The Empress told Bülow that the Kaiser had not for a long time been so annoyed over anything as over the immature Tsar's sudden and stupid step.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, this is what he telegraphed to the Russian Emperor on August 29:

Prince Radolin has communicated to me, by Your commands, the Memoire about the proposal for an International Conference to bring about a general disarmament. This suggestion once more places in a vivid light the pure and lofty motives by which your counsels are ruled, and will earn You the applause of all peoples.

<sup>1</sup> Prince von Bülow, *Memoirs, 1897-1919*, I, 275, of the Boston 1931 edition translated from the German by F. A. Voigt, and I, 232-33, of the London 1932 edition translated from the German by Geoffrey Dunlop.

The question itself—theoretically as a principle seemingly simple—is in practice, I am afraid, eminently difficult, considering the great delicacy of the relations and dispositions of the different nations to each other, as well as with respect to the varied development of their respective histories. Could we for instance figure to ourselves a Monarch holding personal command of his Army, dissolving the regiments sacred with a hundred years of history and relegating their glorious colours to the walls of the armouries and museums (and handing over his towns to Anarchiste and Democracy). However, that is only *en passant*. The main point is the love of mankind which fills your warm heart and which prompts you to this proposal, the most interesting and surprising of this century! Honour will henceforth be lavished upon you by the whole world; even should the practical part fail through the difficulties of the detail. My Government shall give the matter its most serious attention.<sup>2</sup>

Von Bülow states that he worked with Prince Hohenlohe to ensure that the Russian Tsar would not be met with a rebuff, and especially so that there should not be aroused in the world the feeling that the continuance of the heavy burden of armaments and the undeniable tension of the international situation were due to the German people.<sup>3</sup> Nonetheless, he could not but be alive to the great difficulties which would have to be encountered. In his opinion the only basis of discussion was the maintenance of the *status quo*, but this would probably not suit other powers, especially France. In the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, he stated that the German Government could not possibly consent to the reopening of questions which had been definitely settled.<sup>4</sup>

Although German statesmen were willing to accept the Tsar's invitation, they saw little hope of the Conference accomplishing much. As far as their country was concerned, a limitation of

<sup>2</sup> *Die Grosse Politik*, XV, No. 4222, pp. 151-52. Kaiser William II to Tsar Nicholas II, Berlin, August 29, 1898.

<sup>3</sup> Prince von Bülow, *loc. cit.*

<sup>4</sup> G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, *British Documents on the Origin of the War, 1898-1914*. (Hereafter, *British Documents*.) Vol. I (London, 1927), No. 263, p. 217, Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Salisbury, Berlin, September 2, 1898.

either military or naval armaments was impossible. Germany, unlike Russia, had two frontiers to defend; if she limited her standing armies according to population or territory she would commit a great error and place herself at a disadvantage in relation to her neighbors. Besides, the number of effectives was fixed by an agreement between the government and the Reichstag.

As far as the German Navy was concerned the situation was little better. On April 10, 1898, after a struggle of ten years, William II, assisted by his new Admiral, von Tirpitz, had just succeeded in securing the approval of the Reichstag to a Navy Bill providing for a comprehensive program of naval construction extending over a period of six years. But Admiral von Tirpitz considered his first Bill insufficient to create a fleet in its final form. Supplementary demands would have to be brought forward after the conclusion of the six years' period. The passage of the Naval Act was followed by widespread agitation carried on by the Press Bureau and the newly formed Navy League. It was evident that neither the German Emperor nor von Tirpitz would consider the limitation of naval armaments.

Finally, German statesmen doubted the sincerity of the Tsar's proposal. Russia's financial predicament was believed to be the underlying motive for the Rescript. Von Bülow was of opinion that Count Witte, who was anxious to obtain a further loan and who had been given to understand that no more money would be forthcoming from the French market, thought that his best chance of obtaining funds from England and Germany was to proclaim a pacific policy.<sup>5</sup> The Kaiser wrote in one of his characteristic notes:

The whole plan seems to me to be due merely to the financial exhaustion of Russia. Army increases, strategical railways, the rapid expansion towards China, the Siberian railway, all of this has drained the land, taxes can hardly be increased, and culture is at the lowest ebb. Witte had no further sources, since France has given out and

<sup>5</sup> *Loc. cit.*

Germany and England are no longer willing. Whereby it is clearly proven that so far Europe has paid for the Russian armaments. All this must be counted in, along with the young Tsar's humanitarian nonsense which has led him to this incredible step. There's a bit of deviltry in it too, because any one who refuses the invitation will be said to want to break the peace and that at a moment when Russia cannot go further, while others—especially Germany—can now begin and make up for lost time.<sup>6</sup>

The German Emperor was inclined to consider more closely the intended expenditure of 90 million rubles on eight new first-class battleships and six first-class cruisers. The whole "lucubration" seemed to him to come from "Russia's grim necessity of escaping from her financial mess."<sup>7</sup>

The Kaiser thought that the proposal had originated, no doubt, with Nicholas II who, after reading Bloch's book, had been impressed with the necessity to do something to mitigate the horrors of war and to prevent the wholesale destruction of human life. Count Muraviev and Witte warmly adopted the proposal. William said:

The vanity of the former was tickled by the idea of presiding over a Conference, and thus having the opportunity of bringing himself into prominence and getting himself talked about, a consideration which influenced most of his actions, and the latter was in a serious want of money, and thought that the proclamation of a pacific policy would open for him the money markets of London and Berlin, which had now become a matter of vital necessity, since he had lost all hope of receiving further supplies from France.<sup>8</sup>

Furthermore, Russia had no inventors or manufacturers, and was obliged to purchase all her arms and powder abroad. This constituted a heavy drain on the resources of the country, and it was only natural that the Minister of Finance should wish

<sup>6</sup> *Die Grosse Politik*, XV, No. 4219, pp. 149-50. Footnote 4. Prince von Bülow to Kaiser William II, August 28, 1898.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 149. Footnote 4.

<sup>8</sup> *British Documents*, I, 222. Sir Lascelles to the Marquess of Salisbury, Berlin, December 22, 1898.

that the vast sums which went to enrich the foreigner should be spent at home.<sup>9</sup>

In spite of the peaceful character of the Rescript it did not lead the European Powers—not even Russia herself—to reduce or keep their armaments stationary. At the opening of the German Reichstag on December 6, the Kaiser announced the bare outlines of a new Army Bill providing for an increase of 26,576<sup>10</sup> men in the strength of the army on a peace footing. The preamble to the Bill states that the conditions which five years before had made an increase in the army necessary had not changed. Germany continued to be menaced in consequence of her geographical position. The war preparations of neighboring states had meanwhile been carried on systematically and with a great expenditure of money; disarmament had nowhere taken place, and in the existing circumstances it could hardly be anticipated. Reference was made to the Spanish-American War which furnished proof of the disastrous consequences of neglecting in time of peace a careful and systematic preparation for war. No nation, the preamble continues, can afford to neglect this preparation if it means to maintain its prestige and preserve its possessions intact. In the future as in the past a strong and well-organized army will be the cornerstone of the state and at the same time the surest pledge of peace. Special attention was directed to the military preparations of France and “European Russia.” These countries were, in spite of the Tsar’s manifesto, perfecting their armies. In addition to a far higher strength on a peace footing than others, they had increased their annual draft of recruits to 250,000 and 300,000 men respectively, while in Germany the number of recruits provided for in the estimates amounted only to approximately 227,000.<sup>11</sup>

When the debate on the Army Bill opened in the Reichstag

<sup>9</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>10</sup> Including the necessary complement of non-commissioned officers, or 23,277 men, excluding such officers.

<sup>11</sup> *The Times*, December 7, 1898, p. 5, cols. 4-5.

on January 12, Minister of War von Gossler explained the motives which had actuated the Government in framing the measure.

The Eirenicon of the Tsar had given them the certainty that Germany would not within a measurable distance of time be attacked from that quarter. . . . Yet history taught them that the will of the mightiest Monarchs was not able to alter the interests of a great nation or the condition of its existence. If a nation meant to maintain its independence, it must possess the strength requisite for protecting its interests at any moment. If he looked around him in the world he found that nowhere had there been a cessation of preparations for war. On the contrary, in view of the additions to the armies and navies of other nations the measure before them might well appear to be inadequate.<sup>12</sup>

Von Gossler pointed out that the wars of recent years had taught the great lesson that everything favored the side which had most carefully and longest prepared for war and had kept pace with the development of modern sciences in its armaments. He referred particularly to the Sino-Japanese and Spanish-American Wars and to the operations of the Anglo-Egyptian forces in the Sudan.<sup>13</sup>

The following day Herr Bebel, the leader of the Socialist party in the Reichstag, protested against the new Bill. He said that the peoples of Europe had an earnest desire for peace and that consequently its maintenance did not entirely depend upon the wisdom of the Government. He contended that it was mockery of the views expounded in the Tsar's manifesto to express to the Russian Government sympathy with the proposal and at the same time to introduce the Bill. But he was called to order amid the applause of the Right. Herr Bebel declared that Russia must avoid war because of her internal condition, while France was not in a position and did not believe herself to be in a position to go to war with Germany alone. This

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, January 13, 1899, p. 3, col. 5.

<sup>13</sup> *Loc. cit.*



measure was therefore not justified by the political situation.<sup>14</sup>

In the course of the Reichstag debate, Baron von Stumm, a Junker deputy, expressed his own theory as to the soundest attitude of Germany regarding the Tsar's Eirenicon. He did not think that the initiative of the Tsar would lead to any numerical reduction in the armed strength of Europe. But suppose that it were to do so, and that 10 per cent were to be struck off the armaments of all the powers, surely the best thing that Germany could do was to pass the Bill without delay. He triumphantly pointed out, "it is clear that the country will fare best which has made most progress in its military preparations."<sup>15</sup>

The proposal for increase of the German Army led Austrian militarists to demand additions to their armaments. In January, 1899, certain articles appeared in the Vienna military paper, the *Reichswehr*, pointing out how necessary it was that Austria should follow the example of Germany and increase instead of diminish her armed forces. This professional paper, which had great influence in the Dual Monarchy, stated:

The German Army Bill, the first reading of which thoroughly dissipated whatever expectations may have been based on the coming disarmament conference, must be regarded in Austria as a reminder that the relative proportions of the armed forces of the Powers are about to undergo a further change to the disadvantage of the Dual Monarchy, and that the backward condition of our army compared with that of Germany will be further emphasized. The new German Army Bill, which is sure to be adopted, can have no other effect on this country than to force the Monarchy, in spite of peace conferences and the claims of economy, to set about the formation of a sixteenth *corps d'armée* at Brünn, and the rearmament and the reorganisation of our field artillery. For, as General von Gossler declared, and as history teaches, when a people fails to maintain an army proportionate to the extent of its territory, it renounces the position which it has been destined to occupy.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, January 14, 1899, p. 7, col. 4.

<sup>15</sup> Henry H. Howorth, "Some Plain Words about the Tsar's New Gospel of Peace," *The Nineteenth Century*, XLV (February, 1899), 207.

<sup>16</sup> *Loc. cit.*

The attitude of France towards the Rescript was one of polite frigidity. The fact that she was not consulted in advance was interpreted as a proof of Russia's slight consideration of French interests. France had a matter to settle with Germany, and she had counted upon Russian help when the hour should come. It appeared now that Russia was asking her to give up the idea of ever recovering Alsace-Lorraine. The Tsar had practically invited the powers to combine to compel France to abandon the hope which she had cherished for nearly thirty years and for which she had not hesitated to spend tremendous sums.

Nevertheless, since other great powers were accepting the invitation, France must not incur the responsibility of wrecking the Conference. Consequently, the French Cabinet expressed its approval of the Russian Circular and agreed to participate in the discussions on condition that Alsace-Lorraine should not be mentioned. M. Delcassé, speaking in the Chamber of Deputies on January 23, 1899, announced that France would not remain deaf to the call addressed to her by the head of a great nation, a friend, an ally with whom, he added, never had the accord been more complete and the relations more confident. But the same statesman in a private conversation with Count Münster, the German Ambassador in Paris, is reported to have said:

In this conference we have entirely the same interest as you. You will not limit your forces at this moment nor agree to proposals of disarmament, we are in the same position. On both sides we wish to spare the Tsar and to find a formula to circumvent this question; but we will not let ourselves in for anything which might weaken our forces on either side. But to avoid a complete fiasco we may possibly be able to make a few concessions about arbitration. But these must not in any case limit the full independence of the great States.<sup>17</sup>

In England there was a stronger public opinion in favor of the proposed Conference than in any other country. This cur-

<sup>17</sup> *Die Grosse Politik*, XV, No. 4253, p. 186, Count Münster to Prince von Hohenlohe, Paris, April 21, 1899.

rent deterred statesmen and diplomatists from openly criticizing and opposing the Rescript, but it did not diminish their scepticism. At public meetings they offered tribute to the "noble Tsar" and then proceeded to make reserved and indefinite yet sympathetic speeches concerning the Conference. But behind the proposal British statesmen saw a Russian calculation. They were convinced that Russia desired a limitation of armament expenditure chiefly in order to concentrate her energies on a steady Asiatic expansion which in time might threaten the British position in India. Therefore, they had no intention of coming to an agreement that would seriously impair the efficiency of the British military and naval forces.

Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister, was just as conscious as the young Tsar of the evils of the over-grown armaments of Europe. As early as 1887, eleven years before the appearance of the Rescript, he had drawn attention to the enormous and increased armies of Europe and had ventured to state that, so long as the competition of armaments continued, it was idle to hope that perfect tranquillity could prevail in the world.<sup>18</sup> These vast and always growing armaments created well-founded solicitude in the great statesman to whom the peace of Europe was a matter of deepest concern, and to him their mere existence constituted an unceasing and steady danger.<sup>19</sup> With the tremendous forces that had been created, with the tremendous powers modern science had given to the weapons that could be brought into play, a European war had become a terrible hazard which must end in the national annihilation of those defeated.<sup>20</sup> But this state of things, in his opinion, had its compensation; the power of destruction which lay at the mercy of one word from a statesman or a monarch thereby imposed a responsibility so tremendous that he was not sure

<sup>18</sup> Lady Gwendolen Cecil, *The Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury*, IV, 80, Guildhall Speech of November 9, 1887.

<sup>19</sup> *The Herald of Peace*, June 1, 1888, p. 72. Speech on the "Continental Outlook" at Derby in December, 1887.

<sup>20</sup> *The Times*, November 10, 1888, p. 10, col. 4. Guildhall Speech of November 9, 1888.

that the securities of peace were not more sensibly increased than they would be in former times when the weapons of war were weak and war could be easily and cheaply undertaken.<sup>21</sup>

Although Lord Salisbury looked upon the ever increasing armaments as a source of danger and a cause of disquietude, he saw no practical means of lessening the burden. Perhaps the time would come when the nations, thinking they had prepared enough, would begin to decrease their accumulation of arms and men, but until then, in the midst of so much preparation, Great Britain must not remain unprepared.<sup>22</sup>

Less than a year before Tsar Nicholas astonished the world with his Eirenicon, Lord Salisbury declared that the competition in armaments, unless curtailed, would end in a terrible effort of mutual destruction, fatal to Christian civilization. His one hope for the world was that the powers might gradually be "welded together into some international constitution" which would result in a long period of peace.<sup>23</sup> Perhaps this notable utterance of the experienced and practical British Prime Minister encouraged the young idealistic Tsar of Russia to proclaim his peace message. Nicholas II may have thought that it would have the hearty support of the greatest living European statesman; if so, he was doomed to disappointment.

In accepting the invitation to the Conference Lord Salisbury wrote that

the statements which constitute the grounds of the Emperor's proposal were but too well justified. It is unfortunately true that while the desire for the maintenance of peace is generally professed, and while, in fact, serious and successful efforts have on more than one recent occasion been made with that object by the Great Powers, there has been a constant tendency on the part of almost every nation to increase its armed force, and to add to an already vast expenditure on the appliances of war. . . . But the burdens imposed by this

<sup>21</sup> Cecil, *op. cit.*, IV, 80; also *British Documents*, I, No. 269, p. 221. The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. Scott, London, October 27, 1898.

<sup>22</sup> *The Times*, November 10, 1888, p. 10, col. 4.

<sup>23</sup> *Review of Reviews*, XIX, 7. Guildhall Speech of November 9, 1897.

process on the populations affected must, if prolonged, produce a feeling of unrest and discontent menacing both to internal and external tranquillity.<sup>24</sup>

Lord Salisbury gave the assurance that Her Majesty's Government would gladly co-operate in the proposed effort to provide a remedy for the evil, and if in any degree it succeeded they would feel that the Sovereign to whose suggestion it was due had fully earned the gratitude of the world at large. He hoped that the invitation might be accompanied by some indication of the special points to which the attention of the Conference was to be directed.<sup>25</sup>

On the question of a limitation of armaments the English statesman was far from sure that a reduction was desirable even if the powers were to agree to a scheme. Although its immediately effect might be to decrease the burdens of taxation, it would, at the same time, rob war of some of its terrors, and thus add a new peril to those threatening the general peace. He was of opinion that no peace is possible in Europe without an armed force behind it. This force must be either concentrated or distributed. In 1816 it was concentrated, in 1898 distributed. In its latter form it was larger and more expensive, the reason being that the dangers to be provided against were more serious and numerous, and the powers attached a greater value to their individual sovereignty. He believed that the perfection of the instruments of warfare, their extreme costliness, and the horrible carnage and destruction which would accompany their employment on a large scale acted as a serious deterrent from war;<sup>26</sup> armaments were so adjusted as to render a successful war not worth striving for. The moment, however, they were reduced, the prizes of war would outweigh its risks, and peace would be at an end.

<sup>24</sup> *British Documents*, I, No. 269, p. 221. The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. Scott, London, October 24, 1898.

<sup>25</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>26</sup> *British Documents*, I, No. 269. The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. Scott, October 25, 1898.

The conclusions which the Marquis of Salisbury might have drawn from a survey of the practical efforts that had been made to secure peace and disarmament in Europe were:

1. That disarmament is impossible without the security of a durable peace.
2. That a durable peace cannot be obtained without an equitable adjustment of all serious international grievances and the provision of a suitable machinery for the settlement of all future differences.
3. That such an adjustment is impracticable and such a machinery would be ineffective unless a force were available to impose their decrees on possible dissentients.
4. That the supply of such a force is, in the present condition of Europe, impossible.<sup>27</sup>

On the whole, the peace proposals advocated in the name of the Tsar, admirable as they might be in intention, did not inspire practical men, like Lord Salisbury, with much confidence or even hope. This was not so much due to their own inadequacy as to the insuperable difficulties of the problems they attempted to solve. Militarism had never before had so strong a hold on the world. Its influence was everywhere, and everywhere it was baleful. On the other hand, the desire for peace was stronger than ever before, and from this it had been assumed that the time was ripe for disarmament. But Lord Salisbury realized that the moral sense of the world, whatever its strength, was not strong enough to exercise a decisive influence on the preservation of peace, that it had completely failed to overcome or even to diminish the political impediments which had hitherto stood in the way of a permanent pacification, and that the peace Europe was enjoying in 1899 was due less to moral rectitude than to material fears.

The United States Government accepted the invitation con-

<sup>27</sup> "Diplomaticus," "The Vanishing of Universal Peace," *The Fortnightly Review*, LXV (1899), 877. "Diplomaticus" was Mr. Austin, the poet, a whole-hearted supporter of Lord Salisbury's policy both at home and abroad, and a frequent visitor at Hatfield. He forwarded the Prime Minister's policy by calling attention to aspects of it upon which Lord Salisbury could not himself dwell publicly.—Cecil, IV, 56.

tained in Count Muraviev's Circular at once, and the American Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed to do so in the most cordial terms. But this did not mean that American statesmen took the Rescript seriously. The President was of the opinion that the state of war with Spain rendered it impractical at that moment to further reduce our armaments, which were far below the measure which the principal European powers would be willing to adopt in time of peace.<sup>28</sup>

President McKinley, in his Second Annual Message of December 5, 1898, referred sympathetically to the Tsar's proposal in these words:

. . . The active military force of the United States, as measured by our population, territorial area, and taxable wealth, is, and under any conceivable prospective conditions must continue to be, in time of peace so conspicuously less than that of the armed powers to whom the Czar's appeal is especially addressed that the question can have for us no practical importance save as marking an auspicious step toward the betterment of the conditions of the modern peoples and the cultivation of peace and good will among them; but in this view it behooves us as a nation to lend countenance and aid to the beneficent project.<sup>29</sup>

The United States, in virtue of the Monroe Doctrine, looked upon the limitation of armaments as a foreign problem.<sup>30</sup> At

<sup>28</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1898, No. 139, p. 545. Mr. Day to Mr. Hitchcock, September 14, 1898.

<sup>29</sup> *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents*. Prepared under the Direction of the Joint Committee on Printing of the House and Senate (hereafter, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*). XIII (New York), 6335-36.

*The Advocate of Peace*, LVI (January, 1899), 8, made this reflection upon the President's statement: "President McKinley did not grasp the full import of what he was writing, or if he did he purposely meant to blind the country. England is spending this year on her army in round numbers \$100,000,000, France \$130,000,000, Germany, \$120,000,000, Russia \$190,000,000. The regular army of 100,000 which is now asked for by the President is to cost \$167,000,000 the coming year or about four times as much per soldier as the armies of Europe. Add to this \$50,000,000 for the navy and \$150,000,000 which we are paying for war pensions, and we shall have the colossal sum of \$367,000,000 to be paid in a single year for war purposes."

<sup>30</sup> F. W. Holls, "The Results of the Peace Conference in Their Relation to the Monroe Doctrine," *The American Monthly Review of Reviews*, XX (November, 1899), 562.

the time the Government was occupied in the development of the fleet and the reorganization of the army. Consequently, it could not favor a diminution of military forces or any agreement that would restrain the "inventive genius" of the American people. R. M. Johnson asserted that the United States Government went into the Conference: "Firstly, out of courtesy to the Russian Government, secondly, being desirous of improving certain features of belligerency, and, perhaps, hoping to advance a step in the matter of neutral goods at sea; thirdly, attaching no importance to the disarmament proposal and but little to the arbitration question."<sup>31</sup>

The Tsar's Eirenicon pleased Italy no more than other countries. Italy needed money but not men; she was only interested in the reduction of budgets, not of effectives. As the former Minister Crispi wrote in May, 1899, Italy wished to keep her sword unsheathed "in order to have the right to re-enter in the possession of those territories which are still under foreign rule."<sup>32</sup> Sir H. Rumbold, the British Ambassador at Vienna, reported to the Marquis of Salisbury that Count Nigra, the Italian Ambassador, as well as Count Eulenburg, his German colleague, considered that a reasonable basis for a conference was afforded by the Russian proposal as resumed in these four points:

1. That the question of immediate disarmament should remain untouched.
2. That a simple exchange of ideas should take place, in no way binding the Powers.
3. That all political questions, past, present, or future, should be excepted from discussion.
4. That the object of the Conference should be an exchange of views on economic and military questions.<sup>33</sup>

With so carefully guarded a program as the above, the Ambassadors thought there could scarcely be any objection to the

<sup>31</sup> R. M. Johnson, "In the Clutch of the Harpy Powers," *The North American Review*, CLXIX (October, 1899), 449.

<sup>32</sup> *Revue générale de droit international public*, VI (1899), 665.

<sup>33</sup> *British Documents*, I, No. 267, p. 219. Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess of Salisbury, September 14, 1898.



Conference. Count Nigra, who regarded a reduction of armaments as quite out of the question, did not conceal his belief that there was but little probability of the deliberations leading to any practical results.

The idea of disarmament or even a limitation of armaments did not appeal to Balkan statesmen, who demanded justice before peace. Such schemes were bound to be repugnant to those states with still a program of liberation to realize. The opinions of the Serbian Government were crystallized in M. Gjajas' very frank words to Mr. Macdonald, the British Minister at Belgrade. "The idea of a disarmament," he said, "does not please our people in any way. The Serbian race is split up under seven or eight different foreign Governments, and we cannot be satisfied so long as this state of things lasts. We live in hope of getting something for ourselves out of the general conflagration, whenever it takes place."<sup>34</sup>

The Turkish Government expressed the view to a German statesman that Prince Nicholas was arming and provoking unrest in Bulgaria and Montenegro, and that disarmament was not practical for Turkey.<sup>35</sup>

Speaking from the other side of the world, Count Okuma of Japan stated his belief that the Rescript emanated from the Tsar's good heart and was the result of the peaceful policy of Alexander III. He spoke of the strain placed on the resources of Japan by her heavy army and navy expenditure which had led to the downfall of the previous Cabinet and might cause the fall of that of which he was himself a member. There was reason therefore to welcome the proposal.

If Japan joined in working in the cause of peace, the aspirations of the Emperor of Russia would probably be realised, and the solution of the Chinese question rendered easy.

But if the scheme miscarried, no harm would have been done. It would simply mean war. In that case what had Japan to fear? But personally he was for peace, and so was the Emperor of Japan. If,

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 268, p. 220. Mr. Macdonald to the Marquess of Salisbury, September 15, 1898.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, Note to No. 268. Report of Marschall, September 1, 1898.

therefore, east and west worked in unison, he did not see why the desired result should not be obtained.<sup>36</sup>

Very similar to the scepticism of the leading statesmen in Germany, Great Britain, France, America, the Balkans and Japan was the attitude of the Tsar's own ministers. Count Witte, though conscious of the evils of huge armaments, wrote this about the Tsar and the Conference:

I congratulated him upon having taken the initiative in the great and noble task of bringing about universal peace, but I pointed out that the Conference was not likely to have any practical results. The sacred truths of the Christian faith were enounced by the Son of God some two thousand years ago, and yet most of the people are still indifferent to these precepts. Likewise many centuries will pass before the idea of peaceful settlement of international conflict will be carried into practice. Five years later we ourselves showed that our talk about disarmament and peace was but empty verbiage.<sup>37</sup>

When Muraviev wrote to his cousin, Izvolski, then Minister in Munich, to ask him how the grandiose idea was received by the Bavarians, the frank answer he received was that the summons had been "warmly acclaimed only by hysterical women, Jews, and Socialists."<sup>38</sup> Herbert H. D. Pierce, the American Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim*, in St. Petersburg, reported that little value was expected to result from the Conference, that every diplomatic officer with whom he had talked seemed to regard the proposition with that technical scepticism which great measures of reform usually encounter. The consensus among the members of the Russian Diplomatic Corps appeared to be that the whole proposal was "visionary and utopian, if not partaking of Quixotism."<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> *British Documents*, I, No. 270, p. 222. Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Salisbury, Tokyo, November 1, 1898.

<sup>37</sup> Count Witte, *Memoirs*, p. 97.

<sup>38</sup> E. J. Dillon, *The Eclipse of Russia*, p. 254.

<sup>39</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1898, No. 179, p. 547. Mr. Pierce to Mr. Day, St. Petersburg, November 9, 1898.

*Part III*

THE MOVEMENT FOR DISARMAMENT  
1899-1907



## CHAPTER XV

### THE FIRST HAGUE CONFERENCE

IT WILL be recalled that the Peace Societies, the British and Foreign Arbitration Association, the journalist, William T. Stead, and a few resolute members of the Russian Government used their influence in favor of the proposed Conference rather than a conference of ambassadors. One of the objectives of Stead's journey had been to ascertain the direction the Tsar and his ministers intended to give to the Conference. The British, in particular, emphasized the importance of a definite program. In referring to the Emperor's Rescript, Lord Rosebery said that regarding its main issue, disarmament, it was necessary to dwell entirely on generalities because in such a proposal everything depended upon the plan and the practical means suggested to the Conference when it should meet, "for without a practical plan he feared the proposal might not lead to any tangible results." Lord Salisbury concluded his dispatch in answer to the Rescript by requesting some indication of the special points to which the attention of the Conference was to be directed.

Count Muraviev on January 11, 1899 (December 30, 1898, Old Style) replied, suggesting that it would be possible to proceed forthwith to a preliminary exchange of ideas between the powers with the object:

(a) Of seeking without delay means for putting a limit to the progressive increase of military and naval armaments, a question the solution of which becomes evidently more and more urgent in view of the fresh extension given to these armaments; and

(b) Of preparing the way for a discussion of the questions relating to the possibility of preventing armed conflicts by the pacific means at the disposal of international diplomacy.

"In the event of the Powers considering the present moment favourable for the meeting of a Conference on these bases," the Circular read, "it would certainly be useful for the Cabinets to come to an understanding on the subjects of the programme of their labours."

The subjects to be submitted for international discussion at the Conference could, in general terms, be summarized as follows:

1. An understanding not to increase for a fixed period the present effective of the armed military and naval forces and at the same time not to increase the Budgets pertaining thereto; and a preliminary examination of the means by which a reduction might even be effected in future in the forces and Budgets above mentioned.

2. To prohibit the use in the armies and fleets of any new kinds of firearms whatever and of new explosives, or any powder more powerful than those now in use either for rifles or cannon.

3. To restrict the use in military warfare of the formidable explosives already existing, and to prohibit the throwing of projectiles or explosives of any kind from balloons or by any similar means.

4. To prohibit the use in naval warfare of submarine torpedo-boats or plungers, or other similar engines of destruction, to give an understanding not to construct vessels with rams in the future.

5. To apply to naval warfare the stipulations of the Geneva Convention of 1864 on the basis of the Additional Articles of 1868.

6. To neutralize ships and boats employed saving those overboard during or after an engagement.

7. To revise the Declaration concerning the laws and customs of war elaborated in 1874 by the Conference of Brussels which has remained unratified to the present time.

8. To accept in principle the employment of the good offices, of mediation and facultative arbitration in cases lending themselves thereto, with the object of preventing armed conflicts between nations; and to come to an understanding with respect to the mode of applying these good offices, and to establish a uniform practice in using them.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Parliamentary Papers, CX, Miscellaneous*, 1898, pp. 2-4 (101/102), French official text and translation; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1899, inclosure in No. 230, pp. 551-53, Mr. Hitchcock to Mr. Hay.

Universal peace was no longer spoken of; the program was a new scheme, aiming rather at the regulation of armaments and war than at their abolition. But in this revised form the Russian proposal was hardly more acceptable. Lord Salisbury, in a confidential conversation with Count von Hatzfeldt, the German Ambassador in London, is reported to have "expressed himself very sceptically" with reference to Count Muraviev's program. He described the whole scheme as "*pas sérieux*." It would be impossible, he thought, even if agreement could be reached on military and naval reductions, to secure the honorable fulfillment by the individual powers of the arrangements arrived at. Salisbury was willing that his government should take part in the Conference; they would readily recognize the peaceable intentions of the Tsar but in the discussions would commit themselves to nothing which might limit the further development and the fighting efficiency of the British fleet or compel England to submit important English interests to the decision of third parties.<sup>2</sup>

It appeared to Lord Salisbury that the importance attached to the Russian proposal concerning the good offices of mediation and facultative arbitration had been much exaggerated. The acceptance in principal of mediation and facultative arbitration in cases lending themselves thereto would add nothing to the public law and established practice of nations. The principle of mediation in international quarrels had already been accepted by the great powers in the protocol of the April 14, 1856, attached to the Treaty of Paris. Not only was "facultative arbitration in cases lending themselves thereto" firmly established in the foreign relations of all civilized states, but some progress had been made with compulsory arbitration in cases of international dispute. Since 1890 Great Britain had signed ten arbitration treaties for the settlement of various disputes with Germany, France, the United States, Colombia, the Nether-

<sup>2</sup> *Die Grosse Politik*, XV, No. 4237, p. 170, Count von Hatzfeldt to Prince von Hohenlohe, London, January 26, 1899.

lands, Nicaragua, Portugal, Venezuela, Russia and Belgium. She had also signed with the United States a Treaty of General Arbitration which had, however, failed to secure ratification by the Senate. General arbitration treaties already existed between Hungary and Portugal, the Congo and Switzerland, Italy and Argentina, and in the Pan-American Treaty of 1890, which established permanent arbitration between seventeen Republics. The permanent treaty between Italy and Argentina, signed in July, 1898, marked an advanced epoch in arbitration by making all disputes, including questions of "national honour," arbitral. It scarcely seemed necessary for the Conference to devote any portion of its valuable time to persuading the nations merely to accept the principle of "mediation and facultative arbitration."<sup>3</sup>

As for "the mode of applying" arbitration and the "establishment of a uniform practice" in using its good offices, this seemed to the British Prime Minister to be rather an insignificant question of procedure. The Conference would be much better occupied in drawing up a permanent arbitration treaty based on a consolidation of cases already decided and on the principles embodied in the treaties submitting such cases to arbitration. Certain classes of disputes had already been admitted to be arbitrable by nearly all the great powers. In his opinion there were two such categories. In a memorandum on arbitration dated March 20, 1890, he writes:

If the question to be decided is a disputed issue of fact, reference to arbitration is not very difficult to arrange, and it is often the most expedient mode of terminating a discussion. It is easy to state the question of fact on which the difference of opinion has arisen and not difficult to find an arbitrator of sufficient capacity and impartiality to give a decision in which both parties may with confidence acquiesce. Again, if there is an admitted code, rule or system of law, the terms of which are well ascertained and the validity of which is fully accepted by both parties, great advantage may result from seeking an

<sup>3</sup> "Diplomaticus," *op. cit.*, 878-79.



arbitrator to ascertain the bearing of such a law upon the facts of the disputed case.<sup>4</sup>

Lord Salisbury could see no reason why this admission should not be embodied in a permanent treaty and signed by all the powers who had already adopted it "facultatively." Were this done, a tribunal to try such cases might be immediately established, and the scope of the treaty could be enlarged as further bilateral treaties extended the principle of arbitration. In this progressive way something could be effected towards securing a large and established authority for arbitration in international politics. But even then the vital question of its decrees would remain unsolved.<sup>5</sup>

Lord Salisbury was aware that arbitration has its limitations, that it cannot be used for the settlement of all controversies.<sup>6</sup> In cases where facts are not the main object in dispute and where there is no applicable law which both parties would be willing to accept, he thought it impossible to find any acceptable principle or doctrine of international jurisprudence that would guide an arbitrator in deciding the issue. "He would have no rule by which his decision could be framed except that of general political expediency as it might present itself to his mind. It is evident that for such a task as this an arbitrator of sufficient impartiality would be exceedingly difficult to find."<sup>7</sup>

The Marquis of Salisbury was just as sceptical in regard to the remaining clauses of the second Muraviev Circular, contemplating an arrest of armaments in men, weapons and cost, and a reconsideration of the non-ratified supplementary Convention of Geneva of 1868 and of the rules of war, also unrati-fied, known as the Declaration of Brussels. He did not see how such an arrest could be effected. Where was the line to be drawn? There was no uniformity in the strength and equip-

<sup>4</sup> Lady Gwendolen Cecil, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

<sup>5</sup> "Diplomaticus," *op. cit.*, p. 879.

<sup>6</sup> *Supra*, Chapter III, pp. 79-84.

<sup>7</sup> Cecil, *op. cit.*, 267-68.

ment of the European armies and navies, and he was certain that the powers which had the advantage would not abandon it any more than the powers which had temporarily fallen into arrears would abide by their inferiority. An arrest of budgets was even more complicated and would meet with objections from Great Britain because, if Germany were to come to terms with France while the convention for the arrest of armament budgets were in force, the result would be to enable France to allocate a large portion of her military budget to her Navy and Russia to reduce her naval budget and increase her military expenditure on the Indian frontier while British hands would be completely tied.<sup>8</sup>

Nor did the English statesman think it likely that the attempt to revive the supplementary Convention of Geneva and the Declaration of Brussels would meet with more success. Both had been strongly opposed at the time for reasons which had lost none of their force. The Declaration had tended to give an advantage to the greater military states and to deprive an invaded country of the full use of its means of resistance. The smaller states had opposed it, and Great Britain was particularly emphatic in her criticism. The objections raised by Great Britain against the supplementary Convention of Geneva were still as cogent as they had been thirty years before.<sup>9</sup>

Even the Russian officials did not regard the points enumerated as propositions to which they were definitely committed, "as they might possibly find themselves unable to support some of them in Conference." M. de Staal, the Russian Ambassador, who was to serve as President of the august meeting, hoped that it would be possible to get round the armament question and to suggest a few alterations in international law and the Statutes of the Red Cross.<sup>10</sup> He told Von Bülow that he "knew well that most of the expectations which were bound

<sup>8</sup> "Diplomaticus," *op. cit.*, p. 880.

<sup>9</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>10</sup> *Die Grosse Politik*, XV, No. 4250, p. 182. Count Münster to the Foreign Office, April 4, 1899.

up with the Conference could not be realized." But as the dean of Russian diplomacy (he was seventy-six years old) he had to see that the Conference did not result in "a fiasco for his sovereign and his sovereign's country and house. 'Il s'agit pour la Russie d'une question de prestige et d'honneur.'" <sup>11</sup>

We therefore need not be surprised to find the British Prime Minister at the opening of Parliament in 1899 casting this rather gloomy reflection on the projected peace conference:

. . . No one can doubt the purity and grandeur of the motives which must have animated the Emperor in giving this invitation, and every one must heartily wish that the anticipation will be realised; but further than that I do not think it safe to go. The constant increase in armaments which is taking place on all sides, at the very time when we are speaking of and prophesying peace, is not encouraging to the ideal dreams in which, perhaps, the Tsar has indulged, and they warn us to prepare for a possible issue less gratifying than that on which he has most naturally and laudably allowed his mind to dwell. There are many difficulties to be surmounted before any such general benefits can be achieved as that which he has sketched out. I shall myself be satisfied if the results of this conference and of these negotiations are capable of fulfilling a somewhat humbler aim. If, by extending the use of the principle of arbitration, we are able to diminish the number of causes by which war can be induced, and if, by humane and beneficent legislation, we can diminish the horrors of that war, when it is waged, we shall, I think, have done for our generation a service of which the whole value cannot be appreciated at once, but to which the future inhabitants of the earth will look back with gratitude. And if, as I hope, in that more distant time it is developed to a greater and more perfect end, they will have cause to bless the name of the sovereign whose imagination and whose power and courage have resulted in such a measure.<sup>12</sup>

From this speech it appears that Lord Salisbury had little hope that the Conference would be able to restrict the increase in armaments. The fact is that, though the British were anxious to see the use of the principle of arbitration extended, they

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 4257, pp. 193-94. Memorandum of the Foreign Secretary, Bernhard von Bülow.

<sup>12</sup> *Review of Reviews*, XIX (1899), 209.

had no intention of limiting their means of defense and offense; for, on May 16, 1899, before the Conference met on May 18, the Admiralty wrote a letter to the Foreign Office containing the following:

As regards the proposals to limit the Naval forces their Lordships are of opinion that it will be found to be quite impracticable to come to any agreement as to the meaning of the term "effectifs actuels," or to ensure that the terms of any agreement arrived at would be carried out. . . .

With reference to the proposal to restrict improvements in weapons . . . any such restrictions would favor the interests of savage nations, and be against those of the highly civilized. It would be a retrograde step. . . .

It is further observed that the proposal to limit the use of new explosives is believed to be impracticable unless the several Powers are prepared to make known to the Conference the nature and composition of those which they now use and which are at present secret. Their Lordships believe that none of the Great Powers would be prepared to do this.

As to the various proposals to regulate the conduct of war . . . their Lordships are averse to binding this country in this manner, as such an arrangement would be almost certain to lead to mutual recriminations.<sup>13</sup>

A copy of this communication was sent to Sir Julian Pauncefote, the British delegate at The Hague on the opening day of the Conference. A similar despatch came from the War Office, summarizing the views of that body on the subject of the Russian Circular:

Article 1.—It is not desirable that any undertaking should be given restricting the numbers and the cost of Her Majesty's military forces.

Articles 2 and 3.—It is not desirable to agree to any restrictions upon the employment of further developments in destructive agencies, whether in small arms, cannon, or explosives, or the methods of employing them.

<sup>13</sup> *British Documents*, I, No. 274, pp. 224-25. Admiralty to the Foreign Office, May 16, 1899.

Article 7.—It is not desirable to assent to an international code on the laws and customs of war; but an undertaking may be given that Her Majesty's Government will consider the question of issuing instructions on these subjects for the general guidance of British forces.<sup>14</sup>

The instructions issued by the Marquis of Salisbury to Sir Julian Pauncefote did not, however, contain any stipulations as to the attitude the British delegates were to take towards the question of the limitation of armaments. The Marquis merely stated that Her Majesty's Government "agreed to the general definition of the objects of the Conference given in Count Mouravieff's note, namely, the diminution of armaments by land and sea, and the prevention of armed conflicts by pacific diplomatic procedure." He went on to say that with regard to the eight points enumerated as proper subjects for discussion by the Conference, the British Government "thought it best to abstain from expressing any definite opinion beyond repeating their earnest desire to promote, by all possible means, the principle of recourse to mediation and arbitration for the prevention of war which formed the eighth and last point of Count Mouravieff's programme."<sup>15</sup> But, as stated above, Sir J. Pauncefote was informed of the opinions of the Admiralty and the War Office.

Across the Atlantic, in a country whose armaments, compared with those of European countries, had been only meager, explicit instructions were given to representatives which made very plain that the United States would not favor a diminution of military forces or any agreement that would restrain the "inventive genius" of her people. Secretary Hay, in his memorandum to the American delegates, was determined to leave the path open for any increase in armaments that his country might desire to make in future. Thus he wrote:

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 276, p. 226. War Office to Foreign Office, May 17, 1899.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 275, p. 225. The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir J. Pauncefote, Foreign Office, May 16, 1899.

. . . The First article, relating to the non-augmentation and future reduction of effective land and sea forces, is, at present, so inapplicable to the United States that is deemed advisable for the delegates to leave the initiative upon this subject to the representatives of those Powers to whom it may properly belong. In comparison with the effective forces, both military and naval, of other nations, those of the United States are at present so far below the normal quota that the question of limitation could not be profitably discussed.

The second, third, and fourth articles, relating to the non-employment of firearms, explosives, and other destructive agents, the restricted use of existing instruments of destruction and the prohibition of certain contrivances employed in naval warfare, seem lacking in practicability, and the discussion of these propositions would probably prove provocative of divergence rather than of unanimity of view. But it is doubtful if wars are to be diminished by rendering them less destructive, for it is the plain lesson of history that the periods of peace have been longer protracted as the cost and destructiveness of war have increased. The expediency of restraining the inventive genius of our people in the direction of devising means of defence is by no means clear, and considering the temptations to which men and nations may be exposed in a time of conflict, it is doubtful if an international agreement to this end would prove effective. The dissent of a single powerful nation might render it altogether nugatory. The delegates are, therefore, enjoined not to give the weight of their influence to the promotion of projects the realization of which is so uncertain.

The fifth, sixth, and seventh articles, aiming in the interest of humanity to succour those who by the chance of battle have been rendered helpless, thus losing the character of effective combatants or to alleviate their sufferings, or to ensure the safety of those whose mission is purely one of peace and beneficence, may well awake the cordial interest of the delegates, and practical propositions based upon them should receive their earnest support.

The eighth article, which proposes the wider extension of good offices, mediation and arbitration, seems likely to open the most fruitful field for discussion and further action. . . .<sup>16</sup>

<sup>16</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1899, pp. 511-12, Mr. Hay to Hon. Andrew D. White, Hon. Seth Low, Hon. Stanford Nevel, Captain Alfred T. Mahan, U. S. Navy, Captain William Crozier, U. S. Navy, Delegates on the part of the United States; April 18, 1899; also James Brown Scott, *The Hague Peace Conferences, American Instructions and Reports*, pp. 6-9.

From these instructions we can see that the Department of State of the United States was sceptical over the first four articles of the Muraviev Circular but was in sympathy with the proposal to extend the use of mediation and arbitration.

The German delegates likewise were instructed "to be careful not to decide upon anything that would fetter the freedom of movement of German policy" but were to aim at "obtaining some harmless agreement which would prevent the Tsar's efforts being a complete failure." "They were to keep on close terms with the Russian representatives, and support their measures as far as possible, but when necessary, to add reservations and emendations of the text so as to rob it of any unfavorable tendencies. Otherwise they were to keep in the background and leave others to oppose impossible demands, so that Germany could not be reproached for having hindered by her conduct a great humanitarian work."<sup>17</sup>

The attitude of France, Russia's ally, towards the points in the Muraviev Circular did not differ greatly from that of other countries. She was not enthusiastic, for, as a power dissatisfied with the *status quo*, she would not accept a limitation of armaments based upon the relative strength of existing armies. Even the moderate *Temps* declared that France could not endorse the Tsar's aims "until her existence had been safeguarded and the reparation of the past and the redressment of the future had been assured."<sup>18</sup>

In order to avoid the charge of being responsible for the failure of the Conference, France agreed to participate, but she did so on the understanding that Alsace-Lorraine should not be mentioned.<sup>19</sup> Though she was represented by M. Léon Bourgeois, one of the founders of the Inter-Parliamentary

<sup>17</sup> Erich Brandenburg, *Von Bismarck zum Weltkrieg* (Berlin, 1925), pp. 115-116.

<sup>18</sup> *Le Temps*, August 30, 1898.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, August 31 and September 3, 1898; also M. E. Carroll, *French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 1870-1914*, p. 184.

Union and Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, a champion of peace, we know from M. Delcassé's conversation with Count Münster<sup>20</sup> that his country would not agree to proposals of disarmament but might make a concession about arbitration.<sup>21</sup>

Count Nigra, representing Italy, regarded the reduction of armaments as quite out of the question; and the very utmost that he hoped might be obtained would be the possible diminution of the horrors of warfare through an agreement to prohibit some of the more destructive engines of war.<sup>22</sup> At The Hague the Italian Naval Delegate informed Lieutenant-Colonel Charles A. Court, British Military Attaché, that his instructions were to agree to nothing in the shape or guise of a limitation of armaments. The Austrian delegate was instructed to assume a similar attitude, while Japan would only consider limiting her navy when it reached the standard of the Great Naval Powers.<sup>23</sup> Thus it is evident that no country intended to consider seriously the "grave problem" of armaments.

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The Conference assembled at The Hague on May 18, 1899, and closed on July 29. Twenty-six of the fifty-nine sovereign governments of the world were represented by one hundred members.<sup>24</sup> Each power was permitted to send as many delegates as it wished, but was entitled to only one vote. Twenty of the states were European; four were Asiatic—China, Japan, Persia and Siam; and two were American, the United States

<sup>20</sup> German Ambassador in Paris, Delegate to the First Hague Conference.

<sup>21</sup> *Die Grosse Politik*, XV, No. 4253, p. 186, Count Münster to Prince von Hohenlohe, April 21, 1899.

<sup>22</sup> *British Documents*, I, No. 272, p. 223. Mr. Milbanke to the Marquess of Salisbury, Vienna, April 27, 1899.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, I, No. 282, p. 230. Note on the Limitation of Armaments sent by Sir J. Pauncefoot to the Marquess of Salisbury, July 31, 1899.

<sup>24</sup> For a list of the delegates with their official positions and committee assignments arranged alphabetically according to the names of the countries in the French language, see F. W. Holls, *The Peace Conference at The Hague and Its Bearings on International Law and Policy*, Macmillan (New York, 1900), pp. 32-51.



and Mexico. Armed to the teeth with the most destructive appliances that modern science up to the time had invented, the nations sent their representatives to The House in The Wood, which the Queen of Holland had placed at their disposal. The large Orange Hall, with its magnificent paintings by Rubens, seemed specially made for the purpose. "Ultimus ante omnes de parta pace triumphus" is the motto inscribed on the scroll in the Hall. Beneath the scroll the Angel of Peace confers her benediction upon the warrior Prince whose victories secured the Peace of Münster. Pallas Athene and Hercules personifying WISDOM and STRENGTH respectively are also depicted. Truly, STRENGTH was present on May 18, 1899, for all the cannon of the world, with a few negligible exceptions, could only speak by leave of the governments represented in The House in The Wood. But was the daughter of Zeus, WISDOM, equally in evidence?

The Conference was presided over by M. de Staal, the Russian Ambassador at the Court of St. James, and for many years a *persona gratissima* with English statesmen of both parties. He had as his assistant Professor de Martens of St. Petersburg, a learned man, a student of history and jurisprudence, and the author of several important books bearing on the evolution of international law. For several years he had been universally recognized as a "kind of unofficial Chief Justice of Christendom." It was his high character and ability in conjunction with those of one or two of his associates that saved the prestige of the Russian Foreign Office at The Hague.

The work of the Conference was laid out with reference to the points stated in the Muraviev Circular of December 30, 1898, and divided among three great committees. The first dealt with the limitation of armaments and war budgets. The second was concerned with the extension of the Geneva Red Cross rules of 1864 and 1868 to maritime warfare and the revision of the Brussels Declaration of 1874. The third considered mediation, arbitration and other methods of preventing

armed conflicts. It is, however, the attempt to secure an international accord for the limitation of armaments, both in numbers and in equipment, that is of primary interest in this study.

Discussion of the subject was opened in the First Committee on June 23 by M. Beernaert of Belgium, the President of the Committee. M. de Staal took the occasion to express the hope that on the question under consideration the desires of anxious populations should not be balked. Disarmament was not to be considered. "What we are hoping for," he declared "is to attain a limitation—a halt in the ascending course of armaments and expenses. We propose this with the conviction that if such an agreement is established, progress in other directions will be made, slowly perhaps, but surely. . . . For the moment we aspire to the attainment of stability for a fixed limitation of the number of effectives and military budgets." <sup>25</sup>

After an eloquent address by General Den Beer Poortugael of Holland, Colonel Gilinsky of Russia presented the text of the two proposals submitted by the Imperial Government, which was as follows:

I. *As to Armies:*—

1. An international agreement for the term of five years, stipulating for the nonaugmentation of the present number of troops kept in time of peace.
2. The determination, in case of such an agreement, if it is possible, of the number of troops to be kept in time of peace by all of the Powers, not including Colonial troops.
3. The maintenance, for the term of five years, of the amount of the military budgets in force at the present time.

II. *As regards Navies:*—

1. The acceptance in principle of fixing for a term of three years the amount of the naval budget, and an agreement not to increase the total amount for this triennial period, and the obligation to publish during the period, in advance:—
  - (a) The total tonnage of men-of-war which it is proposed to construct, without giving in detail the types of ships.
  - (b) The number of officers and crews in the navy.

<sup>25</sup> Frederick W. Holls, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72.

- (c) The expenses of coast fortifications, including fortresses, docks, arsenals, etc.<sup>26</sup>

Colonel Gilinsky explained that the Russian proposals were not in themselves novel, since they simply extended over the entire world principles which had been accepted in many countries. He pointed out that in Germany the strength of the army was fixed every seven years; in Russia the military budget was settled for a term of five years. The period might be shortened if the Conference so decided. As for disarmament, he repeated that it was neither practical nor desirable to discuss that question until an agreement had been reached regarding a limitation of existing armaments.<sup>27</sup>

At the meeting of the First Committee, on June 25, general discussion was opened. M. de Staal reminded the delegates that armed peace at the time was causing more considerable expense than the most burdensome wars of modern times.

A member of the German delegation, Colonel von Schwarzhoff, struck the opposite note. In a speech of great force and ability he pronounced the following:

I do not believe that among my honoured colleagues there is a single one ready to admit that his sovereign, his Government, is engaged in working for the inevitable ruin, the slow but sure annihilation of his country. I have no mandate to speak for my honoured colleagues, but so far as Germany is concerned, I can reassure her friends completely and dissipate all benevolent anxiety regarding her. The German people are not crushed beneath the weight of expenditures and taxes; they are not hanging on the edge of the precipice; they are not hastening towards exhaustion and ruin. Quite the contrary; public and private wealth is increasing, the general welfare, and *standard of life*, are rising from year to year.

As for compulsory military service, which is intimately associated with these questions, the German does not regard it as a heavy burden, but as a sacred and patriotic duty, to the performance of which he owes his existence, his prosperity, his future.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74.

<sup>28</sup> J. B. Scott, *The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences, Conference of 1899* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1920), pp. 308-10.

In continuing, Colonel Schwarzhoff explained that the question of effectives could not be regarded by itself alone, disconnected from a number of other questions to which it is quite subordinate. He believed that it would be very difficult to substitute an international convention for so eminently national a task. There would also be technical obstacles. For instance:

In Germany the number of effectives is fixed by an agreement between the Government and the Reichstag, and in order not to repeat every year the same debates, the number was fixed for seven and later for five years. . . . It is precisely our "quinquennium" which prevents us from making the proposed agreement.

There are two reasons against it: First, the international period of five years would not synchronise with the national period of five years, and this would be a serious inconvenience.

Furthermore, the military law which is to-day in force does not fix a special number of effectives, but on the contrary it provides for a continuous increase up to 1902 or 1903, in which year the reorganization begun this year will be finished. Until then, it would be impossible for us to maintain even for two consecutive years the same number of effectives.<sup>29</sup>

Colonel Schwarzhoff's speech was conclusive evidence that Germany was going to vote against the limitation motion. Colonel Gilinsky, however, replied to the Colonel's arguments, stating that he considered it possible to meet the objections based upon the present laws of Germany.

A representative of Holland, Jonkheer van Karnebeek, called particular attention to the fact that the forces of anarchy and unrest would be the only ones to profit directly by the failure of the Conference to agree on some limitation of the increase of armaments. Doctor Stancioff of Bulgaria, voicing the sentiment of the lesser states, declared that armed peace was ruinous, especially for small countries whose needs were enormous and who had everything to gain by using their resources for the development of industry, of agriculture and the requisites of general progress.<sup>30</sup> The delegates of the great

<sup>29</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 312.

powers remained silent, and Colonel Schwarzhoff appeared desirous to press the question to an immediate vote. The President, however, at the suggestion of Sir J. Pauncefote, proposed that the naval as well as the military projects of Russia should be referred to two small Committees of naval and military experts. Schwarzhoff was named chairman of the military committee.<sup>31</sup>

At the next meeting of the First Committee, June 30, the military sub-committee made its report—a very laconic report indeed—to the effect that:

The members of the committee, to whom was referred the proposition of Colonel Gilinsky, regarding the first point in the Circular of Count Mouravieff, after two meetings, report, that with the exception of Colonel Gilinsky they are unanimously of the opinion, first, that it would be very difficult to fix, even for a period of five years, the number of effectives, without regulating at the same time other elements of national defence; second, that it would be no less difficult to regulate by international agreement the elements of this defence, organized in every country upon a different principle. In consequence, the committee regrets not being able to approve the proposition made in the name of the Russian Government. A majority of its members believe that a more profound study of the question by the Governments themselves would be desirable.<sup>32</sup>

Following the presentation of this report, General Zuccari of Italy declared that the number of peace effectives of the Italian army was fixed by organic laws which his government had no intentions of changing and that it must therefore reserve to itself complete liberty of action with regard to any international agreement on the subject.

Baron de Bildt, first delegate of Norway and Sweden, explained that the great number of units of the Swedish Army rested on a system two centuries old; thus his country could

<sup>31</sup> In Baroness Bertha von Suttner's words, it was as if cobblers had been chosen to "deliberate on how men could give up wearing footgear."

<sup>32</sup> Frederick W. Holls, *op. cit.*, p. 83; also J. B. Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 135. A similar report was made by the naval sub-committee.

not engage to maintain such an organization, even for five years. He regretted that he was not able to support the proposal made by Colonel Gilinsky. M. Bille of Denmark stated that the views of Baron Bildt were in complete harmony with those of the Danish Government.<sup>33</sup>

Then M. Léon Bourgeois, representing France, came forward with a speech which, though it did not save or aim to save the Russian proposal from burial, at least assured a resurrection. He pointed the way to a more elevated method of handling the question "presented to the civilised world by the generous initiative of the Emperor of Russia."

The French statesman, too, belonged to a country which supported readily all personal and financial obligations imposed by national defense upon its citizens, but he recognized that if the considerable resources devoted to military organization were in part put to the service of pacific and productive activities, the total prosperity of each nation could not but increase at a much more rapid pace. M. Bourgeois reminded his colleagues that they had no right to consider only how their own particular country bore the burden of armed peace. "Our task is a higher one: We are called upon to examine the situation of the nations as a whole."

Although it was a painful necessity to be obliged to give up a positive and immediate understanding on this matter, he thought the Conference should try to prove to public opinion that it had at least sincerely examined the problem placed before it. "We shall have not labored in vain if, by formulating general terms, we indicate the purpose toward which we unanimously desire, as I hope, to see the civilised peoples as a whole march."<sup>34</sup>

After this speech, which was hailed with rounds of applause, the President requested M. Bourgeois to frame in writing the wish which he had so eloquently expressed. Whereupon the French delegate proposed the following wording:

<sup>33</sup> J. B. Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 317-18.

The Commission is of opinion that the restriction of military charges, which are at present a heavy burden on the world, is extremely desirable for the increase of the material and moral welfare of mankind.<sup>35</sup>

As no delegate asked the floor in regard to the proposition of M. Bourgeois, the President declared it to be adopted.

The second sub-committee, to which the naval propositions had been referred, made a report similar to that of the first sub-committee, so far as the limitation of naval budgets was concerned; and the full Committee resolved that the resolution presented by M. Bourgeois applied equally to both Russian proposals.

Subsequently, the entire Conference unanimously adopted the resolution proposed by the First Committee on the above motion and formulated the following:

The Conference expresses the wish that the Governments, taking into consideration the proposals made at the Conference may examine the possibility of an agreement as to the limitation of armed forces by land and sea, and of war budgets.<sup>36</sup>

Thus the entire subject was relegated to the further study of the various governments; but before the question was completely disposed of, Captain Mahan, on behalf of the United States delegation, made it obvious that little encouragement for the reduction or limitation of armaments should be expected from his country. His declaration was not meant to indicate mere indifference to a difficult problem, because it did not affect the United States immediately, but it expressed a "determination to refrain from enunciating opinions upon matters into which, as concerning Europe alone, the United States has no claim to enter. . . ." He declared that:

The military and naval armaments of the United States are at present

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 319; Holls, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

<sup>36</sup> J. B. Scott, *The Hague Peace Conferences, American Instructions and Reports* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1916), p. 75.

so small, relatively to the extent of territory and to the number of the population, as well as in comparison with those of other nations, that their size can entail no additional burden of expense upon the latter, nor can even form a subject for profitable mutual discussion.<sup>37</sup>

Moreover, the proposition that the "Contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of projectiles, the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases," fared little better. For two powerful countries withheld their assent: the United States, not wishing to restrain the inventive genius of her people, refused to accept it; and Great Britain wisely conditioned her vote upon unanimity.

The Conference in another direction produced a positive result; namely, the creation of a "panel" of judges—called the Hague Court. Yet here, "not a single Power was willing to bind itself to a hard and fast rule to submit all questions to arbitration," not even Great Britain and the United States, the nations who had used it most successfully in the past and who appeared to be anxious to see its use extended. Lord Salisbury explained to Count Hatzfeldt<sup>38</sup> that the permanent court should only be "entrusted with disputes of minor importance, particularly in cases dealing with claims for money compensation, and not with decisions on more important and political questions." For example, he considered it absolutely out of the question that the Court of Arbitration should ever have to intervene in the question of Egypt or Alsace. Furthermore, an appeal to it was not to be obligatory but optional.<sup>39</sup>

Germany disapproved, perhaps more strongly than any other nation, of Sir J. Pauncefote's proposal for the formation of a permanent international tribunal and for making the appeal to it in certain cases compulsory. At Holstein's instigation her delegates were instructed to hold aloof from this attempt,

<sup>37</sup> J. B. Scott, *The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences, The Conference of 1899*, p. 327.

<sup>38</sup> German Ambassador in London.

<sup>39</sup> *Die Grosse Politik*, XV, No. 4306, pp. 279-80. Count Hatzfeldt to the Foreign Office, London, June 14, 1899.



even though the other states decided in its favor. But the head of the German delegation, Count Münster, reports Andrew D. White, the American delegate, did not say that he would oppose a moderate plan for voluntary arbitration, "but he insisted that arbitration must be injurious to Germany; that Germany is prepared for war as no other country is or can be; that she can mobilize her army in ten days; and that neither France, Russia, nor any other power can do this. Arbitration, he said, would simply give rival powers time to put themselves in readiness, and would therefore be a great disadvantage to Germany." <sup>40</sup>

The German delegate was not the only representative who raised objections to arbitration on military grounds. Sir John Fisher, English Naval Delegate and Admiral in the British Navy, used the same argument about the sea that Count Münster had used regarding the land. "He said that the navy of Great Britain was and would remain in a state of complete preparation for war; that a vast deal depended on prompt action by the navy; and that the truce afforded by arbitration proceedings would give other powers time, which they would otherwise not have, to put themselves into complete readiness. He seemed uncertain whether it was best for Great Britain, under these circumstances, to support a thoroughgoing plan of arbitration; but on the whole seemed inclined to try it to some extent." Mr. White added, "Clearly what Great Britain wants is a permanent system of arbitration with the United States; but she does not care much, I think, for such a provision as regards other powers." <sup>41</sup>

Finally, rather than break up the Conference and leave the blame for the collapse entirely upon Germany, the German representative consented to the establishment of a permanent court of arbitration on the stipulation that it lay with the

<sup>40</sup> Andrew D. White, *Autobiography* (D. Appleton-Century, London, 1905), II, 265.

<sup>41</sup> A. D. White, *op. cit.*, II, 268.

individual states whether or not they would have recourse to it in any case of dispute. Most of the other states wished to go a *little* further but yielded in order to make the resolution unanimous. "A net full of large holes, but one in which one can get entangled nevertheless" was how Count Münster described the organization of the tribunal.<sup>42</sup> The Kaiser, who at heart considered the whole Conference a farce, when he consented to the establishment of the Court, announced his intentions in the following statement: "To prevent the disgrace of the Tsar in the face of Europe I vote for this nonsense. But in my actions, now and hereafter, I shall trust and invoke only God and my sharp sword."<sup>43</sup>

In spite of the adoption of plans for mediation and arbitration, the extension of the Geneva rules, and the more careful definition of the laws of war, the First Hague Conference did very little towards solving the problem for which it had been convened—the grave problem of armaments. This inability to cope with the primary question caused Baron de Bildt to declare in his address of June 30:

. . . We are about to terminate our labors recognising that we have been confronted with one of the most important problems of the century, and that we have accomplished very little towards its solution.

Let us not indulge in illusions.

When the results of our deliberations shall become known, there will arise, notwithstanding all that has been done for arbitration, the Red Cross, etc., a great cry: It is not enough!

And this cry: "It is not enough," most of us in our consciences will acknowledge to be just. Our consciences, it is true, may also tell us in consolation, that we have done our duty, since we have faithfully followed our instructions.<sup>44</sup>

But he ventured to say that this duty was not fulfilled and that

<sup>42</sup> *Die Grosse Politik*, XV, No. 4349, p. 345. Count Münster to Prince Hohenlohe, Scheveninger, July 30, 1899.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 4320, p. 306—Footnote 11, pp. 5–6. Prince von Bülow to Kaiser William II, June 21, 1899. Also Erich Brandenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

<sup>44</sup> J. B. Scott, *The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences, The Conference of 1899*, pp. 316–17.

there still remained something for them to do—to encourage their governments to study, each in their own way, the idea initiated by the Tsar. An idea which “responds to a desire felt by thousands upon thousands of men, that means too that it cannot die.”<sup>45</sup>

If, in retrospect, we consider calmly and without prejudice the attitudes of the different nations before and at the Hague Conference of 1899, can we hold any one nation responsible for the failure to limit armaments or military budgets, the problem that was put to the fore-front in the Muraviev Circular? All the great powers found the Tsar’s proposals extremely troublesome, but the majority of them had to take into consideration pacific public opinion and were therefore rather cautious in expressing their attitude. German statesmen were in a slightly different position because in their country pacifist ideas were not widespread, and the opinion of the outside world was considered a secondary matter. The opposition of the German delegates relieved other representatives of the unpleasant task of rejecting the Russian proposals. But it is plain that only German methods, not policy, differentiated Germany from the other powers. If her delegates had exercised a little more self-restraint, as they had been instructed to do, other states might have taken the initiative and Germany would have been spared the criticism that she was responsible for the failure of the Conference.<sup>46</sup>

It is true that some representatives expressed themselves more frankly than others. The technical delegates were, on the whole, more vehement in their objections than the statesmen. Strong opposition to the Russian proposal was offered by the German Military Delegates, Colonel Gross von Schwarzhoff, while, on the other hand, the British Naval Expert, Admiral Sir John Fisher, criticized them from the standpoint of the naval powers. Lord Salisbury, in choosing him, remarked that Fisher had fought so well over the transfer of naval ordnance

<sup>45</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Erich Brandenburg, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-32.

from the army to the navy, "that he had little doubt that he would fight well at the Peace Conference." Before going to The Hague, Sir John forewarned the Admiralty that he knew only one principle, "Might is Right."<sup>47</sup>

We get a glimpse of Sir John Fisher and his actions at the august assemblage from this description written by W. T. Stead, who knew him intimately:

At The Hague in 1899 Fisher had a position the like of which no Admiral held at the second Conference in 1907. The naval ascendancy of Great Britain was then accepted by all. Germany was but a fourth-rate naval power. Japan had not proved her prowess. The Americans worked hand in glove with us; and among the naval delegates Fisher was like a little god. As he was personally most gracious, put on no airs, and danced like a middy till all hours in the morning, no man at The Hague was more popular than he.

Fisher's ideas as to war, and especially as to naval war, were all based upon those current in Nelson's time. He was a bit of a barbarian who talked like a savage at times, to the no small scandal of his colleagues at The Hague.

"The humanising of War!" he declared, "You might as well talk of humanising Hell! When a silly ass at The Hague got up and talked about the amenities of civilized warfare and putting your prisoners' feet in hot water and giving them gruel, my reply, I regret to say, was considered totally unfit for publication. As if war could be civilised! If I'm in command when war breaks out I shall issue my orders:—

" 'The essence of war is violence.'

" 'Moderation in war is imbecility.'

" 'Hit first, hit hard, and hit anywhere.' " <sup>48</sup>

Admiral Fisher's opinion of the Conference in general was not very high, as can be gathered from a conversation with Count Münster in which he is alleged to have referred to it and M. de Staal as follows: "As President of that nonsense? Does that count?" <sup>49</sup>

<sup>47</sup> *Die Grosse Politik*, XV, No. 4274, p. 226, Report of Captain Siegel, German Naval Delegate to First Hague Conference, June 28, 1899.

<sup>48</sup> Admiral R. H. Bacon, *Lord Fisher* (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1929), I, 120-21.

<sup>49</sup> *Die Grosse Politik*, XV, No. 4351, p. 357. Count Münster to Prince von Hohenlohe, Scheveningen, July 17, 1899.

Captain A. T. Mahan, the American Naval Delegate, worked "hand in glove" with Fisher at The Hague. He, too, was wedded to the views generally entertained by older men of the naval and military services. An authority on sea power through his numerous publications on the subject, including *The Importance of Sea Power on History* and *The Interest of America in Sea Power Present and Future*, he had written: "That the organization of military strength involves provocation to war is a fallacy, which the experience of each succeeding year now refutes. The immense armaments of Europe are onerous; but nevertheless, by the mutual respect and caution they enforce, they present a cheap alternative, certainly in misery, probably in money, to the frequent devastating wars which preceded the era of general military preparation."<sup>50</sup> Mahan had "very little, if any, sympathy with the main purposes of the conference," and did not hesitate to declare his disbelief in some of the measures which the American delegates were especially instructed to press. "Still," writes Mr. White, "his views have been an excellent tonic; they have effectively prevented any lapse into sentimentality. When he speaks the millennium fades and this stern, severe, actual world appears."<sup>51</sup>

The appearance of two naval powers at the close of the nineteenth century added to the difficulties of the Conference. Suspicion of the naval armaments of Great Britain and incidentally of the United States and Japan, was expressed by Count Witte<sup>52</sup> and by Captain Siegel, the German Naval Delegate.<sup>53</sup> Captain Mahan was described by the Kaiser as "our greatest and most dangerous foe."<sup>54</sup> Certainly the new policy of the United States and the rapid growth of her fleet brought to the fore new considerations which were bound to

<sup>50</sup> Captain A. T. Mahan, *The Interest of America in Sea Power Present and Future* (Harper's, New York, 1897), p. 104.

<sup>51</sup> A. D. White, *op. cit.*, II, 347.

<sup>52</sup> *Die Grosse Politik*, XV, 165, No. 4232. Prince von Radolin to Prince von Hohenlohe, December 28, 1898.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 4274. Report of Captain Siegel, German Naval Delegate to the First Hague Conference, June 28, 1898.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 183, Footnote.

influence other nations. On this point, Sir J. Paunceforte reported:

Captain Mahan has not only stated that his Government will on no account even discuss the question of any limitation of naval armaments; he has also informed me that he considers that the vital interests of America now lie East and West, and no longer North and South; that the great question of the immediate future is China, and that the United States will be compelled, by fact if not by settled policy, to take a leading part in the struggle for Chinese markets, and this will entail a very considerable increase in her naval forces in the Pacific, which again must influence the naval arrangements of at least five Powers.<sup>55</sup>

Germany, distrustful of the navies of Great Britain and the United States, announced through Captain Siegel that she could not consider the limitation of her naval armaments. On the other hand, Russia could not come to a separate understanding with Great Britain so long as there was no check upon the navies of Germany and Japan, with whose maritime strength she was mainly concerned.

Though the First Hague Conference failed in its primary mission and, no doubt, brought to light truths that might better have been kept in the background, the concourse of so important a body demonstrated for the first time in history the epoch-making fact that a Congress of world powers convened to deal not with some concrete question demanding immediate solution but to consider and discuss the application of the general and fundamental principles of justice and humanity to international questions, can be made a practical and effective agency in the government of the world. The greatest benefit of the Peace Conference was in the fact of the Conference itself; in the spectacle of all the great powers meeting in the name of peace, and exalting "national self-control and considerate judg-

<sup>55</sup> *British Documents*, I, No. 282, p. 231. Note on the Limitation of Armaments sent by Sir J. Pauncefote to the Marquess of Salisbury in his despatch of July 31, 1899.

ment and willingness to do justice.”<sup>56</sup> The fact that the question of peace was no longer discussed merely by philosophers, jurists and Utopians, but by responsible governments also, was proof of the enormous strides forward that had been made in the sphere of international politics.

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<sup>56</sup> *Addresses on International Subjects by Elihu Root* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1916). Collected and edited by Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott; Address in Opening the National Arbitration and Peace Congress, in the City of New York, April 15, 1907, p. 144.

## CHAPTER XVI

### THE MOVEMENT FOR A LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCES

THOSE who had been optimistic over the results of the First Hague Conference had every reason to be discouraged by the events that followed it. In the autumn of 1899 the relations between England and the Boer Republic, long tense, reached a breaking point. The Boers proposed arbitration. The British, who had championed arbitration at The Hague, refused; war followed.

The twentieth century opened with conflicts fought in the Far East and South Africa. Russia struggled in distant Manchuria; a combined European and American Army avenged the outrages of the Boxers by sacking Peking; England fought in the Transvaal, five thousand miles from her base of supplies; the United States had just conquered and now held under military rule possessions an even greater distance from home waters. All these wars demonstrated the new significance of sea power in history and intensified the naval armament competition.

The First Hague Conference had referred the question of the limitation of armaments to the respective governments for further study. The result was one spark of light in the period, the conclusion, on May 28, 1902, of a treaty between Chile and Argentina which, in some respects, was an advance on anything achieved previously. It provided the adjustment by arbitration of all disputes between the two countries unless the Constitution of either was involved. In addition the contracting powers signed a disarmament convention which provided:



Article I. With the view of removing all motive for uneasiness or suspicion in either country, the Governments of Chili and of the Argentine Republic desist from acquiring the vessels of war now building for them, and from henceforth from making new acquisitions.

Both Governments agree, moreover, to reduce their respective fleets, with which object they will continue to exert themselves until they arrive at an understanding which shall establish a just balance between the said fleets.

This reduction will take place within one year, counting from the date of the exchange of ratifications of the present convention.

Article II. The two Governments bind themselves not to increase their naval armaments during a period of five years, without previous notice; the one intending to increase them shall give the other eighteen months notice.

It is understood that all armament for the fortification of the coasts and ports is excluded from this agreement, and any floating machine, such as submarine vessels, etc., destined exclusively for the defence of these, can be acquired.

What was more remarkable than the actual agreement to limit naval armaments was that the two contracting parties agreed in Article III that they should "not be at liberty to part with any vessel, in consequence of this convention, in favor of countries having questions pending with one or the other."<sup>1</sup>

The continuous increase in military and naval expenditure attracted the attention of the national and international peace bodies. Resolutions were passed calling for a limitation of armaments at the French Peace Congresses at Nîmes in 1904, Lille in 1905 and Lyon in 1906;<sup>2</sup> at the First National Peace Congress in Manchester in 1904, at the second in Bristol in 1905 and at the third in Birmingham in 1906;<sup>3</sup> at the Italian

<sup>1</sup> Enrique J. Tagle, *Los Tratados de Paz Entre La República Argentina y Chile* (Buenos Aires, 1902), Convención Sobre Limitación de Armamentos Navales, p. 24; Armand Billard, *L'Arbitrage et la limitation des armements*, Les Traités passés le 28 mai, 1902, entre le Chile et la République Argentine; Georges Dublis, *Des Charges de la Paix Armée, et de la limitation des armements* (Caen, 1909), pp. 110-13.

<sup>2</sup> Hans Wehberg, *Die Internationale Beschränkung der Rüstungen* (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1919), p. 418-19.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 421-22.

Peace Congresses at Turin in 1904 and Perugia in 1907; <sup>4</sup> and at the Austrian and German Peace Societies' Meeting in 1907.<sup>5</sup> Discussions of the limitation of armaments were initiated and resolutions were proposed at the Universal Peace Congresses convened in Glasgow in 1901,<sup>6</sup> at Monaco in 1902,<sup>7</sup> at Rouen and Le Havre in 1903,<sup>8</sup> at Boston in 1904,<sup>9</sup> at Lucerne in 1905<sup>10</sup> and at Milan in 1906.<sup>11</sup> At Rouen the Congress invited the friends of peace in all countries to insist upon their governments' studying the question and taking some measures to arrive at a truce in armaments and their final reduction.

At the seventh annual meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, convened in 1901, a reduction of armaments was advocated by Mr. Edwin Ginn.<sup>12</sup> Objections, however, were raised by Commander Albion V. Wadhams of the United States Navy, who stated he would favor disarmament when it was no longer necessary to have armed policemen in our cities and militia in each state. Captain Wadhams maintained that it was our mighty navy that had made it possible for the United States Government to exercise such powerful influence in Eastern affairs.<sup>13</sup> No resolution was adopted. At the 1904 Lake Mohonk Conference a lengthy

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 423.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 415-16.

<sup>6</sup> *Proceedings of the Tenth Universal Peace Congress Held in St. Andrews Hall, Glasgow, from 10-13 September 1901* (London, 1902), p. 112; Hans Wehberg, *op. cit.*, p. 397.

<sup>7</sup> *Bulletin Officiel du XI<sup>e</sup> Congrès Universel de la Paix, tenu à Monaco du 2 au 6 avril 1902* (Berne, 1902), pp. 47-48.

<sup>8</sup> *Bulletin Officiel du XII<sup>e</sup> Congrès Universel de la Paix, tenu à Rouen et au Havre du 22 au 27 sept. 1903* (Berne, 1903), pp. 104-15.

<sup>9</sup> *Official Report of the Thirteenth Universal Peace Congress, Held at Boston, Mass., U. S. A.—October third to eighth, 1904* (Boston, 1904), p. 296.

<sup>10</sup> *Bulletin Officiel du XIV<sup>e</sup> Congrès Universel de la Paix, tenu à Lucerne du 19 au 23 septembre 1905* (Berne, 1905), pp. 188-93.

<sup>11</sup> *Bulletin Officiel du XV<sup>e</sup> Congrès Universel de la Paix, tenu à Milan du 15 au 22 septembre 1906* (Berne, 1906), p. 151.

<sup>12</sup> *Report of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, 1901* (Lake Mohonk Arbitration Conference, 1901), p. 20.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 67-77.

discussion of the problem of heavy armaments<sup>14</sup> was finally closed by Mr. Richard Bartholdt, member of Congress from Missouri, who asked the Conference to endorse a resolution pending in Congress. Unanimous approval was given to this concurrent resolution which requested the President to invite the governments to send representatives to a conference whose purpose should be "to devise plans looking to the negotiation of arbitration treaties between the United States and the different nations, and also to discuss the advisability of, and, if possible, agree upon, a gradual reduction of armaments."<sup>15</sup>

In 1903 at the Inter-Parliamentary Conference in Vienna Sir John Brunner moved a resolution recalling the fact that the First Hague Conference was convened to consider, among other things, the burden of armaments and whereas the burden had continually increased, the Union was of opinion that the time had "arrived when the project submitted by Russia in 1898 should be again submitted to and considered by another conference."<sup>16</sup> Some of the German representatives, though expressing a desire for reduction, intimated that they could not vote for the resolution in the form in which it was presented; nonetheless, it was carried by a good majority.

The next year the Inter-Parliamentary Union, on the invitation of Mr. Bartholdt, founder and president of the American group, held its first American Conference at St. Louis, Missouri. One result of this 1904 convention was to excite greater interest on the part of the United States Congressmen. Up to that date the majority of the American people had taken but a philanthropic interest in questions of arbitration and disarmament; but the rapid increase of the United States Navy and the rise

<sup>14</sup> *Report of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration* (Lake Mohonk Arbitration Conference, 1904), pp. 113-22.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 122.

<sup>16</sup> Christian L. Lange, *Union Interparlementaire, résolutions des conférences et décisions principales du conseil* (Bruxelles, 1911), sixième résolution G. R., pp. 80-81, pp. 67-74.

of the Japanese power in the Pacific were bringing about a change. At St. Louis the Union adopted a resolution requesting the several governments of the world to send delegates to an international conference for the purpose of discussing the questions which the Conference at The Hague had expressed a wish that a future Conference be called to consider. The members "respectfully and cordially requested" the President of the United States to invite all the nations to send representatives to such a conference.<sup>17</sup> President Roosevelt, who the same year also promised the Universal Peace Congress to take the initiative in calling a new Conference to continue the work of that of 1899, accepted the charge offered him.

At the reception of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, September 24, 1904, the President stated that the body had shown sound judgment in concluding that a second Conference should now be called to carry further toward completion the work of the first. He pointed out that it would be visionary to expect too immediate success for the great cause which the Union was championing, but very considerable progress could be made if we strove with "resolution and good sense toward the goal of securing among the nations of the earth . . . a just sense of responsibility in each toward others, and a just recognition in each of the rights of others."<sup>18</sup> The President promised at an early date to issue the call for the requested conference and, on October 21, 1904, a Circular was communicated by the State Department to the various powers.<sup>19</sup>

Though the project met with a general expression of assent and sympathy, the Russian and Japanese Governments consid-

<sup>17</sup> *Compte Rendu de la XII<sup>e</sup> Conférence tenu à Saint Louis, Missouri, du 12 au 14 septembre, 1904*, p. 60; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1904*, pp. 10-11.

<sup>18</sup> *Compte Rendu de la XII<sup>e</sup> Conférence tenu à Saint Louis, Missouri, 1904*, p. 61. *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, XIV, 6891, "Remarks at the White House on the Occasion of the Reception of the Interparliamentary Union."

<sup>19</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1904*, pp. 10-13; *British Documents*, VIII (London, 1932), Ch. LXV, pp. 185-87, "Preliminaries of the Second Hague Conference."

ered the moment of war very inopportune for a discussion of the subject proposed by the United States. A second Circular of December 27, 1904, stated that the replies indicated that the proposition had been received with general favor "and the prospect of an early Conference was regarded as assured as soon as the interested powers were in a position to agree to a date and place of meeting and to join in the formulation of a general plan for discussion."<sup>20</sup>

While international bodies were considering the problem of overgrown armaments, the urgency of limiting expenditures because of their danger both to peace and financial stability was recognized by frequent debates in several of the national legislatures, especially in the British Parliament. In July, 1903, Mr. Chamberlain supported Mr. Goschen's pronouncement of 1899 to the effect that Great Britain was ready to modify her program of naval construction if the other naval powers should be prepared to diminish theirs, and declared that for the English Cabinet it had maintained its full value.

The next year, on February 29, Messrs. Roberts, Buchanan and Robertson declared in the House of Commons that since Great Britain held a predominant position among the naval powers of the world, she should propose a reduction of naval armaments to the other powers. The object of the motion, Mr. Roberts stated, was, in the first place, to call attention to the constant increase that was going on in the Naval Estimates; in the second place, to point out what was patent to all, that those large increases must, if they were persisted in, have a retarding effect on the industrial system of the country; and, in the third place, to suggest that the time had arrived when the Government should be urged "to make every effort possible in order to come to some arrangement with other great naval powers, which would lead to a diminution in the future ship-building programmes of the various countries concerned."<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States, op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

<sup>21</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, Fourth series, CXXX, col. 1274, February 29, 1904.

He was answered by the First Lord of the Admiralty, who stated that the Board of the Admiralty had avoided and would avoid giving any stimulus to the expansion of armaments by the formulation of large programs of construction, but when such programs had been adopted by other powers, they had no choice but to take them into account in framing their own policy.<sup>22</sup>

Meanwhile in his Fourth Annual Message of December 6, 1904, President Roosevelt drew attention to the difficulties in the way of a limitation of armaments in these words:

There is as yet no judicial way of enforcing a right in international law. . . . Until some method is devised by which there shall be a degree of international control over offending nations, it would be a wicked thing for the most civilized powers, for those with most sense of international obligation and with keenest and most generous appreciation of the difference between right and wrong, to disarm, the result would mean an immediate recrudescence of barbarism in one form or another. Under any circumstances a sufficient armament would have to be kept up to serve the purposes of international police; and until international cohesion and the sense of international duties and rights are far more advanced than at present, a nation desirous of securing respect for itself and of doing good to others must have a force adequate for the work which it feels is allotted to it as its part of the general world duty.<sup>23</sup>

In September, 1905, Carl Schurz wrote President Roosevelt congratulating him for his interposition between Japan and Russia and urging him to render another service to mankind, by promoting the "gradual diminution of the oppressive burdens imposed upon the nations by the armed peace."<sup>24</sup> In his reply Mr. Roosevelt stated that he was not clear either what could or ought to be done. He wrote among other things:

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1275.

<sup>23</sup> *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, XIV (New York, no date), 6922; Fourth Annual Message, White House, December 6, 1904, to the Senate and House of Representatives.

<sup>24</sup> *Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918*, II (New York and London, 1925), 195-97.

Until people get it firmly fixed in their minds that peace is valuable chiefly as a means to righteousness, and that it can only be considered as an end when it also coincides with righteousness, we can do only a limited amount to advance its coming on earth. There is of course no analogy at present between international law and private municipal law, because there is no sanction of force for the former while there is for the latter. . . . At present there is no similar international force to call on, and I do not as yet see how it could at present be created. Hitherto peace has often come only because some strong and on the whole just power has by armed force, or the threat of armed force, put a stop to disorder. . . . Unjust war is dreadful; a just war may be the highest duty. To have the best nations, the free and civilized nations, disarm and leave the despotisms and barbarians with great military force, would be a calamity compared to which the calamities caused by all the wars of the nineteenth century would be trivial. Yet it is not easy to see how we can by international agreement state exactly which power ceases to be free and civilized and which comes near to the line of barbarism or despotism.<sup>25</sup>

President Roosevelt did not mean that it was hopeless to make the effort. Perhaps some scheme would be developed. America, fortunately, could assist in such an effort, for no one would suggest her disarmament, and although she should continue to perfect her small navy and minute army the President thought it unnecessary to increase the number of ships. But before he would advocate international action, save in the way of commending it to the attention of the Hague Tribunal, he would have to have a feasible and rational plan of action presented. In a postscript Mr. Roosevelt stated his opinion that "a general stop in the increase of the war navies of the world *might* be a good thing"; but he would not like to speak too positively off hand. "At any rate," he concluded, "nothing useful could be done unless with the clear recognition that we put peace second to righteousness."<sup>26</sup>

On September 13, 1905, Baron Rosen, Russian Ambassador

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 197-99, Letter from President Roosevelt to Mr. Schurz, September 8, 1905; *Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography* (Scribner's, New York, 1913), pp. 589-91.

<sup>26</sup> *Loc. cit.*

in Washington, presented to President Roosevelt at Oyster Bay a memorandum from St. Petersburg stating that in view of the termination of war and the conclusion of peace between Russia and Japan, His Majesty the Emperor, as initiator of the International Peace Conference of 1899, held that a favorable moment had come for the further development and for the systematizing of the labors of that conference.<sup>27</sup> Roosevelt reports that:

After he had read the letter Rosen began to hem and haw as to the steps already taken by me a year ago, and about the fact that the Hague Conference was the peculiar pet project of the Czar. I finally interrupted him and said that I thought I understood what he wished, and that he could tell the Czar at once that I was delighted to have him and not me undertake the movement; that I should treat the movement as being made on his initiative, and should heartily support it. This evidently relieved Rosen immensely. I rather think that the Czar had felt from past experience with the Kaiser that there was a fair chance that I might endeavor to appear as the great originator myself.<sup>28</sup>

Thus the President of the United States yielded the initiative to the Tsar of Russia and received wide acclaim for his generosity, his unselfishness and "graciousness well-nigh unprecedented in world politics."<sup>29</sup> The decision was announced on September 19 when a communique appeared in the *Journal de Saint-Petersbourg*, stating that invitations to the Conference would be issued by the Russian Government with the cordial support of the President of the United States.<sup>30</sup> The members of the Inter-Parliamentary Union regretted that President Roosevelt allowed Russia to take the lead in calling the Conference. M. Albert Gobat, of Switzerland, the Secretary of the Union,

<sup>27</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1905, p. 828, Memorandum handed to the President, September 13, 1905.

<sup>28</sup> *Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918*. II, 201.

<sup>29</sup> David J. Hill, "The Second Peace Conference at The Hague," *American Journal of International Law*, I (July, 1907), 435.

<sup>30</sup> British Documents, *op. cit.*, p. 188.



who was among those present at the White House when the President promised to call the Second Hague Conference, felt that he had only partly kept his promise to the Union. Gobat complained that Mr. Roosevelt "sounded the powers as to their willingness to send delegates, but retired when Russia, after the powers had consented, manifested a desire to convoke the meeting herself. This we deeply regret, for we are convinced that President Roosevelt would have invested the Conference with an entirely different importance. Russia does not march in the van of civilization."<sup>31</sup>

As a matter of fact, Roosevelt was "glad to be relieved from making the move" on his own initiative. He wrote to his Secretary of State, Mr. Elihu Root: "I should have done it if no one else had done it because I think it ought to be done; but I particularly do not want to appear as a professional peace advocate—a kind of sublimated being of the Godkin or Schurz variety—and it gives us a freer hand in every way to have the Czar make the movement."<sup>32</sup> Actually, Theodore Roosevelt considered Schurz's pacific approach and the Baron Rosen episode not as serious, but rather as events only for the amusement of women; for in sending copies of the relevant letters to his friend Henry Cabot Lodge for his perusal, the President wrote: "Nannie<sup>33</sup> and Lady Harcourt might be amused at the enclosed correspondence with Schurz, and of a letter to Root."<sup>34</sup>

In his Fifth Annual Message to Congress on December 5, 1905, President Roosevelt again referred to the absence of the sanction of force for international law and the great calamity for the free peoples, the enlightened independent, and peace loving to disarm while leaving it open to barbarism or despotism to remain armed. The practical thing to do, in his opinion, was

<sup>31</sup> Edwin D. Mead, *The Limitation of Armaments, The Position of the United States at The Hague Conference* (Boston, 1907), p. 20.

<sup>32</sup> *Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge*, II, 201.

<sup>33</sup> Mrs. Henry Cabot Lodge.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 195.

to try to minimize the number of cases in which war must be the arbiter and to offer, at least to civilized powers, some substitute which would be available in at least a considerable number of instances. He expressed the hope that the Second Hague Conference might be able to devise some way to make arbitration between nations the customary way of settling international disputes in all save a few classes of cases, which should themselves be sharply defined and rigidly limited.<sup>35</sup>

Theodore Roosevelt was never sanguine over the prospects of limiting armaments. After the Second Hague Conference had failed to propose an acceptable plan and that of limiting the size of battleships met with no favor at all, the President stated in his Seventh Annual Message that it would be folly for this nation to base any hope of securing peace on an international agreement as to the limitation of armaments. Such being the case it would be most unwise for us to stop the upbuilding of our navy.<sup>36</sup>

Moreover, Roosevelt had no patience with "amiable, but fatuous persons," who pass resolutions demanding universal arbitration for everything and disarmament, or with those who "write well-meaning, solemn little books, or pamphlets, or editorials, and articles in magazines or newspapers, to show that it is 'an illusion' to believe that war ever pays, because it is expensive."<sup>37</sup> If the principles held by pacifists were right, Roosevelt argued, then it would have been better that Americans should have never achieved independence, and better that, in 1861, they should have peacefully submitted to seeing their country split into half a dozen jangling confederates and slavery made perpetual.<sup>38</sup> Finally, it would be folly to try to abolish our navy and at the same time to insist that we have the

<sup>35</sup> *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, XIV, 6993, Fifth Annual Message, White House, December 5, 1905.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, Seventh Annual Message, White House, December 3, 1907, pp. 7113-14.

<sup>37</sup> *Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography*, p. 534.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

right to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, that we have a right to control the Panama Canal which we ourselves had dug, that we have the right to retain Hawaii and prevent foreign nations from taking Cuba, and a right to determine what immigrants, Asiatic or European, shall come to our shores and the terms on which they shall be naturalized and shall hold land and exercise other privileges.<sup>39</sup> Roosevelt was convinced that "only that nation is equipped for peace that knows how to fight, and that will not shrink from fighting if ever the conditions become such that war is demanded in the name of the highest morality."<sup>40</sup>

Fortunately, however, the principle of arbitration gained ground in the early part of the century, especially in Scandinavia. Denmark, profiting from her comparative security, contracted two "all-in" arbitration treaties: one with the Netherlands (February, 1904), and one with Italy (December, 1906), for the peaceful settlement of all disputes without reservation. Four other similar treaties soon followed, including one with Great Britain.<sup>41</sup> By the Treaty of Karlstad in 1905, Norway peacefully severed political connections with Sweden and, on October 26, 1905, the two nations signed a convention in which they agreed to submit to the Hague Court whatever future differences they would be unable to settle by diplomatic negotiations, except "questions of independence, integrity, and vital interest."<sup>42</sup>

On the same day Norway and Sweden signed another convention which demilitarized their frontier by setting aside a zone between the two countries which was to be completely neutralized. Both states agreed to refrain from using this zone as a base for war operations or for concentrating armed military forces, except such as might be necessary for maintaining public

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 538.

<sup>40</sup> *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, XIV, 7113-14, Seventh Annual Message, White House, December 3, 1907.

<sup>41</sup> L. S. Woolf, *International Government* (London, 1916), p. 48, note.

<sup>42</sup> Svensk Författnings-Samling 1905 N:4 81. *Konvention mellan Sverige och Norge angående tvisters Hänskjutande till skiljedon*, Artikel 1, pp. 1-2.

order. Fortifications, war ports and "depots de provision" for serving the army or navy were not to be built in future and the fortifications already existing in the neutral zone were to be dismantled. The convention took effect immediately and could only be denounced by common accord.<sup>43</sup>

On December 22, 1905, no doubt with these agreements in mind, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman delivered a speech at the Albert Hall, London, in which he said:

I rejoice that the principle of arbitration has made great strides, and that to-day it is no longer counted weakness for any of the Great Powers of the world to submit those issues which would once have been referred to the arbitrament of self-assertion and of passion to a higher tribunal. I hold that the growth of armaments is a great danger to the peace of the world. A policy of huge armaments keeps alive, and stimulates, and feeds the idea that force is the best, if not the only, solution of international differences. It is a policy that tends to inflame old sores and to create new sores, and I submit to you that as the principle of pacific arbitration gains ground, it becomes one of the highest tasks of a statesman to adjust these armaments to a newer and happier condition of things.<sup>44</sup>

Throughout the year preceding the Second Hague Conference there was a lively agitation in Great Britain for the question of the limitation of armaments to be included in the program of the Conference. There was a good reason for this: the military and naval expenditures in Britain in the ten years 1896-97 to 1906-7 had increased by 63 per cent for the army and 43 per cent for the navy. On May 9, 1906, Mr. Vivian, a Labor Member of Parliament for Birkenhead, called attention to public expenditure and moved,

That this House is of opinion that the growth of expenditure on armaments is excessive and ought to be reduced; such expenditure lessens national and commercial credit, intensifies the unemploy-

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, "Konvention mellan Serige och Norge angående neutral zon befastningars nedläggande m.m.," Artikel 1 and Artikel 9, pp. 8-9, 13.

<sup>44</sup> Howard Evans, *Sir Randal Cremer*, p. 293.

nent problem, reduces the resources available for social reform; and presses with exceptional severity on the industrial classes; and it therefore calls upon the Government to take drastic steps to reduce the drain on national income, and to this end to press for the inclusion of the question of the reduction of armaments by international agreement in the agenda of the forthcoming Hague Conference.<sup>45</sup>

The Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, in answering Mr. Vivian, stated that a great deal depended on the policy of other countries, and by that he meant the feeling among the people in Europe. He held nevertheless that a declaration of this kind from a British House of Commons was something that was worth having, if only for the effect it might produce on other governments. He expressed his belief that there never had been a time when the relative and comparative supremacy of the British Navy was greater than in 1906 and that at the moment at least it was as secure as ever before in history. Sir Edward Grey pointed out that he could not extend the promises which had been made by the Prime Minister and others as to the specific reductions, for what Great Britain could do with regard to the Hague Conference must depend on the response from other governments. But he welcomed the resolution as a wholesome and beneficial expression of opinion. And just as in the time of the late Government, Lord Goschen, the First Lord of the Admiralty, issued a public invitation on behalf of British Government to other countries for a reduction of naval armaments, so he trusted that this resolution might be taken as being an invitation from the British House of Commons to respond to their feeling in favor of encouraging a reduction of armament.<sup>46</sup> The adoption of Vivian's resolution without division pledged the British Government to urge the consideration of the subject at the Hague Conference.

In the same month (May 25) Lord Averbury brought the armament question forward in the House of Lords when he

<sup>45</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, Fourth series, CLVI, May 9, 1906, col. 1383.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, cols. 1413 and 1415.

asked His Majesty's Government whether they had taken any steps to carry out the suggestion made by the Prime Minister in a speech on December 22, 1905, that as "the policy of huge armaments feeds the belief that force is the best, if not the only solution of international difference . . . it becomes one of the highest tasks of the statesman to adjust armaments to the newer and happier condition"; and, if so, whether there were any Papers that could be laid on the Table of the House.<sup>47</sup> Averbury was aware that the force which each nation requires depends greatly on that of other countries and that formerly Great Britain could not effectively suggest a reduction because it was impossible for her to diminish her armaments. Of late years, however, the increase in British armaments had been far greater than in other European countries. In the preceding ten years Italy had increased her naval and military expenditure by £1,500,000; France by £6,000,000; Germany by £8,700,000. The British increase during the same period has been over £30,000,000—something like double that of France and Germany put together.<sup>48</sup>

Lord Averbury pointed out that the position of Europe was a disgrace not only to men of common sense but to professing Christians. If the suggestions thrown out by the Prime Minister were accepted, it would be an enormous boon to the people of Europe; it would, he believed, save the Continent from drifting into revolution and misery. Of course it was possible that their overtures might be rejected. But even if they were, they could feel that they had done their best. They had held out the olive branch; it would be a failure but an honorable, even glorious failure. He did not, however, entertain such a fear; he had too much confidence in the common sense and conscience of Europe. And if they succeeded, it would be one of those cases in which peace has its victories as well

<sup>47</sup> *Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords*, Fourth series, CLVII, col. 1517, May 25, 1906.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1519.

as war, and they would confer an incalculable boon, not only on their own people, but on the whole world.<sup>49</sup>

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Fitzmaurice, in replying, reminded the members of the House of Lords that the Government had already turned to this question. They hoped, indeed confidently believed, that the next year, unless events took quite an unlooked for and unfavorable turn in Europe, they would be able to propose some reduction in expenditure, by means of changes in war establishments, which might tend somewhat in the direction of the wishes of Lord Averbury.<sup>50</sup> The Under-Secretary, nevertheless, expatiated on the difficulties in limiting armaments—the problem of finding a “unit of disarmament” and the great difficulty of finding the tribunal, of fixing upon an arbitrator “who should decide as to whether or not the unit of disarmament, if one had been found, was really honest and efficiently applied by all the contracting powers.”<sup>51</sup> Nonetheless, Lord Fitzmaurice endorsed the words of Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons on May 9, and in concluding announced that “we decline to be precluded from making a proposal ourselves at The Hague Conference if the times and seasons are favourable, as we trust, under Divine providence, they may be.”<sup>52</sup> Considerable importance was attached to this double English declaration in the month of May, for it seemed to signify a demand for a consideration of the question by the powers or, at least, for entering it upon the agenda of the Conference.

After these declarations in Parliament a Committee of members of both Houses, composed of Lord Courtney, Lord Eversley, Lord Weardale, Lord Farrer, Lord Welby, Lord Reay, Major-General Sir Alfred Turner, Sir John Macdonell, Professor Westlake, Mr. J. M. Robertson and others assembled in London to prepare for the Second Hague Conference; they adopted the following resolutions:

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1523.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1531.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, cols. 1532–34.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1536.

1. That the chief question to be brought before the Second Hague Conference should be that of an agreement for a general limitation of armaments; and that the British Government should make proposals to this end;

2. In any limitation of armaments, the armies and navies of the various nations should be treated separately;

3. That the simplest, though not the only standard of naval strength, is that of naval expenditure;

4a. That Great Britain seek to persuade the Powers to agree to a Proportional Reduction of Naval Expenditure for five years; or, failing such agreement, that Great Britain propose an arrest of expenditure for three years with a view to reduction at a later date;

4b. That the principle of reduction or the principle of arrest shall be applied not only to the total naval expenditure from all sources, but also to the annual provision for the construction of new ships;

5. All naval expenditure of colonies and dependencies should be included in the above-mentioned totals insofar as it is under the control of the contracting Powers;

6. Great Britain should be prepared to support any proposal for the limitation of land forces which may be laid before the Hague Conference;

7. That the terms of Resolution 4 be applied *mutatis mutandis*, to army as well as navy expenditure;

8. It is advisable to establish, in connection with the Permanent Council of the Hague Court, Committees of Reference for the supervision of the carrying out of the aforesaid agreements, for the collection of all necessary information, including statistics of expenditure on armaments, and for reporting on any technical questions which may be referred to them;

9. That the Agreement should contain a provision for its being denounced by any of the Parties to it on two years' notice being given, and a provision for the reference to arbitration of any difference arising.<sup>53</sup>

Pending the convocation of the Second Hague Conference the Interparliamentary-Union stressed the expenditure aspects of the armament problem. At its 1905 meeting in Brussels, it resolved that the Conference should "consider the limitation of

<sup>53</sup> Hans Wehberg, *The Limitation of Armaments*, pp. 29-30.



land and sea forces and military budgets.”<sup>54</sup> The following year the Union was invited to London by the new Liberal Government with the express intention of rousing public opinion in favor of disarmament.<sup>55</sup> Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, as Prime Minister of Great Britain and Leader of the House of Commons, welcomed the delegates and in his address reminded the body of the words of the Tsar in convening the First Hague Conference: “Hundreds of millions are devoted to acquiring terrible engines of destruction, which, although to-day they are regarded as the last word of science are destined tomorrow to lose all value in consequence of some fresh discovery in the same field.” The speaker asked:

Is it not evident that a process of simultaneous and progressive arming defeats its own purpose? Scare answers to scare, and force begets force, until at length it comes to be seen that we are racing one against another after a phantom security which continually vanishes as we approach. If we hold with the late Mr. Hay that war is the most futile and ferocious of human follies, what are we to say to the surpassing futility of expending the strength and substance of nations on preparations for war, possessing no finality, amenable to no alliances that statesmanship can devise, and forever consuming the reserves on which a State must ultimately rely when the time of trial comes, if come it must—I mean the well-being and vitality of its people?<sup>56</sup>

The Prime Minister requested the delegates to “insist, in the name of humanity,” upon going to the Conference at The Hague, as the British hope to attend, “for the purpose of decreasing the burdens of the war and naval budgets.”<sup>57</sup>

Baron d’Estournelles de Constant, President of the French group, who was present in an official capacity at the First Hague Conference and had rendered distinguished service to

<sup>54</sup> Christian L. Lange, *op. cit.*, p. 94; *G.R.*, pp. 99-116.

<sup>55</sup> Christian L. Lange, “The Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Reduction of Armaments,” *The Inter-Parliamentary Union from 1889-1939*, p. 65.

<sup>56</sup> *The Times*, July 24, 1906.

<sup>57</sup> *Official Report of the Conference held in the Royal Gallery of the House of Lords, London, 1906* (London, 1907), p. 221.

the cause of peace and arbitration in his own country, presented a comprehensive and cogent report on the limitation of armaments. He considered the question as one of the most pressing of those which parliaments and governments were called upon to face. All the other items on the Hague program were insignificant compared with the limitation of armaments, "for which the whole world is waiting." If the Conference failed to act bravely on this subject, it would be condemned to avow its impotence and declare its own bankruptcy. D'Estournelles was convinced that the Inter-Parliamentary Union ought to demand and obtain the inclusion of the question of limitation in the program. "Our role," he said, "is to create public opinion, or rather to reveal to all peoples that they have but one and the same opinion, and that governments ought to concert and obey that opinion." M. Messimy, the reporter of the Naval and Military Budget in the French Chamber of Deputies, followed with a detailed statistical account of the war expenditure of the various powers. He concluded by expressing the wish for a meeting of a small number of delegates from each Parliament whose sole object would be to discuss the means to be employed in civilized countries "for putting an end to the increase of military budgets, and to maintain them within the limits of the figures which they have at present reached."<sup>58</sup> The discussion of the problem of the limitation of naval and military expenditure was brought to a close by the unanimous acceptance of the following resolution:

The Inter-Parliamentary Conference, considering that the increase of naval and military expenditure which weighs upon the world is universally recognized as intolerable, expresses the wish that the question of limitation be inscribed on the programme of the next Hague Conference.

The Conference decides that each group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union shall, without delay, place this resolution before the Government of its country and exercise its most pressing action on the

<sup>58</sup> Bertha von Suttner, *Memoirs*, II, 287.

Parliament to which it belongs, in order that the question of limitation be the object of a national study necessary to the ultimate success of the international discussion.<sup>59</sup>

Likewise the Universal Peace Congress at Milan in 1906 suggested to the governments which were to be represented at the Second Hague Conference that proposals for an arrest of armaments should be limited to a plan of agreement simply stipulating that for a certain period of five years at least, and until a conference of the signatory powers had again discussed the question, the signatory powers should not increase their average total military and naval expenditure.<sup>60</sup>

The twelfth annual Mohonk Conference meeting in the summer of 1906 emphasized the urgent necessity of the general restriction of armaments and of the special duty of the United States to co-operate with England to this end. Mr. John W. Foster, the President of the Conference, expressed in his opening address the earnest hope that our government would follow up the indication made in the message of the President, and that its delegates to The Hague would take the lead in bringing about an agreement for a limitation and, if possible, a reduction in armaments.<sup>61</sup> He believed that the measure next to, if not equal in importance with, compulsory arbitration to secure the world's peace, was the limitation and diminution of the armaments of the great powers.<sup>62</sup> Chief Justice Stiness, of Rhode Island, who spoke after Mr. Foster, urged that an effort should be made for some limitation of naval and military budgets.<sup>63</sup> Mr. Samuel B. Capen of Boston believed there "was never such an hour, never such an occasion to present this great question. The omission of it by the Czar from the

<sup>59</sup> C. L. Lange, *op. cit.*, G. R., pp. 127-57, 243-75.

<sup>60</sup> *Bulletin Officiel du XV<sup>e</sup> Congrès Universel de la Paix, tenu à Milan du 15 au 22 septembre 1906* (Berne, 1906), p. 151.

<sup>61</sup> *Report of the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, 1906* (1906), pp. 12-16.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 22-26.

Rescript is most significant, and therefore there is all the more need for the United States to press the point, that this question shall be in the program."<sup>64</sup> Charles Hamlin of Boston, President Faunce of Brown University and Mr. Justice Brewer of the United States Supreme Court, all reiterated the demand for a restriction of armaments. The Conference adopted a resolution to the effect that "as the general restriction of armaments can only be secured by concurrent international action, unanimously recommended by the British House of Commons, we earnestly hope that this subject will receive careful and favorable consideration." This was supplemented by another respectfully petitioning President Roosevelt to instruct the delegates for the United States to the next Hague Conference to urge that body to give favorable consideration to three measures, one of which was "a plan for the restriction of armaments and if possible for their reduction by concurrent international action."<sup>65</sup>

Naturally, after the encouraging addresses and resolutions of 1906, there was much surprise at and much publicity given to the action of the Lake Mohonk Conference the following year when it voted against a resolution "expressing its great satisfaction in the support of the President and Secretary of State of the United States of the position of the British Government, and earnestly hopes that this subject will be freely and fully discussed at the coming Hague Conference."<sup>66</sup> Although the resolution failed, the President of the Conference, President Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia University, while passing disarmament by, had urged the wisdom of formal international consideration of the possibility of restricting the future growth of the great armies and navies of the world, without impairing the efficiency of those that existed.<sup>67</sup> He was in entire accord

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 139; also *Resolutions of the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, 1907* (1907), p. 141.

<sup>66</sup> *Report of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, 1907* (1907), p. 141.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

with the position of the British Government. Edwin D. Mead maintains that fifteen minutes more discussion, with such men as Professor John Bassett Moore and Dean Kirchwey of the Columbia University Law School, asking to be heard when the debate closed, would have decisively changed the vote. The final decision, he claims, should not be regarded as an expression of American international sentiment or of the serious judgment of the Mohonk Conference itself. Rather that judgment was reflected in the strong speeches and united action of 1906; and the real voice of the American peace party was heard at the National Arbitration and Peace Congress in New York in April, 1907.<sup>68</sup>

Secretary of State Elihu Root in an address opening this Peace Congress on April 15 stated that the United States Government was of the opinion that the subject matter of the resolutions of the First Hague Conference ought to be further considered and discussed in the Second Conference; that there ought to be at least an earnest effort to reach or to make progress toward reaching some agreement under which the enormous expenditure of money and the enormous withdrawal of men from productive industry for warlike purposes might be reduced, arrested or retarded. The government had not been unmindful of the fact that the question was one which primarily concerned Europe rather than America; that the conditions which had led to the great armaments of the time were mainly European conditions, and that it would ill become us to be forward or dogmatic over a matter which was so much more vital to the nations of Europe than to ourselves. Secretary Root continued: "It sometimes happens, however, that a state having little or no special material interest in a proposal can, for that very reason, advance the proposal with the more advantage and the less prejudice. The American Government accordingly, at an early stage of the discussion regarding the

<sup>68</sup> Edwin D. Mead, *The Limitation of Armaments, The Position of the United States at the Hague Conference*, p. 9.

program, reserved the right to present this subject for the consideration of the Conference." It might be that the discussion would not bring the Second Conference to any definite and practical conclusion; certainly no such conclusion could be effective unless it met with practically universal assent, for there could be no effective agreement which bound some of the great powers and left others free. There would be serious difficulties in formulating any definite proposal which would not be objectionable to some of the powers. Nevertheless, the effort could be made; it might fail in this conference, as it failed in the first, but even if it failed one more step would have been taken toward ultimate success. Mr. Root warned his audience that "long-continued and persistent effort is always necessary to bring mankind into conformity with great ideals; every great advance that civilization has made on its road from savagery has been upon stepping-stones of failure, and a good fight bravely lost for a sound principle is always a victory."<sup>69</sup>

Secretary Root was unwilling that the Conference should be postponed simply because its meeting might result in failure. He did not share Baron d'Estournelles's view that the Conference should not take place in 1907 because public opinion was not yet ready for it. Mr. Root considered that some of the subjects to be brought before the Hague Conference could only be advanced at all at the risk of failure, and before some of them were settled there would perhaps have to be many failures.<sup>70</sup>

In making his statement of the position of the United States Government before the Arbitration and Peace Congress, the Secretary of State emphasized the duty and the power of the peace party to create by agitation a public opinion in which the government would find its strongest reinforcement. Stu-

<sup>69</sup> *Addresses on International Subjects by Elihu Root*, pp. 138-39. Address in Opening the National Arbitration and Peace Congress, in the City of New York, April 15, 1907.

<sup>70</sup> *British Documents*, VIII, 197, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. Durand, November 6, 1906.

dents, teachers and philosophers, men able "to look upon the world as it ought to be," should "press their views upon the world and insist upon conformity," until a righteous public opinion effects the natural purpose which governments represent. Mr. Root said:

The adoption of a new standard of human action is never the result of force or the threat of force; it is always the result of a moral process, and to the initiation and continuance of that process public assertion and advocacy of the principle are essential. When that process has been worked out and the multitude of men whom governments represent have reached the point of genuine and not perfunctory acceptance of the new standard, governments conform themselves to it.<sup>71</sup>

The National Arbitration and Peace Congress unanimously endorsed the position of Secretary Root and resolved that the time had arrived for decided action towards the limitation of the burden of armaments, which had enormously increased since 1899, and requested and urged the Government of the United States to instruct its delegates to the Hague Conference to support, with the full weight of our national influence, the proposition of the British Government as announced by the Prime Minister, to have, if possible, the subject of armaments considered by the Conference.<sup>72</sup>

American pacifist opinion was anxious for the consideration of a definite proposition at the Conference. There might be examined the plan proposed by an English committee, of which Sir John Macdonell and other eminent jurists were members, for the limitation only of budgets—each country agreeing that its annual naval and military appropriations for the following five years should not exceed its average annual expenditure during the preceding five. Or the Conference might deal with President Roosevelt's proposition, commended in his letter to the New York Arbitration and Peace Congress in April,

<sup>71</sup> *Elihu Root, op. cit.*, p. 134.

<sup>72</sup> Edwin D. Mead, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-3.

1907, that the governments should all agree to build battle-ships no larger than those now building.<sup>73</sup> Then there was President Eliot's suggestion that a commission of ten or twelve men of high standing from the leading nations study together ways and means for the restriction and gradual proportionate reduction of armaments and report definite recommendations to the next subsequent conference; this proposal differed slightly from that of M. Albert Gobat who preferred that the Commission report later to the Second Conference.<sup>74</sup> These, at least, were perfectly definite propositions, and, from the pacifist point of view, furnished a clear practical basis for discussion.

Thus between the First and Second Hague Conferences demands came from several distinguished individuals and from national and international bodies for a further study of the "grave problem" for which Nicholas II had called the First Peace Conference. Outside the British Parliament and the various international groups, M. Jean Jaurès, Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, M. Léon Bourgeois and Gaston Moch were probably the most courageous advocates of a reconsideration of the problem. But French public opinion as in 1896 was unsympathetic. France needed the direction of leaders who could organize an effective movement of opinion in behalf of peace and a limitation of armaments. E. M. Carroll points out that men like Baron d'Estournelles and Frédéric Passy could not supply this need for they were not closely identified with a large political group which they could enlist in support of their cause.<sup>75</sup> Not only were leaders with an important following needed but also those with a practical program.

The leadership for international conciliation through the acceptance of the *status quo* as the basis of permanent peace came from the Socialists. The most active members of that

<sup>73</sup> Hans Wehberg, *The Limitation of Armaments*, p. 70, citing Protocole, p. 33. Cf. *Die Grosse Politik*, XXIII, Part I, No. 7817, pp. 88-89 and *British Documents*, VIII, No. 165, p. 195.

<sup>74</sup> Edwin D. Mead, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18, 20.

<sup>75</sup> E. M. Carroll, *French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs* p. 193.



party in the first decade of the twentieth century were Jean Jaurès and Francis de Pressensé. The former, defeated for re-election to the Chamber in 1898, was returned in 1902 and immediately attempted to force France to renounce the policies and values which for thirty years had been considered fundamental.<sup>76</sup> M. Jaurès' motion of 1900 inviting the government to initiate negotiations for a simultaneous disarmament failed because of the deflection of the "Radical" or right wing of the Republican *bloc*.<sup>77</sup> Disarmament had been included on the platform of this group; but Jaurès' and Pressensé's pronouncements on the *revanche* had aroused the indignation and opposition of this right wing group. Both Socialist leaders were opposed to the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine by war; they wanted France to acquiesce in the loss of these provinces if they could not be recovered peacefully. But the proposition advocated by Jaurès in 1902 was condemned and even misrepresented. *Le Temps* insisted that the reason for armament bore no relation to the Alsace-Lorraine question; its solution "would not hasten disarmament by a single hour, nor would it remove a single motive for suspicion. . . ." The *Petit Journal* went so far as to say that Jaurès had proposed "submission to Germany and that France should immediately scrap her armaments."<sup>78</sup> Clémenceau wrote that the Socialist orator "was mistaken in thinking that the people of France did not desire the *revanche*."<sup>79</sup> Finally, *Le Temps* asserted that the Socialists "do not think, do not feel, nor do they desire what the rest of France thinks, feels, or desires . . . nothing can be done with them."<sup>80</sup>

In Great Britain the demand for an understanding concerning armaments was more pronounced; and it received more

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 195.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 197.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 196, citing *Le Temps*, September 25, 1902, and the *Petit Journal*, October 1, 1902.

<sup>79</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 196-97.

attention than in any other country; first, because the burden there was heavier, and, second, because England could agree in 1907 to limit her armaments without fear in any direction. Her naval supremacy was unchallenged; her insular position protected her from the assault of the large conscript armies of the Continent; in ten years she had augmented her naval and military expenditure from £40,440,000 to £61,635,000.<sup>81</sup> She alone was prepared to advocate at The Hague an armament agreement based on a simultaneous, proportional diminution of expenditure or a maintenance of the *status quo*.

\*            \*            \*            \*            \*

<sup>81</sup> *Bulletin de statistique et de législation comparée*, 1906, p. 593. Expenditure on the army had risen from £18,270,000 in 1897-98 to £29,796,000 in 1906-7 and that on the navy from £22,170,000 to £31,839,000.

## CHAPTER XVII

### THE SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE

1907

RUSSIA finally took the initiative in summoning the Second Hague Conference in a communication of April 3, 1906, addressed to the powers signatory to the Hague Convention. But this document was not of the type of either the Rescript of August, 1898, or the Muraviev Circular of January, 1899. The Russian attitude was now different from what it had been at the time when the main object of the Tsar, if not of his ministers, was the limitation of armaments. Now, after her defeat, Russia desired to increase her armaments. Disarmament, therefore, was not included in the program.

In convoking a second Peace Conference [the Circular read] the Imperial Government have had in view the necessity of giving a fresh development to the humanitarian principles which formed the basis of the work of the great international meeting of 1899.

They are at the same time of opinion that it is desirable to increase as far as possible the number of States taking part in the labours of the proposed Conference, and the enthusiasm which this appeal has met with, proves how deep and widespread is the wish today to give effect to ideas having as their object the welfare of humanity.

The First Conference broke up with the conviction that its work would be completed subsequently by the regular progress of the enlightenment among the nations and as the result of experience gradually acquired. Its most important creation, the International Court of Arbitration, is an institution which has already been tested, and which has collected for the common weal, as it were in the areopagus Court, jurists enjoying universal respect. It has also been proved how useful the International Commissions of Inquiry have been for settling differences which have arisen between one State and another.

There are, however, improvements to be made in the Convention relative to the pacific settlement of international disputes. . . .

\*                      \*                      \*                      \*                      \*

A Convention respecting these matters would have to be elaborated, and would form one of the most important duties of the next Conference.

Consequently, as it is at present desirable to examine only such questions as are of pressing importance, in the light of the experience of recent years, leaving untouched those questions which might affect the limitation of military and naval forces, the Imperial Government put forward as the programme of the proposed meeting the following principal points:— . . .<sup>1</sup>

On the day this Circular was issued, Benckendorff informed Sir Edward Grey that in convoking the Second Hague Conference for July, Russia desired to secure improvements in the Working of the Court and additions to the Rules of War by land and sea, but did not propose to discuss the limitation of armaments. In 1906, the request for a discussion of armament budgets came from Great Britain, not Russia; for the newly installed Liberal Government wished to limit expenditure on the navy in order to have money for the social reform to which they were pledged. Moreover, the *détente* following the Algeçiras Conference made the time opportune for the British Cabinet to strive for a reduction of armaments.

Therefore, after careful consideration of the program outlined in the note, Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, replied on July 25 that, as he gathered, Russia did not desire to exclude discussion of the subject, it was the wish of the British Government to see it included.<sup>2</sup> On the same day he told the American Ambassador that "we ourselves would be able to announce, next year, some reductions on both the Army

<sup>1</sup> *Parliamentary Papers*, "International," 1908, CXXIV (Cd. 3857); "Correspondence Respecting the Second Peace Conferences Held at The Hague in 1907," No. 1, pp. 2-3 (translations).

Four points which concerned improvements in the working of the Court and additions to the "Rules of War by land and sea."

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 6, p. 8. Sir Edward Grey to Count Benckendorff, July 25, 1906.

and the Navy. At the Conference, we should be prepared to propose still further reductions on the Navy in future years, provided the other Powers would do something of the same kind." The British Government were not specially anxious to initiate the discussion themselves but they wished the American Government to know that "when it was brought forward at the Hague Conference they would be ready to support it, both by precept and by example."<sup>3</sup>

As the Russian Foreign Office felt itself unable to fix a date for the meeting of the Second Peace Conference before the great powers signified their agreement to the program, communications went on actively for nearly a year concerning the attitudes of the different governments towards the subjects to be discussed at the coming meeting. As a result of this direct correspondence, at least four of the European powers announced their unwillingness to discuss a limitation of armaments.

On May 17, 1906, Sir F. Bertie, the British Ambassador in Paris, transmitted to Sir Edward Grey an extract from a speech delivered the day before in Algeria by M. Thomson, the Minister of Marine, in which he declared that it would be highly imprudent for France to check her naval armaments. "She was bound to maintain her rank as second naval Power in the world, and not to expose herself to the risk of losing it even for a few hours." Sir F. Bertie added that the Minister's observations were in the nature of a reply to the open letter addressed to him by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant advocating a reduction of armaments.<sup>4</sup>

The attitude of the Minister of Marine did not differ greatly from that of M. Cambon who was apprehensive that a discussion in full Conference on the subject of limitation of armaments might not only result in nothing, but might seem ridiculous. He saw, however, a diplomatic yet harmless method of disposing

<sup>3</sup> *British Documents*, VIII, No. 162, p. 191. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. Durand, July 25, 1906.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 159, 189. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, May 17, 1906.

of the question. He suggested that the subject had much better be referred to a committee of jurisconsults or of delegates belonging to the great powers, and that its consideration by the full Conference might meanwhile be adjourned. M. Cambon also thought that the uneasiness which had arisen in the United States with regard to Japan had started a movement in America in favor of building ships, and this might make the United States reluctant to take the initiative at the Hague Conference. When Sir Edward Grey asked the French Ambassador whether, in case Great Britain and Germany were able to attain some mutual agreement to suspend naval construction, he thought other countries might do the same, Cambon replied that "France was in arrears, and he did not think she could diminish Naval expenditure unless an agreement was also made in favour of the limitation of Military as well as Naval expenditure."<sup>5</sup> In fact, the French Government saw no need for the British to include the question of the limitation of armaments in the program of the Second Peace Conference, since this was a subject that had been particularly excluded by the Russian Government and one on which the views of the German Government were so well known. But should the initiative be taken by some other Government, by that of the United States, for instance, the French would be compelled to support it in order to satisfy public opinion.<sup>6</sup>

Just before the Conference met in June, 1907, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a reply to M. Pressensé's interpellation, declared that in case the disarmament question should become acute at The Hague, diplomatists would be supplied with the procedure to enable them to find a formula for the proposal.<sup>7</sup>

In the early months of 1907, Professor de Martens of St. Petersburg visited Berlin, Paris and London to sound the powers with regard to the discussion of the reduction or limitation of

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 177, pp. 206-7. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, February 14, 1907.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 170, p. 199. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, December 5, 1906.

<sup>7</sup> *Echo de Paris*, No. 8394, June 8, 1907.

armaments at the Hague Conference. On February 15, he talked with Sir Edward Grey who informed him that he preferred the subject to be labelled "Expenditure on Armaments" rather than "Disarmament." Sir Edward thought it most desirable that a discussion in this form should take place. In view of the attention already given to the subject by public opinion and by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the British statesman thought there would be great disappointment if it were not discussed; indeed he felt that the Conference would lose in prestige if it separated without venturing to touch this question.

Professor de Martens asked the Foreign Secretary whether he considered that the discussion must be "a serious one, and not that the matter should simply be raised and buried in half-an-hour." When Sir Edward Grey replied that he certainly thought that the discussion "must be a serious one," Professor de Martens dwelt upon the danger of friction arising and suggested previous discussion between the great powers.<sup>8</sup>

While the Russian envoy was in London, Sir Edward Grey wrote to President Roosevelt to ascertain if the Americans were going to raise the question. He knew that if the Hague Conference separated without discussing expenditure on armaments, Parliament would have to be given a definite answer as to why nothing could be done, and that if need be, he "must get a 'yes' or 'no' from Germany by putting a direct question."

"Meanwhile," Grey wrote, "if your Delegates bring the subject forward, ours will be instructed to support; but if you decide not to take the initiative (which I should very much regret) I should like to know in good time, that I may consider what course it is best to take. It will be a poor lame Conference if the Powers all meet there and shirk the question. . . ."<sup>9</sup>

Thus the position of the British Government in the early

<sup>8</sup> *British Documents*, VIII, No. 179, pp. 209-10. Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicholson, February 15, 1906; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1907, p. 1102. Ambassador Reid to the Secretary of State, February 22, 1907.

<sup>9</sup> *British Documents*, VIII, No. 175, p. 203. Sir Edward Grey to President Roosevelt, February 12, 1907.

months of 1907 was: They had told the Russian Government that they desired to see the question of expenditure on armaments discussed, but if this was mentioned in the invitation they wished the American Government also to state their opinion. Sir Edward Grey hoped, for the sake of public sentiment, that the limitation of armaments would be considered at the Conference but realized that some mention of the subject should be made in the invitation as otherwise a discussion of it at The Hague could be ruled out. He did not, however, wish Great Britain to be isolated in any proposal.

Finally, in March, Professor de Martens, the learned scholar and jurist who was in close touch with the Russian Foreign Office, suggested a plan which would save the face of the British while placing their proposal on the program, yet would not injure the sensibilities of the German delegates. He thought, as Sir A. Nicholson<sup>10</sup> informed the Foreign Secretary, that it would be advisable before the Russian Government issued invitations, if the British Government were confidentially to explain at Berlin a harmless procedure which might be followed at the Conference in regard to the question of limitation of armaments, namely, "that the question should be submitted to Conference and then referred to a Special Committee of naval and military experts, who, before the termination of Conference, would present a report concluding with a Resolution."

In view of the feeling which on his second visit Professor de Martens found existing at Berlin, he was strongly in favor of this course. He further suggested that his proposed step should be taken at the German capital before the formal request of the British Government to have the question discussed was communicated to St. Petersburg, so that the Russian Government would, "in issuing final invitation, simply accompany it with a communication of the desire of His Majesty's Government."<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

<sup>11</sup> *British Documents*, VIII, No. 185, p. 215. Sir A. Nicholson to Sir E. Grey, March 14, 1907.



Sir Edward Grey, although he did not object to referring the question of the limitation of armaments to a committee, was skeptical about the above method of procedure, for it was bound to shift to some extent the initiative onto the British Government. He wished to ascertain whether the United States would advocate this plan at Berlin concurrently with Great Britain. Accordingly he telegraphed to Mr. Bryce, the British Ambassador in Washington, as follows:

I should be ready to agree to the question when raised at the Conference being referred to a Committee representing the Great Powers, who should report to the Conference. I do not think this Committee should be restricted to Naval and Military experts. Our desire is to act with the United States and I cannot therefore commit myself to any procedure without knowing whether they agree. Please therefore ascertain the views of the American Government upon this telegram, especially on the two points of what should be said as regards expenditure on armaments in the invitation issued by the Russian Government and whether the procedure should be accepted. I do not propose that any scheme for restricting expenditure on armaments should be formulated before the Conference, but if no mention of the subject is made in the invitation any discussion whatever may be ruled out when the Conference meets.<sup>12</sup>

Already, even before the final invitation had been issued, the proposal for a limitation of armaments was moribund. It may be true that the British and American Governments wished that there should be some consideration of the subject at the Conference, but the other great powers were certainly not so inclined. Discussion of the problem in Conference had been forestalled by a process of direct communication between the governments having the greater immediate interest in the subject. Prince von Bülow, the German Chancellor, stated that he was not opposed to a discussion, but Germany could not assent to a solution that might be antagonistic to her interests. The Emperor, however,

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII, No. 186, p. 217. Telegram of Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Bryce, March 15, 1907.

was opposed to any discussion<sup>13</sup> and Russia did not want to offend Germany in the matter. Professor de Martens declared that the Russian Government was not opposed to a disarmament discussion and did not wish to be so considered, but wanted the Conference to proceed without friction.<sup>14</sup> Count Karl von Wedel, a German diplomat, considered it incompatible with the dignity of a great power to allow any state to interfere in so vital an affair.<sup>15</sup> "It is an encroachment on the rights of a sovereign," said the Tsar who had proposed the same idea in 1898. Count Muraviev dismissed the intentions of the "Friends of Peace" as "Utopias."<sup>16</sup> In a public pronouncement, the Italian Foreign Secretary, Signor Tittoni, stated that the Italian delegates would support the British, and he informed the United States Government that if the English proposals encountered difficulties the Italian delegates would bring forth substitute propositions.<sup>17</sup> But in an informal conversation with Mr. Griscom, the American Ambassador in Rome, Signor Tittoni said that the "Italian delegates to the conference would neither take part in the discussion nor vote on the question of limitation of armaments."<sup>18</sup> Baron d'Aehrenthal, the Austrian Foreign Minister, regretted the desire of the British to enlarge the scope of the discussion by raising this question. He, like the German Foreign Office, found material enough in the Russian program as announced, and did not think it necessary to add new subjects. D'Aehrenthal was certain that no practical results would be obtained and that therefore to raise the question "would be simply to waste the time of the Conference; moreover, it would,

<sup>13</sup> Erich Brandenburg, *Von Bismarck zum Weltkrieg* (Berlin, 1925), p. 244, based on the observations of the Kaiser published in a newspaper, August 6, 1906.

<sup>14</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1907, p. 1103. Ambassador White to Secretary of State, Rome, March 1, 1907.

<sup>15</sup> *Die Grosse Politik*, XXIII, Part I, No. 7860, pp. 135-36. Count Karl von Wedel to Prince Bülow, February 27, 1907.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 105. Count Monts to Prince von Bülow, January 22, 1907.

<sup>17</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1907, No. 863, p. 1105. Italian Ambassador to the Secretary of State, April 5, 1907.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1106. Ambassador Griscom to the Secretary of State, April 6, 1907.

not improbably, lead to friction and would be apt to disturb rather than improve the general relations between the Powers." To this Sir E. Goschen, then British Ambassador at Vienna, replied that he could not see why the mere fact of bringing the subject of expenses on armaments before the Conference should have any disagreeable consequences. For, he explained, "if after the question had been raised, it was held that the discussion was useless or premature, that would," he presumed, "be for the time being the end of the matter."<sup>19</sup>

The attitude of the United States as to the consideration of the subject of limiting armaments was stated in a letter from the Secretary of State to the Russian Ambassador dated June 7, 1906. Mr. Root wrote that the Government was not unmindful of the fact that the people of the United States dwell in comparative security, partly by reason of their isolation and partly because they have never become involved in the numerous questions to which many centuries of close neighborhood had given rise in Europe. They were, therefore, free from the apprehensions of attack which are to so great an extent the cause of large armaments; and it would ill become them to be insistent in a matter so much more vital to the nations of Europe than to them. Nevertheless, sometimes the very absence of a special interest in a subject enables a nation to make suggestions which a more deeply interested nation might hesitate to present. The Government of the United States, therefore, felt it to be its duty to reserve for itself the liberty to propose to the Second Peace Conference as one of the subjects of consideration the reduction or limitation of armaments, in the hope that, if nothing further could be accomplished, some slight advance might be made toward the realization of the lofty conception which actuated the Emperor of Russia in calling the First Conference.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> *British Documents*, VIII, No. 190, p. 219. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, March 23, 1907.

<sup>20</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1906, No. 27, pp. 1635-37. The Secretary of State to the Russian Ambassador, June 7, 1906; J. B. Scott, *The Hague Peace Conferences American Instructions and Reports* (Washington, 1916), p. 75.

President Roosevelt at first hoped that the Conference would consider limiting the size of battleships to 15,000 tons.<sup>21</sup> He quite agreed with Captain Mahan that it was absurd for the different nations to try to outvie each other in building big ships. He thought that the *Dreadnought* was "quite as big as any ship need be," and his idea was that a proposal should be brought forward at the Hague Conference "that no ship should in future be built bigger than the *Dreadnought*." The President asked Count Gleichen to put the proposition before the British Government and to ask them what they thought about it.<sup>22</sup> While promising to support Great Britain at The Hague, Mr. Roosevelt warned Sir Edward Grey and Haldane not to let themselves be led away by emotional ideas. "Wars are not conducted on sentimental principles," he said, "and I am afraid of the present Government giving way to the noisy sentimentality of their followers, in opposition to their own good sense."<sup>23</sup>

President Roosevelt had very little faith in the Conference accomplishing much, as can be gathered from the following passage in a letter he wrote to Mr. Andrew Carnegie on August 5, 1906:

I hope to see real progress made at the next Hague Conference. If it is possible in some way to bring about a stop, complete or partial, to the race in adding to armaments, I shall be glad; but I do not yet see my way clear as regards the details of such a plan. We must always remember that it would be a fatal thing for the great free people to reduce themselves to impotence and leave the despotisms and barbarians armed. It would be safe to do so if there were some system of international police; but there is now no such system.<sup>24</sup>

In short, Roosevelt's opinion was that sufficient naval and military force should be kept up to make the higher civilizations masters of the world.

<sup>21</sup> *Die Grosse Politik*, XXIII, I, No. 7817, pp. 88-89. Correspondence between Tschirschky and Tirpitz, September 7 and October 10, 1906; and Speck von Sternburg to the Foreign Office, October 9, 1906 (No. 7818, p. 89).

<sup>22</sup> *British Documents*, VIII, No. 165, p. 195. Count Gleichen to Sir M. Durand, September 2, 1906.

<sup>23</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>24</sup> J. B. Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and His Times* (Scribner's, London, 1920), I, 21-22.

Thus, during the year between the proposal for the Second Hague Conference and the issue of the final invitation, the governments of the world discussed with one another their attitude toward the question of limiting armament expenditure. Nevertheless, during this period, one power, Great Britain, showed evidence of good faith by announcing in July, 1906, that one of the four battleships of the Cawdor program would be omitted, with corresponding reduction in destroyers and submarines. This step did not evoke a favorable response from Berlin, for the next month the Kaiser, in a conversation with Sir Frank Lascelles, informed the British Ambassador that "in case the disarmament question came up in any form whatever (at the Conference), German participation was to cease, for I as well as my people would never tolerate any prescription by foreigners regarding the condition of our Navy and Army." To this Sir Frank replied: "I perfectly understand, and quite agree with you, that that is quite out of the question, and impossible. It is exactly the same with us." <sup>25</sup>

About the same time, August 15, 1906, King Edward visited his nephew at Cronberg. No strictly political conversation took place between His Majesty and the Kaiser, but the German Emperor reported to President Roosevelt in January, 1907, that "the King himself took the initiative in telling me that he entirely disapproved of the New Conference and that he considered it as a 'humbug.' The King told me that he not only thought the Conference useless, as nobody would, in case of need, feel bound by its decisions, but even as dangerous. It was to be feared that instead of harmony more friction would be the result." <sup>26</sup>

The Kaiser admitted that he did not conceal from His Majesty that he himself was not enthusiastic about the Conference, and especially told the King and Sir Charles Hardinge

<sup>25</sup> *Die Grosse Politik*, XXIII, I, No. 7815, pp. 85-86. William II in conversation with Sir F. Lascelles, August 15, 1906.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 93. Telegram from German Emperor to President Roosevelt, January 5, 1907; also, *Scribner's Magazine*, April, 1920, p. 397; Sir Sidney Lee, *King Edward VII* (Macmillan, London, 1924), II, 529-30.

that Germany could not recede from her naval program laid down six years before, but that Germany did not build up a fleet with aggressive tendencies against any other power; she did so only in order to protect her own territory and commercial interests.<sup>27</sup>

On the other hand, William II, in a conversation with Hardinge, is said to have ridiculed the approaching Hague Conference by calling it "great nonsense," and to have urged that direct negotiations between the great powers would be more successful in regulating naval warfare. When the question of a limitation of armaments was raised he declared that "Germany since the peace of Tilsit, had depended on the strength of her own right arm, and her safety lay in her present overwhelming army. She could put into the field three million more men than France and crush France by sheer weight of numbers." Despite his boastfulness, the Kaiser showed a desire for good relations with England and hinted that he was fully prepared to discuss conditions of naval warfare with her before the Conference.<sup>28</sup>

Undeterred by the hostility of the Kaiser to a discussion of armaments, the British Prime Minister made an impressive appeal to Europe in an article entitled "The Hague Conference and the Limitation of Armaments," published in *The Nation*, a liberal weekly, March 2, 1907. He wrote:

The disposition shown by certain Powers of whom Great Britain is one, to raise the question of the limitation of armaments at the approaching Hague Conference, has evoked some objections both at home and abroad, on the ground that such action would be ill-timed, inconvenient, and mischievous. I wish to indicate, as briefly as may be, my reasons for holding these objections to be baseless.

It should be borne in mind that the original Conference at The Hague was convened for the purpose of raising this very question, and in the hope that the Powers might arrive at an understanding calcu-

<sup>27</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>28</sup> Sir Sidney Lee, *op. cit.*, II, 530.

lated to afford some measure of relief from an excessive and ever-increasing burden. The hope was not fulfilled, nor was it expected that agreement on so delicate and complex a matter would be reached at the first attempt; but, on the other hand, I have never heard it suggested that the discussion left behind it any injurious consequences. I submit that it is the business of those who are opposed to the renewal of the attempt, to show that some special and essential change of circumstances has arisen, such as to render unnecessary, inopportune, or positively mischievous a course adopted with general approbation in 1898.

Nothing of the kind has, so far as I know, been attempted, and I doubt if it could be undertaken with any hope of success. It was desirable in 1898, to lighten the burden of armaments; but that consummation is not less desirable to-day, when the weight of the burden has been enormously increased. . . .

I am aware of no special circumstances which would make the submission of this question to the Conference a matter of International misgiving. . . . Since the first Hague Conference was held, the points of disagreement between the Powers have become not more but less acute; they are confined to a far smaller field; the sentiment in favour of peace, so far as can be judged, has become incomparably stronger and more constant; and the idea of arbitration and the peaceful adjustment of International disputes has attained a practical potency, and a moral authority undreamt of in 1898. . . .

Let me in conclusion say a word as to the part of Great Britain. We have already given earnest of our sincerity by the considerable reductions that have been effected in our naval and military expenditure, as well as by the undertaking that we are prepared to go further, if we find a similar disposition in other quarters. Our delegates, therefore, will not go into the Conference empty-handed. It has, however, been suggested that our example will count for nothing, because our preponderant naval position will still remain unimpaired. I do not believe it. The sea power of this country implies no challenge to any single State or group of States. . . . Our known adhesion to those two dominant principles—the independence of nationalities and the freedom of trade—entitles us of itself to claim that if our fleets be invulnerable, they carry with them no menace across the waters of the world, but a message of the most cordial goodwill, based on a belief in the community of interests between nations.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>29</sup> *The Nation* (London) (March 2, 1907), I, 4; also, J. A. Spender, *Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, II* (Houghton, London, 1923), 328–30.

This article had been submitted to Sir Edward Grey and most carefully discussed with the Foreign Secretary before it was issued. The writer was certain that words could not have been more carefully chosen to avoid offense or misunderstanding, but the result was extremely discouraging. *Le Temps*, in referring to it, stated that "this article, which has made England ridiculous in the eyes of the world, has caused no pleasure in France and has awakened evident irritation in Germany."<sup>30</sup> King Edward, who was at Biarritz at the time, wrote, among other things, on a report of a Cabinet meeting sent him: "I am disgusted at his article in *The Nation* and his backing up the Women's Franchise Bill. Both are unnecessary and the matter very undigested. I suppose he will support the Channel Tunnel Bill next week!"<sup>31</sup> From the first His Majesty had desired that his Government should not initiate the discussion of limitation of armaments at The Hague and was willing that Great Britain should support such a proposal only if coming from the American delegates. It is a matter of conjecture to what extent his opinions on the subject were influenced by President Roosevelt. King Edward was supported in his view by the Admiralty,<sup>32</sup> who, as at the time of the Conference of 1899, were opposed to any reduction of naval force.

Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's sincerity was, however, confirmed by a Navy program of three capital ships and a promise to drop one of them if other powers would do the same. The offer was communicated officially to seven nations, but, on April 30, von Bülow, to whom the invitation was virtually addressed, announced in the Reichstag that the German Government could not participate in a discussion which they believed to be impractical, if not actually dangerous. At the same time the British Government were informed that if anything was to be done in this direction it must be through the ordinary

<sup>30</sup> *Le Temps*, March 7, 1907.

<sup>31</sup> Sidney Lee, *op. cit.*, II, 467.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 438-39.



diplomatic channels. In the meanwhile Russia and Austria expressed a desire to postpone the question.

Despite the conciliatory attitude of the British Prime Minister, a warm believer in the principle of conditional programs in naval construction, the German General Staff regarded his offer as part of a plan concerted with France to put pressure on Germany. To a large number of Germans the publication of the *Nation* article seemed paradoxical. Only one year before Great Britain had launched the *Dreadnought*, a new type of fighting vessel whose superiority over all other battleships then afloat had been repeatedly emphasized by Sir John Fisher. The Home Fleet was being concentrated in the North Sea, and Mr. Haldane was busily organizing an expeditionary force to operate on the Continent, but certainly not against France or Russia. That the supreme Naval Power at the moment of its own great preponderance desired a halt in naval competition seemed the antithesis of conciliation. In Berlin many believed that Great Britain together with France and Russia wished to force the issue with Germany before she became too formidable at sea.<sup>33</sup>

Though the sincerity and enthusiasm of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman may not have been doubted in his own country, the wisdom of his policy was certainly questioned. On March 5, on presentation of the naval budget for 1907-8, Mr. Arthur Lee, Conservative M. P. and naval specialist, stated that England had already sacrificed enough on the altar of peace in reducing her naval program and peace effective. He felt it would be more honest for Great Britain to go before the Hague Conference with the two-power Standard as the basis of her minimum—and if the Government liked, as her maximum strength; but he did not want Britain to make herself “ridiculous in the eyes of the world by going before the Conference with the bait of one ‘Dreadnought’ which might be dropped if other Powers cut out something else, as if we were putting out

<sup>33</sup> On this point see: J. A. Spender, *Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman*, II, 330-31; and J. A. Spender, *Fifty Years of Europe* (London, 1933), p. 267.

a piece of toasted cheese to catch unwary mice. The other powers were not unwary, and they would not be fooled in that way." He hoped that the Prime Minister, when at the Conference he held out that bait to the other Powers, would be able to obtain some result in suspending shipbuilding, but he did not believe that any such thing was possible.<sup>34</sup>

Finally, by April 3, 1907, all the powers to which the Imperial Government had, in April, 1906, communicated their draft proposals as to the work to be undertaken by the new Conference, had expressed their adhesion. But before summoning the meeting the Imperial Government thought it their duty to furnish the powers which had accepted their invitation with a statement of their position.

Accordingly, Count Benckendorff reported that Great Britain, Spain and the United States desired a discussion on disarmament, while the last country had introduced an additional question, namely, the passing of an agreement for restricting the employment of force for the recovery of ordinary public debts resulting from contracts.

But the Imperial Government considered it their duty to state that, on their side, "they adhere to their proposals of April, 1906, as a basis for the deliberations of the Conference, and that, in the event of the Conference initiating a discussion which did not appear to them likely to lead to a practical issue they reserve in their turn the right of abstaining from such discussion." At the same time the Russian Foreign Minister announced that similar observations had been made by the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments.

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Soon the nations appointed their delegates and issued to them detailed instructions. Those of Great Britain and the United States are particularly interesting, for they concern the initiation of the proposal for a limitation of armaments. On June 12, the British Foreign Secretary signed elaborate instruc-

<sup>34</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, Fourth series, CLXX, col. 668.

tions to Sir Edward Fry, who was accompanied by Sir E. Satow, Lord Reay, Sir H. Howard, British Minister at The Hague, with General Ellis and Captain Ottley, Director of Naval Intelligence, as experts. The Government had now acceded to the views of the King and Admiralty and merely decided to support a proposal from the American delegates. From the following it is obvious that caution was the keynote of these instructions:

The Government, in accepting the invitation, reserves the right of suggesting the discussion of other questions. Foremost among them is that of expenditure upon armaments. . . . They felt it was better to have a discussion, even if it did not lead to a satisfactory conclusion. Discussion without results would, at any rate, have kept the door open for continuing negotiations on the subject. Whereas to put the question aside would seem like an admission that it was hopeless, and had receded since the First Conference, of which it was the prime object. . . .

The position of Germany both as a military and as a naval Power is such that it is difficult to regard as serious any discussion in which she does not take part. His Majesty's Government would be most reluctant that anything should take place at The Hague Conference, summoned, as it is, in the interest of peace, that would be of a nature, to cause friction or ill-feeling. You will therefore consult closely with your United States colleagues, and ascertain what instructions they have, and consider with them what line it is best to take.

Should it be decided that the subject shall be discussed and a practical proposal invited, you are authorised to say that His Majesty's Government would agree to a proposal that the Great Powers should communicate to each other in advance their programmes of new naval construction. . . . His Majesty's Government are aware that this would not necessarily lead to any reduction in expenditure; but they are hopeful that the mere fact of communication between the Powers would provide opportunities for negotiations that do not now exist, and would tend to alleviate the burden of expenditure or retard its increase.<sup>35</sup>

At the same time the British delegates were instructed that Great Britain could not agree to abandon the right of capture

<sup>35</sup> *Parliamentary Papers, op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.

at sea, except in return for concessions of equal value. On this point the Foreign Secretary informed Sir Edward Fry that:

It is probable that a proposal will be brought before The Hague Conference to sanction the principle of the immunity of enemies' merchant ships and private property from capture at sea in time of war. . . . It must be remembered that the principle, if carried to its logical conclusion, must entail the abolition of the right of commercial blockade. During recent years the proportion between the British army and the great Continental armies has come to be such that the British army, if operating alone, can not be regarded as a means of offence against the mainland of a great Continental Power. For her ability to bring pressure to bear upon her enemies in war, Great Britain has, therefore, to rely on the navy alone. His Majesty's Government cannot, therefore, authorise you to agree to any Resolution which would diminish the effective means which the navy has of bringing pressure to bear upon an enemy.

You should, however, raise no objection to the discussion of this question of immunity from capture at the Conference, nor should you refuse to participate in it, nor need you necessarily take the initiative in opposing a Resolution. . . . If at some future date the great continental armies were to be diminished . . . and if it became apparent that such a change could be brought about by an agreement to secure this immunity from capture at sea under all circumstances, and was dependent upon it, the British Government might feel that the risks they would run by adhering to such an agreement . . . would be outweighed by the general gain and relief.<sup>36</sup>

We shall see how the refusal of the Admiralty to dispense with this powerful weapon placed Great Britain in an awkward position at The Hague.

On the question of the limitation of armaments the instructions to the American delegates were as cautious as those to the British. The delegates were reminded that upon every question it is important to remember that the object of the Conference was agreement, and not compulsion. After reasonable discussion, if no agreement were reached, it would be better to lay

<sup>36</sup> *British Documents*, VIII, No. 206, pp. 246-47. Instructions to British Plenipotentiaries, Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Fry, June 12, 1907.

the subject aside, or refer it to some future conference.<sup>37</sup> The policy of the United States to avoid entangling alliances and to refrain from any interference or participation in the political affairs of Europe, the delegates were instructed, must be kept in mind, and might impose upon them some degree of reserve in respect of some of the questions discussed by the Conference.<sup>38</sup> After quoting the contents of Secretary Root's letter of June 7, 1906, to the Russian Ambassador,<sup>39</sup> the instructions stated that there should be a sincere effort to learn whether, by conference and discussion, some practicable formula might not be worked out which would have the effect of limiting or retarding the increase of armaments. The United States Government was still of opinion that this subject should be regarded as unfinished business, and that the Second Hague Conference should ascertain and give full consideration to the results of such examination as the governments might have given to the possibility of an agreement pursuant to the wish expressed by the First Conference. Regret was expressed that discussion should have taken place before rather than at the Conference, for discussion at the Conference would have afforded a greater probability of progress toward the desired result. The fact, however, could not be ignored.<sup>40</sup> The final instructions to the delegates were as follows:

If any European Power proposes consideration of the subject, you will vote in favor of consideration and do everything you properly can to promote it. If, on the other hand, no European Power proposes consideration of the subject, and no new and affirmative evidence is presented to satisfy you that a useful purpose would be subserved by your making such a proposal, you may assume that the

<sup>37</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1907, Part 2, pp. 1129-30. "Instructions to the American Delegates to The Hague Conference, 1907," Messrs. Joseph H. Choate, Horace Porter, Uriah M. Rose, David Jayne Hill, George B. Davis, Charles S. Sperry and William I. Buchanan, pp. 1128-37; also James Brown Scott, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-76.

<sup>38</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States*, *op. cit.*, p. 1131.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1131-32.

<sup>40</sup> *Loc. cit.*

limitations above stated by way of guidance to your action preclude you from asking the Conference to consider the subject.<sup>41</sup>

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The Second Hague Conference sat from June 15 to October 18, with M. Nelidov, who represented Russia, presiding. At the suggestion of President Roosevelt, the Latin American republics had been invited; consequently, forty-four sovereign states sent delegates to this Conference which thus was more truly international than the first.

It was known beforehand that any proposal in regard to the limitation of armaments would have no immediate results; nevertheless, a discussion was initiated by Sir Edward Fry on August 17 at the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Conference. He began by quoting the Muraviev Circular of 1898, and then pronounced its true and eloquent words to be more opportune than ever. Since then the armament expenditures of Europe, the United States and Japan, had risen from 251 to 320 millions of pounds sterling. He was quite sure that the Conference agreed with him that the fulfillment of the desire expressed by the Emperor of Russia and by the First Conference would be a great blessing for the whole of humanity. Sir Edward assured the body that his Government was a convinced supporter of these high aspirations, and that it charged him to invite the Conference to co-operate for the realization of this noble desire. He proceeded to say:

The Government of Great Britain will be prepared to communicate annually to Powers which would pursue the same course the program for the construction of new ships of war and the expenditure which this program would entail. This exchange of information would facilitate an exchange of views between Governments on the subject of the reductions which it might be possible to effect by mutual agreement.

The British Government believes that in this way it might be possible to arrive at an understanding with regard to the expenditure

<sup>41</sup> *Loc. cit.*

which the States which should undertake to adopt this course would be justified in incorporating in their estimates.

In conclusion, therefore, Mr. President, I have the honour to propose to you the adoption of the following resolution:

The Conference confirms the resolution adopted by the Conference of 1899 in regard to the limitation of military expenditure; and inasmuch as military expenditure has considerably increased in almost every country since that time, the Conference declares that it is eminently desirable that the Governments should resume the serious examination of this question.<sup>42</sup>

The British proposition was supported by the United States, France and Spain. The delegates of the Argentine Republic and Chile presented to the Conference their treaty of May 28, 1902, and the supplementary agreement of January 9, 1903, in the belief that these protocols might be of some use in the study of Great Britain's proposals. The discussion was concluded by a brief address from the President. In 1899, M. Nelidov declared, the discussions had been so lively that they had threatened to wreck the Conference. Therefore, the Russian Government this time had refrained from placing the limitation of armaments upon the program. He continued, "If the question was not ripe in 1899, it is not any more so in 1907. It has not been possible to do anything on these lines, and the Conference to-day finds itself as little prepared to enter upon them as in 1899."<sup>43</sup> He could only applaud the English initiative and recommend the Conference to unite in accepting the resolution as it had been proposed by Sir Edward Fry.

In the absence of the German delegates the resolution was accepted with unanimous applause, whereupon the President announced that the unanimity of the acclamation made it unnecessary to proceed to a vote.

Thus the question of limitation of armaments was quietly, quickly, peacefully and respectfully laid to rest. The discussion

<sup>42</sup> J. B. Scott, *Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences, The Conference of 1907* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1920), I, 89-90.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 92.

had lasted only twenty-five minutes, a period shorter by five minutes than Professor de Martens had originally suggested for consideration of the subject.<sup>44</sup> It had not even been necessary to refer the matter to a Committee of Experts.

The friends of peace had hope for something more substantial than this academic resolution; but under the circumstances it would not have been "diplomatic" for the British Government to have proceeded further. Germany, Russia and Austria, it was definitely known, stood in the way. France was not anxious for a limitation of armaments, though, for the sake of appearances, she was ready to take part in a harmless discussion. The Admiralties and War Offices of most countries were opposed to the idea. It is not likely that any result would have been reached at the Conference, even if Germany had consented to a discussion. It was Germany's frankness rather than her policy that distinguished her from other great powers. Nevertheless, she acted unwisely, for she has had to shoulder the blame for the failure of the world to disarm in 1899 and again in 1907.

The brief twenty-five minute discussion provided the British delegates with a clear conscience. They did "all in their power," as Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman said, "and if greater results were not obtained, it must be borne in mind that all progress in these matters depends on general consent, and that any attempt to force the pace beyond the general goodwill of nations is bound to have a negative result, and may even lead to friction, which is a good deal worse than the negative result."

Apart from disarmament the only other subjects on the agenda which interested the general public were arbitration and the immunity of private property at sea, the second of which was brought forward by the United States and firmly resisted by the British Admiralty. Germany, Austria and Italy supported the Americans, while the British were placed in a position in which they seemed to be holding out for the largest

<sup>44</sup> *Supra*, p. 325.



belligerent rights against the human opinion of the rest of the world. The civilian representatives of the British Liberal Government could do nothing against the obduracy of the experts.

The *beau rôle*, as Lord Reay complained, had certainly passed to Germany. One of the grounds on which large navies, and above all a large German Navy, were demanded, was the necessity of defending commerce in time of war. It seemed only logical that, if this danger were removed, one of the excuses for naval armaments would disappear and disarmament could then be seriously considered. But so long as the British Admiralty insisted on the right to capture merchant ships Germany must build a fleet capable of protecting her rapidly expanding commerce and one that would be respected on the high seas.

The German naval experts were well aware of the effect that an agreement on the immunity of private property at sea would have on their fleet in being, and at heart would not have wanted such a proposal to be carried; for, at the time of the First Hague Conference, Captain Siegel had expressed his opposition to the idea. He well knew that if private property at sea were declared inviolable, demands would at once be raised in Germany for a diminution of naval war material, particularly of cruisers, since their chief purpose, to protect trade, would no longer be included in the tasks of the navy; then it would be asserted that in future only battleships were necessary. The naval experts wanted above all to combat such agitation, for they considered a reduction of the cruiser fleet the greatest mistake. Was it not this type of fleet that made Great Britain "able to maintain her character as the strongest Power all over the world"? <sup>45</sup>

The unyielding opposition of the British technical delegates to the immunity of private property at sea and their argument that a hundred-ton marine collier must be treated as an auxiliary man-of-war, were difficult to reconcile with the British desire

<sup>45</sup> *Die Grosse Politik*, XV, No. 4273, p. 227. Report of Captain Siegel, German Naval Delegate to the First Hague Peace Conference, June 28, 1899.

for a limitation of armaments and had the effect of making Great Britain appear hypocritical. Marschall von Bieberstein, the leader of the German Delegation, was jubilant that the British had turned the situation to German account. The way was now clear for new German Navy Laws and the great competition in dreadnoughts that was to characterize the period from the Second Hague Conference to 1914. This discussion of maritime law led, in February, 1909, to the Declaration of London which, because of the opposition of the House of Lords, was rejected by the British Government. Thus, when the World War started, German submarines were at liberty to send as much of British shipping to the bottom as they were capable of doing, and England was morally free to starve out Germany if she could.

Nor did the principle of compulsory arbitration make much headway at the Second Conference. On this issue the Germans have been criticized for their opposition to the principle of compulsion; but again, as in 1899, the other powers were hardly more favorable to the idea. Austria was not willing to accept compulsory arbitration so long as the Balkan question was unsettled. The French Minister at Rome said that his country would never consent to obligatory arbitration. Great Britain was at first opposed to it but later threw in her weight on the side of compulsion. In spite of her apparent enthusiasm and the fact that she had signed a special arbitration treaty with Germany in 1904, England refused to submit to arbitration the German claims to compensation for two ships stopped during the South African War. Great Britain made the basis of her refusal that this was a political, not a legal, question and therefore affected the "vital interests" of the nation. On the other hand, an arbitration treaty that Germany had signed with the United States came to naught because the American Senate insisted on the right to accept or reject the *compromis* proposed in each particular case. Still, some of the delegates to the Conference, in particular M. Bourgeois, Herr Lammasch and Mr. Choate, were honest in their support of arbitration. In the

voting Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Switzerland and the four Balkan States stood against the proposed obligatory arbitration, while Italy, Japan and Luxemburg abstained from voting, so that, lacking unanimity, the motion was defeated. In these circumstances it was impossible to do more than pass a resolution "admitting the principle of obligatory arbitration," and declaring that certain disputes are suitable for settlement in that way.<sup>46</sup>

Although the Conference failed on three important problems on its agenda, it extended to naval warfare the provisions of the Geneva Convention; obtained some limitation on floating mines, live torpedoes, the bombardment of undefended places, the dropping of explosives from the air; and declared against poison gas—all of which was forgotten in the years 1914-18. And finally, the body resolved that another Conference should be held within seven years,<sup>47</sup> a period which expired when the most highly civilized nations of the world possessed of the most powerful and deadly means of destruction devised to that time were engaged in one of the most ghastly annihilations in history.

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<sup>46</sup> J. B. Scott, *op. cit.* Vol. I, Plenary Sessions, p. 332.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 169.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATIONS

THE limitation of armaments is not a matter of mathematics nor of morals but of politics; states seek to give effect to their national policies through armaments as well as through monetary and immigration policies, tariffs and embargoes. Armament competition is inextricably interwoven with political tension, and international agreement on armaments is possible only when the national policies of states are not in conflict; for international disarmament standardizes the relative diplomatic power of the countries involved and prevents the use of armament competition to upset the political equilibrium. Fleets and armies, since they are the means by which a nation can coerce other nations by direct physical violence, are inevitably important elements of diplomacy. As the instruments of war and therefore of national policies, their limitation involves questions affecting national honor and vital interests. How can an efficacious plan for disarmament be combined with the fundamental principle of international law, the sovereignty of the state? How can a proportion be found that will be just to all states, large and small, rich and poor, those with several frontiers to defend and those with only one, those with far-flung colonial possessions and those with none, those on the periphery or far distant from the armed camp and those in its midst? How can an arrangement be supervised and enforced? How can the exact nature of armaments be defined? The inventions of modern science have produced ingenious instruments which are as effective for defense as for attack, and what power, when engaged in a war *à outrance*, will observe an agreement not to

employ these new weapons? Even more perplexing, how can the opposition of some states to the permanent acceptance of the *status quo* be surmounted? In the European society of the nineteenth century, without an international executive to enforce engagements on recalcitrant states, disarmament was impossible.

For one hundred years before the World War statesmen and pacifists, jurists and international societies, considered and discussed plans for limiting armaments. But all their proposals, with a few meager exceptions limited to specific regions, failed because no state seriously believed in disarmament for itself. No one nation was exclusively responsible for the competition in armaments; none was innocent, for they all lived in a perpetual state of mutual fear and antagonism, expecting war and always preparing for it. If none was innocent, therefore, they were all more or less guilty. Finally, the failure of the powers to check the intense armament rivalry made war inevitable.

Arms could not be limited without perpetuating a settlement intolerable to several states. Here was the crux of the whole problem of disarmament; here has been and always will be the greatest obstacle in the path to the limitation of armaments. For the maintenance of the *status quo* involves the perpetuation of a settlement unjustly imposed by the power of the sword, in a passion of retaliation. Its maintenance assumed a portentous significance after the revolutions of 1848 and still more after France lost Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. Irredentist peoples of Europe—Italians, Bohemians, Southern Slavs, Poles—and even the French, were proud of refusing to accept the territorial settlements as final, biding their time for the correction of the deeds of injustice. Disarmament and the surrender of the notion of altering the existing situation by force of arms can only be viewed with favor by those powers which not only accept the *status quo* but regard it with satisfaction. Dissatisfied powers may not actually want war, may even dread it, and may be in practice quite as unwilling to run the risk of an appeal to arms as the satisfied states; but in spite of this, they will not

voluntarily shut off all possibility of obtaining a state of things which will be to them more acceptable than the present. Here is the simple common sense of disarmament. No plan for limiting armaments by which the *status quo* would become stereotyped was acceptable in 1816, in 1870, in 1899, in 1907. Many questions in Europe, the Near East and the Orient remained unsettled, and no power was willing to face the future inadequately armed to protect its "vital interests." Moreover, after 1870 the size and the efficiency of the military and naval establishments of a state were considered by many to be the best indication available of the aggregate power and wealth of a nation. So long as this view prevailed, the rivalry in armaments was not an accidental evil, but a fundamental necessity. Any proposal to limit it was considered a device to give to decadent and inefficient countries an artificial position which they did not deserve.<sup>1</sup> The armament competition took the place of actual warfare, and the superiority of Germany on land and of Great Britain on the sea became evident even though no gun was fired.

Nevertheless, by the last quarter of the nineteenth century the limitation of armaments had become one of the major problems facing Europe. No longer was its discussion relegated to Peace Society meetings. The Manchester School of economists lent the subject prestige through their advocacy of free trade and world peace. Liberals, Radicals and Nonconformists joined in the agitation. During the decade 1888-98 the disarmament movement received new impetus from the Universal Peace Congresses, the Churches, the Arbitration Alliance, economists, international jurists, novelists, journalists, statesmen, kings and emperors, until it culminated in the greatest surprise and mystification of the country—the invitation from the most absolute sovereign of the world to meet in conference to deal with the "grave problem" of armaments.

The Tsar's initiative was applauded by all lovers of peace,

<sup>1</sup> Sir James Headlam-Morley, *Studies in Diplomatic History*, p. 266.

for it was the most significant event up to 1898 that the peace movement had to its credit. While the pacifists became jubilant, the diplomatists remained sceptical; while the European press soon lost sight of the humanitarian side of the Eirenicon and, with a few exceptions, maintained a rather hostile attitude, the international jurists indicated the technical difficulties in the way of a limitation of armaments. In America the impression prevailed that not much would be accomplished in the way of limiting armaments but that something might be done to extend the use of arbitration. The Foreign Offices of all the great powers doubted the sincerity of Nicholas II and found his proposals extremely troublesome. Some statesmen, however, had to take into consideration pacific opinion and were, therefore, cautious in making public statements. They agreed to meet in conference for the sake of public opinion and for saving the face of the Tsar but had no intentions of limiting their forces.

A solution of the armament problem was even more remote in 1899 than it had been in 1816 and in 1870. Most of the powers had ambitions which they desired to gratify and which they would not readily renounce in the interest of peace and economy. As far as the French were concerned, the status of Alsace-Lorraine was not permanently settled; for the other great powers, the Eastern Question was still open, and in the Far East an ancient empire was in danger of division into rival "spheres of influence." Furthermore, most statesmen realized that, whatever arrangements a conference might make, the peace of Europe depended upon the life of one great monarch, Francis Joseph of Austria. It was believed that when the Emperor died—he was sixty-nine in 1899—a successor would not be found able to hold together all the dominions of the House of Habsburg. Internecine discord would break out, and Kaiser William II would probably not refuse the appeal of millions of Germans wanting the *Anschluss*; but was it conceivable that Russia and France, regardless of what arrangements were made at the Conference, would be willing quietly

to stand aside while this change in the map of Europe was taking place? Would not the Czechs and Slavs of the disrupted Empire appeal to their great Slavonic neighbor? The approach of this threatening crisis in Europe, and the certainty that no power would be content to watch it unarmed and unprepared, seemed to doom to failure any attempt to limit armaments. In addition, the appearance at the close of the century of two new naval powers—the United States in the New World and Japan in the Far East—added to the difficulties of stabilizing or limiting armaments.

Finally, in naming their delegates to the Conference the governments were shrewd and far-sighted enough to include among them such militarists as Sir John Fisher, Captain Mahan, Captain Siegel, Colonel Gross von Schwarzhoff and Professor Karl von Stengel. Admiral Fisher's previously demonstrated qualities as a fighter made him, in Lord Salisbury's opinion, particularly well qualified to serve as a British delegate to the *Peace Conference*. Captain Mahan, who had little sympathy with the main purposes of the Conference, was chosen by the United States Government because of his views on sea power. Baron von Stengel, whose pamphlet, *Der Ewige Friede*, glorified war as a God-given institution and derided attempts to limit armaments, was the Kaiser's choice as delegate. Although the representatives of some states demonstrated more effrontery and ostentation, were less diplomatic and more vehement in their opposition than others, most of the experts were none too adroit in their finesse. They pointed to technical difficulties in the path of disarmament which were in most cases political prejudices in uniform. The Conference went through the ritual of passing an innocuous resolution which stood before the public opinion of the world as a symbol of the attempted solution of the armament problem.

It might have been hoped that the Conference would be the beginning of a new era in the history of the peace movement and an epoch in the history of man; but this did not prove to



by the case. It did not result in any action of the nations for the purpose of claiming from their governments that this official meeting should be made to fulfill the purpose that the Tsar had proclaimed to the world in his manifesto. The Conference, like the movement for a limitation of armaments which preceded it, did not affect the public at large; it met with no general interest or encouragement. The world's press, after striving without avail to gain admission to the sessions, gave up in disgust and neglected the Conference, so that it was advertised only by Baroness von Suttner's telegrams to Vienna and W. T. Stead's daily bulletin to London. Jean de Block, Bertha von Suttner and Stead went to The Hague to use their personal influence on some well-meaning delegates, but the pacifists as a whole remained inactive. The Peace Conference was not sufficiently turned to account to win over public opinion. From a study of the nineteenth century movement for a limitation of armaments and the First Hague Conference we must conclude that there was then no public opinion on disarmament. Complicated factors were involved which could not be understood without a thorough knowledge of events and historic background that was not easily available to the people.<sup>2</sup>

After the First Hague Conference, armament expenditure, instead of decreasing, increased by leaps and bounds. Two wars, the South African and the Spanish-American, fought far away from the British and American base of supplies, demonstrated the importance of sea power in deciding political disputes and intensified the race in naval armaments.

Moreover, economic imperialism encouraged this competition, for one of the chief purposes of armaments, especially naval armaments, is to defend colonies against seizure and to enhance diplomatic prestige. These were the chief reasons Germany advanced for building a large navy. The British "seizure" of the Hamburg Mail Steamers during the course of the Boer War made the German Government realize their maritime defici-

<sup>2</sup> Charles W. Smith, *Public Opinion in a Democracy*, p. 503.

encies and consider how different the course of that war might have been, if the German Navy had not previously been neglected. After 1900 Germany therefore set about constructing a battle fleet so strong that even an adversary in possession of the greatest sea power would attack it only at a grave risk.

The German reasons for wanting a navy were as logical as those of any state for wanting armaments. Germany wanted a strong navy because Germany was becoming a great power. At the opening of the twentieth century the German fleet bore no reasonable proportion to Germany's growing trade and over-sea commerce; Germany wanted a navy to protect her large and increasing merchant marine; Germany with her rapidly growing population, trading all over the world, aspired to become a colonial empire. Colonies she could gain and hold only with a navy. Her superb military forces could not help her in deciding disputes in the Pacific, in Asia, in Africa, where her policy was often rendered impotent by her weakness at sea.

But this German desire for a navy and its rapid fulfillment became the principal source of antagonism between Great Britain and Germany in the new century, and their rivalry in dreadnought construction after 1907 was the chief factor in the armament competition up to 1914. Instead of these two friendly powers co-operating as was advocated by the most convinced, energetic and influential promoters of British imperialism, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain and Mr. Cecil Rhodes, they chose opposite paths. The nation with the greatest army and the nation with the greatest navy, had they worked together, could have maintained their own interests and kept Europe in order, for the fleet and the army could not fight each other.<sup>3</sup> A proper understanding between the two Governments would have guaranteed the peace of the world; but, instead of alliance, they chose rivalry.

Great Britain, whose naval supremacy had been unquestioned

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Chamberlain's speech at Leicester, November 30, 1899; cf. H. H. Asquith, *The Genesis of the War* (London, 1923), pp. 23-24.

since the days of Nelson, looked upon new accessions of naval strength and new stirrings of naval ambitions on the other side of the North Sea as frankly incompatible with good Anglo-German relations, however eagerly some minds in both countries might desire them. She admitted that Germany, with her frontiers on both the East and the West exposed to the rooted enmity of military powers like France and Russia, was clearly prudent in keeping a double-edged sword keenly sharpened to meet two-fold emergencies. But Germany's aspirations to become a great naval as well as a great military power had to be turned into less dangerous channels. England was willing to further German colonial development if that would in any way detract her rival's attention from her naval objective, but the German Admiralty, bent upon one purpose, would not deviate from their course for concessions that took the form of "problematical colonies."

When, therefore, before the Second Hague Conference, the British Government announced their intention of omitting one ship from their forthcoming program and their willingness to make further reductions, if they found a similar disposition in other countries, Germany would have nothing to do with the proposition and went so far as to announce that she would refrain from participating in the Conference if disarmament were placed on the agenda. Other nations too were opposed to discussing a problem which they had no inclination to solve. Russia, after her crushing defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, wanted to be left free to build up her armaments. Austria certainly would not disarm or even limit her armaments so long as the Balkan question was unsettled and so long as militaristic Russia considered herself the protector of Slav minorities in southern Europe. Italy was unwilling to disarm before "Italia Irredenta" was realized. France would not seriously consider a limitation of her army until she had redressed the wrong of the past in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, while Germany was determined to retain by arms what arms had so successfully

conquered for her. The United States of America, after her success in the Spanish-American War, a success primarily due to her sea power, had no intention of checking the further development of that power. In the future, sea power would be necessary for America to hold possessions which she had acquired, and sea power would also give her prestige in settling questions in Asia and the Pacific, for after 1900 American interests lay east and west as well as north and south. Nor was the United States Government more willing in 1907 than it had been in 1899 to agree to any restrictions that would limit the "inventive genius" of the American people.

Great Britain was the only country prepared to advocate a limitation of armaments at the Second Hague Conference. The Foreign Office felt that, first, for the sake of public opinion the question should be brought forward. Besides, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's Liberal Government, pledged to a program of social reform, needed money to carry out its projects, and the best method of obtaining the necessary funds was through a reduction of naval expenditure. In 1907 British naval supremacy was unchallenged. Great Britain could agree to limit her armaments or to maintain the *status quo* without fear. She had just completed a revolutionary battleship, the *Dreadnought*, and had temporarily silenced battleship construction in all the navy yards of the world. An agreement to limit armament expenditure would have been of great practical value to England in 1907. Her superiority in old ships held good, and the more slowly other nations built dreadnoughts, the longer would she reap the benefit of the two years when she alone had built them. In addition to her being mistress of the seas, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance furnished Great Britain a *quasi*-guarantee of the peaceful occupancy of her possessions in the East; her insular position protected her from military assault at home. She had no need for a large standing army or an enlarged navy. These facts combined to discount her influence in appearing as an advocate for lessened military expenditure; it is the nature of

power politics for a satisfied power to want disarmament of other countries or disarmament in the weapons which it does not regard as vital to itself.

In spite of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's desire, no doubt genuine, to see the Conference agree on a limitation of armament expenditure, the Admiralty, the War Office and the Foreign Office were certainly not prepared to advocate any real disarmament at The Hague. The British Admiralty were just as determined in 1907 as they had been in 1898 not to diminish the striking force of the British Navy. At the Second Hague Conference, England, in the face of world opposition, stood out for the right of capture at sea—the one effective weapon on which she depended to bring pressure to bear upon a foe. Her refusal to acknowledge the inviolability of merchant shipping gave Germany a plausible reason for building a battle fleet, which she could justify to the public in her own country and to the world in general as necessary to protect her expanding commerce. The failure of the Hague Conferences to limit naval and military expenditure left the path open for the Anglo-German naval competition of the pre-war period.

All the attempts of Great Britain and Germany between 1908 and 1914 to arrive at an agreement to limit their navies failed in the final analysis because neither power was willing to yield anything essential. Germany considered that a political agreement was the necessary presupposition of a naval understanding, while Great Britain laid chief stress on naval reductions, which she argued would lead to better political relations. Both points of view were equally intelligible and reasonable, for the naval and political frictions were inextricably interwoven. Germany would not consider a drastic limitation of her naval armaments unless Great Britain would promise neutrality of a far-reaching character, for so long as she stood with France and Russia, Germany feared that they would cherish schemes of revenge and aggression. An Anglo-German understanding would have meant that France and Russia would have

lost the certainty that they could continue to count upon the support of England in pursuing an anti-German policy. Great Britain, however, would not give up the insurance provided by the Entente so long as Germany went on adding to her navy and had the protection of the Triple Alliance. "The British insisted on both their naval supremacy and their diplomatic combinations, for thus the balance of power was turned against Germany. To restore the balance in their favour, the Germans wished to retain their freedom in the matter of armaments or to break up the Triple Entente. The position of each was logical, so long as the theory of equilibrium was the mainspring of European diplomacy."<sup>4</sup>

The theory of equilibrium or the balance of power as it expressed itself in alliances, accentuated the armament competition. The year 1914 found Europe divided into two armed camps, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente. Each group—Triplice and Entente—aimed at being sufficiently stronger than the other to dictate rather than accept results. Thus both increased armaments, urged on and assisted by other members of the group. Each country aimed not only at being secure but at strengthening the alliance to which it belonged. In 1907, a Russian loan was floated in London and a Russian cruiser was ordered from Vickers. At Reval in 1908, Sir John Fisher urged the Russians to concentrate their energies on their army and to strengthen their western frontiers. On July 15, 1913, M. Kokovtsov, Russian Minister of Finance, directed that 100,000 francs should be paid to M. Klotz, the French Finance Minister, out of the Russian secret fund for influencing the French press in favor of the three-year term of military service, and at the same time he demanded "semi-official" support for Russia in Balkan affairs.<sup>5</sup> In December, 1913, the French Government agreed to permit Russia to float a loan in Paris, the money to be

<sup>4</sup> Bernadotte E. Schmitt, *The Coming of the War* (Scribner's, New York, 1930), I, 56.

<sup>5</sup> Friedrich Stieve, *Isvolsky and the World War* (London, 1926), p. 168.

used for building strategical railroads towards the German frontier. It was also expected that Russia would enlarge her army. In June, 1914, Russia set aside approximately \$100,000,000 for the year's needs of her army alone, and urged France to prepare herself by carrying out the three-year term of service.

The three-year service in France was exploited by Germany as a reason for increasing her forces, while France maintained that the burden which she was shouldering was due to the lead that Germany had given. This result was only natural, for if there were armaments on one side there must be armaments on the other. While one nation or group of nations armed, other nations could not remain defenseless. If one nation built strategical railways, it had to expect other nations to do likewise. The strategical railways which Russia, encouraged by France, built towards Germany were a reply to those that Germany had already constructed towards the French and Belgian frontiers. Measures taken by one government lead to counter-measures by others. Yet, arming and counter-arming fail to guarantee security. Sir Edward Grey writes that "the increase of armaments, that is intended in each nation to produce consciousness of strength, and a sense of security, does not produce these effects. On the contrary, it produces a consciousness of the strength of other nations and a sense of fear. Fear begets suspicion and distrust, till each Government feels it would be criminal and a betrayal of its own country not to take every precaution, while every Government regards every precaution of every other Government as evidence of hostile intent."<sup>6</sup> Thus armaments increased, and out of the competition there arose fear, suspicion and an intense rivalry which made war inevitable, although it was not known by what precise date the conflict would be precipitated.

War came in 1914, not necessarily because any one nation

<sup>6</sup> Viscount Grey of Fallodon, *Twenty-five Years 1892-1916* (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1929: Peoples Library Edition), I, 160-61.

wanted it, but because all the nations were more or less prepared for it. Four crises in less than a decade had been surmounted because one power or another, whose interests were affected, had not been strong enough for war or did not consider the issue worth a war. France, in 1905, was too weak to fight Germany unaided. When Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1909, Russia was not prepared. In 1911, not a single nation felt that it was "quite" ready. In 1912-13 Russia, though better prepared, did not consider a Serbian port on the Adriatic worth a war.<sup>7</sup> Each of these crises was followed by further military preparations, by a drawing together and a tightening of the alliances. After Agadir, and especially after the Balkan Wars, the great powers made a final effort at military and naval preparedness so that they would be ready when "the bells should ring again." If, in 1914, the European states had been armed only for defense there would have been no war; but the preparations of all the nations had gone far beyond the limits of defense because of the fear that other countries were pursuing offensive purposes. Europe was better prepared for war in 1914 than at any previous time in history. Each group of allied nations believed that it was stronger or better equipped than the opposing group or that its chances of winning were greater at that time than they would be later. Furthermore, most states desired something that was only to be won by a struggle. They did not want war, but, since war was inevitable, better to have it finished and thus end the ruinous armament competition.

Finally, there was in the pre-war world a large and influential body of military and naval officers, whose psychological outlook was colored by the possibility, if not the inevitability of an early war. Militarists like Sir John Fisher, Admiral Tirpitz, Colonel Gross von Schwarzhoff, General von Bernhardt and Captain Mahan were experts at picturing the difficulties in the way of a limitation of armaments. They could always point to the fact that no unit of disarmament existed. Captain Mahan,

<sup>7</sup> B. E. Schmitt, *op. cit.*, I, 53-54.



in his book *Armaments and Arbitration*, defends armaments on the ground that arbitration cannot always take the place, either practically or beneficially, of the processes and results obtained by the free play of natural forces. "Of these," he writes, "national efficiency is a chief element and armament, being the representative of the national strength, is the exponent." In the Captain's appreciation, armaments represent the aggregation of the natural forces inherent in any community, armaments are "a gage of the capacities of the people not only to do, in all the phases of national activity, but to bear—a no less important element of national power."<sup>8</sup> Mahan was of opinion that "all that European civilization has to depend upon for its supremacy is its energy, of which international competition and armament are not only the expressions, but essential elements—factors. When these fail and fall the end will be at hand."<sup>9</sup> Naturally, the militarists, especially trained to predatory habits of mind, looked forward to the opportunity of putting into practice the results of the work of preparation for war to which their lives had been devoted.

Every year in every country the General Staff worked out detailed plans for meeting or making an attack in the shortest possible time. These plans were extremely technical and guarded in absolute secrecy. They were unknown to the national parliaments and to the public; their details and significance were not comprehended by the Foreign Ministers. Sir Edward Grey states that he never knew what the military experts settled, the position being that the Government was quite free, but that the military people knew what to do if the word was given.<sup>10</sup> Although no political alliance existed between France, Great Britain and Russia, the General Staffs were given a free hand to work out the plans of combined action for the "inevitable"

<sup>8</sup> A. T. Mahan, *Armaments and Arbitration* (New York, 1912), pp. 11-12.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

<sup>10</sup> Viscount Grey, *op. cit.*, I, 164.

<sup>11</sup> Count Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador in London, doubted whether a more powerful guarantee for common military operations could be found, in the event of war, than the spirit of the Entente, reinforced by military conventions. (Siebert, *Entente Diplomacy and the World*, p. 720.)

war; <sup>11</sup> for since war was bound to come, there must be a pre-determined program. When the crisis came in June-July, 1914, the militarists exerted tremendous pressure upon the civilians to accept the arrangements which had been planned long in advance.<sup>12</sup>

Sir Edward Grey in his *Twenty-Five Years* tersely summarized the effects of armaments on the European political situation and the part they played in bringing about the catastrophe of 1914-18. He wrote:

More than one true thing may be said about the causes of the war, but the statement that comprises most truth is that militarism and armaments inseparable from it made war inevitable. Armaments were intended to produce a sense of security in each nation—that was the justification put forward in defence of them. What they really did was to produce fear in everybody. Fear causes suspicion and hatred; it is hardly too much to say that, between nations, it stimulates all that is bad, and depresses all that is good.

One nation increases its Army and makes strategical railways towards the frontiers of neighbouring countries. The second nation makes counter-strategical railways and increases its army in reply. This first nation says this is very reasonable, because its own military preparations were only precautions; the second nation says that its preparations also were only precautions, and points out with some cogency, that the first nation began the competition; and so it goes on, till the whole Continent is an armed camp covered by strategical railways.

After 1870 Germany had no reason to be afraid, but she fortified herself with armaments and the Triple Alliance in order that she might never have reason to be afraid in future. France naturally was afraid after 1870, and she made her military preparations and the Dual Alliance (with Russia). Britain, with a very small Army and a very large Empire, became first uncomfortable and then (particularly when Germany began a big-fleet programme) afraid of isolation. She made the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, made up her quarrels with France and Russia, and entered into the Entente. Finally, Germany became afraid that she would presently be afraid, and struck the blow, while she believed her power to be still invincible.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> S. B. Fay, *The Origins of the War* (London, 1929), I, 41.

<sup>13</sup> Viscount Grey, *op. cit.*, II, 265-67.

The enormous growth of armaments in Europe, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them—it was these that made war inevitable. This, it seems to me, is the truest reading of history, and the lesson that the present should be learning from the past in the interest of future peace, the warning to be handed on to those who come after us.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 162.



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